 Thank you, Lars-Erik. Sorry that I'm not in the room there, but I hope it works this way as well. So let me start by thanking the four presenters for their thought-provoking presentations. I think the presentations, we've heard were excellent, and it's absolute pleasure for me to be able to comment on these presentations and offer some reflections from my part. I think each of the presentation has a very interesting research question, and the presentation and the associated research is really based on fascinating original data collection and very meticulous empirical analysis. I also think the findings that come out are interesting. They are interesting not only because they help us understand new theoretical and empirical issues that are involved in these questions, but they're also important because they have important policy implications, and the presenters haven't spoken a lot about this in their presentation, and I will be asking some questions maybe to get them to reflect on that a little bit. Now having said this, I have to say it's quite a challenge to find common threads or themes across these papers. Given that they analyze and study very different topics, very different questions, focus on different time periods and different geographical locations, yet for me I think there are two important themes or conclusions that come out of these four presentations. The first one is the fact that these presentations on the score that the role identities, ethnic or otherwise, as a cause or a contributing factor to conflict or the development of peaceful societies remains a hugely important field of study. Now despite the extensive body of research that has emerged on these issues in the last 20 years or so, I think many questions and issues are not well researched and not well understood, and I think these presentations show us that there are indeed a lot of issues left to be researched and investigated. Now a second important theme that I think I want to highlight here and draw out of this presentation is most closely associated with the presentation of Mareike. Mareike in our paper with Bert and Reginas analyzed the political representation and particularly how political representation is being perceived in Rwanda and Burundi, and given the fact that people act and react on the basis of their perceptions of reality, I agree with these authors that it's indeed crucial to better understand what drives these perceptions of political representation, but more than that, I think we should not only be interested in understanding and analyzing how political representation or political inequalities are being perceived, but I think it's crucial for us to better understand how perceptions of other types of inequalities, be it in the economic sphere or in the social sphere of regarding cultural status are being perceived by individuals and group in society, and the reason why this is so important, in my view, is that for long-term stability and durable peace, perceptions of these inequalities, of these group-based inequalities or horizontal inequalities, are crucially important. Now, in the reminder of my brief commentary, and I think I have 10 more minutes left, I will provide some comments and raise some questions concerning each of the presentations. My questions, as I said before, will not only be focusing on some of the theoretical arguments that are being put forward by the presenters, but I also aimed at getting insights from the presenters regarding possible policy implications of their research for countries coming out of conflict or countries in search of durable peace. Now, let me get to the first presentation by Mareike. The presentation by Mareike is based on a paper by Bert Ingellara and Mareike and Reginas, and as I said before, it focuses on perceptions of political representation in Rwanda and Burundi, two countries that have experienced widespread ethnic violence at different times in their post-colonial history. Now, for me, this presentation and the associated paper is special for two reasons. Most importantly, this presentation is special because it's based on the work and research that was initiated and to a large extent conducted by Bert Ingellara, who, as Mareike mentioned in our presentation, is unfortunately no longer with us. Now, Bert was not only a wonderful person, but he also was a truly outstanding researcher and undoubtedly one of the experts with regard to conflicts in the Great Lake region in Africa. And I applaud Mareike and Reginas for their excellent efforts in further developing and writing up Bert's research. The second reason why the research presented by Mareike and Reginas is hugely important is because it addresses an issue which is not well understood and has not received sufficient research attention. As mentioned earlier, perceptions of political representation and inequalities are not widely studied, are not widely understood, despite established linkages between inequality, especially group-based or horizontal inequality, and the emergence or reemergence of violent conflict. I thought of paper that I was sent off a fascinating read. I have a couple of questions and I will limit it in the interest of time to two questions. The first question, if I have understood the paper correctly in the presentation, is that improvements in perceptions of political representation after the conflict, particularly in Rwanda, was mainly driven by improvements in people's perceived substantive representation. I think this is an interesting finding and it suggests, I think at least, that a regime that delivers in terms of developmental outcomes will be seen to be representative. Now this seems to be quite similar to China's model or social contract it has with its people. But if perceptions of political representation are based too much on developmental outcomes, and hence a regime has only outcome legitimacy, will such a situation not inevitably lead to sharp swings in political support for the political regime in charge and possibly result in occasional bouts of political instability, tensions and possibly conflict. A second question relates to the demography aspect. In both Burundi and Rwanda, Tutsis represent about 15% of the total population and Hutus about 85% of the population. How do groups demographic shares in the total population relate to perceptions of political representation? Are people aware of these large differences in population size? And how does this awareness or lack thereof affect their perceptions of political representation? Let me move on to the second presentation, the presentation by Rin Shan on the hybrid governance and conflict in Pakistan Northwest Frontier. I think it's interesting to draw attention, I think it's important to draw attention to the fact of the lasting legacies of colonialism and also the fact that colonialism should not be seen as a uniform