 So the paper is called Bank Capital Redux, and the subject is looking back across economic and financial history from the 19th century to the present in the advanced economies. So 140 years, 17 countries, and trying to build up a picture for the first time of what did those countries' financial systems, their banking systems, look like in terms of their liabilities. So were they funded by deposits, by capital, or by other types of non-core funding? And these are data that have existed in fragments for particular countries and particular periods, but they never been brought together so that we could see in a sort of systematic way what's happened over time. And quite a lot has happened, some of it was surprising even to us. Over time capital ratios have declined, so in the 19th century banks used to be very highly capitalized, around 20 or 30% capital on their balance sheet, which is an extremely high number by today's standards. But since World War II, that ratio has been in the sort of 5 to 10% range and quite stable. Other changes over time that have been dramatic, as capital ratios were falling, the difference was taken up by an increased use of deposit funding. So just, you know, the average person goes in, makes a deposit, up to about World War II. The kind of interlinkages between banks, the non-core funding through wholesale markets or repo markets or other interbank sources of funding, those have dramatically increased. So that's interesting to someone looking at empirical questions in macroeconomics and finance because there's a lot of variation there through which you could try and address are certain theories true or false concerning what places the financial system at risk. So we look back at the correlation between these different balance sheet measures and subsequent outcomes such as financial crises and the depths of recessions following those kinds of events. And the main findings are that perhaps surprisingly, at least to us, there wasn't a systematic relationship between bank capital ratios and whether you were going to have subsequently a financial crisis. And that's maybe not surprising once you realize that despite all of that capital in the 19th century, we know those were decades in which periodically many banks failed. What's interesting though over time is that other measures like loan to deposit ratios, measuring how much maturity transformation and other kind of risk, that seems to be significantly associated with crisis risk and so too do measures of non-core funding. The other interesting finding was that capital maybe did matter in terms of resilience of the entire system. After a crisis occurs, can the economy rebound? We did find that high levels of bank capital were associated with shallower recessions and generally a faster recovery in output and also in bank lending. So that's the summary of the paper.