 Section 17 of an essay concerning human understanding. Book 2 by John Locke This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Chad Chapter 21 of Part 45 The ordinary necessities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneasiness of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weariness with labour and sleepiness in their constant returns, etc. To which, if besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness as itch after honour, power or riches, etc. Which acquired habits by fashion, example and education have settled in us and a thousand other irregular desires which custom has made natural to us. We shall find that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses as to leave us free to the attraction of remote or absent good. We are seldom at ease and free enough from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires, but a constant succession of uneasiness out of that stock which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up take the will in their turns and no sinner is one action dispatched which by such a determination of the will we are set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set us on mark. For the removing of the pains we feel and are at present pressed with being the getting out of misery and consequently the first thing to be done in order to happiness, absent good, though thought on, confessed and appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappiness in its absence is jistled out to make way for the removal of those uneasinesses we feel till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind given some relish of it and raised in us some desire which then beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness stands upon fair terms with the rest to be satisfied and so according to its greatness and pressure comes in its turn to determine the will. And thus by a due consideration and examining any good proposed it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will and be pursued for good though appearing and allowed ever so great yet till it has raised desires in our minds and thereby made us uneasy in its want it reaches not our wills we are not within the sphere of its activity our wills being under the determination only of those uneasinesses which are present to us which whilst we have any are always soliciting and ready at hand to give the will its next determination the balancing when there is any in the mind being only which desire shall be next satisfied which uneasiness first removed whereby comes to pass that as long as any uneasiness any desire remains in our mind there is no room for good barely as such to come at the will or at all to determine it because as has been said the first step in our endeavours after happiness being to get holy out of the confines of misery and to feel no part of it the will come be at leisure for nothing else till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed which in the multitude of wants and desires we are beset with in this imperfect state we are not like to be ever freed from in this world section 47 there being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will it is natural as I have said that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action and so it does for the most part but not always for the mind having in most cases as is evident in experience a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires and so all one after another is at liberty to consider the objects of them examine them on all sides and weigh them with others in this lies the liberty man has and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives and our endeavours after happiness whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills and engage too soon before due examination to prevent this we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire as everyone daily may experiment in himself this seems to me the source of all liberty in this seems to consist that which is as I think improperly called free will for doing the suspension of any desire before the will be determined to action and the action which follows that determination done we have opportunity to examine view and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do and when upon due examination we have judged we have done our duty all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness and it is not a fault but a perfection of our nature to desire, will and act according to the last result of a fair examination section 48 this is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom that it is the very improvement and benefit of it it is not an abridgment it is the end and use of our liberty and the further we are removed from such a determination the nearer we are to misery and slavery a perfect indifference in the mind not determinable by its last judgement of the good or evil that is stopped to attend its choice would be so far from being an advantage an excellency of any intellectual nature that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of indifference to act or not to act till determined by the will would be an imperfection on the other side a man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head or let it rest quiet he is perfectly indifferent in either and it would be an imperfection in him if he wanted that power if he were deprived of that indifference but it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same indifference whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand or its remaining in rest when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming it is as much a perfection that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good as that the power of acting should be determined by the will and the certainer such determination is the greater is the perfection now where we determined by anything but the last result of our own minds judging of the good or evil of any action we were not free the very end of our freedom being that we may attain the good we choose and therefore every man is put under a necessity by his constitution as an intelligent being to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do else he would be under the determination of some other than himself which is one of liberty and to deny that a man's will in every determination follows his own judgment is to say that a man wills an axe for an end that he would not have at the time that he wills an axe for it for if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other it is plain he then thinks better of it and would have it before any other unless he can have and not have it will and not will it at the same time a contradiction to manifest to be admitted section 49 if we look upon those superior beings above us who enjoy perfect happiness we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy or less free than we are and if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do I think we might say that God himself cannot choose what is not good the freedom of the Almighty enters not his being determined by what is best section 50 but to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty let me ask would anyone be a changeling because he is less determined by wise considerations than a wise man is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool and draw shame and misery upon a man's self if to break this from the conduct of reason and to want that restraint of examination and judgement which keeps us from choosing or doing the worse be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men but yet I think nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty but he that is mad already the constant desire of happiness and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it nobody I think accounts an abridgement of liberty or at least an abridgement of liberty to be complained of God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy and the more any intelligent being is so the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness that in this state of ignorance we short-sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire and keep it from determining the will and engaging us in action this is standing still where we are not sufficiently assured of the way examination is consulting a guide