 Well, good morning. My name is George Moose, and I have the great privilege of serving as the vice chair of the board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace. And it's my pleasure this morning to welcome you to the ninth event in our bipartisan congressional dialogue series. It's a platform that we created about a year and a half, two years ago. For members of Congress, working from opposite sides of the aisle to discuss their shared concerns, shared goals, and shared priorities. And we are especially honored today to have with us two foreign policy leaders in the Congress, congressman Ed Case from Hawaii, congressman John Rutherford from Florida, whose work on national security issues embodies that spirit of bipartisanship. This bipartisan spirit is indeed something that is native, inherent to USIP, bringing people together from different viewpoints to tackle challenging national security issues. It has been at the heart of USIP's mission since our founding in 1984 by the Congress as an independent, nonpartisan, national institute with a mission of reducing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflicts abroad. I would like to make a special note that we have with us today four representatives of the US Military Academy and the US Naval Academy, West Point cadets Isaac Ford and Mason Lee, and Naval Academy midshipmen Juliette O'Brien and Laura Spratling. We're delighted to have them with us this summer there. These future military leaders will be working alongside USIP experts to learn peace-building techniques and to gain practical experience that we believe will be important to them in their careers as military leaders. We're grateful for their service and pleased that they could be with us this morning. The US Institute of Peace has a long and important role as a platform for convening policymakers, practitioners, and experts from across sectors, political viewpoints to tackle some of the most. We have some static going on here, and I'm not quite sure where it's coming from. To tackle some of the most important foreign policy issues we face as a nation is the purpose that brings us together today for a discussion of China's use of economic and military coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and how to address it. Over the past decade, China has shown a growing inclination to flex its muscle on the international stage, investing heavily in countries across Asia and Africa and elsewhere, and playing a more active role in regional and international conflicts. Since last year, USIP has convened a series of bipartisan senior study groups to examine China's influence on conflict dynamics around the world most recently with regard to North Korea and Burma. We are therefore especially pleased that Congressman Case and Congressman Rutherford, at their own initiative, volunteered to come to the Institute to share their views on this important issue. Representative Case and Rutherford are both members of the House Appropriations Committee, and they recently traveled to the Indo-Pacific, to the Philippines in particular, to see firsthand the impact of China's growing influence in the region. Congressman Case represents Hawaii's first district, which, given its location in the Pacific, has a deeply vested interest in economic and security stability in Asia. His district is also home to the US Indo-Pacific command. Congressman Case also has a special relationship to USIP, having worked for the late Senator Spark Matsunaga, who was the leader of congressional efforts to establish the US Institute of Peace 35 years ago. Let me assure you, Congressman Case, that we are honored to carry that mantle and to carry forward Senator Matsunaga's commitment to building peace in the world. Congressman Rutherford represents Florida's fourth district, which is home to some of the nation's premier naval, national guard, and Marine Corps installations that support the United States presence in the world, but also in the Indo-Pacific. These include the Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, the naval station in Mayport, the Florida National Guard's 125th Fighter Wing, and the Marine Corps' Blout Island Facility. Congressman Rutherford also has a long and distinguished career in public service, having spent more than four decades in law enforcement. Under his leadership, homicide and violent crime in Jacksonville dropped to a 40-year low. Congressman Case, Congressman Rutherford, we are grateful to you for being here today, and we are also pleased that you have chosen USIP as a venue for sharing your thoughts about this important part of the world and the challenges that the United States faces there. For those of you who are following this event online, and we believe there are many of you, I want to invite you to join the conversation on Twitter at USIP using the hashtag BipartisanUSIP. And with that, please join me in welcoming to the stage Congressman Case, Congressman Rutherford, and please, I've enjoyed both of us. Yes, and let me first then invite Congressman Case to offer some opening remarks, and then we will be followed by Congressman Rutherford. And then we'll have a moderated conversation for a few minutes before opening it up to the audience for questions. Cool. Thank you. Good morning. Morning. Aloha, as we say in Hawaii. Happy summer solstice. Yes. Ambassador Congressman, honored guests, it's a great pleasure to be with you here today. And I'm especially honored, Ambassador, that you have recognized my political mentor, a US Senator, Spark Motsanaga. I started working for then House member, Spark Motsanaga, 44 years ago this summer as a summer intern. And he really corrupted the rest of my life because here I am 44 years later representing the same district that he represented in Congress. And he had many, many interests. But one of the interests