 Hello. Good morning. Welcome to New America. I'm Leila Halal, the director of the Middle East Task Force here. And this event is co-sponsored with the Arab American Institute, which I'd like to thank for all their efforts in helping organize. And I want to say I know that this is a rescheduled event. We had previously not been able to hold it on the original day due to inclement weather. And some of you may have come out. Our server was down and we weren't able to send out notices in time for all persons to get notice of the cancellation in time. And so if you, this is your second visit to us for this event, we apologize for that mistake. And we're very happy to see you here today. We, you know, this is a very timely discussion of public opinions on Israel-Palestine. We have Secretary Kerry's initiative, which is now, it appears, you know, was initially a secret effort. Now we know that they are attempting to put together a framework agreement of principles addressing all of the core permanent status issues. And the parties will supposedly have a chance to provide some comments or reservations on these framework proposals that will be put forward by the U.S. We know that each Israeli and Palestinian leaders have said that they would put any final agreement to the public for referendum. So public expectations, public opinion is hugely important for any deal, but it's also very important for a sustainable peace process more broadly and generally. And it's something that we, we need to pay close attention to. And so I'm very happy that we have this chance to co-host the event with the AAI and Dr. James Zogby, who will present his poll. Dr. Zogby is a founder and president of the AAI and managing director of Zogby Research Services, which specializes in groundbreaking polling in the Arab world. And he will present momentarily his most recent findings of polling in Israel and Palestine. I would also like to note his recent appointment as a commissioner on the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom. To comment on the poll, we have Khaled al-Gindi, who is a fellow at the Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy and a former advisor at the Negotiation Support Unit in Ramallah. Laura Friedman will also respond. She is director of policy and government relations for Americans for Peace Now and a leading voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli settlement policy, and Jerusalem. She is a former Foreign Service officer who served in Jerusalem, Washington, Tunis, and Beirut. And we're very happy to have all of the panelists here with us today for this important discussion. Thank you, Jim. Before I begin, I just want to thank the New America Foundation and also thank those of you who came. You just called it inclement weather. It was actually a pretty awful snowstorm that canceled our last event. Thank you for coming back again today. You're right, the story in The New York Times this morning makes the topic a little more relevant even because it gives us a bit more inkling of what the contours of the discussion are like. Let me begin with a backdrop and a bit of a sales pitch. The predicate for this poll was a study that we did that was published just this month called 20 Years After Oslo, and you have a flyer here that gives you a way to download it from Amazon, or you can order a hard copy of it. What we did in 20 Years After Oslo was looked at all of the public opinion polling done by everybody of Israelis and Palestinians over the last 20 years and put them against the timeline of events and behaviors of both parties in an effort to see what moved attitudes and how attitudes evolved and or devolved over the 20-year period. The conclusions aren't pretty. I just want to lay them out, actually encourage you to look at the entire study, but I want to lay them out as I begin the most recent poll. The first observation that we discovered was that in polling about Israeli attitudes, they were always more positive in supporting negotiations and the idea of peace. That was always very popular. What was not popular were the contours of what a peace agreement might look like, especially one that would be acceptable to Palestinians. On the other hand, Palestinians lost confidence in negotiations and in the notion of a peace process, but remained very committed to what an acceptable agreement would look like, so that it was a kind of a reverse. Israelis liked the concept of negotiations, but not the outcome. Palestinians were interested in the outcome, but lost confidence in the process. There were ups and downs. Have you ever seen Gore's Inconvenient Truth? The film shows that weather goes up and down, up and down, but it's over time that you begin to see a shift. The seismic shift, despite the ups and downs throughout the 90s, the seismic shift in attitudes occurred around the time of the Second Intifada and never recovered. The drop in confidence never recovered after that. The third observation is that Palestinians were the weakest party in the relationship, but were always expected to pay the heaviest price, do the heavy lifting in terms of what they were required to do, but also in terms of the sacrifices they had to make. The next is one, again, on both sides. Israel's blind spot has been the failure to understand the anger and lack of trust created by their policies and behaviors that they displayed toward Palestinians. Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side, their acceptance of or tolerance for violence has been their counterproductive blind spot. Both behaviors played into the narratives of the other side, reinforcing their negative views and creating this lack of trust we're dealing with. The final observation is that what was clear from Oslo from the beginning and is still clear today is that, left to themselves, Israelis and Palestinians are simply not capable of completing what they began in those negotiations. They needed forceful help and firm intervention, and it was not forthcoming. And the final point is that it's ironic that at the point in time where the lasting contribution of Oslo was the concept of a of a two-state solution, that at the very point in time when everybody now accepts it on paper, we may have come to the point where it's less likely to occur because of the politics on both sides than ever before. Let me get into this poll. We did, we polled in September. We polled Israelis and Palestinians of a thousand in each, and we asked a series of questions about Oslo, about attitudes towards it. We broke it in half between those who were old enough at the time of Oslo to have a direct memory of the period and those who were either not born, had not immigrated to Israel, or those on the Israeli and Palestinian side who were too young to actually have direct memory of it. Here's what we found. We found there were several areas of agreement, areas of disagreement, and areas where attitudes on both sides were conflicted. Let's start with the areas of disagreement. First disagreement was who benefited from Oslo. Israelis were convinced that Palestinians were the main beneficiaries, but Palestinians were convinced that Israelis were. Israelis were convinced Palestinians didn't do enough, and Palestinians thought they did more than enough. On the question of the role played by the leadership, Palestinians were very supportive of their leaders, saying that they made the effort to make peace work. 90 percent rating for Arafat, 81 for Abu Mazen, and 66 for Salam Fayyad. On the other hand, Israelis gave their leaders fairly low-ranked grading. The highest was Rabin, got 69 percent, followed by Perez, 65, and Sharon, 50. Netanyahu and Barak got in the 40 percent rating. Then comes the question of confidence of each other. Let me just talk about the U.S. role for a minute. Palestinians give largely negative ratings to every American president, including President Obama, and Israelis give favorable ratings to almost every American president, except for President Obama. They give him a 45 percent favorable rating in terms of his contribution to peace. Confidence in each other's commitment to peace. 50 percent of Palestinians are confident that their leadership is committed to a two-state solution. Israelis are not convinced that Netanyahu is committed to a two-state solution, and Palestinians, again, are not convinced that the Obama administration is committed. Only about 20 percent think they are, and Israelis, on the other hand, about 45 percent think that the Obama administration is committed, but a majority think that they're not. So those are the areas where there's a kind of a disagreement, a disconnect between the two. Then there are areas where there's agreement. The first is that in the beginning, both sides said that they were very hopeful. Oops, that's the wrong one. This is the one. Hopeful that there'd be a resolution to the conflict. At the time of the signing, more than a majority on both sides were very hopeful. 