 Thank you very much both for your warm words and, you know, don't exaggerate. I've been there just for 11 weeks and, well, you know dear friend, if you start in a new job, everything looks like roses, but eventually we all discover the thorns as well. But nevertheless, thank you very much for inviting me here. Thank you to the Institute of International and European Affairs for this invitation and the invitation to present some of the key findings of the IAEA World Energy Outlook and I have to say to such a distinguished audience. And in the time available I intend to look at some global trends, but also I would like to focus on issues affecting the outlook for Europe and of course there will be a number of references to the situation in Ireland. Now, let's have a look at what happens. Can everybody see the slide because if you can't see them, you move your chair. Because I can see somebody over there who's looking like this and you'll get a pain in your neck if you continue to do that for the next half an hour. Well, over the past 12 months we have seen some fresh challenges being added to an already complex picture in the energy sector. And first there was this persistent economic concerns and this persistent economic concerns have divert the attention of governments away from energy policy and limited the means of intervention. But as we all know, the financial crisis as we have now, it's very difficult and it's terrible, but we will overcome that. History has told us that it's possible to overcome these kind of troubles. But these climate problems and the questions of energy supply and energy demand will still be there with or without financial crisis. And that's something that, well, sometimes I get an idea, I get a feeling that not everybody is aware of. The second challenge is Fukushima because Fukushima raised questions about the future of nuclear power and some countries have already announced plans to move away from nuclear while others are reassessing its place in the energy mix. And I know Ireland doesn't have a nuclear power plant, but you import, you import from the UK and part of that comes from a nuclear power plant. So you are in it as well, although you don't produce, although you don't have a nuclear power plant. Then third, there's the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa and this raised questions about oil and gas investments in this region and any shortfall would have significant impacts as the region is crucial to meet future demand, future demand growth. And in addition to these new challenges, there are some key trends that point also in a worrying direction. And let me mention three, in 2010 energy demand rebounded following the global recession and pushing CO2 emissions to a record high and the energy efficiency of the global economy worsened for the second straight year. And for many countries, spending on oil markets or spending on oil imports is close to record highs due to persistently rising oil prices with implications for their economic recovery efforts. But despite all this uncertainty, one thing is sure. Economic growth and rising population will push energy demand higher. And this is shown by our new policy scenario. It's a central scenario of the WIO 2011 which takes into account recently announced commitments and plans even if they are yet to be formally adopted and implemented. And we project global energy demand to rise by over one-third by 2010 and 2035. And this will be increasingly dominated and determined by countries outside the OECD. And the emerging countries account for more than 90% of the growth. Well, the biggest contributors to global economic growth are China and India so they lead the way and they represent half of the growth in demand. And China alone represents almost one-third of the growth. Even though by 2035 its per capita energy consumption is still less than half the level in the United States. Well, and then you can see this thin green line at the bottom representing OECD countries and in the OECD, energy demand increases a limited amount as the population growth is stable and economic growth is moderate. Now, primary energy demand in the EU levels off after the mid-2010s and the EU does see no new high record over the projection period with declining trends of oil and gas. Oil slips from the largest energy sales around 2025 and the reduction rate is the second fastest next to Japan and half of the reduction comes from the transport sector due to improvements of fuel efficiency and wider use of biofuels. Coal. Coal demand almost halves and the reduction is as much as oil and almost all comes from the power generation sector and it contributes to the climate change issue, but its small share, small coal share, 8% in the primary energy mix is lower than even in Russia may rise questions on energy security. I come back to coal later. Natural gas, its increases in both power generation and final energy sector. Biomass, see the largest increase among energy sources followed by other renewables such as wind and solar PV. And on nuclear, although the installed capacity declines towards 2035, higher capacity factor contributes pushes up slightly the electricity generated by nuclear. So which fuels are going to meet all this demand? Well, dear friends looking forward, the age of fossil fuels is far from over. But there are some important shifts taking place in the overall energy mixed with renewables and natural gas set to experience the largest growth. Output from renewable energy, it will rise by 85% in the wind and hydro power for electricity generation. Demand for natural gas rises by 45% and it's the only fossil fuel to increase its share of the energy mix. And increases in coal demand are held back by policies aimed at fuel diversification in China and by that decreased coal use in the OECD. The growth in oil comes entirely from the transport sector in non-OECD countries. And I'll tell you why that is because there will be the economic growth, there will be the growth in population, and there will be the growth in prosperity. And what do people want the moment they get money enough to buy it? It's a car. It's as simple as that. And we expect that by 2020 more cars are built and sold in non-OECD countries than in the OECD. One example, I'm going to do that later because it's not in... Yes, it's here, it's in that slide. Let me give you just one example about China. In