 Human society and nature interact in a complex way, with human activities leading to changes in the environment as well as being affected by it. To understand this relationship, researchers have used collective risk social dilemma gains to study how individual contributions and the risk of future losses are intertwined. Some studies have shown that these interactions are governed by a co-evolutionary process, where individual decisions influence both the level of risk and the amount of cooperation in the population. This paper takes a different approach, developing a co-evolutionary game model that incorporates the effects of individual strategies on risk levels. The authors found that the level of cooperation in the population depends on the initial proportion of cooperative players and the type of feedback loop between risk and strategy. Additionally, they discovered that the evolutionary outcomes depend on the initial conditions, with either a stable equilibrium or an oscillatory pattern emerging depending on the feedback loop. Finally, they showed that a critical starting point of cooperators and risk level is necessary for guiding the evolution towards a desirable outcome. This article was authored by Lin Zhe Liu, Xie Jiechen, and Atila Solnoki. We are article.tv, links in the description below.