 Manuel, we have many discussions about technologies during these few days, namely dedicated to the transformation of business models. So I think it's good to listen to you because you will certainly explain to us also the transformation in international politics related to technologies. So the floor is yours. Thank you, Thomas. So one of the things I find fascinating and that I've seen throughout this conference as well is that if you look back, say, 10, 12, 15 years ago, there was this thesis of the end of history, which I know was very controversial at the time that it was posed, but there was a generalized, there was a certain consensus in the Western world that liberal democracy would move forward and sweep through the world and open markets would do the same and all of the other regimes were on the wrong page, on the wrong side of history and this was going to be a slow process of expansion of this system. Now what's interesting and it's come up in this conference and it comes up repeatedly in events and meetings and gatherings that I attend is that actually that order, the liberal order, the Western-led rules-based order of open markets, porous borders, multiculturalism is very much fighting for its survival around the world. I find that fight to be developing in two very particular fronts. I mean, one is the external front or the external dimension and it's been mentioned here. Within that, the siege of the order I think is taking place in many areas, but I find three of particular importance. One is the rise of China and of course everybody has spoken about the rise of China and if you look at, for example, military spending of China in the 1990s, in the early 90s, it was about 40 billion. The budget this year is about 175 billion US dollars. That's what the government has announced, whether that's the precise figure or not, it's up to debate, but let's say it's 175 billion and so the single most significant case of success of economic development of the last 30, 40 years happens to be of a deeply anti-liberal, anti-democratic country that has actually now begun to defend its model even beyond Chinese borders. So when you go to China, if you went 15 years ago, they would be fairly modest about the validity and efficacy of their system. If you go there today, you will find people that are much more bullish about their system and about how viable it is and useful it is for them, but also for regions around the world. So the biggest development, geopolitical development in the last 40 years seems to point in the direction that actually a well-run, well-managed autocracy does very well in the space of economic development, military development and others. And the argument in China now, by the way, speaking about technology is that technology will help them solve some of the fundamental shortcomings of a centralized system because through AI they're going to be able to solve the information and coordination challenges of a centralized and planned economy and also of an autocratic system that has fewer elections and few social and political rights because through AI they're not going to need the messiness of elections to understand what's happening to their people and react accordingly. So that's the messages coming out of China. The second external development I think is Russia and the autocratic drift of Russia and not just that, but Russia's actions internationally. So if you look at the hacking campaigns and the electoral interference campaigns, I was having a very fascinating conversation with an EU official that works in the EU office that fights disinformation and what you see is that these attacks, whether they happen in the Rust Belt in the US or the Midlands in the UK or France or in Catalonia in Spain, visually these attacks seek to undermine the institutions of the liberal order quite evidently in most instances. I mean, that's one of the features that connects them. But subversively, and this is a point that I think is sometimes missed, they seek to undermine our faith in our capacity to attain objective truths, right? So they attack the intermediation institutions, whether it's the press, political parties or others. So they seek to make us question the truth and the honesty and legitimacy of the institutions we've built. They're fundamentally anti-enlighted in the sense that they seek to undermine our faith in our own institutions and they're having growingly, I think they're having success in various places, but they're clearly growing in intensity. Now, the third external dimension, I think it's the Middle East and if you think about what's happened in the Middle East since the middle of the mid-2000s, but particularly since the Arab Spring, has been a systematic failure to democratize the region, right? I think except the case of Tunisia, some of the places where we thought we would be establishing or seeing democratic regimes emerge have actually gone back to even more autocratic regimes and that's, for example, the case of Egypt, which is particularly salient and significant because of the scale of Egypt, but that's also the case in Libya and we're seeing an autocratic drift in Saudi Arabia, so it varies in perspective and in intensity, but if you look at the region, I think that the general thrust that we're seeing is actually a reversal of the democratization process. So this idea of the liberal order of democratic regimes emerging, of the liberal trading system and others deepening has actually been reversed in a number of places, but particularly I think under attack is the idea of liberal democracy of something that is