20 years later, when asked, was it a positive development? Are you hopeful? This is the number you get. Less than 40 percent on the Israeli side, on the Palestinian side, and, again, less than 40 percent again on the Israeli side. Young Palestinians are more positive about Oslo than Israelis. There are several factors that Laura can comment on that, but one of the things is that the demographics on the Israeli side more orthodox and settlers have children than those living in Israel, the older generation that live within Israel itself, the more secular Jews. On the other hand, on the Palestinian side, it appears that the narrative as it's been communicated, especially because of the strong support for Arafat himself who signed the agreement, seems to have conveyed a received knowledge to young Palestinians that it actually was a positive thing. That is not the case on the Israeli side. A two-state solution is viewed as desirable by Israelis overwhelmingly. Palestinians not so, but still the plurality. Is it feasible? Both sides are not convinced at this point that it's even a feasible outcome. Israelis could have done more. Both sides agree that Israelis could have done more, and both sides also agree that America could have done more. Both sides also agree, and this, I think, is the most remarkable finding here. There's a consensus of the fact that violence from both sides contributed to the decline in confidence and trust on both sides. When we asked a whole series of events, did this enhance the prospects of peace, or did it contribute to the lack of confidence in peace? Both sides agreed that suicide bombings, rocket fire from Gaza, the second intifada, the election of Hamas, settlement construction, Israel's conquest of the West Bank in Sharon's era, the assassination of Prime Minister Abin, and Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Palestinians in Hebron, both agreed that those activities and behaviors on both sides contributed to a loss of trust. That, I think, is a sense of, like I said, a remarkable finding of a shared understanding that both sides have, that what we did, but both of us have done, or contributed to, eroded the prospects of confidence and the prospects of peace. Finally, there was general agreement on both sides. 62% of both Israelis and Palestinians said that the failure at Camp David harmed the prospects for peace. There are areas where there's a sort of a sense of being conflicted. The Arab Peace Initiative gets lukewarm support from Palestinians and gets less support from Israelis, but it's about a split on both sides. On the issue of withdrawal from Gaza, both sides are conflicted about whether that was a positive or negative development. And with regard to Secretary Kerry's initiative, if it is endorsed by their leadership, would they accept it? Pluralities on both sides would accept it, but it is not a ringing endorsement. And I think that that almost, to me, spells the difficulty that we're currently facing. The loss of trust and confidence is great. We've had this steady erosion over the last 20 years that was actually more significantly an erosion in the period 2000, 2002. And here we are in the midst of negotiations. The difficulty of coming up with a framework or an agreement cannot be underestimated. But given the polling data, what also becomes clear is that the difficulty of then selling it to both constituencies, even if their leaders were to endorse it, becomes even more difficult to imagine. And so this is not an easy deal. And if there is a framework agreement, or even if both parties sign off on a framework and agreement, we're not done yet. One of the things I've been arguing with the administration is that they need to be doing more to prepare the ground in both communities now, not wait until agreement is, a framework is out, because by then it's going to be harder to sell than it is while both sides are in a mood for hearing at least more about what's at stake for them. So I'll stop now and then turn it over to Laura and Khaled. Laura, do you want to go ahead and respond first? Do you have any particular comments that you would like to focus on? I mean, I think it's probably most interesting for people if we have a discussion. I mean, look, my first point is I'm very happy to be here. Thank you for hosting this. AI, thank you for co-hosting this. Jim, thank you for doing more amazing polling. It's so important for all of us as we sort of try to track the pulse on the ground. I was on a panel like this in December 2012 looking at polling and what strikes me looking back at what we talked about then is not a whole lot has changed. And what's changed, I guess, is mostly the context. I mean, it's really interesting looking at the polling across time. When I looked at this polling initially, I thought, wow, this isn't unexpected. I find reasons to be hopeful in it. I find reasons to be very depressed in it. But mostly I find reasons to think Israelis and Palestinians react to things just like anybody else. And we've had 20 years of challenges and failures and betrayals and growing fear and animosity. And here we are today. And I think what Jim ended with is the real question. What does this mean in terms of where we are today with the peace process, in terms of framework agreement? And we can get more into this later. I do actually take a slightly different position on where this leaves us. And I think I said this in December 2012. I really do believe at the end of the day when there is a deal, when people are presented with the possibility of ending this, whether it's something that they hate or just dislike intensely or maybe don't dislike that much, I do think opinions shift very, very quickly. And I saw that when I was on the ground in Jerusalem in the time of Oslo. But that doesn't mean that there aren't really important lessons to take from this and that the ground can't be prepared better than it has been in the past. Jim had posed one question to you about why the youth have responded to Oslo in a particularly negative way. I mean, do you have any comments on that issue? Sure. Sure. And first of all, looking, the one point here that I took immediate when I looked at it, I thought, well, people aren't being entirely honest was the point about how optimistic or how hopeful they felt when Oslo first came out, because I was on the ground. And I think people have engaged in a very unconscious sort of reframing of where they were at the time, because people across the board, even if they were skeptical about the agreement, were very hopeful. And I think the numbers would have been higher. It isn't surprising now, just as the numbers of Palestinians who are skeptical about the possibility of a two-state solution, you can understand why they'd be skeptical. On the Israeli side, you have certainly what Jim said, you have a growing demographic bump in folks who are ideologically opposed to this. But I think even more important, you have a generation which did not come to the peace process after the first Intifada that did not have that bump of, okay, we have a whole paradigm shift now towards making peace and who have essentially been nourished on a narrative, and it's a very logical narrative if you're growing up in Tel Aviv or Shtarot, which says we offer them peace and they gave us missiles. It's a narrative which is defined by the Second Intifada, by the failure of Camp David, and by successive military action in Gaza. And if you are living in Tel Aviv or anywhere else in Israel, and your only experience with Palestinians is when you're in the military, that is a fairly, that is a very understandable, that narrative is so, it has so much traction. And we all face when we talk to our Israeli friends, to an extent that I think people shouldn't underestimate, the generation that came to the peace process already knowing Palestinians was in much ways better equipped to deal with Palestinians and make peace, sort of, you know, looking people directly in the eye. And I think that is a tremendous challenge going forward. We've lost those connections with this, with the generation that's since Oslo. I just have one more question for you, Laura, and then I'll turn it over to Khalid to comment. But I was recently at a meeting of Breaking the Impasse, which is an initiative, a private sector initiative led jointly by a Palestinian philanthropist and an Israeli business leader. And I was talking to an Israeli business person. He works for Microsoft and he employs Palestinians. And he's also trying to encourage Microsoft to open an R&D center in Ramallah. And, you know, doing what I think is a commendable job of trying to help bring jobs to Palestinians. And he brings Israelis to the West Bank to see what's happening inside. And what the reaction always is, oh, my God, the Palestinians are, you know, very developed and advanced and Ramallah's cosmopolitan. And he says that this actually impacts their perceptions of peace more broadly. And so when you're giving comments about how, you know, people respond to Oslo in a security frame, I think there's also a cultural dimension to it that perhaps is under looked at or less discussed. I guess, I mean, just to clarify, when I talk about the different generations, the generation that came to Oslo knew Palestinians. Before the First Intifada, Israelis shopped in Palestinian towns in the West Bank. If you wanted your car fixed, you went, there was no barrier. You know, people knew each other and Palestinians worked in Israel in much larger numbers. I'm not saying it was great and there's a reason the First Intifada broke out. It wasn't sustainable. But in a very different way than we have today, people knew each other. My colleague Denny Seidemann always talks about meeting people eye level. You look them in the eye as another human being. It's very different today. And one of the sort of accompanying challenges in the current moment is that with all of the cynicism and skepticism that has built up on both sides, and Khaled can talk about this on the Palestinian side, we are seeing, and I think it's quite understandable, this wave of opposition to what is seen as normalization. I've talked to people who are very much opposed to the breaking the impasse. They see this as economic normalization, which breaks my heart. I do not believe you can have economic development as an alternative to a political solution that gives the Palestinian self-determination in their own state. But I think it is a key driver of that. It can be a key component of that, and it can build those ties that help people see each other's people and then build the basis for that political agreement. But there's a tremendous groundswell of opposition to that now. It's much harder. It's much harder for my colleagues in Israel to bring Israelis to the West Bank to meet with Palestinians, even if Israelis want to go. And I completely get where that comes from, but it's a new obstacle. We've had another