the determination of the will upon inquiry is following the direction of that guide and he that has a power to act or not to act according as such determination directs is a free agent such determination abridges not that power wherein liberty consists he that has his chains knocked off and the prison doors set open to him is perfectly at liberty because he may either go or stay as he best likes though his preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the night or illness of the weather or want of other lodging he ceases not to be free though the desire of some convenience to be had there absolutely determines his preference and makes him stay in his prison section 51 as therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness so the care of ourselves that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness is the necessary foundation of our liberty the stronger ties we have in an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general which is our greatest good and which as such our desires always follow the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action and from a necessary compliance with our desire set upon any particular and then appearing preferable good to be have duly examined whether it has a tendency to be inconsistent with our real happiness and therefore till we are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter and the nature of the case demands we are by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases section 52 this is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings in their constant endeavors after and a steady prosecution of true felicity that they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases till they have looked before them and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end and make a real part of that which is their greatest good for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to them to take care not to mistake or miss it and so necessarily put them upon caution the liberation and wariness in the direction of their particular actions which are the means to obtain it whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss the same necessity with the same force establishes suspense the liberation and scrutiny of each successive desire whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness and mislead us from it this seems to me is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings and I desire it may be well considered whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have are capable of or can be useful to them and that where on depends the turn of their actions does not lie in this that they can suspend their desires and stop them from determining their wills to any action till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it as far forth as the weight of the thing requires this we are able to do and when we have done it we have done our duty and all that is in our power and indeed all that needs for since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice and all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire what follows after that follows in the chain of consequences linked one to another while depending on the last determination of the judgment which whether it shall be upon a hasty and precipitate view or upon a due and mature examination is in our power experience showing us that in most cases we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire section 53 but if any extreme disturbance as sometimes it happens possesses our whole mind as when the pain of the rack an impetus an easiness as of love, anger or any other violent passion running away with us allows us not liberty of thought and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly God who knows our frailty pities our weakness and requires of us no more than we are able to do and sees what was and what was not in our power to judge as a kind and merciful father but the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires the moderation and restraint of our passions so that our understandings may be free to examine and reason unbiased give its judgment being that we're on a right direction of our conduct the true happiness depends it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours in this we should take pains to soot the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weary good to slip out of our thoughts without leaving any relish any desire of itself there till by a due consideration of its true worth we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it in the fear of losing it and how much this is in everyone's power by making resolutions to himself such as he make it is easy for everyone to try nor let anyone say he cannot govern his passions nor hinder them from breaking out and carrying him into action for what he can do before a prince or a great man he can do alone or in the presence of God if he will section 54 from what has been said it is easy to give an account by it comes to pass that though all men desire happiness yet their wills carry them so contraryly and consequently some of them to what is evil and to this I say that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world argue that they do not all pursue good but that the same thing is not good to every man alike this variety of pursuits shows that everyone does not place this happiness in the same thing or choose the same way to it where all the concerns of man terminated in this life why one followed study and knowledge and another hocking and hunting why one chose luxury and debauchery and another sobriety and riches would not be because every one of these did not aim at his own happiness but because their happiness was placed in different things and therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes if you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight wine is good for you the pleasure of saying be greater to you than that of drinking wine is not section 55 the mind has a different relish as well as the palate and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory which yet some men place their happiness in as you would to satisfy all men's hunger with cheese or lobster though very agreeable and delicious fair to some or to others extremely nauseous and offensive and many people would prefer the gripping of a hungry belly to those dishes which are a feast to others hence it was I think that the philosophers of old did in vain enquire whether summum bonum consisted in riches or bodily delights or virtue or contemplation and they might have as reasonably disputed whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums or nuts and have divided themselves into sex upon it for as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves but their agreeableness to this or that particular palate wherein there is great variety so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance any pain now these to different men are very different things if therefore men in this life only have hope if in this life they can only enjoy it is not strange, not unreasonable that they should seek their happiness by avoiding all things that disease in here and by pursuing all that delight them wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference for if there be no prospect beyond the grave the inference is certainly right let us eat and drink let us enjoy what we delight in for tomorrow we shall die this I think may serve to show us the reason why though all men's desires tend to happiness yet they are not moved by the same object men may choose different things and yet all choose right supposing them only like a company of poor insects where of summer bees delighted with flowers and their sweetness others beetles delighted with other kinds of vines which having enjoyed for a season would cease to be and exist no more forever section 56 these things Julie Wade will give us as I think a clear view into the state of human liberty liberty it is plain consists in a part to do or not to do to do or for bear doing as we will this cannot be denied but this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a man consecutive to volition it is further inquired whether he be at liberty to will or no into this it has been answered that in most cases a man is not at