China at this moment there are 33 zero vehicles per person and we expect it to be 300 per thousand in 2035. And in Europe for comparison we have 500 vehicles per thousand people. So growth in oil demand will be driven by this vehicle ownership as in total the passenger fleet, the passenger vehicle fleet will double to 1.7 million by 2035. Now, does this mean an equivalent rise in oil demand? No. No, because there are factors such as improved fuel economy and alternative fuel vehicles and they will moderate the increase. But as I told by 2020 more cars are built and sold in non-OECD countries than in the OECD. And this means that the key to global oil demand becomes transportation policies in non-OECD countries both in terms of efficiency but also deployment of electric vehicles, hybrids and other alternative fuel vehicles. So this leadership in this area is quite well known. Now let's have a look at the changing oil imports and what kinds of shift we do expect. Europe's importance in global oil trade does not diminish. By 2015 oil imports to the European Union are set to overtake those of the United States, currently the world's large oil import. The US imports requirement is falling. And why is it falling? Because efficiency gains reduce demand and new supplies such as light, tight oil are developed domestically. By 2020 China. China becomes the largest single global importer and you can see that by 2035 imports to China are over 12 million barrels a day and that's far above those of any other importing country or region. Now what do these patterns of global trade imply? They imply a geographical and political shift in concerns about the costs of import and supply security away from Washington, towards Brussels and then Beijing and New Delhi. And against this background, I imagine that European and global oil security will become an increasingly important point for the discussions around this table. Because, you know, I was in Saudi Arabia this week and we had some discussions on oil and they know about this. They know. And they are diversifying their markets and China is paying. It's paying whatever it needs to pay because they need this oil, they are in need of this oil. And that means that the European Union with this kind of flat perspective for 2035 will have to be very, very careful to see that its needs, its demands are going to met and that we are looking that the European Union is going to look for alternatives when we are talking about oil. Now we also analyze in the World Energy Outlook the risk and implication of a shortfall investment in the Middle East and North Africa in the period to 2015. And well, that could be the case as a result of this turmoil and political changes in this region. And such a shortfall could result from an increased political risk or a change in government spending priorities as we can see at this moment. And the world relies heavily on this region, Middle East and North Africa, for the bulk of the growth in global oil output. So this would have significant consequences for supply and prices. And let me make this fairly clear. It's a scenario. It's not a prediction, it's a scenario. And the assumption of this scenario, the inverted investment scenario is that if investment falls one-third below the 100 billion that we think will be necessary each year, that would lead to a significant near-term rising price for consumers to 150 US dollars per barrel in today's money. But it's a scenario. Let me underpin that once more. Now, let's have a look at coal. And in some countries, coal is a little bit like a forgotten fuel because it's not necessary anymore there. And so it doesn't get a lot of attention in some countries. But when we look at coal, then we can see that coal has a crucial role over the past decade, meeting nearly half of growth in global energy demand. And all of this additional demand occurred in non-OECD countries and mainly in the power sector. Total non-coal and coal. And the use of coal has underpinned growth in many emerging economies over the period, including China, which now accounts for almost half of global demand for coal. And whether this trend alters and how quickly, well, it's among the most important questions for the future of the global energy economy, particularly in reference to achieving global climate change objectives. So how does this coal market develop? We project global coal use to rise for the next 10 years, 10 levels off to finish 25% above the levels of 2009. But prospects for coal might be much brighter than this, particularly if you see the environmental impacts mitigated by the uptake of more efficient power plants, the development of carbon capture and storage, and the use of biomass together with coal. And China accounts for over half of global demand to demand growth to 2035, India. India also plays an increasingly important role and displaces the United States as the world's second largest coal consumer, 2025, and becomes the largest coal importer in the 2020s. So the international coal market will become increasingly sensitive to developments in China. And its emergence, China's emergence, as a net coal importer in 2009 led to rising prices and new investments in exporting countries, including Australia, Indonesia, Russia, and Mongolia. What we project is that the main market for traded coal will continue to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but the scale and the direction of international trade flows are highly uncertain, particularly after 2020. And it would take only a relatively small shift in domestic demand or supply for China to become a net exporter again, competing for markets against the countries that are now investing to supply its needs. So Asia will really be the arena of future coal trade. Then let's have a look at post-Fukushima. Fukushima has led some governments to question the long-term role of nuclear power, and in some case, notably Germany and Switzerland, to move away from nuclear power altogether. Now these decisions are incorporated into our central new policy scenarios, but the net effect of this on the global level is relatively small. We don't project the role of nuclear to be reduced significantly as a result. This is because the countries that are really driving the expansion of nuclear power that's China, India, Russia and Korea, they did not change their policies. But given the increased uncertainty, this could