unavoidable. Now, what's fascinating is that to this external siege, which has been in different, has been there in different forms and shapes for a long time, although punctured by these particular instances as I mentioned, we are witnessing a real implosion of the liberal order from within the liberal countries and this is consistent and here I'm getting to the tech piece and others. So we've seen growing numbers of people within the Western world that question liberal values, whether it is multiculturalism or even democracy. Support for authoritarianism has risen almost consistently across the Western world, a questioning of democratic processes and others. Now, why is this happening? And here I have three fundamental points that I want to make. So we see a great deal of social fracture within the Western world and some people have mentioned inequality and others, but I just want to give you some figures, right? And here is another instance of decoupling, by the way, you started with some contradictions of decoupling of economic growth at the aggregate and prosperity on the average. So in the US, 70% of households in the US have seen no real market income in the last 30 years, right? No real market income increase in the last 30 years. I mean, that's an astonishing figure bearing in mind that the last 30 years have seen very rapid growth at the aggregate in the US, even if you take into account the economic crisis. If you look at, for example, life expectancy in some communities in the US, life expectancy has fallen for the next generation in the US for the first time since the Second World War in some mostly middle-class, wide, economically depressed communities. Child mortality has doubled in some communities in the US again. I mean, this is really shocking data. We only see data like that in countries that have undergone a civil war. So some of you might have seen the work done by Angus Deaton on something he calls the deaths of despair, which is the number of suicides and deaths from opioid abuse. If I could show you a map of how wage stagnation and these deaths of despair overlap, you would see almost a perfect overlap. So there are communities within this liberal Western bloc that have clearly not benefited from the process of globalization and changed to the economy that we've seen over the last 20, 30 years. This is producing a very significant political fracture and this manifests itself in many ways, but I would only point to three that I think are significant. One is an increase of empezymism about the future within Western societies, about the economic future of the next generation. And this is, again, consistent in polls and surveys in the West. A great deal of anti-elitism or a questioning of how the elites function under legitimacy. And again, we've seen this in polls time and time again and we've seen a strong correlation between the sense of anti-elitism and anti-establishment sentiment and support for populism, which is, I think, the third manifestation of this. Now, this is, I think, one of the big puzzles of our era, which is we've seen huge growth in the aggregate. The US returned to pre-crisis GDP levels in 2012. I think the UK was about 2014. Even Spain, after a very deep economic crisis, has returned to pre-crisis GDP levels a few months ago. Spain has never created as many jobs, has sustained as many jobs as it does today. That's at the aggregate level, but when you look at more granularly, lower level, the distribution issue is highly problematic. So we are failing, literally, at the manage of abundance, at the manage of prosperity within our societies. There is something that has changed in the structure of the economy that is leading to a lot of people being left behind and questioning that order. So I'll finish here, because I promise I would be very strict on the time. That was a lot of it to me, but when I think about this conference and when I think about world policy and world governance, I cannot say that I think the most significant thing that I see is that we are in shift, I think we're in a nearer transition, that the liberal order is clearly under siege in a way that it has not been, at least since the end of the Cold War, if not before, but shockingly, it is really undergoing a process of implosion from within the order that is produced in my mind fundamentally by a compensation failure, which has prevented us from transferring gains in wealth and productivity and others to people within society that have simply been left behind of this process. And that picture I think is very worrying. I think very few people would have predicted that we would be here 10 years ago. And I think that unless we find ways, and some of us have spoken of fixing the fracture of our social contract moving forward, the political convulsion we're living will deepen and the world will continue to shift to a more illiberal place where the rights of minorities will not be as respected as they have been, both in the West and in other places. We will live in a world with more walls and less movement of people and less commerce and others. And that basically to me means that we're very much living the return of history. I mean, we're moving back into a world where the fundamentals of political governance, both domestically and internationally, are up for grabs and we enter this debate without knowing where it's going to lead. So for me, that's the backdrop to this conference and that's one of the takeaways that I take home from this and also from this panel because various bits and pieces of this came up. Thank you. Take a moment. Thank you.