 Good afternoon. Welcome to our panel, what it promises to be a very exciting and informative panel. I'm Rick McGahey. I'm the Senior Vice President of Programs for INET. And thank you all both for coming to our reawakening conference, and particularly for coming to this session on immigration and migration. One of the most challenging effects of economic disruption and demographic change and globalization around the world is, of course, mass migration and immigration, a force that's disrupting politics and economics around the world, including in Europe and the United States, where opposition to immigration has helped to fuel populist nationalism. That opposition is often expressed in economic terms with reactions claiming that immigrants take jobs and hurt economies. Our panel will explore the differing views of economists on that question, but we'll also go beyond that to talk about the politics and political issues associated with immigration and consider the future of immigration and migration in an increasingly globalized and economically disrupted world. We have a terrific panel. I'm going to introduce them all at once and then get out of their way. We have three speakers who will each get up to 15 minutes and then one commentator with 10 minutes. Then the panelists will have a chance to discuss with each other, and we'll get some time in for questions with the audience as well. So we have in order of presentation Christian Dustman, a professor of economics and director of the Center for Research and Analysis of Migration at University College London, and Hammerstadt, an honorary senior research fellow at the University of Kent, and Andrew Shang, a longtime friend of INET and a distinguished fellow at the Asia Global Institute at the University of Hong Kong. And our commentator is Philippe LeGrain, the founder of the Open Political Economy Network. And Christian, we'll start with you. OK, thank you very much. So the title of the session was Why do estimates of immigration's economic effects clash so sharply? And my talk will be structured into three subsections. So I will definitely cover the first two. If I get the sign too early, probably I won't say much about the third. First of all, what are the economic effects of immigration? And how can we measure them? What is the challenge to academic research to measure the economic effects of migration? I will give you some examples on that. Secondly, do economic considerations matter, actually, for the way people assess immigration policy? And if not, what are the drivers of people's attitudes towards immigration and immigration policy? Suppose we knew everything about how immigration affects the economy, would that be something which is valuable information for people who make voting decisions when actually deciding which party they would want to vote for? And that brings me to the third point. Why does immigration affect voting outcomes? I will draw on various bits of research we have done on that over the last one and a half decades. So why do estimates of immigration's economic effects clash so sharply? Incidentally, we have actually just written a paper on that which looks at the various reasons why the literature on the wage impacts of migration is, well, apparently, coming to different results. Let me just summarize that here, and you can look at that at your leisure. So the first reason is because, actually, the effect of immigration is different for every country and for every period within countries that we are studying. So other than many other areas in economics where we can generalize results, that is not something which is advisable when it comes to immigration. The effects of immigration depend on the composition of the immigrant population, depend on the composition of the receiving country's population. They depend on the period over which migration occurs within the same country. They depend on the type of migrants where they are coming from, how long they intend to stay, et cetera, et cetera. So there are many reasons why we should expect these effects to be heterogeneous to conclude from what we learned, for instance, about the US that we can generalize that to Germany or other countries is highly arraignous. Now, the second reason why so many papers find a different effect is actually because they estimate often very different parameters, parameters which are not comparable. So for instance, if you take the economics of migration focusing on the economic impact of migration on wages, many papers are actually estimating different effects. Some estimate partial effects, which means, for instance, the impact of unskilled immigrants on unskilled natives within a particular country. Other estimate total effects, the impact of unskilled immigration on unskilled immigrants in that country, however, taking also a count of complementarities between unskilled and skilled immigrants. So these parameters are different and often not comparable. So the third point on which I would like to extend a little bit more is actually measurement. The way what we do in empirical work is we slice the labor market, we identify which part of the labor market is differentially affected by migration, and we compare the wage effects, the employment effect that has on native workers. However, of course, a prerequisite for that is that we are able to find out where in a particular labor market, immigrants are actually occurring. In what part of the labor market do they compete with native workers? And that is challenging, and I will show you that in a number of graphs, which is based on some of the work we have done in the past. So in measuring the impact of migration more generally, we need to construct what we call a counterfactual situation. We need to understand what would have happened had migration not occurred. What we observe, for example, when we look at the wage impacts of migration, is the wages of residents before and after immigration has taken place. What we would like to understand is, and what we would like that to compare to, is what the wages of immigrants, sorry, what the wages of residents would have been had migration not occurred. We call that a missing counterfactual. And I would think that the entire literature can be actually structured