change. So we decided to look at what we call a low nuclear case in which nuclear additions are halved globally compared with our central scenario. Well, we found out that turning away from nuclear power on such a scale posed significant risks to energy security and to the environment. And yes, of course, there will be new opportunities for renewable energy sources. Yes, definitely. But there will also be a large increase in demand for fossils and increased emissions. And that will make it harder and more expensive to combat for climate change. And yes, that means that by 2035, compared with our new policy scenarios, there will be a cold demand increase comparable with twice Australia's team called exports, natural gas demand increase, two-thirds Russia's natural gas net exports. And in the power sector, we will see that CO2 emissions will increase by 6.2%. And of course, the biggest implications are for countries with limited energy sources that plan to rely on nuclear power. Let's have a look at gas. And we called this slide, the Golden Prospects for Natural Gas, but I'll make some comments on that. And there is much less uncertainty over the outlook for natural gas because factors both on the supply and demand sites point to a bright future, even a golden age for natural gas. And demand for all gas reaches that for CO2 by 2035 with 80% of the additional demand coming again from non-OCD countries. And when we have a look at the world's remaining resource of natural gas, yes, they can comfortably meet the projections of global demand to 2035 and well beyond. But our optimism about this ample availability of gas is based in part on an increasing share of unconventional gas in overall output which rises from 13% in 2009 to above 20% in 2035. And we do see some possibilities for unconventional gas production in Europe. I could mention Poland is the best example and this could change the energy landscape in individual countries. But looking at Europe as a whole, we do not see this having a transformative effect. Europe's gas imports requirement continues to rise by almost 200 billion cubic meters compared with today and increasing concerns about energy security will be part of that. Now let's have a look at Ireland. And this can again be the case of Ireland in particular given the current low level of storage relative to gas demand. And I know that you are working on a gas field and I know that on the deployment of a gas field I know that you are working on an LNG and I think all these things are quite important for energy security. Gas field in short and medium term and LNG in storage important for the longer term because now import comes from through the UK. So this is one source of supply. So it's I think it's quite important to diversify sources. And of course I knew about the concerns of unconventional gas and that's exactly why the IEA together with Poland and Ireland will be part of that as well are organizing a workshop on the implications of shale gas because there are quite some concerns about it and I think we think it's very important to address these concerns and we can do this now at this moment. So that is some activity that we are going to undertake in next year. Now let's have a look at Russia. Every year we have one special country that we give special attention to and this year it was Russia and Russia remains the global gas producer and the largest source of growth in gas supply. We looked in detail in this year's World Energy Outlook at the prospects of Russian energy and there were three key issues that we focus on was investment, efficiency and markets. Now Russia really faces a major investment challenge as it moves to develop the next generation of oil and gas supply and is often in quite challenging and remote areas like the Arctic or Sakhalin and so on to replace their aging energy infrastructure. And investment and energy pricing is also the key to increase energy efficiency and there the potential in Russia is huge. Within Russia there is also still much to do to create functioning competitive markets so we look at a way that international markets for Russian export are set to change and in our projections the bulk of Russia's fossil fuel exports continue to flow to markets in Europe but there will be a shift, a shift towards Asia and the shift gathers momentum and it provides Russia with greater diversity of export markets and it will also bring them higher export revenues and of course we have an assumption and the assumption is that there will be pipelines to the east, pipelines to China that's the assumption that brings me back to the investments that are necessary to really see that this picture is going to be turned into reality and Russia remains an important supplier of gas to the European market over the coming decades continuing to provide around a third of the EU's gas imports but as Russia develops a greater degree in choice of gas export so Europe too should ensure that it has options and an integrated competitive European gas markets with new links to external suppliers via pipelines, LNG as well as some production of unconventional gas can deliver the choices that Europe really needs let's have a look at electricity in the electricity sector Europe is the leader in green technologies followed by China and we expected this to continue in the future it's the European Union and China that make the largest contribution to a shift towards lower carbon sources of power generation at global level, generation from renewables excluding hydropower increases from 3% of the total in 2009 to over 15% in 2035 but it's driven by something it's driven by government policies and continuing subsidies and in our projections the share of low carbon technologies within the European Union electricity generation rises to two thirds in 2035 with Germany playing an important role and of course, yes this higher level of renewable energy deployment delivers lasting benefits a more diverse electricity mix a reduction in CO2 emissions, yes and the fuel and operational costs are in many cases close to zero however, new renewables capacity is often capital intensive for the world as a whole it represents 60% of power sector investment 30% of additional generation now let's have a look at Ireland when we see Ireland in 2009 electricity about 60% from gas that's about 12% from wind and of the increase there will be an enormous increase in wind