liberty to forbear the action of volition he must exert an act of his will whereby the action proposed is made up to exist or not to exist but yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing and that is the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued here a man may suspect the act of his choice for being determined for or against the thing proposed as he has examined whether it be really of nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or no for when he has once chosen it and thereby it has become a part of his happiness it raises desires and that, unfortunately gives him uneasiness which determines his will and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer and here we may see how it comes to pass that a man may justly incur punishment though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills necessarily does will, that which he then judges to be good for though his will be always determined by that which is judged good by his understanding yet it excuses him not because by a too hasty choice of his own making he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil which however false and malicious have the same influence on all his future conduct they were true and right he has vitiated his own palette and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it the eternal law and nature of things must not be altered to comply with his ill ordered choice if the neglect or abuse of the liberty he had to examine what would really and truly make for his happiness that leads him the miscarriages that follow on it must be imputed to his own election he had a power to suspend his determination it was given him that he might examine and take care of his own happiness and look that he were not deceived and he could never judge that it was better to be deceived than not in a matter of so great concern what has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things and pursue happiness on contrary courses but yet since men are always constant and in earnest in matters of happiness and misery the question still remains how men come often to prefer the worse to the better and to choose that which by their own confession has made them miserable section 57 to account for the various and contrary ways men take though all aim of being happy we must consider whence the various uneasinesses that determine the will in the preference of each voluntary action have their rise one, some of them come from causes not in or far such as are often causes of the body from want, disease or outward injuries which when present and violent operate for the most part forcibly on the will and turn the courses of men's lives from virtue, piety and religion and what before they judge to lead to happiness everyone not endeavoring are through disuse not being able to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he fails in those bodily torments and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness. A neighbour country has been afflated a tragical theatre from which we might fetch instances if there needed any and the world did not in all countries and ages furnished examples enough to confirm that received observation and therefore there is great reason for us to pray, lead us not into temptation. Two other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good which desires always bear proportion to and depend on the judgment we make and the relish we have of any absent good in both which we are apt to be very esteemed said and that by our own fault section 58 in the first place I shall consider the wrong judgment men make of future good and evil whereby their desires are instead for as to present happiness and misery when that alone comes into consideration and the consequences are quite removed a man never chooses a miss he knows what best pleases him and that he actually prefers things in their present enjoyment are what they seem the apparent and real good are in this case always the same for the pain or pleasure being just so great and no greater than it is felt the present good or evil is really so much as it appears and therefore where every action of ours concluded within itself and through no consequences after it we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good we should always infallibly prefer the best where the pains of honest industry and of starving with hunger and cold set together before us nobody would be in doubt which to choose where the satisfaction of lust and the joys of heaven offered at once to anyone's present possession he would not balance or err in the determination of his choice section 59 but since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance but are the precedent causes of good and evil which they draw after them and bring upon us when they themselves are past and cease to be our desires look beyond our present enjoyment and carry the mind out to absent good according to the necessity which we think there is of it to the making or increase of our happiness it is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction without that we are not moved by absent good for in this narrow scantling of capacity which we are accustomed to and sensible of here wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once which when all uneasiness is away is whilst it lasts sufficient to make us think or shalls happy it is not all revoked and even apparent good that affects us because the indolency and enjoyment we have sufficient for our present happiness we desire not to venture the change since we judge that we are happy already being content and that is enough for who is content is happy but as soon as any new uneasiness comes in this happiness is disturbed and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness section 60 their atness therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest absent good for whilst such thoughts possess them the joys of a future state move them not they have little concern or uneasiness about them and the will free from the determination that such desires is left to the pursuit of near satisfactions and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels in its want of and longings after them change but a man's view of these things let him say that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness let him look into the future state bliss or misery let him see their God the righteous judge ready to render to every man according to his deeds to them with a patient and well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality eternal life but unto every soul that doeth evil, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish to him I say who hath the prospect of the different state of perfect happiness or misery that tens all men after this life and on their behaviour here the matters of good and evil that govern his choice are mightily changed for since nothing of pleasure and pain in this life can bear any proportion to the endless happiness or exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter actions in his power will have their preference not according to the transient pleasure or pain that accompanies of those in here to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter section 61 but to account more particularly for the misery that men often bring on themselves notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue happiness we must consider how things come to be represented to our desires under deceitful appearances and that is by the judgement pronouncing wrongly concerning them to see how far this reaches and what are the causes of wrong judgement we must remember that things are judged good or bad in a double sense first that which is properly good or bad is nothing but barely pleasure or pain secondly but because not only present pleasure and pain but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a distance is a proper object of our desires an apt to move a creature that has foresight therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain are considered as good and evil section 62 the wrong judgement which leads us makes the will often fastened on the worst side lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these the wrong judgement I am here speaking of is not what one man may think of the determination of