 Good morning. Take it you can all hear me. Please consider the following two statements. One, you are advancing into the night bearing torches toward which mankind would be glad to turn, but you leave them enveloped in the fog of a merely experiential approach and mere practical conceptualization with no universal ideas to communicate. For lack of an adequate ideology your lights cannot be seen. That was a French philosopher Jacques Maritain in his book Reflections on America. Now consider this statement. Quote, I come to say to you freedom works. Unquote. James Baker, United States Secretary of State in a recent address to the citizens of Albania. Some initial observations about each of these statements needs to be made. One, by ideology Maritain means of course philosophy or more specifically moral and political philosophy. He neither accepts the Marxian meaning of that term nor the post Conte an idea that since philosophy cannot provide insight into the nature of reality, it is reduced to mere ideology. Two, by freedom Baker intends to refer not merely to the process of democratic decision-making but to the economic system known as the free market. That is capitalism. Three, it seems most important to note that freedom works and I do not want to deny for a moment the importance of this fact or the role it plays in motivating the people of the world in moving from non-democratic institutions and command economies to democratic institutions and capitalism. I have never had much stomach for those ivory-towered philosophers who believe that practical concerns are beneath them. I have always thought it a mistake to scorn excellence in plumbing because it is deemed a humble activity and to tolerate shoddiness in philosophy because it is thought an exalted activity. As the saying goes, a society that does so will not have good pipes or theories. Neither will hold water. So I think it is crucial to know that capitalism provides more and better bathtubs. And other such things. This is very important. Yet, as Miratyn states, a mere practical conceptualization will not do. Secretary Baker's statement eloquently reveals the inadequacy of the prevailing philosophy used to justify freedom. At a time when people of the world are throwing off various forms of political and economic oppression. At a time when the moral vision behind limited government and capitalism is under attack among the intellectuals of the West. Something more than an appeal to pragmatism is required. If the free institutions fostered by the Enlightenment are to be maintained. If the liberal order is to overcome its current malaise, an adequate moral vision is absolutely necessary. The moral vision behind constitutionally limited government and the system of private property and free markets must be found and communicated. It is about that moral vision that I wish to speak. This moral vision is expressed most eloquently in the American Declaration of Independence. And can be summed up in two words. Individual rights. Yet, the doctrine of individual rights suffers from many difficulties and misinterpretations. More indeed than I can consider and respond to here. Chief among these problems is explaining the exact relationship between rights, law and morality. The problem, however, is primarily, I think, a result of a failure to grasp the moral function of individual rights. Indeed, this failure is sometimes found among defenders of individual rights as well as opponents. So it is about the moral function of individual rights that I wish to concentrate my remarks. I shall begin by discussing just what kind of moral concept rights are. Rights are a moral concept, but they are different from other moral concepts. They have a unique function. Their function is not to directly secure the moral well-being of individuals. Rather, their function is to protect the self-directedness or autonomy of individual human beings and thereby secure the social condition under which individual human moral well-being can occur. Rights provide guidance in the creation and interpretation of a legal system which protects individuals from being used by others for purposes to which they have not consented. Rights are used to determine what ought to be a law. They provide the normative basis to law, but they do not, like the moral virtues, provide individuals with any guidance regarding what choices to make in the conduct of their daily lives. Regrettably, the unique function of the moral concept of rights is not recognized today, and there is much confusion regarding this concept. This confusion is especially manifested in the claim that people have welfare or positive rights. The claim, for example, that people have a right to a job, an education, a home, and medical care. There are no such rights. The concept of welfare or positive rights confuses the functions of law and morality and thus does damage to a proper understanding of not only rights, but law and morality. Now, law and morality are not entirely unconnected. Law must have some normative basis if it is to ultimately have authority. And so the attempt to make law entirely independent from morality is a mistake. But it is also a mistake to reduce the moral concepts which underlie law to those moral concepts which provide individuals guidance in the conduct of their lives. Yet, what is the fundamental difference between law, morality, and law? Let's consider this. There is a fundamental difference between the concerns of morality and law, and an examination of the character of human moral well-being will reveal the basis for this difference. Consider morality. The moral life is concerned with choices that necessarily involve the particular and the contingent. Knowledge of the moral virtues and true human goods may tell all of us what, abstractly speaking, we ought to do. But in the real world of individual human conduct, where all actions and goods are concrete, and where human well-being takes a determinate form, what the moral virtues and human goods involve cannot be determined from the philosopher's armchair. This is why what Aristotle called phronesis, or practical reason, that is the use of reason by the individual person to determine what ought to be done in the concrete situation, is the cardinal virtue. Determining what moral virtue and goods call for in terms of concrete actions in specific circumstances can vary from person to person, and certain virtues can have larger roles in the lives of some persons than others. Determining the appropriate response for the situation faced is therefore what moral living is all about. A successful moral life is, by its very nature, something which is highly personal. This is, of course, not to say that any choice one makes is as good as the next, but it is to say that the choice must be one's own and involve considerations that are unique to the individual. One person's moral well-being cannot be exchanged with another's. The good for me is not and cannot be the good for you. Human moral well-being is something objective, self-directed, and highly personal. It is not something abstract, collectively determined, or impersonal. Now consider law. Law is, on the other hand, neither concerned with determining the appropriate course of conduct for an individual in a specific circumstance, nor teaching him what he ought to do. Rather, law is concerned with the protection of the self-directedness or autonomy of individuals when they live among others. An examination of the character of human moral well-being will reveal why. Before ever addressing the question of what people ought to think or how they ought to conduct themselves, an analysis of human moral well-being shows that human