paradigm shift. In this new paradigm, it's a new obstacle. Okay, thank you. Khaled? Thank you, Leila. And thank you, Jim, for putting together a great poll. It's fascinating. It's always interesting to track these over time. And I think a lot of the observations, before getting into the specific observations, I just want to point out a couple general observations to keep this discussion in context. And the first is that obviously the, at least on the Palestinian side, we are getting the views of West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians, I assume Gaza was also part of, yeah, and Jerusalem now. And of course, there are the other 40% of the Palestinian population that live in the diaspora were not part of this. I think it's important to keep that in mind. And I think it is actually, it skews things in a much more, I would say, negative direction in terms of a two state solution and in terms of a negotiated outcome to the extent that the views of the Palestinian diaspora are relevant to the current process, as well as to the Palestinian leadership. Just one second. The polling that we did last year included refugees in Jordan and in Lebanon. Their views were much more negative. Yes. Yeah, right. And I think that's to be expected because the the they're not included in the two state discussion. Exactly. The two state solution doesn't address their primary, primary concern. So that's just something to keep important when we talk about Palestinian public opinion writ large, because they are a factor, I think, and they, you know, the Palestinian leadership, as such as it is, is still essentially derived from the diaspora. Their their legitimacy, I think, is is rooted very much in the fact that they were once in exile and sort of have that historical claim. That's that's one point. I think also we can't separate the discussion from the regional environment, which which is obviously very tumultuous events in Syria, events in Egypt, the impact that that has on on the power balance inside inside Palestine, specifically between Hamas and Fatah, Hamas obviously being weakened. So I think it's important that that we keep that in mind. Some of the more interesting observations that that I found, and I agree with almost everything that that Laura has already said. You know, one thing that I found interesting was how the Palestinians are more divided than Israelis on Oslo and becoming more so. And specifically, Palestinian support for the agreement is about 49 percent, is lower than the Israeli support, which is around 55 percent, while opposition on the Palestinian side is higher at 28 percent versus 19 percent. And so that tells me that Palestinian society is is more divided, more polarized than than Israeli society is. At the same time, Palestinians saw Oslo as as harmful, mostly as harmful. But younger Palestinians, I mean, they're sort of split, Palestinians 51 47, I think were the numbers. Younger Palestinians are much less split. I think 7 percent of the young versus 14 percent of the older. So I think there's more clarity in it. I think it suggests that there's more polarization. All of this is I think consistent with my own sense that a Palestinian consensus, at least, you know, to the extent within the confines of the West Bank and Gaza, around a two state solution are beginning to collapse. I think there are our signs of that. And I think when you look on the Israeli side, the huge differential, the generational gap, the views of young Israelis being much more right wing, much more antipathetic to negotiated settlement for all the reasons that that Laura pointed out. Both of those trends, obviously, do not bode well for for a negotiated two state agreement, which is, I suppose, the basis of our discussion. But but there are there are other things also, but I think it's much more useful if we have a discussion that involves all of you. Yeah. Jim, we'll bring you into the discussion before opening it to question and answers with sort of a comment and an observation because I've worked a lot on. I also was a colleague with Khaled and negotiation affairs unit in Ramallah and was an advisor to Palestinian negotiators. I was on the refugee file. That was my portfolio. And that sort of put me outside the context of what was considered to be the primary issues for resolving the two state question, which was security and borders, Jerusalem settlements, etc. But my observation was always that the notion of two states is a very vacuous one that that it that it doesn't really have specification. Certainly, it hasn't been conveyed in a way that gives by the leaders that hasn't been conveyed in a way that gives the public's an idea really of what it means. And I think, you know, I think that that changed a little bit under Sharon and his policy of separation and erecting barriers, checkpoints, walls, etc. that intended to separate Palestinian from Israeli communities. And so perhaps on the Israeli side, there's a perception that two states means the Palestinians are on the other side of the wall. But for Palestinians, I think there may not be maybe that they're also similarly thinking two states means our continued confinement. And I'm just wondering, you know, given given that we don't have a lot of detail about what two states means, and it could mean a lot of different things, but contrasted against the situation on the ground, it doesn't look like a very hopeful thing. I mean, how does that factor into to your poll results? And that's one of the reasons why I said that as I in the book, that Israelis agreed with the general concept of peace, but not the details. Palestinians were interested in the details but had given up on the process. And the term accepting two state solution has now become a touchstone, but in the process of becoming a touchstone, it got hollowed out of all meaning, so that it means about as much as the sanctity of marriage means to Newt Gingrich. And so for the Palestinians, the two state concept originally meant freedom and justice. For Israelis, it came to mean getting rid of them and in a controlled way. And when the details then began to come forward, Israelis said, no, no, no, no, that's not what we mean. I mean, you're not giving up this and we're not giving up that and we're not giving you this and we're not giving you, and Palestinians said, no, that's not a state. That's something else. You know, that's pretty much what we got just with holy water sprinkled on it. And so I think that therein lies the difficulty at the very point in time when the terms become hollowed out and everybody accepts it. It both doesn't mean anything, and we're further away from getting to it than we are because we haven't actually been honest about what it means. And I don't think, as I said, that the parties themselves are capable on the one side and willing on the other side to get to where a solution is. And that's why external intervention is possible, but I just don't, is necessary, but I don't think it's possible. I don't think it's forthcoming. And I just would disagree with one thing about what Laura said, and I've struggled with this myself because I was there in 93 and as well and saw it play out here in a way and then went repeatedly to the region as a part of the Builders for Peace Project. And some six, seven months into it, I began to feel this slippage. And I wrote a piece at one point saying, if this is peace, somebody forgot to tell the guys at the checkpoints, you know, and it was just the behaviors were such that it was eating away at confidence on a daily basis. I just don't know if you get a second shot in the same way. It's a harder sell this time. It's 35 years of a bad marriage. They went to the marriage counselor, said, we got a problem. We need talk. The marriage counselor unfortunately said back to them, which is what the Clinton administration did. That's great. You guys solve this now. We can't do it for you. And they were not capable of getting beyond where they've been in Oslo. Now, 20 years later, of the bad marriage and the awkward and testy and problematic, difficult divorce that never really worked, we're telling them again, you guys work this out and then we're going to try to come up with a framework as if we're a neutral party. And I think that's the difficulty. I don't think there's really trust on either side right now for what we might come up with. And I want to be hopeful. I'm just struggling with how to get there. So, and the numbers don't speak well to it. We have each of you wants to respond. So, commenting on your comments. Thanks. I actually don't disagree with you at all, Jim. I think you actually put your finger on the fundamental failing so far, which has been the process. It's not that the initial divorce failed. It's that we didn't get to the divorce. We got into counseling. And then we stayed into counseling for 20 years while bad behaviors continued while more grievances were established and deepened. This is why a lot of us who still believe in the two state solution and still believe in a negotiated solution, believe that you've actually got to get to a deal and do it. This is why many of us believe when you talk interim agreements and phase things, we get very nervous. I'm not saying it's impossible, but I get very nervous. I was on the ground during Oslo and I saw how, you know, leaving in time and constructive ambiguity and confidence building actually was the death of confidence. I don't think we have any ability now to build confidence to get to a deal. I think we need to get to a deal. We need a divorce and then confidence can be built after a divorce. That is the lesson of the past 20 years. Frankly, when I look at these polling results, what gives me some optimism is my surprise that people still are this positive about the peace process and the two state solution after 20 years. It's pretty extraordinary. And I think it shows a certain amount of both pragmatism and recognition that there