onshore wind and I think this is very important to bear in mind when we are talking about Ireland then about the subsidies for many regions and technologies this energy derived from renewable sources is and is projected to remain for decades to come more costly than energy from fossil fuels and well designed subsidies for renewables yes, they will be vital they will be vital to see to it that at the end the renewables will be cost effective and in our analysis the required support for each unit of renewable energy is set to decline over time yes, because cost reductions are achieved and end user energy prices will rise but the global cost of subsidies to buy fuels and renewable energy electricity generation is set to expand with their increasing supply from 66 billion US dollars in 2010 to 250 billion US dollars in 2035 and in the European Union subsidies to renewables they will peak in 2020s somewhere in 2020s at just over 50 billion US dollars in today's money as wind power, again wind power becomes increasingly competitive and we projected onshore winds will become competitive without subsidies in many parts of Europe from around 2020 these costs I have to admit do not include integration costs and these integration costs we estimate can range between 5 and 25 dollars per megawatt hour and these costs will likely increase electricity costs although in some countries like the recent Irish experience they will be counter balanced by reduced generating costs so this again shows that we have to look at the picture as a whole and not just have a look at part of the picture so what does this increasing energy use mean for climate change now over the past century the carbon emissions from the western industrialized world are far out based those from other countries but now let's have a look forward and when we look forward it's China again China that's poised to emit more CO2 emissions than the United States and the European Union combined over the period to 2035 and that is as its per capita emissions increase to the average level for the OECD and its cumulative emissions overtake those of the European Union and this shows that the solution to have a society with less CO2 emissions has not only to be found in the OECD countries but has to be found in the emerging countries as well and there I would like to add one remark we have always this learning curve and it's not necessary for somebody for countries that are emerging now to start at the learning curve that the OECD countries once did let's help them to make a start with the present state of our technology because that will help everybody well what does this simply this whole story mean for the goal to reach this two degree Celsius targets well all the results that I've presented so far are from the new policy scenarios and that's our central scenario and these projections put us on track a dangerous level of climate change inducing a global average temperature increase of more than three and a half degrees Celsius and without these policies current trends put us on an even more variant track for the temperature rise of 6% now in the world energy outlook 2011 we also present what we call a 450 scenario and that sets out what it would take to reach the international goal of limiting the long term increase to 2 degrees Celsius but this year we also did something else we made a picture or you might call it a snapshot of all the existing capital stock power plants, buildings and factories because you know as well as I do they have a lifetime for 30, 40, 50 years so we made a snapshot and then we discovered that 80% 80% of the total CO2 emissions permissible by 2035 are already locked in by our existing capital stock and without serious new efforts by 2015 the energy related infrastructure in place will generate more than 90% of the allowed emissions by 2035 well and you can see what will be the next one if we delay action until 2017 we will be totally locked in and this means that in order to achieve these 2 degrees Celsius all additional energy related infrastructure built from that point forward would have to be zero carbon now the question is should we accept this? of course not because we have things that we can do and that brings me to my next slide how can we achieve the 450 scenario now our analysis shows that at EU level 50% cuts in emissions compared to 1990 levels will be needed in 2030 and those results are in line with the 2050 roadmap and the most important contribution comes from the energy that we do not consume energy efficiency energy efficiency accounts for more than half of the reduction in emissions compared to our central scenario and then there are renewables we have carbon capture and storage we have nuclear power we have biofuels and we have to put a price on carbon to redirect investments so there are a number of things we can do to prevent that the situation I showed you in the previous slide will come to reality to conclude at global level there are few signs that the urgently needed shift in energy trends is under way or forthcoming and global energy is set to continue its increase with rising prosperity and population and the EU is the largest import market for natural gas and it will for some 10 years after 2015 in our projections also be the largest importer of oil yes and the EU is already the leading edge of the international debate and climate change and it will also be in the front line when it comes to energy security we do see a strong shift towards renewable energy sources led by European Union and China and yes renewables are set to come of age and promise a more sustainable energy pathway but these will require further subsidies in some cases for an extended period and getting the design of this support right is critically important because of course we have to see to it that there is a decline in this support as the renewable energy sources come of age and the costs go down further and while some steps are being taken in the right direction it's clear that the door to the 2°C scenario is closing but we can't keep the door open and we can open it even more wider if our governments have the political will and courage to do so Mr. Chairman I hope that this brief presentation has provided some point for discussion and I would like to hand over the World Energy Outlook not to you but to the Director General and to you, to the two of you because I've got two of you