beings ought to act according to their own judgment. This is true, however, not because of the consequences, but because of the character of human moral well-being. Self-directedness or autonomy isn't a necessary condition for and an operating condition of the pursuit and achievement of human moral well-being at whatever level. It is necessary for any person undertaking any right action. It pertains to the very essence of human moral well-being, and is therefore right for any person, regardless of the circumstance. The protection of self-directedness or autonomy must then be provided if human moral well-being is to socially occur. Now, this point is, of course, of no great importance in determining personal conduct. A normative ethicist could not get very far with this information, but it is crucial for the understanding the nature of law. Since the self-directedness or autonomy of individuals must be protected, if there is to be any possibility of them choosing as they ought, there needs to be an institution whose function consists in protecting the possibility of individuals being self-directed, an institution which states and enforces what must be the case. The appropriateness of self-directedness or autonomy for human moral well-being is, as we have seen, only grasped in abstraction from the specific virtues and concrete goods. A particular human being's intelligence determines as needed for the circumstances in which he finds himself. Thus, the institution whose aim is to protect the possibility of self-direction for all should not be concerned with what is good for some individuals relative to some concrete situation. Since protecting self-directedness or autonomy of individuals is only a concern of community life, the institution whose aim is the protection of the possibility of self-direction should be concerned with establishing and enforcing rules of community life which prohibit forms of action which use people for purposes to which they have not consented. Its function is not that of attempting to teach individuals how to attain their well-being. An analysis of human moral well-being shows, therefore, that there needs to be an institution which is concerned with what must be the case for any and all individuals when they live together. An institution concerned with the protection of only those things which are universally and necessarily good for any and all individuals no matter what their concrete condition or circumstance. This institution is law. Its function is the protection of the self-directedness or autonomy of individuals. Now, confusing law and morality. Let's consider the claim that human beings have a right to a job, an education, a home, or medical care. Job, education, home, medical care. Now, these are goods or services which, when considered from an abstract perspective, are good or appropriate for all human beings. They ought to be created or achieved. Yet, this claim is not too helpful in providing guidance to the individual in a concrete situation. None of these goods exist in the abstract. Consider, how are they to be created or achieved? What kind of job, education, home, and medical care does one need? To what extent and in what amount are these to be pursued? And how is the achievement of one of these goods to be related to the achievement of other goods? What is the proper balance? What is the proper mix? These questions can only be answered by a consideration of the unique needs and circumstances of the individual. And the insight of the individual himself is crucial to determining the proper answer. An individual's practical reason is needed in the achievement, maintenance, and coherent integration of these basic human goods. Yet, if persons have a right to these goods and services, then it is the responsibility of the administrators of the law to determine the answers to the foregoing questions. They must determine the type, the extent, the amount, and combination of these goods and services. They are to determine how they are to be balanced with other goods. They must determine how individuals are to conduct themselves with respect to using these goods and services. Law, however, is by its very character not suited for the task of determining what is good or appropriate for an individual in the concrete situation. Such specific knowledge cannot be part of the law and the law remain law, the destruction of morality and law. Suppose that the law were to take on this function. What would be the effect on morality? What would be the moral worth of these goods and services? As every good parent knows, a child is not mature unless he does what he ought to do in light of his own understanding of his well-being and what that calls for in the way of day-by-day conduct and behavior. Having the law attempt to take on the task of determining what an adult human being's well-being requires destroys the moral worth of the provided goods and services. Even if the administrators of the law should by luck determine what is appropriate for an individual, the individual's own judgment has not been employed. Abstractly speaking, we may say that such goods and services are valuable, but in the real world of human conduct they remain like works of art which have been provided to a man to enjoy at the price of him not using his senses. An individual's judgment and effort is necessary not only for enjoying the values his well-being requires, they are needed for their very existence. The needed goods and services are to be created or achieved by an individual if they are to be morally worthwhile. Values and more specifically goods and services do not exist independent and apart from human cognition and effort. When we abstractly say that human well-being requires certain values, we are speaking of what is to be created or achieved by the cognition and effort of an individual human being. Not merely what is to be distributed and enjoyed. The goods of human well-being are not found lying about like manna from heaven. These goods cannot be goods for an individual unless he has achieved them himself. The idea that the moral life is a life of self-actualization refers to the manner of actualization as well as the object. Now this last point is also important when we consider the claim that individuals have welfare or positive, when we consider what the claim that individuals have welfare or positive rights implies. If an individual has a right to these goods and services, then as a matter of law others must provide them. Other persons are to be used without their consent for the purpose of providing these rights. Self-directedness or autonomy, the very condition which any and all persons need to have legally protected in order for the possibility of their attaining their moral well-being, must be denied if these welfare or positive rights are to be enforced. When the law is used as an instrument for using persons for purposes to which they have not consented. When it is used to take the time and resources from persons without their consent, then most truly the rights of individuals are violated. The very reason for law is destroyed. The claim that people have a right to a job, an education, a home, and medical care confuses law and morality. By trying to have law provide what only the moral judgment and conduct of an individual can, it separates morality from the moral agent. It destroys morality and as Bostiot noted so long ago, it perverts the law and makes it a destroyer of what it is to protect. Only by obtaining a clear understanding of the nature of law and morality and developing a proper concept of rights will this situation change. The moral function of individual rights must be understood.