that he had was peace. And when I joined him 44 years ago, he was already well into the concept that we should have dedicated institutes that focus on peace. He advocated for a department of peace. And over the years, he continued to advocate for that as he got to the United States Senate. And in 1984, he realized his dream when the public law was passed that created this institute. And so I think that he would look back on what he had conceived and would have been very, very proud. And frankly, I'm honored to follow in that legacy and to be with you today. Couple of disclaimers up front. First of all, I'm completely grateful to USIP and my colleague John Rutherford for this opportunity to discuss China. But I will say up front that I don't regard myself in any way, shape, or form as a, quote, China expert. Like many of you in the audience who are a China expert who have spent your lives focusing on China and are going to focus perhaps the rest of your lives if you have a career in front of you on China, whether it be a military career or a diplomatic career or not NGO career. But I do pretend to be one American who, being born and raised in Hawaii and whose life goes back generations in Hawaii. And for whom, Asia is all around me every day. And for whom, when I am in my district, Asia is actually closer to me than is Washington, DC. I do pretend to be an American who has focused on China and Asia for a lifetime and who has lived it really in many ways. And then I also pretend to be, of course, one member of Congress charged with the responsibility, the responsibility to make the decisions that are available and possible on a relationship that I believe will define our world for the next generation. So my job is to make those decisions. And so in that context, I think there's two pieces of good news to leave with you at the very beginning. First of all, I consider it very good news that the interest in China inside Congress is much, much higher than it was only a decade ago. I served in Congress from O2 to O7, then I took a little 12-year hiatus. And so I remember O2 to O7 versus now. And I can tell you that in O2 to O7, there wasn't a whole bunch of discussion of China inside Congress. Yes, many people were completely focused on it, but not across the board, not as a broad-based concern and interest in the ranks of the members of Congress who are responsible for these decisions. So that has very much changed today. China is very much at the forefront of everybody's thinking. And then the second piece of good news I hope is demonstrated by the fact that John and I are here to talk to you. And that is that China is a bipartisan, nonpartisan issue for the most part. I don't really sense a whole bunch of deep divisions over whether China is a concern to us. We may disagree from time to time, even within our own parties on the best way forward with China. But the good news is that we all agree that we need to do something about China, contrary to 10, 20 years ago when either China was not particularly front and center, or if we talked about it, it was not particularly an area of agreement. So I do ask you to accept my remarks both here and during the Q&A as really the evolving thinking of one member, which I believe is likely shared by many members. This is what a member of Congress thinks about China. I think it's always important when we get into these discussions to kind of try to dispense with some of the base questions to set the context for the discussion. Now I realize that by jumping through these base questions, I'm making some assumptions that you may disagree with. But I'm going to articulate my base questions and cut to the chase so that we can get to the discussion that follows. First of all, what does China want? I believe China wants to extend its power and influence as widely and broadly as it can. If it can get all the way to be the global hegemon, then that would be its goal. But its goal is to extend its power and influence as widely as broadly as it can. And why is that? Because it believes that it is a matter of its renaissance, is a great nation, a great power. It is its destiny. What will China do to get there? Anything it can. China, if anything else, is ruthlessly practical. It will make the decisions it can in the context of the times in which it operates to get to its goal. It is not particularly handicapped by concerns over democracy, for example, a pretty straightforward, logical decision making that is very logical and very practical. And there's good news in that because you can usually, if you get into that mindset, try to understand it a little bit better. Maybe you don't like understanding it that way. But on the other hand, it gives you some of what's happening and why. What are its tools? Well, its tools are the entire toolkit. And we're here to talk to you a little bit about that toolkit. Obviously, militarily, where China is expanding its military reach as far as wide and as possible as it possibly can out into the Pacific and the Indian oceans and beyond. Economic is clearly a tool development we will talk about here today and social, cultural. Does it offer a better model to the world than democracy? That's one of the great questions of the time. What are the obstacles to China's goals? Well, the international rules-based order is an obstacle, at least if you don't want to play by those rules. And that rules-based order has served our world well for the last two generations. And that rules-based order is a series of agreements among nations, among peoples, as how we conduct ourselves militarily, economically, culturally, socially, to avoid conflict. And sometimes those rules get in the way. And so that's a potential obstacle. Obviously, the strength of others is an obstacle, whether it be in military, economic, development, social, cultural, or the alliances