event, in particular if you want to understand institutional differences and or differences in institutional arrangements and state society relations, it's important to take these elements into account. I have two, I guess two questions I want to relate, I want to put forward here. On the one hand is the presenter stated that hybrid forms of governance are much more fluid and unstable and cause much more instability and hence fluidity of governance systems are presented as something that is detrimental and negative. I was wondering whether a situation in which this fluidity can actually become a strength rather than a weakness or a problematic characteristic of a particular governance system. Second question relates to the fact that to the statement that hybrid governance arrangements are not very short resistant according to the analysis and hence this makes them more conflict prone. I'm wondering in this regard what can and should be done in the short term and long term respectively to reduce the conflict risk of such institutional arrangements. Can hybrid governance arrangements be made more shock resistant or is the only way to reduce the risk of conflict in the situation, the introduction of more formal government arrangements or more formal institutions of conflict management. Let me quickly move on to the third presentation by Omar. Now in his presentation he focused on a number of theoretical and empirical findings and insights which he developed more fully in his excellent book The Path to Genocide in Rwanda. I think the book is highly original and offers very interesting new ways of thinking about violence and mobilization in Rwanda and beyond and I have one question I want to ask regarding the third point that Omar was making and the link between radicalization and violence in this respect I just remind everyone he argues that radicalization can not only lead to violence but the violence can also lead to radicalization and indeed he argues convincingly I think that causation runs in both direction. Now while the argument rings true to me intuitively and also theoretically it's still not really clear to me how pervasive or universal the connection from conflict to radicalization is. So I want to pose the question on the which circumstances is violent conflicts likely to result in the radicalization of people. Are all people equally susceptible to become radicalized or are some people immune and can withstand pressures to radicalize and and and commit Rwanda's acts of violence. Moving on to the last presentation but on the question whether primary education has decreased the likelihood of insurgency in Turkey. That's obviously an interesting question and in the literature on education and conflict it's a well-known fact I would say that education has two phases and on the one hand it can it's argued to contribute to comfort, to peace by some of the mechanisms that Tugba has nicely set out but there's also a lot of literature showing that education might actually be a contributing factor to violent conflict. I think about schools and a national curricula that are being used to indoctrate young people. I may actually be used to disseminate hate and polarize people. So understanding on the which circumstances and in which context education is likely to contribute to peace stability and social cohesion and in which scenarios and in which cases it leads or might lead to conflict and violent group mobilization is a crucial question because it's also one of the areas where we think we can have an influence on creating long-term stability. Now the results of the paper are interesting in that regard that the prevalence and availability in this regard of primary education did not lead to an insurgent or a decrease insurgency participation quite the contrary and Tugba in a conclusion speaks about a possible backlash effect of the adoption and introduction of centralized education with a national curriculum and a national institutions structuring and structuring the educational curricula. Now I want to ask a question about that more specifically I would like Tugba to reflect maybe a little bit more on which circumstances in which circumstances such a backlash is more likely or less likely to occur and how can we actually avoid such a backlash from occurring. I will leave it at that. I will look forward to our discussion and I thank the presenters for their very nice presentations. Thank you. Thank you so much Arnim for really extensive comments and a lot of food for thought for our presenters but I'm not going to turn over the word to them as of yet because I think we should allow the audience to put a few questions. We are running behind schedule and I'm going to allow this panel to run over time just a few minutes so I hope there are going to there's going to be no starvation in the room in the interim but I would like to invite everyone or anyone to stick up a hand and we will hand over a microphone. I think we have one question here so would you please we can start over here. Yes and some thoughts are for Rinchen actually. So first and maybe you have this in the list of robustness checks but are you able to look at kind of trends between these places in the pre-colonial time just to show that you know they were kind of similar in other things even before colonization so maybe data from gazetteers or so on just to look at before as well and the second was that in terms of the in terms of the different types of mechanisms I mean you showed us the mechanisms that you think are plausible but also the ones that are maybe not plausible so maybe political shifts or things that you think are not to happen and then third also this you mentioned that there's a rise in violence against state is is it true that there is no rise or the difference across the discontinuity but you know for other types of violence is that unchanged and if yes that would be interesting to see sorry I took too long. No no that's fine so please also for the following interventions try to be as brief as possible so we are able to give the panel a chance to respond please. Hi I had a question for the last presenter on the education for the Kurdish so in terms of mechanisms why do you think education would lead to more conflict is it because of the nature of the curriculum and the nature of what is taught which which gives rise to this identity issue or are there other things which might also be different in the places where education there's more education versus less education are there other factors can you rule out other factors of reasons for conflict in your robustness checks. Hello I'm Baibi Karnista from UNVM and just linking to the panel session we had earlier where somebody said it's always about resources and and power over them so I wanted to ask in your research about ethnicity and perceived ethnicity did you see links how that was used