isn't anything else on both sides. But we cannot have 20 more years of processing. It's simply not possible. I agree. We can't have another 20 years of processing, but we very well might. Just to pick up on a point that Jim made, that we haven't been honest about what a two state solution means. And I think that's been true from day one. And unfortunately, I think that that phenomenon is continuing. And we still have a continuation of the same mindset of constructive ambiguity, which I consider to be quite destructive, in the current negotiations. And I would argue that the framework agreement that is being talked about is actually neither a framework nor is it an agreement. It's so vague. It's vague in some areas, of course, that the Israelis are not that interested in or interested in terms of specificity. And it's quite specific on those areas that they are interested in. As far as we know, of course, I haven't seen anything. I'm basing this on whatever is available, everything that you guys are reading. But it seems to be, I mean, this is pretty much standard operating procedure. Jerusalem is a tough issue. So there'll be references to Palestinian aspirations in Jerusalem. And I think it's a continuation. If we are this far into the process and the two state solution really hangs in the balance, it's not a time to be vague. And I think it's clear if we cannot say a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, in Palestinian East Jerusalem, and define what Jerusalem means. And if we cannot draw a map instead of saying blocks or percentages or what have you, if we cannot identify an end game for all of these issues, then it's really, I think, just more of the same. Because these issues don't get easier. They actually get harder. And so if we're this far along and we still can't get ourselves to articulate it, then I think we're very much in trouble. As far as a two state solution, in general, I think it was never the best option. I think it has always been the least worst option in general. It's the one on which the largest plurality has existed on both sides in one form or another. But I think the reason that it survives, especially on the Palestinian side, one thing that really struck me about the poll is the constancy between the numbers, between generations, young Palestinians support and oppose a two state solution and Oslo in pretty much the same proportions that their parents or grandparents do, which is remarkable. But I think it stems from a lack of alternatives. It stems from a lack of alternatives in terms of leadership. And this is why I made the point about the internal power dynamics between Hamas and Fatah. I think it is not out of the love for this leadership's direction and guidance and their leadership. It is out of an absence of alternatives. This is a leadership by default on the Palestinian side. And so there is a deeply rooted pragmatism on the Palestinian side that is reflected in the polling numbers much more than I would say than on the Israeli side. On the Israeli side, the status quo is quite comfortable. Two state solution is quite abstract. Whatever benefits are very hard to grasp intellectually, especially given the past 20 years. And I think there is, on the other hand, on the Palestinian side, real pragmatism, but we shouldn't confuse that or conflate that with optimism. On the election on the Hamas Fatah, it is interesting that there is very little demographic split between the two. There is also very little difference in attitude. They are as supportive on both sides and as lacking in confidence on both sides. It is not a question of the parties. It is a question of, give me something to work with, and there is nothing there. In 2006, when we polled on the Palestinian election, we came up, poll was done about a week before the final, and it came up about a draw, which actually is what the turnout was. The reason Hamas won more seats was because of the way the lists were drawn up, but the two parties were very close in terms of their vote total. Interestingly enough, 73% of those polled said, if peace were possible, if the outcome of this election were to make peace possible, who would you vote for? 73% said they would have voted for Fatah, including Hamas voters. It was more the throw the bums out than it was they were voting against peace. They just didn't think it was going to happen, and so they said, nothing has happened, and the other guys had 15 years they didn't do anything. Let's try something new, because nothing is going to change anyway. And I think that is still kind of where they are. There is a sense that it is just not going to change. I have some hands in the back. First to Jim, I would agree with you. The most pressing thing right now is preparing the ground, and we don't have much time. So what would you suggest practically be done by the administration and by the players? And to Khaled, if I may, quickly, you said you talked about the diaspora. My understanding and my assumption working there was always that the most operative center of gravity since Oslo has been the occupied territories of the diaspora. And if there is a deal that has buy-in in the territories and not in the diaspora, then frankly the diaspora is more of a Jordanian or Lebanese problem than it is a Palestinian problem. So why do you think that in actual operable political terms the diaspora is as important for selling a deal for the Palestinian leadership? Thank you. You didn't ask me the last part, but I'll answer it anyway. I mean, in Nazareth, going to Hagar's tent, it is still a core part of the Palestinian narrative, including for the Arabs who stayed in the Galilee, that their brothers and sisters are in the north. It is not just a Lebanon problem and a Jordanian problem. It is part of the Palestinian narrative. These are our brothers and sisters. We want to abandon them. And I just don't think you can avoid that as an issue. I was with Clinton in 1998 when he went and went over the head of the Palestinian leadership and went to Jerusalem. And Ashley was quite, I mean, the put down to Netanyahu was really significant, really significant. And he got an ovation from Jews for it. In the state dinner that I was at, Netanyahu insulted him at state dinner. Clinton came back like that and knocked them down as gracefully and as delightfully as possible, but devastated him and people applauded him for it. I would send Clinton back or I'd send Obama back. His speech in Jerusalem, you know, he gave Israel everything it wanted, but it was a compelling part of the Palestinian story that got told by the president. That has to be repeated. I mean, we've got 20 years of wounding that has to be healed and compensated for and a direction changed and new confidence built. And the only way that's going to happen is somebody building that kind of base of support from outside. Waiting until you got ink on paper and saying, here, let's buy it, we're past that. The ground has to be prepared now in a very significant and dramatic way. And I've been urging that since this all started. Don't wait until it's done to say, are you going to buy it? Invest people in the process. And they're not right now. And for Abu Mazen, in particular, it is important because his hold on leadership is so fragile. But there isn't that kind of thing being done. It's behind closed doors and all quiet, quiet, and then a phone call here or a phone call there. It much more needs to be done and it's not being done. We have a question on why does the diaspora now? That's a question that I think probably Layla could answer better than anyone else. But I'll take a whack at it. Just three points. The first is the point I mentioned. I think the legitimacy of this leadership is in many ways derived from their experience in exile. This is the PLO was fashioned in the diaspora, in the camps. And it earned its legitimacy internationally and locally as a refugee driven diaspora movement. So that's one thing. Abu Mazen himself is a refugee from Safaq. More practically, the agreement will address any agreement between Israelis and Palestinians will deal with the refugee issue. It will determine the fate of Palestinian refugees. And so they will have to have a say. If there's going to be a referendum, and both sides talk about putting any agreement to a referendum, and the referendum is put only to the 60% of the Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza, who will determine the fate of refugees and those whose fate is being determined have no say. I think it will be quite glaring. I recognize the logistical and technical problems with actually having Palestinians outside vote. But still, I think it's a bit of a bait and switch type of a scenario that will be hard to sell if and when that happens. Lastly, I think it's just untenable to say that the refugees, the Palestinians in Syria and Lebanon are a Syrian and Lebanese problem, especially today, given the reality that you have in Syria as well as in Lebanon. You're all familiar with the disastrous situation in the Yarmouk camp. It's clearly something that cannot be left to those governments to resolve. They've shown themselves well before 2011 that they are not interested in absorbing the Palestinian population, that they're not interested in enfranchising them. And so someone has to. It's impossible for 40% of the Palestinian population, from which this leadership is derived, that they remain stateless and disenfranchised. I think that is not. It is not something that I think would be acceptable to Palestinian public opinion inside the West Bank and Gaza. And you know, one of the interesting demographic splits that you get in polling in the West Bank and Gaza are refugees versus the what we call them indigenous people from Ramallah, Hebron, et cetera. The attitude of refugees track inside the West Bank and Gaza track the attitude of refugees in Lebanon and in Jordan. They feel the very same way about the issues of evolving right