 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, may I express my sincere appreciation to Professor the Honourable Great Events ACQC, Chancellor of the Australian National University and Professor Veronica Taylor, Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific for the warm hospitality and giving me an opportunity to deliver the keynote speech at this conference. I also thank the conveners of this conference, Dr. Nicholas Ferrelly and Dr. Nick Cheeseman who have done much work to arrange this meeting of minds. As a common practice for all speakers of parliament, I have the authority to close the mic of the MPs making unnecessarily long discussions. But this time, I hope you will be kind enough not to close the mic. I'll try to be as brief as possible, but at the same time touching important issues on Myanmar. Here, I want to thank you Chancellor for your experience with Myanmar. All of us have taken risks and have gone a long way. My presence as the Myanmar update symbolizes that Myanmar is ready to engage. As a Myanmar citizen, I am deeply satisfied with international interest and report some Western media have called the Myanmar Supreme. Which is our democratic transformation. I believe that there are two fundamental issues in Myanmar politics which still have not yet been resolved. These two are, one, the issue between the central government and the ethnic minorities, two, the relations between the people and various successive governments. All governments of Myanmar since 1962 have been in one way or another influenced by the military. Therefore, we can also call this issue a civilian military issue. The first issue caused the civil war. As long as this issue persists, it will be extremely difficult to end the civil war. The other issue is the result of long-term ruling of military-length government. And it is the goal of our democratic cause. Still, these are issues between brothers of the same blood and therefore are not deadly empties. They are issues which can be resolved by a friendly position. But since these issues are long-fistering ones, we cannot expect them to be solved quickly. We need time and patience. The problem must be solved politically. This is a historical legacy which cannot be avoided. I believe that solving these two issues is in itself today's democratic transformation. And solving these two issues are, in other words, Myanmar's democracy cause. There are also some unbiased background historical legacies. Because these have become interest from our long history, we may also call them Myanmar political culture. These are three obsessions and a warship of paternity. One, an obsession with norms. This obsession with norms weakens pragmatism. Two, an obsession with radicalism. Myanmar politics has a tendency to mitigate solutions that would like to uproot everything. We must solve this tendency through negotiation and slowly change this attitude. This can be an obstacle to Myanmar's democratic cause. Three, an obsession with sectarianism. Sectarianism, what I mean is everybody wants to be a leader and not a follower. At this point, when we need national unity, overcoming this obsession is also a challenge. Four, a warship of paternity. A warship of paternity and the desire for a political severe is an obstacle for institutionalization. Only if we truly understand this historical legacy will we truly appreciate the challenges of Myanmar's democratic transformation. The first attempt at creating the democratic transformation that we see today was the 1988 democracy at Peewell. To be honest, even then the government in power, the Obama Socialist Program Party knew it had to change and accordance with the trends of the times. However, it appeared that they were thinking of economic reforms first and political reforms later. The people's patience got not last that long. Because the 1988 movement began with street protest, it was a transformation from below, or in other words, a bottom up transformation. Its initial stages were similar to the Eastern Europe political transformations that would happen in 1989. But there was no public revolution as happened in Eastern Europe because in Eastern Europe, the democratic groups and the governments in power could sit around a table and reach a political bet, which enabled them to ensure a smooth transition. This was caused a better transition by Professor Felix C. Schmitter. In Myanmar politics too, Dr. Momo's government tries to create a round table political discussion culture. However, this was not a success and the context of radicalism accepts Myanmar politics. In this way, the 1988 uprising did not lift up and its expectations and was defeated. Because the country's stability had completely collapsed, the temporal had to step in and take over. The military government tried to practically implement economic reforms, especially in the bearing of basic economic infrastructure. But because of the economic blockade, the results did not match the efforts. A hasty political transition was not attempted. Taking a note of deep caution from the events of 1988, time was taken to create a gender-as-good transition. And in this way, we have multi-party democratic elections in 2010. We may call this the second attempt at democratic transformation. I believe this is what Professor Schmitter calls and post-transition. The distinguishing mark of this type of transition is that it was unlike other types of democratic transition. It was not a transformation winding up from street protest, but one whose the government itself began the ducts of opening. We can see that this type of transformation is a transformation from top. Unlike the 1988 bottom-up transformation, this was a top-down transformation. As we have said above, preparations were made in advance to deal with the adverse effects of change, which would appear as soon as the opening for the change took place. The 2008 constitution was designed as such. Those who drew up that constitution designed it so that it could create a transition which all political possess in the country, including the temporal military, could follow and agree to. Now, if you measure that constitution against democratic norms, there may well be some weaknesses. But it is clear that because of this constitution, the 2010 elections were successfully heard, and also because of this constitution, a parliament which had been non-existent for half a century came back into life and the present government formed. But for those in Myanmar politics obsessed with norms, there are many who are resentful of this constitution and this election. The NLD blackouted the 2010 election. But in the 2012 part elections, nearly all the political possess, including the NLD, stepped on the part of parliamentary politics. The government