ethnicity for getting access to resources and and their decision-making and how that affected inclusion thank you. So I have one question for Rinjan that do you also test and see whether there are differences in public good availability between these two areas so in line with like banner jire papers that show divergence in public good provisional effecting welfare and I have one question for Tukpa that in terms of the language of instruction when it changes to the national language do you observe larger school dropouts for for people for whom that's not their home language so I'm kind of thinking that would also have future labor market implications and increased resentment for that kind of an instruction. Thank you so much I have two questions one for Malike I think I want to understand why is colonial legacy so stubborn in the case of Pakistan and my question to Omar I think when you were talking about the role of emotions I think I understood the argument that you are trying to make and my question was how do you know that people when they are assessing you know when they are trying to exercise their rationality that they have good quality information because I would say maybe how can you account for the possibility of maybe over evaluating one's capabilities without taking into account the emotions because you know as human beings we are also favorable you know we can have our limitations when we are assessing situations thank you. In any case at this point I think we have to close the questions from the audience and we're going to turn to the members the speakers and so we're going to go in the same order as before and I think each speaker has roughly two minutes so be selective you don't have to answer all questions you can talk to the people in the room but in particular please try to respond to Arnim's points so please go ahead especially to Arnim for for intervening from distance and also for expressing again his appreciation for Bert's work we really appreciate that and his family as well who is following online today and of course we try to continue the legacy of his work but it is of course with mixed feelings as we would rather have him with us so Arnim made two comments the one was indeed if the legitimacy of a regime is only based on substantive representation it is fragile it's vulnerable to economic shocks and I share your concern on the other hand if you look at the data and certainly at the milestone moments of formalistic representation where descriptive representation is agreed upon or brought in practice you see that even Hutu in Havana experience or report a search in perceived political representation which means that they no longer associate the regime just with an ethnic identity so I think at least my reading of the data is that besides the substantive representation this policy of reconciliation also is entering the hearts and minds of people after a while but it took time but it could be that after a while indeed salience has decreased of ethnicity has decreased to such a point that this vulnerability to a drop in substantive representation has has also lowered but of course time will tell and any shock also I mean any ethnic incident even in the neighboring country Bohundi like Omar said could could actually spark these feelings again then on demography people know that Tutsi are a minority of about 15% and Hutu a majority of 85% and actually if you see the power sharing in Bohundi the Tutsi minority of 15% demographic minority has ethnic quotas of 40% which is quite generous certainly if you compare it to the Hutu majority in Havana who lost the monopoly on power and as de facto maybe 40% of ministerial portfolios but this is not public data it's based on our own investigations of the identity of power holders in in Havana and I have zero minutes but I will just say that in terms of resources in Havana Bohundi it's rather the scarcity of resources than the abundance of resources that plays a role in the violence in particular to mobilize people and motivate them to fight. Hi I'll be I'll be quick to respond to the questions that were asked thanks Arnim for for for your very important questions with regards to you mentioned fluidity is presented as a negative could fluidity be a strength I would say that it's more about fragility of the hybrid governance system or institution rather than the fluidity and it was fragile in the sense that it you know it was a it was a colonial era system that was put in place where sovereignty was shared by the center with tribal elites on the ground they were given some form of autonomy in terms of you know kind of maintaining political order in their areas but also the state had implemented some exceptional legal instruments and arrangements whereby they could from time to time in fact interact and intervene when they felt that you know the social order was close to collapsing or it did indeed collapse in the colonial era with with you know conflicts happening in in these tribal areas so this system which was fragile was adopted by with some modifications by the post-colonial independent state in Pakistan which then basically with these minor modifications continued pretty much up until the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 which is where we show this unlocking and violence so in answer to one of the questions that were raised by the audience do you have any pre trends essentially we see no difference between hybrid and non-hybrid areas prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan it's only that shock that you know unlocks this so the result I showed I didn't manage to show one of the further supplementary results was that the the difference in conflict between hybrid and non-hybrid areas is primarily driven by the post 2001 era the post US invasion era so there's you know this system remarkably fragile system worked well in managing conflict but then but then when a shock happens the fragility of this system is such to shocks that that that you know violence unlocks itself with regards to Arnim second question what could be a possible solution with regards vis-a-vis these hybrid areas in fact your suggestion Arnim is absolutely on point we need more formalized institutions in these areas right we need more formal forms of conflict management we need police presence we need formalized courts constitutional courts and we need electoral politics to kind of penetrate further the Pakistani state has formally de jure introduce you know kind of elections and district administration in these areas but de facto none of it has has really taken place on the ground and this de jure change even happened very recently so let's see you know that's something that that remains to be seen on the ground and in in answer to one of the questions one final question about you know differences in public goods that is something that we for