to return and property compensation, et cetera, et cetera. So it's an internal issue as well as an external issue. We have a lot of hands here to the left, to your left, Josh. My name is Martin Anderson. I'm the author of Peoples of the Earth. I'm very pleased that you mentioned the word indigenous because I really do agree that this two-state solution will continue to be seen as vacuous until it goes down to some basics. Israel is the first modern state, indigenous state in the world. The Palestinian demands are indigenous. The way you get to revamp the lessons and make sure that people participate in the debate in a positive construction constructive way is to bring indigenous peoples from around the world, not the way they're being done right now. Okay, I'm happy to ask the question. Sir, what do you see as the solution long-term in terms of engaging people and what role can indigenous peoples from around the world play in helping solidify the necessary steps that need to be taken? Let's take a couple more questions. We have another one to the left and then to the right. Realistically, so not optimistically. Can you introduce yourself, please? I'm Alex Samaha. Realistically, so not optimistically or pessimistically, where do you see Palestine and Israel in 20 years and in 50 years to each of you? Okay. To the right here. Harold Vagan. Do you, the right of return, do you see Israelis ever accepting the right of return and can you have a two-state solution without the right of return and how can that possibly be handled? Okay. Let's discuss what's the future look like. I can't, I don't have a crystal ball. I can read the numbers now and they don't look good, but I don't know what to, how to see 20 years down the road. I just don't. If the next 20 years are like the last 20 years, it's not pretty. But I don't see the, I don't see where it goes. I just, I just don't. I can't even, I can't see 100 years. I mean, I used to say that 100 years from now, an Arab boy from Amman al-Maria, Jewish girl from Tel Aviv and settled in the suburbs of Damascus, I still think that's the case. I mean, I still think that the region integrates at some point and we move toward that. It's getting there. It's getting there. That's the problem. And I don't know even that when that all happens, what shape the region will be in. Whether there'll be one big state or several states or a European Union type set of relationships, it is not sustainable to have these crazy divisions that currently exist. I just don't know how you get from where you are to where the region has to be. I'll take just a quick shot at that one and the right to return. I don't have a crystal ball either. I will say they're really, as I see it, are two paths. One is that we get to a two state solution, which is going to be imperfect and dissatisfying to everybody, probably equally dissatisfying to everybody, but hopefully sustainable and over time will solidify into some coexistence or we get more conflict. There isn't an alternative. When we had this discussion on the last panel, December 2012, for those of us who are determinedly supporting two state solutions, some believe it's because we have some ideological blinders that only let us see that. No one has yet sketched another option that is in any way viable. Neither party is going to disappear. Neither party is going to lose their nationalist identity. Neither party is going to cease to seek self-determination. What will also remain true is both parties will retain the ability to inflict tremendous suffering on the other. That won't change. Hearts will continue to harden as there are more grievances inflicted on both sides. There really are only two paths. I don't know if it's 10 years, 20 years, 50 years. We talk about the two state solution dying. Again, it's not that I'm somebody who just desperately wants this division. It has to happen. If the two state solution is taken off the table, eventually it's going to come back. It's just a question of how much bloodshed is on the way. On the right of return, I just want to say this very clearly. The right of return in terms of accepting a Palestinian right of return is a non-starter with Israelis. It is seen as code for flooding Israel with Palestinians, which is the end of a state that has any sort of Jewish identity or Jewish nature. You can love that. You can hate it, but that is the reality. I can give my opinion if anybody wants, but in terms of where we go, can you get a two state solution starting with that? That really, I think, depends on the determination of negotiators and the creativity. There are ways to get at this, which say we recognize your pain, we see your narrative, we have conflicting narratives. I don't think it's insurmountable if people actually have a whole package which offers something enough to all sides. If we can get to an agreement with Iran. I mean, I had this conversation with someone yesterday. Who would have thought that dealing with the Iran nuclear program is easier than Israel-Palestine? It's a little bizarre, actually. This is a matter of giving both sides the minimum that they both need. Neither is going to get the maximum and then moving forward and trying to build something from that. I do think it's possible. Yeah, just real quick. Where are we in 20 years? I think if present trends continue, I actually think I'm not an optimist as far as the current negotiations. I think they might be able to get a piece of paper signed, but I think the leaders are just as likely to walk away from that, quote, unquote, agreement just after signing it. I think we're likely to see a continuation of the status quo only in a very negative direction. I agree also that a one-state solution is not a viable option at this point in time. I can envision a reality in which a two-state solution is actually no longer physically possible, and a one-state solution is no longer viable, and that we continue in that neverland of neither here nor there for some time. I think we may actually be already in that sort of murky phase. As far as the right of return, I think Palestinians for most of the last 40 years, at least the PLO leadership, let's say, has accepted that the right of return as an implemented reality for the vast majority of Palestinian refugees in a two-state solution is the two are not compatible. I think it was prepared to make that trade-off, whether rightly or wrongly, for many decades. I think there's a recognition of that. On the other hand, I think recognition is important. I think not necessarily accepting the other's narratives, but accepting some sort of moral formula that recognizes the aggrieved that an injustice was committed. In conflict resolution in general, I mean this is not a strange phenomenon. I think conflicts are more about mindsets in psychology than they are really about weapons systems or rockets. Conflicts are about attitudes and recognition of the right, whether or not or how it is put into practice, I think is very important to the Palestinian side to be able to have confidence in a two-state solution where most refugees probably won't get to go to their original homes. The way Arifat used the pyramid was the right to return is absolute. How you implement the right can be subject to negotiations. But I had a roommate in college, Kevin. He was a tough guy from Brooklyn, but he was really brainy and funny. When he complained about something, they said, what are you complaining about? He'd say, I'm a human being. I got a right to a moat, don't I? My first exposure to the Palestinian issue was staying in Ain al-Heloui for several weeks back in 1971, taking down people's stories. The stories are real. The people are real. The loss is real. Wearing the key around your neck as a sacred object is real. You cannot deny that narrative. You can't deny the reality of what people have left with them. When I first met people from Nazareth and they wanted to raise money to build Hagar's tent in the center of the town, Hagar being the mother of Ismail, and her dress is shaped like a tent, which is where the refugees were living, and Hagar is facing north to Lebanon with her arms outstretched, welcoming her children back. That is not a story you just simply say ain't never going to happen. Don't even talk about it. It's over. As the Holocaust is real and as it is a narrative that must be understood and dealt with, as the pogroms were real and are a story that must be dealt with, so too the story of the refugees are real and have to be dealt with. It is an existential issue for Arabs that has to be dealt with. Those two narratives, as difficult as they are to reconcile, have to be understood and somehow brought together in a common narrative of suffering and respected by both sides, or else we don't go anywhere. They can't say, you have to respect my suffering, but yours is a non-starter. I understand your point, but for Palestinians to say do away with it is also a non-starter. The issue has to be how do we figure out how to create it? I don't believe Netanyahu has it in his DNA to understand Palestinian suffering, but Israelis have to and Palestinians have to understand the suffering and fear of Jews and stop playing into each other's stories in a negative way, which is what they've been doing. Can I just want to say something? I have been working on the refugee issue for a very long time and I've spoken to Israeli audiences numerous times about the refugee issue, and I think that it is true that the right of return is a non-starter for Israeli leaders, but I don't think it is necessarily a non-starter for the younger generations of Israelis. I think that what I have increasingly heard from the younger generation of Israelis on the issue of refugees is that they are culturally fearful of the Palestinians. It's not that they are able to recognize the suffering, they are able to recognize that they're the wrongdoing, they are able to recognize the claims of the refugees, but they cannot