that have been formed around the world, those are obstacles. And then finally, I think we have to recognize that internal stability is an obstacle for China. We often assume that we often make the assumption that as we go out into the next couple of generations of this choice, China will always be as it is. And I don't think we can automatically make that assumption. Neither, by the way, do I think we can make that assumption as to the rest of the world, including our country. But we nonetheless have to make our best predictions, our best guesses, based on where we think this is going to be going. But we acknowledge that as an obstacle. What is China's approach to influence the international rules-based order to its own direction and or to replace the international rules-based order with a China rules-based order? And when I say that, I switch the hyphen from rules-based to China rules-based order. What is our response? Well, obviously, it's still developing. That's what we're talking about here today. How do we address China's goals and means? I think that we have been slow to see the reality of China. I think we hoped and believed and thought maybe that extending that rules-based order to China would incorporate it into that rules-based order and would lead to a more peaceful world. I think, obviously, at this point, maybe it's not so obvious, but it's my conclusion that China kind of cherry picked on that one and took the best of the rules-based order. And then when it didn't like the constraints of that order, went in another direction. South China Sea would be the best example of that. So we're still developing on our response. But obviously, some areas are strong and must remain strong. Our military is the best. And by our military, I mean not just the United States, but our allies in the Indo-Pacific. Anybody that has ever taken a look at the Indo-Pacific knows how well and how hard they work to preserve the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and free and open navigation, for example, which is so important in that area. And that is a completely compelling reason for us to continue that support. Our response needs to be economic. Considered just to be upfront about it, the withdrawal from the TPP to have been a mistake from that perspective. I think that we need to revisit that in some way, shape, or form. And then, obviously, we have other responses, including one that we tend to overlook, which is a cultural response. Because most countries in the world would prefer a culture, I believe, that we have offered to the world the democratic approach to life over the Chinese version. But they won't, if they have no choice, take that over an insufficient response from the perspective of their own goals, which is the dilemma. What is the outcome of all of this to be determined? These are choices that face us today. In fact, I would argue that the choices that we make with respect to China, as I said earlier, will determine the next two generations, at least, of our world, how we work through these choices. I think our goal needs to be to accommodate China's legitimate goals within a rules-based order internationally to incorporate them, but always from a position of strength. I think we need to pursue really a multi-approach of maintaining our strength in these areas as much as we can, as well as, obviously, always, maintaining very strong and open lines of communication critical to do that. And we're seeing in real time, with Iran, the consequences of letting communication lines lapse when you get to a crisis point. So with that, I've talked too long, and I'll turn this over to John and to your questions. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. And first, let me say, Ambassador, thank you. And thank you to USIP for this opportunity to come and share, particularly this opportunity to come and share with my good friend Ed Case from Hawaii. Although geographically, our districts are about as far apart as you can get, still be in America, we are not that far apart. And our opportunity to go to the Indo-Pacific and observe some of the going-ons there, I think really has helped build a great relationship between the two of us who are so far apart geographically. But I have to tell you, as Ed said, I'm not a China expert. I'm not an Indo-Pacific expert. But I will give you, as Ed described, the view of someone who has spent 41 years of my life protecting the hometown as a police officer and then as a sheriff. And that was a tremendous calling and opportunity. And now it's an honor to be in Congress and now have this opportunity to protect the homeland. And trust me, it won't be for 41 years. But it is a tremendous opportunity. And on our recent tour of Southeast Asia and the Pacific with military leaders, I have to tell you, I was alarmed at what I saw. China is tightening their grip on our allies in the Indo-Pacific. China is a true, pure adversary, I believe. I have great concern for our ability, the military, to be able to do their job against such a formidable, pure adversary. Just this week, the Wall Street Journal had an article detailing how China and Russia are attempting to move into Afghanistan as we withdraw. And in South and Central America, China continues to make strategic investments causing instability and increasing China's resources and power. At an opportunity, I was amazed. I had a codel down to South America and went to Suriname in Guyana. And I was quite surprised that the Chinese had already been there. And I suspect that a lot of their attention to South America is the fact that an oil reserve of 44 billion barrels has been located off the coast of Guyana. And so they truly see opportunity in South America. And they are building a pure military power that threatens to compete with our American armed forces. And as one who believes strongly