another but what every man himself must confess to be wrong for since I lay in the ground that every intelligent being really seeks happiness which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure without any considerable mixture of uneasiness it is impossible anyone should willingly put into his own trot any better ingredient or leave out anything in his power that would tend to his satisfaction of the completing of his happiness but only by wrong judgement I shall not here speak of that mistake which is the consequence of invincible error which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgement but of that wrong judgement which every man himself must confess to be so section 63 if therefore as to present present as have been said never mistakes that which really good or evil that which is the greater pleasure or the greater pain is really just as it appears but though present pleasure and pain show their difference and degrade so gently as not to leave room for mistake yet when we compare present pleasure or pain with future which is usually the case we often make wrong judgments of them taking our measures of them in different positions of distance objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger view that are more remote but so it is with pleasures and pains the present is apt to carry it and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison thus most men like spend threat are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come and so for small matters in possession heard with greater ones in reversion but that this is a wrong judgement everyone must allow let his pleasure insist on whatever it will and since that which is future will certainly come to be present and then having the same advantage of nearness will show itself in its full dimensions and discover his wealth and mistake be judged of it by unequal measures where the pleasure of drinking accompanied the very moment a man takes off his glasses with that six stomach and egging head which men are sure to follow not many hours after I think nobody but ever pleasure he had in his cups would on these conditions ever let wine touch his lips which yet he daily swallows and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time but if pleasure or pain can be so lessen only by a few hours removal how much more will it be so by a further distance to a man that will not by a right judgement do what time will i.e. bring it home upon himself and consider it as present and there take its true dimensions this is the way we usually impose on ourselves in respect of their pleasure and pain where the true degree of happiness or misery the future loses its just proportion and what is present obtains the preference as the greater I mention not here the wrong judgement whereby the absent are not only lessened but reduced to perfect nothing when men enjoy what they can in present and make sure of that including a miss that no evil will thence follow for that lies not in comparing the greatness of future good and evil which is that we are here speaking of but in another short of wrong judgement which is concerning good or evil as it is considered to be the cause and the curement of pleasure or pain that will follow from it section 64 the cause of our judging a mess when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future seems to me to be the weak and narrow institution of our minds we cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once much less any pleasure almost whilst pain possesses us the present pleasure if it be not very languid and almost none at all fills our narrow souls and so takes up the whole mind that it's scarce leaves any thought of things absent or if among our pleasures there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance yet we have so great an importance of pain that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures a little bitter mingled in our cup leaves no relish of the sweet hence it comes that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present evil which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal because under the present pain we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this the pain that anyone actually feels is still of all other the worst and it is with anguish they cry out any rather than this nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer and therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts intend to get rid of the present evil before all things as the first necessary condition of our happiness let what will follow nothing as we passionately think can exceed or almost equal the uneasiness that sets so heavy upon us and because the abstinence from the present pleasure that offers itself is a pain now often times a very great one the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does and lessons in our thoughts what is future and so forces as it were blindfold into its embraces 1665 add to this that present good or which is the same thing future pleasure especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with seldom is able to counterbalance any uneasiness either of pain or desire which is present for its greatness being no more than what shall be really tested when enjoyed men are apt enough to this and that it gives place to any present desire and conclude with themselves that when it comes to trial it may possibly not answer the report or opinion that generally passes of it they have been often found that not only what others have magnified but even what they themselves have enjoyed with great pleasure and delight upon time hence has proved and sipped more nauseous at another and therefore they seeing nothing in it for which they should forgo a present enjoyment but that this is a false way of judging when applied to the happiness of another life they must confess unless they will say God cannot make those happy he designs to be so for that being intended for a state of happiness it must certainly be agreed to everyone's wish and desire could we suppose their relishes as different there as they are here yet the manna in heaven will sit everyone's palette thus much of the wrong judgment we make of present and future pleasure and pain are compared together and so the absent considered as future end of section 17 recording by Chad section 18 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke this is a Librebox recording all Librebox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit Librebox.org recording by Chad chapter 21 of power part 4 section 66 2 as the things good or bad in their consequences and by the atness is in them to procure us good or evil in future we judge and miss several ways 1 when we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does 2 when we judge that though the consequence be of that moment yet it is not of that certain day but that it may otherwise fall out or else by some means be avoided as by industry address change repentance etc that these are wrong ways of judging were easy to show in every particular I would examine them at large sing them that I shall only mention this in general is that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding to venture a greater good or a less upon uncertain guesses and before a due examination be made proportionable to the willingness of the matter and the concern it is to us not to mistake I think everyone must confess especially if he considers the usual causes of his wrong judgment were of these following are some section 67 1 ignorance he that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable cannot acquit himself of judging to miss in advertency when a man overlooks even that this is an affected present ignorance which misleads our judgments as much as the other judging is, as it were balancing an account and determining on which side the odds lie if therefore either side we huddled up in haste and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out this precipitancy or a perfect ignorance that which most commonly causes this is a prevalence of some present type of opinion heightened by our feeble passionate nature most strongly brought on where what is present to check this precipitancy our understanding of reason was given us if we will make a righteous event to search and see