conceptualize actually living with a Muslim people that have grievances against them, and so to me what that means is that the work to create the foundations of a sustainable peace have not yet been addressed because the two sides are still largely distrustful of each other, and so I think instead of promoting that distrust on the basis of separation as an initial step, we should also consider addressing, promoting trust by insisting that we not begin with statements of non-starters and dismissal of issues, but understand that people themselves are much more capable of dealing with these complex issues in a way that politicians are not. First of all, I want to be clear. I did not say it's a non-starter at all. I said that implementation, I think Khalid and I agree. The issue is implementation versus exactly what Jim said and what Arafat said, how you manage to deal with it, not in a different way. That's the first thing. In terms of, I'm sorry, Leila, we may just talk, I mean, I don't know who you're talking to. It is very clear when Bibi Netanyahu, and I actually had a thought as Jim was talking, when people talk about reconciling narratives, the Palestinian right of return narrative, the proper narrative to reconcile it with isn't Israeli suffering and Jewish suffering across the years. It's the current Israeli demand for recognition of Israel's Jewish state. That is the proper parallel, and both of those are very hard to manage for either side. They have to do with the legitimacy of claims to the ground. I don't think Israelis always understand why the claim, why the call for recognize Israel's Jewish state is so hard for Palestinians. And I've explained it many times. I've explained what it means in terms of denying legitimacy of Palestinians having ever been there, denying their suffering, blah, blah, blah. I think it's very much parallel to denying the right of return, which isn't just saying you can't come back. If you're not able to say you were here, you were here legitimately, you were hurt, in some way, it's a mere image. And this is something the sides have to grapple with. I don't know how they grapple with it. I believe there can be a two-state solution without the Palestinians evoking this formula of Israel as a Jewish state which delegitimizes their own history and delegitimizes the 20% of Palestinians of Israelis who are not Jewish Israelis. I think that's possible, and I think it's possible on the refugee side as well. But my sense of Israelis, and this is not just since Oslo, it's before Oslo, Israelis want a state which is a Jewish state which has a star of David on the flag. And I have said this before and I'll say it again, as a Jewish person raised in what is predominantly a Christian country, I don't think that's wrong as long as people who are not Jewish do not feel marginalized and discriminated against. That is the challenge for Israel. I mean, you can debate whether ethnocentric states are good or bad. Most states are ethnocentric in some way. And I think the question is, can you show that you truly treat all your citizens equally? That is a challenge for a state where there is a cross on its flag, or where there is Christian holidays as national holidays, where there is a star of David. That ultimately is the way forward. But the idea that Israelis really, if they just liked understood Palestinians better, would be happy to see the majority of their state be Muslim Palestinians. That doesn't actually match any reality that I've experienced. We have a question in the front. The ambassador had his promise to him to give an answer. I have a question. Please go ahead. A question actually is mostly for Khaled Layla and Jim. You spoke about, all three of you seem to feel that the Kerry initiative is not going to be accepted by both governments. And even if it was, it can't be implemented. And we're going to go, and the very most likely scenario is another 25 years going downhill further. And it's very discouraging. My gut feeling is it's much more discouraging than that. Don't you think that what will happen if Kerry fails is what happened when Camp David failed? And that is to say, we'll have a third intifada. And if we have a third intifada, it seems to me, given the current Israeli public's attitude and the current Israeli government, the reaction is going to be very, very strong. And we're going to have another 1948 war and another Nakba. And I don't think we're going to have 20 more years of slow deterioration. I think we're going to have a gigantic catastrophe. Why do you not agree? Obviously, you don't agree. Why not? Thank you. The ambassador here. Yeah, I'm going to say anything from the Arab League. Dr. Zucki, just I wonder whether you have, if there is any findings in your polls regarding the issue, whether the Palestinians and the Israelis think that this is the right time to negotiate the Arabist initiative at a time when the neighboring Arab countries, the neighboring, I mean, with the Israelis, around the Israelis, are in chaos and turmoil. And not only that, even Kerry, as the Palestinians and the Arabs are suspecting the role of Kerry, when he said that, I have been 29 years as a senator and voting 100% for Israel, and I will not change it now. So is he really also an honest, peace broker? Thank you. Thank you. We have one question in the green. As a former practicing clinical. Can you introduce yourself? Oh, okay. I'm Diane Perlman. I'm at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason. And I mean, there's been a lot of talk about psychological issues, and as a former practicing clinical psychologist, I think we could say that the 20 years of therapy was, there's such a thing as bad therapy. And that also the current, we can imagine that if there were more skillful people involved, the process would have been different. And also in the field of conflict transformation and mediation that what goes on a lot is like pressure, arm twisting. And that I think we need people with more sophisticated, deeper skill sets to handle the profound issues of trauma, fear, and even like an unconscious guilt. You know, I'd say we can't solve the problem with the level of thinking that created them. So we need to do something. So we need a different process or different leaders? People intervening using, I think it is political therapy, but dealing with all the profound issues of recognition and trauma. And also you just said that there's, people haven't thought of another alternative, sketched out something. And I did a few events in November and December with Johann Gauteng, who has an idea of a regional solution modeled after the European community, like a six state solution, Middle East community. Could that be the alternative? So there, I mean, there are other things out and other people thought similar things. Thank you. Okay. Khaled? On the question of the failure and its implications, and are we going to see a third into father? I don't think we're there yet. I have, it could happen. I think expectations are much lower than they were in 2000. This time around, I think people have seen this movie and they've said, you know, sure, we'd like it to succeed, but, you know, we're not holding our breath. I think the polls show that. And so I don't think it will be this kind of climactic moment of, oh no. I also think that the conditions are not quite the same as they were in 2000. I think one of the lessons of the regional turmoil in Egypt and elsewhere is that just because something is started doesn't mean that you're able to finish it. And this is a lesson that Palestinians have known, I think, for quite some time, but Egyptians and Syrians and others are only beginning to learn. This isn't the Palestinians are not new to the idea of rebelling. And so they understand the costs entailed. And I think that they understand that a leadership that there needs to be, you know, an uprising can open up a political space, but it's political leaders who can take advantage of that and turn it into something. That's what happened in the first Intifada. And to some extent in the second Intifada there was, there were some openings, there was the roadmap, there was, but it disintegrated. Right now I think Palestinians don't have that confidence in their political leadership, whether it's Hamas or Fatah or anyone else, to take advantage of that. There is no political safety net, neither in terms of a process, nor in terms of their leadership. And I think they're much more reticent to begin something that they are unsure of how it might end. That's not to say that that situation would continue forever. On the point on psychology, I agree. I think conflicts are inherently more about psychology than about anything else. And I think an idea that hasn't been explored in the Israeli-Palestinian context is something like a truth and reconciliation initiative that takes into account the traumas, not just perceived trauma, but actual damages that were done in physical terms, loss of life, loss of property, and so on on both sides. And I think that is the ultimate confidence-building measure, because it's actually, in some ways, addressing writing past wrongs. And that's what conflicts should be about, not simply drawing lines on a map. Do you have anything to say on the API? What was the question specifically on the API? Wouldn't I just, I think you're, if I understood it was... Maybe we can let Jim take that one then. We actually didn't ask a question about that. It was going to be in the roster of questions that we asked about reducing confidence, increasing confidence in peace. It didn't get out. I was checking to see if it was there. We did ask about Kerry, and as per expected, I mean, as I expected, the Palestinians were... Only 11% were hopeful about his initiative, whereas 39% of Israelis were hopeful, but 31% of Palestinians said they were willing to wait and see what happens, and 40% of Israelis felt that way. So much more support on the Israeli