in President Reagan's statement that peace through strength, I think is very, very important to keep in mind. And I know in the Indo-Pacific, when we had a briefing from Admiral Davidson, I was amazed to see the imbalance of military power in the South Pacific. Their surface vessels were already, I'm not talking about 2025, which there's some even more amazing projections, I'm sorry, 2045. But today, they have three times the surface vessels that we have. They have five times the subsurface vessels that we have. Three to four times the number of aircraft that we have. And one of the statements that concerned me most was when the Admiral said, yet, we have the technological advantage. And being a bit of a World War II buff, one of the things that concerned me about that statement was that was exactly the way the Axis powers felt, not Germany particularly, that they had the best technology. And they did. They had the best planes, the best ships, the best artillery, the best of everything. What they didn't have was the industrial might of the United States. They couldn't shoot us down quick enough. They couldn't sink us quick enough to win the war. I fear we're making the same mistake that Germany may have made in World War II, and that was an overreliance on technology. The Chinese are also stealing our intellectual property and planting their flag around the world. I'm sure you've all heard of the Road and Belt Initiative. And the scary part about this is how quiet they are about it. Most folks I talk to who haven't studied the issue specifically are shocked when they discover China's quiet aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. As many of you know, China is methodical, if nothing else. They learn from their mistakes, and they have the type of political system which allows them to work for the long game. If you look at the Belt and Road Initiative that I mentioned earlier, they are planning a future where Chinese, not US leadership, is assumed. We as a nation and as a Congress have to understand how this would change the core underpinnings of our global structure and norms of conduct. China has even gone into the developing nations of Africa and Asia to buy influence from governments who are desperate for the financial support that China is willing to provide. That's why they were in South America, going to Suriname and Guyana in these other areas. Some of these countries have no other option, if not the United States. And that's why it's important to have dialogues like this to show our allies in the developing world that the US is ready to take on these challenges. During our trip, I made certain that everyone that I spoke to understood that I believe when the President says America first, he does not mean America alone. But we have to make sure that America is strong economically, that we're strong militarily, and that we are aggressive with our efforts to influence throughout the country or throughout the globe winning hearts and minds. And I believe that the US IP plays a key role in raising that awareness, which is one of the many reasons I support this organization strongly. And again, I want to thank you for having us here today so that we can discuss more our conclusions from our trip abroad. Thank you. Thank you both for setting the table for a conversation that could go on for much longer than the time that we have allowed ourselves. But I built on, Congressman, on the last point that you made. I'd like to start by asking you, Congressman Case, in your testimony in April on the National Defense Authorization Act, you said, and I'm quoting here, that even with increased investment in improving our military posture in the Indo-Pacific, the US cannot go alone in the region. Peacefully integrating China into the existing rules based regional order, which you talked about, requires the active cooperation of partners and countries. Could you say a bit more about what you think the US approach should be in the region beyond, obviously, the importance of maintaining a strong military posture? Sure. I mean, we are not going to address China over the long term alone. That's what John just said. I think that we all, on that congressional delegation and all of us, I think independently, know and feel that the days when the United States can simply snap its fingers around the world and things will happen magically, those days are, for the most part, either unwise to depend on or, in some cases, over. And we have to work on our partnerships around the world. And we have alliances in Asia. We have great alliance partners, and we tend to focus on our alliance partners. And some of them are incredibly strong. Japan has been an incredible alliance partner from the perspective of an international rules-based order and constructive engagement with China. So that's a very positive one. I think Australia needs to be noted as an incredible partner in Asia and the Pacific. But we only have five alliance partners, but we have a lot of friends and potential friends. And some of the most notable ones, Singapore, is not technically an alliance partner. And yet, for all intents and purposes, it functions as one. We both met with our congressional delegation with the top leadership of Singapore. And all of these countries are in a very difficult, difficult situation, where they are, their largest economic partner is China, which, of course, China wants to foster, but their largest strategic and defense partner is the United States. So imagine that you're that country that puts you in a little bit of a bind. Australia, same thing. I could go right down the list. Vietnam, to some extent, the same thing. But they want to align with us. They want to be our strategic partner. They don't like having to be put to this choice. And they certainly don't like to be in a situation. They don't want to get