into various approaches, trying to reconstruct this missing counterfactual. To come back to the measurement issue, I have pointed out before, for example, if we take the UK, the distribution of native earnings is just this horizontal line. Let's see where we would place immigrants if we would take their observed education and their observed age structure to place them along the distribution of native wages. Well, this is how it looks like. We would particularly place them at the upper part of the distribution. Immigration to the UK is highly skilled. Immigrants to the UK have been, for a long time, on average, better skilled than natives and far less so at the lower part of the distribution. The problem, of course, is that this is not good indication where immigrants compete with natives in the labor market. The reality where they compete with natives in the labor market looks very different. That is the green line. So we have more density at the low end of the distribution, far less density in the middle of the distribution, and then again something coming up at the upper end of the distribution. So if we did conduct research based on the red line, apparently we would get it very, very long. So let's see how that translates into the wage impact of immigration along the distribution of wages of natives. Well, this would be the graph if we estimated the impact of migration along the percentiles of native wages. We find a slight negative wage impact at the lower end of the distribution and positive effects further up the distribution, which is very much nearly a mirror image to the green line, which is based on completely different extracts from the data, namely where we find immigrants in the distribution of wages. So if we would do that according to whether you would allocate immigrants in the distribution of wages, you clearly would get that very wrong. So there were many challenges in estimating wage impacts, employment impacts, impacts on innovation, et cetera, et cetera of immigration, very often related to constructing counterfactuals, which are useful. But then also, of course, there were many measurement issues and that is an ongoing field of research, which is actually quite exciting. Of course, there were also dynamic effects. So what we usually pick up when we estimate the effects of migration is we compare, well, we use approaches which utilize those individuals who have just come to a particular country. To give you again an example for the UK, the blue line is the location of immigrants where they are in the wage distribution in the UK according to their observed characteristics. The red line is where we would allocate them according to where they actually, the red line is where we would allocate them according to observed characteristics. Over time, this particular entry cohort is kind of upgrading their skills. So the red line would be where these individuals are after three to five years. The green line is where they are after five to 10 years and the yellow line is where they are after 10 or more years. So you see they become more and more closely related to where in the first place we would expect them to be based on their education. So while they move up through the distribution of wages of natives, of course, they affect the wages of natives at different parts of the distribution. So we call that a particular dynamic where the literature is still very unadvanced to understand that fully. Now, let's kind of pause a little bit. Suppose as economists we would be able to track down precisely how immigration affects the receiving country. Would that be something which is important for individuals when they make their voting decisions or when they form their attitudes towards more or less liberal migration policy? So is immigration policy related to the effect immigration has on the economy and the way individuals perceive that? Or is it something entirely different which affects the way immigration policy is thought of by individuals? Is it non-economic considerations? Is it cultural concerns which actually matter? So this is a question which, together with, in particular, my colleague Ian Preston, I'm following up for, well, nearly two decades now. And let me just give you some results of that research which I think are quite interesting. Well, we started this some years ago when we constructed a particular module for the European Social Survey with the aim to distinguish between two different factors which may affect the way individuals think about migration policy. So the one factor we call social-cultural concerns. So this is based on questions about whether individuals favor a common language, what individuals think about a common religion, et cetera. Things which are outside the economic limit. The second factor is a factor which is related to economic concerns such as labor market effects in terms of employment, in terms of wages, and in terms of the fiscal impact immigration may have. So I don't want to go into details how we are doing that. Let me just give you some results. So throughout that research, however we cut the data, we find that effects of economic concerns are far less important if it comes for individuals to form their attitudes about whether they want more or less immigration than social-cultural concerns. So social-cultural concerns are very important. No matter how we form that factor, which variables we include, which variables we exclude, we have done that for the British Social Survey, we have done that for other surveys. So the social-cultural concerns always dominate economic concerns in the formation of these attitudes. They are important when individuals decide about migration policy. Do you want more or less migration? They are less important if it comes to whether individuals think migration is a good or bad thing for the economy, as we would expect, and they are again important when individuals decide whether immigration makes the country a better or worse place to live. Now there is, we have done that for many countries. So for every country for which we have done that the social-cultural concern is more important than the economic concern, as you can see, by all these entries being above this red line. The exception is Luxembourg, which is the blue