and then judge their own what liberty the understanding would be to no purpose without understanding liberty if it could be would signify nothing if a man sees what would do and good our harm what would make him happy or miserable without being able to move himself one step towards or from it what is he to better perceive and he that is a liberty to ramble in perfect darkness is liberty better than if we will driven up undone as a public by the force of the world the being acted at a blind impulse from the loud or from the thin its little odds the first therefore a great use of liberty is to hinder blind precipitancy the principal exercise of freedom is to stand still open the eyes and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to do as much as the weight of the matter requires how much sloth and negligence hate and passion the prevalence of fashion are required in dispositions do severely contribute on occasion to these wrong judgments I shall not hear further require I shall only add the first judgment which I think necessary to mention because perhaps it is little taken notice of though of the influence section 68 all men desire happiness that is past doubt but as has been already observed when they are rid of pain they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand or that custom has endeared to them to rest satisfied in that and so being happy till some new desire disturbs the happiness and shows them that they are not so they look no further nor is the world determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent good for since we found that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good but one excludes another we do not fix our desires on every apparent greater good unless it may judge to be necessary to our happiness if we think we can be happy without it it moves us not this is another occasion to men are judging wrong when they take not that to be necessary to their happiness which really is so this mistake consulates us both when the choice of the current we aim at very often in the means to it when it is a removed good but which way ever it be either producing it or really it is not or by inflicting the means of not necessary to it when a man misses his great and happiness people acknowledge he does not right though it contributes to this mistake is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the actions which are lowly to this end it seeming so preposterous a thing to men to make themselves unhappy in order to have wings that they do not easily bring themselves to it section 69 the last inquiry therefore concerning this matter is whether it be in a man's heart to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies in sort of action and as to that it is plain in many cases he can men may and should correct their pallets and give relish to what either has or they suppose has done the relish of the mind is as various as that of the body and like that too may be altered and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change the displeasiness or indifference that is in actions into pleasure and desire if they will do but what is in them now a due consideration will do it in some cases and practice application and custom in most bread or tobacco may be neglected where they are shown to be useful to health because of an indifference or disrelish to be reason and consideration at first recommend and begin their trial and use, finds or custom makes unpleasant that this is so in virtue to is very certain actions are pleasing or displeasing either in themselves are considered as a means to greater or more desirable ends the eating of a well-seasoned dish suited to a man's palate may move the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating without reference to any other end to which the consideration of pleasure there is in health and strength to which a meat is subservient may add a new gusto able to make us swallow an ill relish option in the latter of these any action is rendered more or less pleasing only by the contemplation of the end and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to eat it or necessary connection with it but the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired or increased by use and practice trials often reconcile us to that which at a distance we looked on with aversion to the conditions where us into liking of what possibly in the first essay displeased us habits have powerful charms and have put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to that we cannot for dare to do or at least be easy in the omission of actions in which habitual practice is suited and thereby to us though this be very visible and everyones experience shows him he can do so yet it is a part of the conduct of men towards their happiness neglected to a degree that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox if it be said that men can make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves and thereby remedy that to which one may justly and cute a great deal of their wandering fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong notions on education and custom ill habits the just values of things are misplaced and the palates of men corrupted pains should be taken to rectify these and contrary habits change our pleasures with a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our happiness this everyone must confess he can do when happiness is lost and misery overtakes and he will confess he did a mess neglecting it and condemn himself for it and I ask everyone whether he has not often done so section 70 shall not now enlarge any further on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power whereby men mislead themselves this would make a volume and is not my business whatever false notions or shameful neglect of what is in their power may put men out of their way to happiness and distract them as we see a so different process of life this yet certain that morality established upon his true foundations cannot but determine the choice of anyone that will but consider it and he that will not be so far irrational creature as to reflect seriously upon infant happiness and misery must needs condemn himself as not making that use understanding he should the rewards and punishments of another life which he already has established as the enforcements of this law are of way enough to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility which nobody can make any doubt of he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be of the possible consequence of a good life here and a contrary state that is of a reward of abandon must own himself to judge very much on this if he does not conclude that a virtuous life with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss which may come is to be preferred to a vicious one with the fear of a dreadful state of misery which it is very possible may overtake the guilty or at best the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation this is evidently so though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain and a vicious continuum of pleasure but she is for the most part quite otherwise and wicked men are not much the odds for that of even in their present possession and then all things rightly considered have I think even the worst part here but when infinite happiness is put into one scale against infinite misery in the other if the worst that comes to the pious man if he mistakes be the best of the wicked man attuned to he be in the right who can without madness run the venture who in his wits will choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery which if he mess there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard whereas on the other side the superman ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got if his expectation comes to pass if the good man be in the right he is eternally happy if he mistakes he is not miserable he feels nothing on the other side if the wicked be in the right he is not happy if he mistakes he is infinitely miserable must it not be manifest wrong judgment and does not presently seem to put side in this case the preference is to be given I have forewarned to mention anything of the certainty or probability of future stale designing here to show the wrong judgment