to a situation where they're both the largest economic partner and the primary strategic partner. And China is their biggest defender in the world. That's not where they're trying to go. We have to realize that. We have been inconsistent, I believe, in our focus on those alliances and on those friendships. So the alliances need a lot more strengthening. Some of them are not doing as well as others. The Philippines, for example, is our alliance partner and yet a pretty inconsistent response from the China perspective with the Philippines. It needs a little more attention from us. And that's probably why, one of the reasons why it has flirted a little bit more with China. But let's not forget about countries like Vietnam, which, inside a couple of generations, has become a pretty strong partner of ours in many ways. Certainly does not want to fall under China's spell. And then partners that want to, and I believe, we need to recognize, need to remain independent, but nonetheless have the same concerns. And in that department, I would put India at the top of my list. So we, and fundamentally, if we approach this the United States trying to project ourself out there militarily, culturally, economically. First of all, we probably don't have the capability to do that, at least on a sustained basis over time, given our commitments to the rest of the world as well. But second, we don't have to, and we shouldn't. We should look for those friends. And we should foster those strengths that we already have and think of ways to strengthen the countries and places in our world that are very concerned about the division of the world into an international rules-based order and a China rules-based order. Ratharva, just sort of building, I think, in a way on that. As you know, in early June, top international security officials from 20 Asia-Pacific nations met in Singapore to talk about the state of the region and our delegation, of course, is represented by Acting Secretary, Mr. Fentze Shanhan. The commentaries coming out of that meeting were that the U.S. talked a very good game about our strategy and our approach. But at the end of the day, participants were much more focused on the very tough line taken by senior Chinese officials in the course of that dialogue. And of course, that tough line has also been reflected in tough actions that the Chinese have been taking in the region. You mentioned Vietnam. I happened to be there about four years ago. And already, we talk a lot about the South China Sea, but there's an awful lot of activity going on in Southeast Asia, particularly given China's dominance of the Mekong River. What is it we need to do to make more credible our intentions with regard to maintaining a strong posture and presence in the Indo-Pacific? What are the kinds of actions that you think our government, our administration ought to be thinking about as part of that strategy? Well, I think the key to the Indo-Pacific area, and particularly in response to the military and economic coercion that you see throughout the region from China, it requires that we become much more aggressive in our desire to have bilateral trade agreements with our partners. We are still the partner of choice in that region, I believe. But they are beginning to question our resolve and whether we truly will be there for them. And I sort of think we took our eye off the ball in that region, focused too much on, well maybe not too much, but I shouldn't say that. But the focus shifted to the Middle East, and I believe now we need to focus back on what's going on in the Indo-Pacific region. And when you look at Congressman Case mentioned the Singapore and how they are trying to walk that fine line and not make a choice between the United States and China, we need to be sure that we are economically and diplomatically assuring those individuals that we are there for them. And when I look at the Philippines, when we traveled to the Philippines, I was quite concerned. First of all, I thought it was interesting that the American delegation goes to the country and we did not meet a single high-ranking governmental official in the Philippines. That concerned me. Now, the president was over visiting President Xi in China, so I understand that. And they did have an earthquake up in Luzon, but I'm really concerned and I will tell you when you look at what's going on with Subic Bay, I think that's gonna be the telltale sign for the Philippines because while we were there, we're looking at Subic Bay and the military, I should say, in the Philippines is very close to the American military, very close. But I have great concern about the president who they are in the process right now of leasing or selling Subic Bay in the shipyard to either a Chinese consortium or an American consortium. And our diplomat there believes that we still have preferred members that want to do business with us. So I think the telltale sign is gonna be what happens in Subic Bay. That will give us a greater indicator of what direction we're gonna see the Philippines go. And I'll close with this on this question. I think we rely too much on carrier task force diplomacy. I think we need the Clark airfields, we need the Subic bays, we need to have a presence, I believe, on the ground and helping with the economy of these countries, particularly those like the Philippines that have a real tendency, I think, toward China. Well, thank you. I have a whole raft of questions I would love to ask, but we promised our audience would give them a chance to pose their questions and we also may be getting some that are coming to us from those who are viewing following this online. So let me open it to, yes, I see, hand right here in the middle row. Yes, that one. Thank you very much. Please introduce yourselves briefly and make your questions brief. I'm trying to make it