dot just very close to that line. Now, do immigrants think different than natives when they form these perceptions? Well, that's not the case. As you can see, even for immigrants, within those countries, social-cultural concerns matter more than economic concerns. We observe a gap in the way individuals form their attitudes to immigration, which is very much related to education, and which by many scholars has been interpreted by something which is related to labor market concerns. So low-educated individuals have a more negative attitude towards more immigration, and people claim that this is due to education, to low-educated being more exposed to the effects of immigration. Well, is that really the case? Is it really labor market concerns, or is it social-economic concerns, social-cultural concerns? We can actually, using the same analysis, decompose that, and it turns out that the gap which is attributed to social-cultural concerns is that this gap is mainly explained by social-cultural concerns. So how does immigration affect voting? Behavior is basically the last thing I would like to talk to you about, and clearly an issue which is very important. So I don't have much time anymore, so let me just summarize that. We, in order to find that out, we would want to randomly allocate immigrants across different areas in a particular country, and then see how that affects the voting behavior of majority individuals. We have such an experiment taking place in Denmark in the 90s and 80s, where refugees have been randomly allocated across municipalities, and municipalities had no influence on how many refugees and what type of refugees they actually receive. Doing that, let me just give you this last slide here. We find that this type of allocation of refugees has a very strong impact on the vote shares for right-wing anti-immigration parties. It increases their share, in this particular diagram, from 8.4% to 9.7%, which is actually quite dramatic. So this is due to a one percentage point increase in the share of refugees allocated to a particular area. It decreases the vote share of center-left parties, and we have varying results somewhere in the middle. So let me kind of conclude and wrap up. Well, estimates of economic effects of migration are so different to come back to the main topic of this particular session, because they are actually different across different countries, because different studies measure often different parameters which are not comparable, and because it is difficult to place immigrants and natives into the same slice of the labor market, which is due to downgrading and very often ignored. Secondly, attitudes of individuals towards migration policies are mainly driven by non-economic concerns. This makes, of course, migration a very unpredictable policy issue, and we have seen the latest example, Angela Merkel strongly struggling with that. And lastly, there is strong evidence that refugee migration to Denmark over the period over which we observe has been a main driver for the increase in vote shares for white-leaning anti-immigration parties. Now clearly we may want to discuss that later on in this panel. This means there are major challenges for Europe in view of future migrations from Africa and from the Middle East. Thank you. So Anne, we'll turn to you now. So that's almost as if we planned it, but the end of Christian's talk is very much the beginning of my talk. It's about the movement of refugees asylum seekers and so-called irregular migrants to Europe and the political effects of that. So in spite the topic of the seminar, I'm going to talk mostly about politics, and one reason for that is exactly what Christian was saying, that in the political debate, there is so much material you can take in cherry pick, which is what people are doing in the political debate, whether you are pro or against migration. So I'm going to talk about the politics of it, and I'm going to look particularly at the relationship between Europe and Africa. So Europe or the EU rather had a migration crisis, although many migration experts would argue that this wasn't really a crisis. So if it was a crisis, it was a crisis of Europe's own making in terms of how they handled it. In 2015, there was a large influx of migrants, a big jump in the numbers, crossing the Mediterranean and arriving on the EU's southern shores. Now, in terms of numbers, you would think that this particular episode had a seemingly outsized political effect. If you look at migrant figures from 2015, the EU had something like around 55 million international migrants at the time, and in the period from January 2015 till today, these irregular arrivals across the Mediterranean were 1.5 million, so seemingly not that big a figure. But there are reasons why it was seen as a crisis. One is that if you look at the new arrivals, so not migrants already living in their host countries for a long time, then irregular migrants are a big share of the new arrivals. They're also a fairly large share of the net migration surplus in Europe. Europe, the EU, is one of the regions of the world where there is a net immigration rather than emigration. And also, of course, the both migrants were very much a visible, chaotic form of migration, which caused the sense in many European capitals that Europe had lost control of its borders, lost control of deciding who gets to come and who gets to be stopped. Now, 2015 didn't come out of nowhere. There was a rising number of both migrants, especially from 2010 onwards, mostly arriving in Italy. There was also, after a fairly quiet from the point of view of forced migration and refugees, there had been a lull in conflict and conflict-related displacement in the first decade of the 2000s. But then that was followed by a very sharp rise, especially because of the war in Syria, but not only because of that. So by 2015, you had the situation where you had record number of refugees combined with very high levels of South-North migration. There was a very strong pressure on the host states, the refugee host states in the EU's neighborhood, like Turkey, like Lebanon, Jordan. So you had a scene set up for the next stage in this refugee crisis. I won't talk lots about this, but this is a typical example of how