has had to struggle with not just one, but three reforms. Any one of which would need a tremendous effort to successfully get it out. These are the political and economic reforms and the peace process. Of the three reforms I have mentioned above, the one which has had the highest acceptance, both internally and internationally, and which has the highest momentum is the political reform. This was begun under the slogan of national reconciliation. In our president's fairing and speech, he asked all the political possess to leave aside our differences and work together for the good of our country. In political terms, he had discussions with the all society and opened the way for the NLD to become a recognized political party. The president released political prisoners one after the other and accelerated the process of liberalization. More well known examples are the liberalization laws which the Pirozulto Palema has remarketed. The law on the registration of political parties. The law on peaceful assembly and demonstration. The law on labor unions were laws enacted during the time of this present government. But the process of institutionalization is one which due to factors such as its long absence and the lack of qualified professionals could not be realized as much as was wanted to. In this way, the process of institutionalization could not keep pace with the process of liberalization and therefore there arose some instability from about 2013 onwards. Economics magazine has commented that the main problem with Myanmar's democratic transformation is that the pace of reform has been too rapid. At the same time, there are also critics that the Myanmar's transformation is slow. I'm curious about the judgment of this conference. As for the economic reform, our aim was to change from a closed, common style economy towards an open door towards a free market economy. This aim was not as successfully achieved as that of political reform. But some important achievements were made. A special achievement was the one which replaced the longstanding enormous difference between the official and market-based exchange rates with the free float of our currency which was better led by administrative measures. Our parliament has enacted laws emanating the commerce and tax laws and rectify the land allocation law and the environmental preservation law. In addition, the Small Loans Act and the foreign investment law were also re-marketed. However, our priority, which is poverty reduction and rural development has not succeeded as much as we would have wished to. This is related to an economic legacy which is not easy to overcome in a short time period. At the point when we began our economic reforms, Myanmar was still at a low-level industrialized stage. In addition, Myanmar had to suffer the economic legacy of a failed socialist economic system with its weakened banking sector. Even within this situation, the government was clearly able to grow the country's economy. Another official statistic of the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, Myanmar's GDP grew at the rate of 5.6%, 7.3% and 8.4% respectively within the 2011-2% 2014 financial years. Now, may I inform you about the peace process? As I mentioned previously, it is to solve one of the two great issues. In other words, it's the aim of achieving internet peace and national reconciliation from the current situation of national disunity and civil war. This aim is being carried out at an escalating pace. In a very short period of time, we have managed to achieve ceasefire agreements with 11 armed ethnic groups. Only one main ethnic group, the GIA, remains. However, even while we were trying to achieve the goal of a national ceasefire, the number of armed groups actually increased instead of decreasing. Our peace-working committee is patiently negotiating a national ceasefire accord with the national ceasefire coordinating team, which includes 16 armed ethnic groups. The government is at present negotiating with the ethnic armed groups that have signed the NCA and official political parties and is striving for signatures. These do be affixed to the NCA and official political discussions to begin as soon as possible. Ladies and gentlemen, now there are only a few months left on the first five-year Myanmar democratic reform period. At this point, we can look at the Arab Spring, which happened at about the same time as our reform, and see chaos and a situation full of sorrows. If we compare ourselves to those countries, we can find much to console ourselves with. I'd like to say that ensuring and guiding the situation so that the Myanmar Spring did not reverse itself and broke down into chaos is and itself a great achievement. If we can cap this with a free and fair election, we'll have done our historic duty in our first five-year term. This is not to say that we have won a complete and full victory. The two pandemic issues that I have mentioned before are still not resolved. The fact that these two deeply rooted disease of over half a century's duration cannot be resolved in only five years is natural. I fully agreed with Professor Larry Diamant's analysis that the greatest weakness in Myanmar democracy is the lack of a fundamental political agreement between Myanmar's political forces. We will have to work to create the fundamental political agreement with Professor Diamant's spoke of. In order to achieve this, I argue that we need to carry out three bold steps. They are, one, to hold a free and fair election by the end of 2015 as the latest. Two, to have stability before and after the elections. Three, to have a smooth and orderly transfer of power to the new parliament and government after the elections. As for ourself, we are ready to join hands with whichever party or organization which has won the election to strike for the future of Myanmar's democratic transformation. Previously, I refer to Professor Schmitter's portrayal of the Myanmar Supreme and shown the characteristics of Myanmar's change. This change will be more complicated and subtle than anticipated and can take longer than expected. It will be one which will not succeed at once and one which will gradually be implemented step by step. In conclusion, I'd like to state that the president of Myanmar, the speakers of our parliament, including our colleagues who have done their best in laying democratic foundation for the future generations. I come to ANU with two intentions. The first is to deliver keynote speech and second to hear academic and experts opinions on Myanmar's political and economic reforms. Therefore, I look forward hearing your thoughts and comments. May all those who are attending today be blessed with physical happiness and peace and tranquility in their minds. Thank you very much.