brief. Mark Miller, international trade advisor, mostly focusing on Central Asia. Countries like the Central Asia and caucuses, countries want U.S. investment and assistance and they understand that the Belt and Road Initiative does come with a price tag. Ultimately, in some cases, threatening their sovereignty. However, for many of these countries, Belt and Road Initiative is the only game in town. So, it goes beyond funding, technical assistance, relationship building, international standards. What could be done to encourage these countries to avoid being overwhelmed by the Belt and Road Initiative? What U.S. programs, what U.S. initiative, as well as European initiatives can be effectively and consistently, Congress, you mentioned consistency, consistently applied so these countries look to the West for leadership and for long-term development assistance. Thank you. Let me just simply validate that question since I just returned from Central Asia three weeks ago and found exactly that. It's clear, the effort that Chinese are making to assert their influence, economic and other in the region and the apprehension that the countries in the region have about the fact that, you know, how that is impacting their freedom of choice with regard to their own policies. Who wants to start off on that? Go ahead. Well, I'll start with the answer and I have to tell you, I think the answer is we really must step up diplomatically in these areas where they don't feel they have another opportunity. You know, I think Secretary Mattis said it best when he said, if you're gonna cut the State Department, find me more bullets. I think he was absolutely right. We quote him often. Yeah, I do as well because I think he's spot on with that analogy. At the same time, we need to start bringing light to the economic coercion that China is using throughout the world. Most folks have no idea how bad it is and actually what the Chinese are doing, not just in tariffs, those people see. What you don't see are the non-tariff barriers to imports and exports that they do, for example, when South Korea put the THAAD missiles in China responded very aggressively, but nobody saw it because what they did was the company that provided the land in South Korea for those missile sites actually had like little convenience stores inside of China. They're all gone now because they ran the amount of business by saying they had fire code violations and other things. Nothing to do with what you would typically think they put tariffs on them or something like that. It's these regulatory methods that they use to really harm these companies. And unless you are really on the inside, you're not gonna see what's going on there. Yeah. Do you want to? Well, I think I agree with Congressman Rutherford. First of all, I believe that the reductions in the State Department over the last couple of years or longer need to be reversed in the big time. So I think diplomacy needs to return to the forefront, number one. Number two, we forget about the credibility and validity of our soft power when we do project it. So these are areas, for example, the Peace Corps to bring the Peace Corps back. The Peace Corps, we have forgotten the incredible contributions of the Peace Corps to the world over the last half century. And so many countries that are directly in the line of fire, so to speak, are we don't have Peace Corps there anymore? Why not? Not only is that good for those countries, but I think it's good for the world. So that's number two. Number three, in terms of Belt and Road and economic coercion, completely agree again with the analysis. Again, China ruthlessly practical. This isn't just about the redevelopment of those countries. It's about dependence. It's about a military option. So when China goes around the world helping countries build ports, you think it's only to build ports for those countries? I don't think so, build airfields. I don't think so. So what do we do about that? Because you're correct that those countries, in many cases, have no practical choice, because the means and the approaches that were taken consistently since the Second World War to offer development assistance throughout much of the world are lapsing. Number one, and number two, the needs are so much more overwhelming. And China holds out that carrot and says, I'm the only game in town. You're one of those countries, it's a hard deal to turn down. Now, query whether that's sustainable on China's part, obviously they've had problems at the Belt and Road as they've said so themselves. And they have actually looked for partners from the rest of the world to come in and help them out with this in cases. And so I think that's a sign that maybe they can't pull this off forever and ever. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't be out there doing it. So in that category, I think we've got a lot of eggs in the basket of the Build Act and whether we can make that work. And we're obviously way early in the implementation of the Build Act. But we have essentially said this is our response. So can we make that work or not? I think parts of it can work very, very well. If we sustain it, if we fund it, and if we back it up, there are parts of the Build Act that I think still leave big holes in what countries need. For example, infrastructure projects for which there's no real economic return. Those are gaps still. And I will close by emphasizing one thing you said, which is us with our European partners. And I would broaden that, by the way, to say other countries like Japan, which is very, very much focused on foreign investment and development assistance. Not only because they think it's the right thing to do in the world, but because, for them, it's part of their basic strategy of maintaining independence from China over time. And so we need to be partnering with the rest