 You will now view three fire situations that actually occurred and resulted in fatalities. Take notes on the downhill fire line construction tactics that were being implemented. Fire number one took place in Montana in 1949. It involved a smoke jumper crew. Even at the time, jumpers were considered to be the most highly trained and best conditioned wildland firefighters available. Most of the men had prior experience, but there were some rookies. Flame resistant clothing and fire shelters had not been developed. Terrain was considered rugged, and the accident occurred on a 75% southwest-facing slope. Fuels at the point of origin were dense stands of pole-sized Douglas fir and ponderosa pine, with occasional mature trees scattered through the stand. Larger timber and stringers of ponderosa pine predominated on the lateral ridges, broken by openings of medium density grass and forb. At the point of the accident, tree cover consisted of stringers of scattered young ponderosa with occasional over-mature ponderosa. Predicted fire danger was low, but observations taken at a ranger station a few miles away indicated the potential for severe fire behavior. Relative humidity was in the low 20s, and fuel stick readings were at 5%. Winds were steady and moderate, with typical afternoon up canyon and up slope patterns. However, sometime during the jump operation, a thunder cell passed over the area, scattering jumpers and gear all over the hill. Fire size at the time of the jump was estimated at 50 to 60 acres, and behavior was relatively quiet. The crew landed on a ridge above the fire, gathered up and began hiking down, intending to anchor line at the head, and then flank down both sides to the toe. An increase in activity at the head caused them to change plans and continue down toward the toe. Previously undetected spot fires, probably generated by the passage of the thunder cell, kicked up under the crew, and a massive run of fire aided by both the up canyon and up slope winds, and the steep slope started pushing up the gulch. Escape downhill was cut off, and the crew started running uphill toward the ridge. One man survived by firing at a grassy opening and taking refuge in the black. Two others were able to scramble to a rock outcrop on the ridge and survive. Twelve jumpers died on the slope. Elapsed time from the arrival at the landing zone, and the accident was about 1 hour 45 minutes. Approximately 12 minutes passed between the start of the fire's run up the gulch, and the time the smoke jumpers were overrun. Fire number two took place in Southern California in November 1966. The victims were all working as part of a well-respected Forest Service hotshot crew. This crew was very familiar with firefighting in the type of terrain and fuels where this blaze was located. Fuels were typical California brush type, Sage and Sumac. The more barren rocky areas had enough cured grass to carry fire. The area located above an expanding urban area was rugged and mountainous. Heavier fuel loads were located near the base of slopes and at canyon mouths. All fuels were extremely dry. Santa Ana winds were blowing at between 40 to 60 miles per hour, and the burning index was extreme on the day of the accident. The site of the burn over was in this barren chute. Crew members were equipped with neither flame resistant clothing nor fire shelters, since they hadn't yet been developed for wildland fire use. Portable radios were not used by the crew at the time, but normally they would have had some handheld CB radios. On this particular day, however, these CBs were not functional, and the crew was communicating by passing messages, word of mouth to each other. The initial crew briefing occurred at 1430, at which time the operations section chief instructed them to leapfrog another crew working on the ridge and cold trail the fire edge until they tied in with a county crew working the bottom. Remember, no communications could be established with either the fire line supervisors or adjoining crews. The route of travel followed by the crew took them across the top of a steep rocky chute. Rolling rocks were of great concern to the crew members as they made their way to the burn edge on the left side of the chute. The burn was dirty at this point. At 1530, the superintendent was located at the lower end of the crew formation with the remainder of the crew strung out up the chute. The fire had backed across the mouth of the canyon and was being attacked by a helicopter dropping water. At 1535, one hour five minutes after the initial briefing, the fire at the bottom of the chute had generated enough heat to produce a run that went from the bottom to the top of this rocky chute in less than one minute. Twelve hotshots died. Fire number three took place in central Colorado, 1994. It started on July 2 on a hilltop during a time when firefighting resources were in very short supply. The fire was sized up but not initially staffed due to other priority incidents. After approximately two days, the fire had only reached the size of about three acres. Initial ground suppression actions commenced on the morning of July 5 and by the morning of July 6, the fire had spread off the hilltop and was about 127 acres in size. The terrain was steep and intersected with drainages. Fuels consisted of large pockets of pinion juniper and adjacent large pockets of gamble oak. Many of the fuels within the fire perimeter had been underburned and dried to the extent that, from a fire behavior standpoint, it would burn like dead fuel. By the morning of July 6, smoke jumpers and a hotshot crew were arriving at the fire. The hotshots were shuttled in to ridgetop hella spots while the jumpers landed on the ridge a little further from the fire. Nine members of the hotshot crew and several jumpers were assigned to construct direct fire line down the west flank of the fire. All were equipped with the required personal protective equipment. At 1520, a predicted cold front arrived at the fire location and created control problems for the personnel left on the ridgetop fire line between H1 and H2. The hotshots and jumpers working the west flank were continuing with their assignment when at 1600, the fire crossed the drainage far below them and made a run up the canyon under the influence of a very strong wind. In approximately 12 minutes, the fire had traveled up the drainage to a point underneath the west flank personnel. It spotted back across the drainage and within two minutes raced to the ridgetop overtaking the fleeing firefighters. Nine hotshots, three smoke jumpers and two Hell Attack crew members perished.