that anyone must allow he makes up his own principles laid I he places he prefers the short pleasure of a vicious life upon any consideration whilst he knows and cannot be but certain that a future life is at least possible section 71 to conclude this inquiry into human liberty which as it stood before I myself from the beginning fearing and a very judicious mind since the publication suspecting to have some mistake in it though he could not particularly show it me I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter wherein lighting up on a very easy and scarce observable step I had me in and putting one seemingly indifferent word for another in that discovery I was given to me this present view which here in this edition I submit to the learned world on which in short is this liberty is a power to act or not to act according as the mind directs of order to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the will that which in our voluntary actions determines the will to any change or determines the will to any change of operation is some present uneasiness which is or at least is always accompanied with that desire desire is always moved by either good flight because total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness may every greater good is not constantly moved desire because it may not make or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness for all that we desire is only to be happy but though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action till we have naturally examined whether the particular of our own good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness or be consistent or inconsistent with it the result of our judgment upon that examination of what ultimately determines the man who could not be free if as well were determined by anything by his own desire guided by his own judgment I know that liberty by some is placed in an indifference of the man antecedent to the determination as well I wish they would lose so much stress on such an antecedent indifference as they call it I told us plainly whether this supposed indifference antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding as well as to the degree of the will for it is pretty hard to state it between them i.e. immediately after the judgment of the understanding and before the determination of the will because the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding and to place liberty in an indifference antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness wherein we can neither see nor say anything of it at least it places it in a subject incapable of it no agent being allowed capable of liberty but in consequence of the judgment I am not nice about phrases and therefore consent to say with those that love to speak so that liberty is placed in indifference but it is an indifference which remains after the judgment of the understanding yea even after the determination of the will and that is an indifference not of the man for after he has once judged which is best viz to do or for burn he is no longer indifferent but an indifference of the upgrade of powers of the man which remaining equally be able to operate or to prepare upgrading after as before the decree of the will or in a state which may be called indifference and as far as this indifference reaches a man is free and no further for example I have the ability to move my hand or to let it rest and my operative power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand I am then in that respect perfectly free my will determines that operative power to rest I am yet free because the indifference of that my operative power to act or not to act still remains the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will which at present orders rest the indifference of that power to act or not to act is just as it was before as will appear if the will puts it to the trial by ordering the contrary or if during the rest of my hand it be seized by a sudden pulse the indifference of that operative power is gone and with it my liberty I have no longer freedom in that respect but I am under a necessity of letting my hand rest on the other side if my hand be put into motion by a convulsion the indifference of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion and my liberty in that case is lost or I am under a necessity of letting my hand move I have added this to show in what sort of indifference liberty seems to me to consist and what in any other real or imaginary section 72 true notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty are so great importance that I hope I shall be pardoned in this digression which my attempt to explain it has led me into the idea of will addition, liberty and necessity in this chapter of power came naturally in my way in the former edition of this treatise I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them according to the light I then had and now as a lover of truth I am not a worshipper I own some change on my opinion which I think I have discovered ground for and what I first read I with an unbiased indifference followed truth whether I thought she learned but neither being so being as to fancy and thought the ability nor so disingenuous as to disemble my mistakes as a lover of blemishing my reputation I have with the same sincere design for truth only not being shamed to publish what a severe inquiry I suggest it it is not impossible but that some may think my former notions right and some as I have already found these latter I shall not at all wonder at this variety immense opinions impartial deductions of reason incontroverted points being so rare and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy especially if of any length and therefore I should think myself not a little beholden to anyone who would upon these other grounds fairly clear the subject of liberty from any difficulties that may yet remain before I close this chapter it may perhaps be to our purpose and help to give us clearer conceptions about power if we make our thoughts take a little more exact survey of action I have said before the way of ideas two sorts of action this, motion and thinking these in truth though called incontroverted actions yet if nearly considered will not be found to be always perfectly so for if I mistake not there are instances of both kinds which upon due consideration will be found rather passions than actions and consequently so far the effects barely of passive powers in those subjects which yet on their accounts are thought agents for in these instances the substance that have motion or thought receives the impression where it is put into that action purely from without and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent and such a power is not properly an active power but a capacity in the subject sometimes the substance or agent puts itself into action by its own power and this is properly active power whatsoever modification a substance has whereby it reduces any effect that is called action for example a solid substance by motion operates on or alters the sensible ideas of another substance and therefore this modification of motion we call action but yet this motion in that solid substance is when rightly considered but a passion if it received it only from some external agent so that the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself or in another substance when addressed so likewise in thinking a power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of any external substance is called a power of thinking but this is a passive power or capacity but to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight of one's own choice and to compare which of them one thinks fit this is an active power this reflection may be of some use to preserve us from the stakes about powers and actions which grammar and a common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into since what is signified by verbs that Vermarians call active does not always signify action for example this proposition I see them in or a star or I feel the heat of the sun though expressed by a verb active does not signify any action in me whereby I operate on those substances but the perception of the ideas of light roundness and heat wherein I am not active