side, Palestinians kind of ambivalent about it. 40% of Palestinians not hopeful at all about the initiative. Look, with regard to the earlier question, when the early Zionist settlers came into Palestine, there was a reference to Palestinians, the indigenous people, they used to call them red Indians. I mean, Arafat at one point picked that up and said, we are not going to be red Indians. But I see that playing out. There's, at this point, as a result of the decades that we've endured in this conflict on all sides, there are two pathologies that have set in. On the Israeli side, there's the pathology of the spoiled child who is enabled in his behavior, and is continually enabled in his behavior. I mean, Netanyahu knows that put too much pressure and I'll set Congress loose on you. And while Congress can back off on Iran, they're not going to back off on the behavior of the past in terms of supporting Israeli intransigence. That's, I think, the feeling in Israel in any case. I think that the idea that APEC is on its death bed is premature at best. On the Palestinian side, the pathology is the abused child and the beaten down child who, at this point, in some cases is turning on himself and or accepting the being locked in the closet and behaviors manifesting that. And I, therefore, don't see a third Intifada. And I think that what really troubles me is that both notions that we have to do it now, because if you don't do it, there's going to be a third Intifada. And if, or if you don't do it, the demographic time bomb, both of them are fundamentally racist, I think. Palestinian children are not a demographic time bomb. They're real people with real needs. And Palestinians are not just prone to self-destruction and to behavior that is going to inevitably bring down this incredibly superior military force and destroy them. They're not suicidal. And so the demand for justice is separate from this and is not considered at all in the discussion. And so back to your point, I mean, what I've always thought is that what God needs to do is get a big couch and take a note and say, okay, tell me your story. How can I help you? I mean, I need to help you. You got a problem here. And both sides got problems, real problems with this. And but I don't think that the approaches that we've used to date in terms of dealing with both publics have addressed the problems as they are. Obama, I think, came close in his speech. And when Clinton and Gaza came, I'll never forget, he spoke to 700 members of the Palestine National Council. And I mean, guys, I knew that Israelis had let them in for the first time. Some of these guys I knew from Beirut and elsewhere, hardened revolutionaries. And when Clinton said, I know your story, you've been dismembered and dispossessed. When he used that word dispossessed, I saw these guys tear up and begin to cry. Because no one had ever talked to them as real people before. And we still don't do it. Obama did when he's talked about the little kids, the Palestinian kids, just like my kids. He said, just like your kids. That's the issue. Who's going to treat Palestinians like real people who have real needs that have to be dealt with in the same way we deal with human beings and want to or that human needs demand to be dealt with everywhere. That's what's missing in this discourse right now. I just want to just for a second touch on the Arab Peace Initiative, which wasn't in this polling, but it was. I mean, it was. But in terms of the question here, for those of us who watched the emergence of the API years ago, many of us were dismayed at the extent to which Israelis ignored it. It was seen as a trick or it was just simply ignored. I think that for those of us who hoped to see a resurgence of belief in the point of peace, for Israelis, and Khaled talked about this, it's harder to talk to young Israelis about any benefits of peace. The Shimon Peres idea of a region where we all have commerce and we all get along. I mean, the API is really the only piece that holds out any tangible evidence of that. And I think it's incredibly important, should not be underestimated, to the extent that there is any ability of the Arab world to make clear, we're still serious. Where are you? We're partners for peace. Where are you? I think that has a tremendous impact. And is a great tool for those of us who want to see progress. And to the extent that it helps the Kerry folks, that's great. To the extent that it can actually mobilize a debate in Israel about what Israel is not getting, because it's not pursuing peace. I think it's really, really important. So I just want to put an exclamation point on that. On the point about just very quickly. But just with the sense that it has to be a... We will do this if, only if you do this. In other words, the notion that Obama had in his first term, which was you give up front, and then that'll make them more acceptable, it's not. That creates the enablement that is destructive. Yeah, I completely agree. And just one quick point. And I'm going to say this, I don't mean to be dismissive. After years of doing this, I'm very... I think it's great that people are doing creative thinking, thinking outside the box, whatever. I am extremely uncomfortable with what I call Sim City solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to Palestinian development. It is very attractive to come up with solutions that would work, assuming there are no political limitations. It's, you know, let's have a blue skies exercise and reimagine a region where there's coexistence and people function well. And I think that's valuable. But those actually aren't implementable solutions. Those are not alternatives. We do have a political reality. We do have nationalisms. We do have intractable governments and parties that don't want solutions. I mean, that's the reality. So to the extent that there are many people in various places doing really fascinating brainstorming about how we would develop a Palestinian economy if we didn't have checkpoints, that's valuable. And down the road maybe can be used. But it's not actually a solution to... There's no getting from here to there. So I'm very boring and pragmatic and focused on the now and dealing with those, you know, these are the limitations we're operating in. But also it's not possible to build a sustainable piece on formulas that are decided between leaders behind closed doors if they don't conform or address the grievances of the people on both sides. I agree. So the idea that people are starting new thinking is important if it includes a process of trying to build more ground consensus on what a piece would include. And that doesn't... I don't disagree. When we talk about things like a six-state solution, there are Israelis who've come up with awesome ideas of how you solve the Palestinian conflict by annexing part of the West Bank to Jordan, giving part of it to Egypt, moving borders around. I've sat through these presentations. They are great on paper as long as the Palestinians have no free will and no agency. I have seen Palestinians who talk about this is how we'd solve it. One state we all get along, one man, one vote. Great if you can erase Israeli agency, self-determination, nationalism, and actual sovereignty. These aren't going to happen. And it sometimes pains me how much energy is going into things. If you can come up with an alternative that is easier to get to than this ugly thing called the two-state solution, then let's talk about it. But, I mean, it isn't there. Okay. Thank you. We have a lot of hands. We have one over here, young woman and orange. Hi. Introduce yourself, please. And I'm sorry? Introduce yourself. I'm Rebecca Harris with UNRWA. So I guess this can be addressed to really anyone on the panel, but Layla, since you have experience in the refugee area. The refugees in all five of our fields have been living in emergency crises, pretty much perpetually. The best example of this being in Syria is Yarmouk, where it's not just affecting the Palestinians living inside Syria, but then the spillage over into the Lebanon camps, the Jordanian camps, which were already having issues. Do you have a question? Yeah. How do you see this protracted and deteriorating humanitarian crises affecting Palestinian public opinion in the future because the situations are just not anywhere near resolved? Thank you. That's a good question. Okay. To the left, the woman here in black. I'm Dr. Caroline Poplin. I'm a member of Americans for Peace Now and J Street. My question is for Mr. Zogby. I was born in 1947. One of the big theories that has made peace difficult is the theory that, and this is a theory of APEC probably, that there's two-state solution for the Arabs is just the first stage. And that once there's a Palestinian state, then the second stage is the destruction of Israel. And I'm curious if Palestinians have rejected that now, and they're comfortable with the idea of an Israeli state, a permanent Israeli state? Because that's a big narrative here among older people. Thank you. Okay. In the back. Adi, yeah. Can you wait for the mic? We're being recorded. Can you pick up something, Lara, that you said on thinking outside the box, but sometimes they make us feel good, but they're not necessarily effective. I'm not necessarily putting this particular thinking outside of the boxing in that category, but I'd like to get everybody's opinion on some of the divestiture or international boycott efforts against Israel or Israeli institutions, whether they're settler-related, West Bank-related or non-West Bank-related. Not so much on whether or not they're the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do, but how are they being received inside Israel? Does it actually make a difference? Or does it make us feel good, but they're really not making a difference? Just be curious from folks who are actually on the ground, how are those particular efforts affecting, if at all, what we're talking about