of the world in order to develop a credible alternative to what China has offered, even if China's offer is an imperfect one with a lot of strings. Other questions? Yes, over here on the right. Hi. Isabella Paternostro, Department of State Bureau of East Asia Pacific Affairs. So how does US Congress planning to address China's military coercion and balance them, per se, without risking our economic ties and isolating the Chinese-Americans who live here in the US? That's an excellent question you anticipated, my closing question. But it put it in a bit of a broader context. We have our agenda with China is deep and complex. We have issues of economics and trade. We have issues of security. We have issues of China's increasingly repressive behavior inside of China. How do we sort through this complicated agenda? How do we do all of these things? First of all, we commit to sorting through it. I think we practiced a denial approach for about half a generation here. And unfortunately, reality has caught up with our denials, which is good. I'm happy it happened now rather than after another half generation. Your point about Chinese-Americans, frankly, I sense absolutely no disagreement with Chinese-Americans with the overall concern with China and with the direction that our country has to take. So I don't share that concern. I think Chinese-Americans understand perfectly what's at stake here and what our country to succeed and prosper in the world. I think that we've already ticked off a couple of things we have to, first of all, absolutely, we have to maintain our military strength and partner with other countries in the region on strong military ties with countries like Australia need to be maintained and strengthened. John is exactly right on the Philippines. We need to make sure that relationship goes well. That's key to a lot of this. I already talked about new military alliances. But again, the projection of other forms of influence into the region needs to be returned diplomatic, economic, cultural, social across the board. We've got to take a really cohesive overall approach. Not any one of these areas is going to work over time. It really has to be all of these areas at one time. Perhaps building on that, what's the role of the Congress in helping bring together this sense of a coherent strategy? I think one of the best approaches that Congress can take is to shine the light on the problem. As I mentioned earlier, I think this has happened very quietly over the last 20 years. State and foreign affairs ought to be, we should be holding hearings, bringing people in, shedding light on what's going on economically and militarily. Particularly, I think it important that we start to collect some of the economic data so that when we go to our allies and others who are being approached by China for the one belt, one road, we can actually show them some empirical data that shows that's not the way to go. When you look at what happened in Sri Lanka, that should never happen again anywhere. And I fear that it will. And so I think a couple of things that we can do is gather the data and then make it known to the world exactly what's going on. Let me take one more question right here. And then maybe we'll have time just to allow each of our speakers to wrap up. Thank you. My name is Hamna, and I am from the Woodrow-Belton Center. Going back to the idea of the Belt and Road Initiative, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is the foundation of the Belt and Road Initiative, being from Pakistan, I do see the effects of the Chinese influence within my country, not only economic effects through development, but also social and political influence. My question is born out of concern, because a lot of Pakistanis support this Chinese development and Chinese political inclusion as the retaliation to the United States. And because of the drone strikes we've had, and generally our relation with the United States has been very problematic in the past few decades, at least, especially after the Afghan war. My question is, how can the United States bring Chinese allies on the table, such as Pakistan, and make them feel like the US has better intentions for them than China does? There's another relationship that is fraught with complexity. Our relationship with Pakistan. And that it figures very prominently in this whole conversation about how do we, at the one time, strengthen these relationships with key partners in the region, even when we have some significant issues in our bind, our relationship? I'm sorry, Don, you want to say something? I think you have to leave the door open and the lights on for starters. History has a way of surprising you. And you need to be open to opportunities. The US relationship with Pakistan has been a troubled one, and I regret that, as one member of Congress. I don't see any reason why we should have that relationship with Pakistan. Obviously it has to do with regional differences in India-Pakistan rivalries and past alleged wrongdoings by any one of a number of countries. So if we're going to live in that past, and it's going to be hard to get over that. But I believe that Pakistan does not want to be dependent upon China. I believe that Pakistan does want a relationship with the United States. And that's a pretty good starting point for a better relationship. After that, it's hard work, because obviously Pakistan, like many other countries, although not in the same dire straits as many countries that absolutely have no choice to accept the Chinese offers if they have no alternative, Pakistan has its own resources, obviously a great country in its own right with a lot of economic ability and potential. Nonetheless, everything that I said about the choices that we face with China applies to Pakistan. And so I think that it just needs a lot of work. But I would be