but barely passive and cannot in that position my eyes or body avoid receiving them but when I turn my eyes another way or remove my body out of the sun beams properly active because of my own choice I are within myself I put myself into that motion such an action is the product of active power section 73 and thus I have in a short draft of our original ideas from whence all the rest are derived and of which they are made up which if I would consider as a philosopher an examine on what causes they depend and of what they are made I believe they all might be just to these very few primary unoriginal ones viz, extension solidity, mobility or the power of being moved which by our senses we receive from body perceptivity with power of perception or thinking, utility or the power of moving which by reflection we receive from our minds I bravely to make use of these two new words to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal to which if we an existence duration number which belong both to the one and the other we have perhaps all the original ideas on which the rest depend for by these I imagine might be explained the nature of colours, sounds tastes, smells and all other ideas we have if we had the faculties acute enough to receive the severally modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us but my present purpose being only to inquire into the knowledge the mind has of things by those ideas and appearances which God has fitted it to receive from it and how the mind comes by that knowledge rather than into their causes or manner of production I shall not contrary to the design of this essay, set myself to inquire philosophically into the particular constitutional bodies and the configuration of parts whereby we have the power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities I shall not enter any further into that disposition it's suffice to my purpose to observe that gold or saffron as a power to produce in us the idea of yellow and snow or milk the idea of white which we can only have by our side without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies or the particular figures and motion of the particles rebonded from them to cause in us that particular sensation though when we go beyond their ideas in our minds and would inquire into their causes we cannot conceive anything else to be in any sensible object whereby it produces different ideas in us but the different bulk figure, number texture and motion of its insensible parts end of section 18 recording by child section 19 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Franklin Pios chapter 22 of mixed modes 1 having treated of simple modes in the foregoing chapters and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them to show what they are and how we come by them we are now in the next place to consider those we call mixed modes such are the complex ideas we mark by the names abdication, drunkenness, ally, etc. which consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds I have called mixed modes to distinguish them from the more simple modes which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind these mixed modes being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristic marks of any real beings that have a steady existence but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances 2. that the mind in respect to its simple ideas is wholly passive and receives them all from the existence and operations of things such as sensation or reflection offers them without being able to make any one idea experience shows us but if we attentively consider these ideas are called mixed modes we are now speaking of we shall find their original quite different the mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations 4. it being once furnished with simple ideas it can put them together in several compositions and so make variety of complex ideas without examining whether they exist and so together in nature and hence I think it is that these ideas are called notions as if they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things and to form such ideas it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together and that they were consistent in the understanding without considering whether they had any real being though I did not deny several of them might be taken from observation and the existence of several simple ideas so combined as they are put together in the understanding 4. the man who first framed the idea of hypocrisy might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not or else unframed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by it is evident that in the beginning of languages and societies of men several of those complex ideas which were consequent to the constitutions established and most of them must needs have been in the minds of men before they existed anywhere else and that many means that stood for such complex ideas were in use and so those ideas framed before the combinations they stood for ever existed 3. indeed now that languages are made and abound with words standing for some combinations unusual way of getting these complex ideas is by the explication of those terms that stand for them 4. consisting of a company of simple ideas combined they may by words standing for those simple ideas be represented to the mind of those who understands those words though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things thus a man may come to have an idea of sacrilege or murder by enumerating to him the simple ideas which these words stand for without ever seeing either of them committed 4. every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas it seems reasonable to inquire since it has its unity and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea since that combination does not always exist together in nature to which i answer it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas together and considering them as one complex one consisting of those parts and the mark of this union that which is looked on generally to complete it is one name given to that combination for it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas to make one complex one but such collections as there be names for thus though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea as the killing a man's father yet there be no name standing precisely for the one as there is the name for parasite to mark the other it is not taken for a particular complex idea nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a young man or any other man 5. if we should inquire a little further we see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct and as it were settled modes and neglect others which in the nature of things themselves have as much an aptness to be combined and make distinct ideas we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language which being to mark or communicate men's thoughts to one another with all the dispatch that may be they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes and affix names to it as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation leaving others which they have but seldom an occasion to mention those and without names that tie them together they rather choosing to enumerate when they have need such ideas as make them up by the particular names that stand for them than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of 6. This shows us how it comes to pass that there are in any language many particular words which cannot be rendered by one single word of another for the several fashions customs and manners of one nation making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one which another people have had never an occasion to make or perhaps so much as they might notice names come of course to be annexed to them to avoid long paraphrases and things of daily conversation and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds thus Ostracismos the most Greeks and Prosciptio the most Romans were words which other languages had no names that exactly answer because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the men of other nations there was no custom there was no notion of any such actions no use of such combination of ideas as were united and as it were tied together by those terms and therefore in other countries there were no names for them 7. Hence also we may see the reason why languages constantly change take up new and lay by old terms because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about new names to avoid long descriptions are annexed to them and so they become new species of complex modes what a number of different ideas are by this means wraps up in one short sound and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved anyone will see who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either reprive or extend for and instead of either of those names use a peripheries to make anyone understand their meaning 8. Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when I come to treat a words and their use yet I could not avoid to take this much notice here of the names of mixed modes which by fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas which have but a short existence anywhere in the minds of men and there too have no longer an existence than whilst they are thought on have not so much anywhere the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their names which are therefore in the sort of ideas very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves. 4. If we should inquire where the idea of a triumph or apotheosis exists it is evident that we could neither of them exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves being actions that required time to their performance and so could never all exist together and as to the minds of men where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged they have there too a very uncertain existence and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us. 9. There are therefore three ways whereby to get these complex ideas of mixed modes 1. By experience and observation of things themselves thus by seeing two men wrestle fence we get the idea of wrestling or fencing 2. By invention or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds so he that first invented printing or etching had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way by explaining the names of actions we never saw or emotions we cannot see and by enumerating and thereby as it were setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up and are the constituent parts of them for having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas and by use get the names that stand for them we can by those means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows and has with us the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas of which they are compounded and originally made up though perhaps their immediate ingredients as I may so say are also complex ideas thus the mixed mode which the word lies stands is made of these simple ideas 1. Articulate sounds 2. Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker 3. Those words the signs of those ideas 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or negation otherwise then the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need that go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one which from what has been said he cannot but be able to make out of himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever which however compounded and decompounded may at last be resolved into simple ideas which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas if we consider what is inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone afford us. How far than mixed modes which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas and their infinite modes are from being few and scanty we may easily imagine so that before we have done we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope encompass enough for his thoughts to range in though they be as I pretend confined only to simple ideas received from sensation or reflection and there are several combinations. 10. It is worth our observing which of all our simple ideas have been most modified and had most mixed ideas made out of them with names given to them and those have been these three thinking and motion which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action and power from when these actions are conceived to flow these simple ideas I say of thinking motion and power have been those which have been most modified and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes with names to them for action being the great business of mankind and the whole matter about which all loss are conversant it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of the ideas of them observed and laid up in the memory and have names assigned to them without which loss could be but ill made and disorders repressed nor could any communication be well had the most men without such complex ideas with names to them and therefore men have settled names and supposed settle ideas in their minds of modes of actions distinguished by their causes means, objects ends, instruments time, place and others circumstances and also their powers stated for those actions vg boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend before others without fear or disorder and the greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name paresha which power or ability in man and doing anything when it has been acquired by a frequent doing the same thing is that idea we name habit when it is forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action we call it disposition thus testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry to conclude let us examine any modes of action vg consideration and ascent which are actions of the mind running and speaking which are actions of the body revenge and murder which are actions of both together and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas which together make up the complex ones signified by those names 11 power being the source from whence all action proceeds the substances wherein these powers are when they exert their power into acts are called causes and the substances which they're upon are produced or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power are called effects the efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced is called in the subject exerting that power action but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced it is called passion which efficacy however various and the effects almost infinite yet we can I think conceive it in intellectual agents to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing incorporeal agents nothing else but modifications of action I say I think we can conceive it to be any other but these two for whatever sort of action besides these produce any effects I confess myself to have no notion nor idea all and so it is quite remote from my thoughts apprehensions and knowledge and as much in the dark to me as five other senses or as the ideas of colors to a blind man and therefore many words may seem to express action signify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all but barely the effect with some circumstances of the subject wrought on or cause operating VG creation inhalation contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are reduced but barely of the cause and the thing done and when a countryman says the code freezes water though the word freezing seems to import some action yet truly signifies nothing but the effect this that water was before fluid is become hard and consistent without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done 12 I think I should not need to remark here that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes marked by names and the familiar in the minds and mouths of men yet other simple ideas and their several combinations are not excluded much less I think will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled with names to them that would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity ethics law and politics and several other sciences and that is requisite to my present design is to show what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes how the mind comes by them and that there are combinations made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection which I suppose I have done end of section 19 recording by Franklin Diaz