sure are going to test I showed you balance on climatic as well as geographic dimensions but public goods dimension is another one that we want to show the balance test for for spatial rd but one of the thing is because the variation that we're picking up in our rd estimation comes from such a narrow buffer zone around the hybrid border we feel that even public goods provision things like roads or rail rail roads or you know other kinds of public infrastructure hopefully the balance test will will will pass but that's something that we're going to incorporate as the next step in ideas thank you thanks so I try to make three points in two minutes in the reverse order that they were posed so there was a question from this gentleman about how do we know whether emotions are driving the decisions that we make and it's a kind of relevant question if we think about what's going on in Ukraine at the moment and the way that we frame Putin's decision on the one hand we he's framed as you know he's lost it right he's emotional on the other hand perhaps it isn't that perhaps it that he's simply you know he can make a calculation and he simply made a miscalculation that that that there would be as much resistance and there would be as much support as there was in Ukraine so the answer to the question is it's really obviously very difficult to know what's going on inside the mind of an individual it doesn't stop psychologists from having a go though there is quite an extensive body of research where they do try to cue individuals with emotions to see how that affects their decision making processes in my case i'm simply inferring from observed behavior and coming up with the most theoretically reasonable explanation which in my view was it's a combination of both cognitive and effective processes there was a question about the role of resources and ethnicity yes i mean this panel is entitled ethnicity inequality and i and something else but resources obviously do matter when it comes to inequality but i would actually go back to i guess the 19th century into vapor so vapor when he talks about inequality he talks about three different bases of inequality of which resources by which he means economic material resources is only one the other is power and moica talked about how political power is a very important driver of conflict and also reconciliation after conflict but also prestige or status and this is more closely in line with what i've been looking at about symbolic and identity and things that are much more intangible to be able to measure but prestige as a very important dimension of inequality it kind of explains why it is that for example poor non-college educated whites in the united states vote against their material interests and vote for the republican party despite its redistribution preferences and then anum um thank you by the way anum for uh anum but so you should know only knew that i was going to present my book about 48 hours ago and i sent him the link to the e-copy i i don't believe anum would have had the time to do so but nonetheless i appreciate the fact that he engaged with the point so anum asks me about the third point about radicalization being a consequence of violence so and he asked specifically the question of well is it true that everybody is equally susceptible no no there is individual heterogeneity um from from a social science perspective what we would want to know about this heterogeneity is the distribution of the heterogeneity uh across societies and across time you only have to look at some of the classic psychosocial work um on violence for example Stanley Milgram's experiments from the 1960 philips and daros experiments from the 1970 solemn ash's experiments from 1950s we take all that research and we think well that means that in anybody's capable of committing violence under the right circumstances what we often miss in that research is that we look at the sample sizes there's actually quite a significant number of people who do not turn the dial all the way to the very end in the case of Stanley Milgram's experiment and who refuse to become abusive prison guards in the case of Solomon Ash's experiment so clearly there is individual heterogeneity because individuals differ in their disposition towards violence and therefore by extension to their susceptibility to radicalization okay so uh should i stand up or okay so uh about Arnim's question regarding where we could see this backlash effect most I think this completely depends on the nature of the education curriculum in a country and how exclusive or inclusive it is unfortunately because this is a very hard thing to identify and measure across different countries as far as I know there is no data that we can use to measure that or to see where we can see this backlash effect but I think the content of education the educational content of the curriculum and also the rituals embedded in the education system are very important and how exclusive they are will determine how much backlash they will receive in terms of participation of participation and insurgency I think um a second question was about how this backlash effect like occurs in practice so I think being excluded from like the school like if you see as a member of a minority group if you see yourself or your identity or culture if it's being excluded from curriculum or school content this is likely to create some grievance even if it's not like about material material circumstances this will still mean that you're excluded from some area that belongs to you originally and therefore this may actually induce grievances as is the case with like economic grievances and of course it's a big threat to group identity and against this threat it's very likely that this backlash effect may give incentives to some young people to join insurgencies and there was another question about how much student enrollment is given that the instruction language is not Kurdish or there are no Kurdish schools yes this is I mean the enrollment rate I mean historically was always lower for Kurdish areas and the compliance rate of course with mandatory compulsory education is very low in Kurdish areas of course this is not only a function of ethnicity but other things like the power of local elites and how much they are allies with the newly founded republic but still this affected students enrollment rates and probably future social and economic outcomes made it would like to like everyone to join me in thanking the presenters and the discussant for excellent work and excellent input so and I would also want to apologize for going over time with this panel I mean if I done this this in Switzerland I probably would have been fired but anyway I wish you all the bon appetit all the sponsored participants please remember to drop by the travel support office at the library yes join this break thank you