optimistic on that if that work was devoted on both sides. I'll take that as a clear plug for renewed and reinforced diplomacy for the entire region. Yes, Congressman, did you want to respond to that? I would just go back and add what I mentioned earlier. And that is, I think, the importance of educating Pakistan and ourselves, quite frankly, because I'm not sure how many Americans really understand the coercive nature that China is employing through all these relationships. And I think the best thing that we can do, and I think Congressman Case is absolutely right, let's talk a little history. Let's talk about some very recent history and what has China done with the relationships that they've already built and that folks that they're dealing with now. And when you see what they've done with Japan, with South Korea, with Taiwan, what they want to do in Hong Kong, what they're doing in the South China Sea, I think the more we illuminate for their potential partners, the more they'll understand that they're bad actors. And that's not necessarily a good way to address the issues that they have internally. And I think it also goes to a cultural sale. One of the things I'm most proud of, I think, as an American, is the fact that we truly go in so people can have freedom. We don't want to rule their country, run their country, occupy their land. That's not our mission. I don't see America going in and taking a Sri Lanka port because they can't pay their bill. So I think the more we can illuminate the strategy that China has, I think fewer and fewer people will be drawn in by it. And as you pointed out, this aggressive Chinese behavior extends well beyond that. You talked about Latin America. Since most of my time has been spent in Africa, I see it very evidently in Chinese activities there. Regrets on the part of many African countries about some of the deals into which they have entered and only belatedly have realized what some of the implications and consequences are. So the idea of illuminating the consequences and the implications of these things, I think, is very important. I guess we sort of have come to our last minute here. And I wanted to ensure both members of the Appropriations Committee. I wonder, from that perspective, whether there are particular initiatives or ideas that you believe can be proposed or further, through your work in the Appropriations Committee, that would go to some of the elements of your strategy for how the US ought to be approaching it. Yes, I believe there is. And I would focus and try to get my colleagues to focus. I think we are on the issues of building up our military. Folks, our military has been in pretty bad shape. Secretary Mattis said out of 31-milit Army brigades, five can fight tonight. Now, I think that's improved over the last couple of years, but five can fight tonight. That means they have all of the equipment, the training, the support that they need to be successful on the battlefield. Not because we want to use that military might, but because with that military might and with our economic might, we are much more effective diplomatically. Because we're able to assist our partners instead of leaving them to China's influence. And so I think we have to focus on our military, our economy, and our diplomacy, and sell our culture around the globe. Because I think that's why we are the preferred partner for most of the globe. Carlos, in case I think you get the last word. Well, I think a starter here and an absolute is a strong military in the Indo-Pacific. And by the Indo-Pacific, we are talking about Indo-Pacific command, which stretches from right off the coast of California, all the way into the western half of the Indian Ocean. That is the sphere that China plays in, lives in plays in. That's the sphere where a lot of these choices are going to be made, whether it's closing down the streets of Malacca, or keeping them open, or having to navigate outside of the Philippines to get goods to Japan as opposed to the South China Sea. Those are absolute must-haves. But if we only put our eggs in that basket, we're not going to make it here. We do have to start, again, to fund the institutions of our government that were non-military influencers out there. And that's where China, frankly, perceives our weakness right now is in a failure of commitment to diplomacy, to, as I say again, soft power, whether it be the Peace Corps or anything else. The State Department itself, whether we have sufficient folks in our embassies, whether we have sufficient embassies in consulates, whether we have sufficient projection into many of these countries. And then finally, economic assistance. Both funding some of the old brands of economic assistance that have tended to fall by the wayside, but also, again, building on the Build Act, making sure that works, and filling in the holes in that where, again, China senses weakness. So those are the areas that we have to put our money into. And this is cost-benefit stuff, because it is going to cost a lot of money to do all of this. But the cost of not doing this 10 years from now or 15 years from now or 20 years from now is a factor of complete multipliers over what the investment is today. Well, thank you very much. I want to thank both of you, Congressman Rutherford, for the case, for taking the initiative to come here to present your views. But important to present them in a bipartisan way, which I think for us is encouraging in the sense that understanding that there are shared concerns and shared views about how we should be addressing what is clearly one of the major challenges that the United States faces in terms of its foreign policy. So please join me in thanking our two speakers this morning for their presentations and their questions. Thank you very much. No, thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.