here today. Okay. Lara, do you want to start with that question? Sure. I think I'm going to be the anti-BDS voice on the panel. Look, my organization, me, we strongly support no problem boycotting settlements and things directly related to the occupation to the extent that you can figure that out and that's a long-standing position of ours and of our partner in Israel, the Israeli Peace Now movement. In terms of boycotting, divesting all of that from Israel, I do think people should pay very close attention to the discourse and I understand that this is something that speaks to people's desire to do something, anything. Writing letters to Congress hasn't worked and letters to the editor or whatever. What can we do? I think from my perspective, knowing Israelis, I think first of all, it's not effective and I do believe it targets the wrong people. I think targeting Israeli academics is just, that is, for example, people who are deeply devoted to peace but I understand where that comes from in here and I don't believe it is across the board, anti-Semitic or anti-Israel. I do believe though that it is also counterproductive and I think, I've watched the Scarlett Johansson Soda Stream thing with great interest. And what's interesting to me and we, by the way, as an organization Soda Stream, as long as you're manufacturing and Michelle Ademim, I won't buy Soda Stream. I want a Soda Stream so badly, so badly. Soda Stream is manufactured in a settlement. Yes, the moment they move their factory out of there, I will buy one for all my friends too but not until then. And that's easy but when you look at the debate and it's really interesting and I'm getting questions, a lot of questions from activists because now it's become well but since this has now been embraced by the BDS movement, this is part of the broader boycott Israel and now you're giving energy to that and suddenly what on the one hand I think is a very positive story that brings a lot of light to the economics of occupation has now very quickly turned into an anti-Israel, anti-Semitism story and I'm not sure where, I don't sure what's going to come out. We're getting a lot of questions about this. I really, I understand and I actually think in some ways this is a challenge for the peace camp because we, you know, people want, our folks, want something to do that feels effective and let's, you know, there aren't that many things we can come up with. It's very frustrating but I do think this is both ineffective and essentially counterproductive. I do think targeting settlements and we were mocked by the BDS folks when we came out with our position supporting boycotting settlements and we were mocked by the right, Jewish right wing. Doesn't matter, there's not enough, it won't make a difference but when the Europeans suddenly come out with a directive targeting development, targeting money in settlements it makes a huge difference. When you have European companies pulling out of deals because there's got stuff in settlements, when you've got a, I think it was the Norwegian retirement fund pulling out, taking two companies out because they operate in settlements, that makes a difference. This is for us drawing that shining green line and it absolutely makes a difference and I think that making that distinction is very valuable. Jim, are Palestinians okay with the Jewish state? Look, in 1988 when the PLO passed its resolution, it was historic and the intensity of the debate around recognizing Israel as a fact was painful. I remember Shafiq al-Hut, who was the executive committee member and he headed the PLO office in Beirut, saying to me, if my father were alive today, he would kill me for having done this. I gave up my right to go back to Haifa and it was a big deal. I was there in 1998 when, and I made the wrong call. President Clinton was going to speak in Gaza to the National Committee, the Palestinian National Council and he said, I want them to renounce the charter. I said, Mr. President, they've already done it three times, don't get them to do it again, it's an insult. I need them to do it in my presence. And he gave this speech and he said about as plain as possible, you know, the language I said, I mean the language he used was his and it actually wasn't even in the written text, it was like he was just feeling the moment and he talked about their dispossession and about their dismemberment as a nation, et cetera. And he said, and so I ask you, stand with me and renounce the charter, make it public, make it visible. And they did, in unison they stood up and they clapped and they voted there on the floor in Gaza to renounce the charter. That was a huge deal to do it at that point, given the disappointments of the years that had proceeded. We're now 15 years on and I don't know where the mood is at this point. Behaviors have consequences and sure, the rockets from Gaza have eroded confidence on the Israeli side, loss of trust, et cetera. But so too has the fact that settlements have doubled since then and that the checkpoints have become where they are and that on and on and on, I mean, behaviors have consequences on both sides. And so, I remember being in Gaza monitoring the, when the day laborers were, it was like Southwest LA, they'd get there at like six o'clock in the morning to see if somebody would pick them and take them on a truck to work for a job for 10 hours and then bring them back on a truck late at night and they'd go home, sleep for four hours, come back the next day. It was the most dehumanizing behavior but it was the only job they could get. And it was there, they had cattle shoots that were like about shoulder high and Israeli soldiers would straddle them and look down. And the one thing that struck me was the Israeli soldiers yelling at the guys, don't look at me. Put your head down, don't look at me. And he'd point the gun, don't look at me. And I was like, what is this don't look at me thing? And then as I saw the scene play out, it was the master slave dialectic. And I wrote an article called Anger and Fear. And I said, the Israeli guy is yelling and he's manifesting anger but he's scared stiff. And the Palestinian guy has his head down manifesting fear and submission but he's seething in anger. It's a long time for that relationship to have played out. And to play out in the negative way it's played out and when there's been hope and it's dashed and hope and dashed, I don't know where we are today. So I want to give you a straight answer. Palestinians formally accepted it. They formally accepted it multiple times. But where are they in their hearts right now? I dare say that they're pissed. And I don't think they're happy at all. And I understand we could get the same story on the Israeli side of their fear and their insecurity and their whatever. But the narrative of the Palestinians has played out in a way that has become, I mean the Yarmouk thing has fed into the narrative that there is no place to go. I mean, not unlike the Jew in Europe at the time of Dreyfus and beyond, there is this sense, I've said it before that in some ways the Palestinian situation for the Arabs is like the Holocaust and pogroms were for Jews in America. It's like, it's people like me. Look what's happening to them. It's my story. It's the story of my, it's the story of betrayal by the West. It's the story of insecurity. It's the story of no place to go. It's the story of denial of rights and justice. And so it's a Palestinian story. It's a larger Arab story. And I don't know where it is right now. When the Arab Peace Initiative was passed, it was a huge deal. It was rejected or it wasn't dealt with. I don't know where Arab public opinion is. And we've polled now recently. Two thirds, three quarters of Arabs say, yes, they're willing to accept the Arab Peace Initiative. Public opinion does. But do they like it? I don't think so. You know, are they happy? I don't think so. After Gaza and everything, I just don't think they are anymore. But where I think we all agree is that we have to unwind this. And unwinding it doesn't come on a piece of paper. It comes with hard work and discussion. And that's where nothing's happening right now. It's like you've got a bunch of people meeting and coming up with a framework or trying to come up with a framework which will all of a sudden get sprung on people. But nothing is happening to unwined attitudes. Nothing is changing that. And I don't believe that the paper alone, at this point, given the history of the last 20 years, is sufficient to do it. It won't be as dramatic in any way as Oslo. I just don't think so. We're over time, but Khaled, last words quickly. Just on the BDS point. I don't have a position on whether BDS is good or bad or moral or not. I think I would certainly any use of anti-Semitism or engaging in anti-Semitic rhetoric or hateful speech, I think, is condemnable in and of itself separate from BDS. But more importantly, the logic of boycotting the whole because of the sins of a part is actually built into the peace process. So Lara may actually be right, but this thing that we call peace process is actually, it's institutionalized. It's embedded in it in the sense that, for example, when Hamas won an election, they didn't only boycott the part of the government, the Palestinian government, and the Palestinians tried so many different configurations what might be acceptable to the United States and the West and the Quartet. But the United States was determined to, if there was any involvement of Hamas to this day, any participation of Hamas in any Palestinian government, the entire operation will be boycotted. So if the logic is flawed in terms of Israel separating the settlements from the rest of Israel, then I think we have to apply the same logic in sort of across the board. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Jim, for doing your important polling and for sharing it with us. And thank you, Lara and Khaled, for your thought leadership.