refugee movements, I'm sorry about the lurid colors, happened. So in the case of Syria, this is figures from 2015, the biggest number of people affected by the conflict do not move at all, but they need humanitarian assistance. They're in trouble. Then the next biggest group, among those 13.5 million, are internally displaced people, so they do not actually leave Syria. Then the next largest group out of this will be regional refugees, and so people who go just across the border. And then finally, you get people who move beyond that region. And often, this is also a timeline, so you start with humanitarian need, and then you get displacement. Often what happens, people will flee to the region, and they don't actually want to go any further. They're hoping to go back, but they will run out of resources. The host states will run out of patience as numbers get bigger. Also, the problems arrive, so people will start wanting to move further on to restart their lives. So the Syrian refugee crisis is quite typical of large refugee situations. Don't know how well this map comes up, but what happened in 2015 was that suddenly a new and much easier route opened up from Turkey to Greece, and there were a lot of Syrian refugees in Turkey by 2015. This is a map from UNHCR, by the way. So suddenly, from very few people taking that route, you had 836,000 people arriving by sea in 2015 into Greece, into these small Greek islands very close to the coast of Turkey. Most of them are refugees, obviously refugees, not economic migrants, especially in the beginning. So this was the overall number of the breakdown of the main population groups in the whole period from January 2015 to February 2016. And in the beginning, the vast majority were Syrians. After a while, other groups started coming too. Skip that one. So this was the situation at the beginning of 2016 that you had a lot of people arriving, getting into Greece, then walking through the Balkans and Eastern Europe and making it to Germany, who decided to lift the Dublin requirement and allow people to walk through Europe and claim asylum there. What you also had by then was ample proof that there was no, there's very poor cooperation between EU countries on this topic. Very few common EU measures actually worked. Instead, what you had was a lot of unilateral policies and border closures starting with Hungary by October 2015. Also a mood shift, the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, where it turned out that at least a couple of the terrorists had probably taken the same migration trail as the refugees. So people were also starting to talk much more about the potential of terrorism, crime, and other dangers. So this was put a relatively effective stop to in late February. A combination of Macedonia, which has the northern border with Greece, closing its border, and the EU-Turkey deal, which EU negotiated with Turkey in return for various goods, especially money. Turkey would stop the boats. It's not clear how long the deal will stick, but it's also not clear that this deal needs to stick, because if you look at the bottom of this, this is another UNHCR map. It shows, so the EU-Turkey deal was in, I think, the 20th of March, but the numbers of arrivals stopped earlier than that, and they stopped because Macedonia was closing its borders. So people didn't want to be stuck in Greece. Greece is not a place where you can rebuild your life very easily. There's very high unemployment. There's an economic crisis, so people wanted to move on. So the border closures were at least as important as the EU-Turkey deal, in my view. Now, so the politics, the repercussions of this. Well, anti-migrant sentiments, which were already on the rise, really got wind in its sails. In my view, Brexit had a lot to do with the migration worries, and what happened in Europe in 2015 was an important part of that. Even though the UK actually didn't get that many refugees coming here, they did manage unilaterally to stop most from arriving. It led to all sorts of stricter asylum rules and immigration rules. I'm talking about Denmark again. They introduced, among other things, the so-called jewelry law that anyone, a refugee, would ride with more than 10,000 Danish crown or about 1,000 pounds, would have it confiscated to pay for their upkeep. And then you had debates about wedding rings and engagement rings and family heirlooms, whether that could be confiscated or not. Suggestions by countries like Norway that had always been a very strong advocate for refugee rights to scrap the whole refugee convention and start having quotas. There's been many more forced returns, including of people from regions that have a lot of refugees like Afghanistan. It was also very clear that EU burden sharing did not work. East-west differences came out very clearly. Many Eastern European countries flatly refused to have any sort of burden sharing mechanism where refugees from who had already been given refugee status in Greece and Italy would be resettled in other European countries. So what EU managed to do was to clamp down on border control, but with very little other types of cooperation. You've seen sort of Greece being sealed off from the rest of the EU for irregular migrants and you see a similar thing for Italy now. It's very hard to get onwards from Italy if you arrive on the boats from North Africa. So it's EU in a security mode, very much thinking of migration, not in terms of the economic positives, negatives but as a matter of the various survival of the EU as an entity in some discussions of this. So what does that say about EU-Africa relationships? So after closing the Aegean route, which is the much safer and simpler route, most irregular migrants who attempt the trip with boats now come from Libya and they end up in Italy. It's a much more dangerous route, both getting to Libya, being in Libya and then crossing the Mediterranean. So the Terence perspective of EU migration policy has now shifted towards Africa, towards North Africa particularly. Migration is very much dominating the EU's agenda vis-à-vis Africa now. You can see it in the Summatory, ever since the Malta summit on migration. You can see attempts at replicating the spirit of the EU-Turkey deal in Africa, especially with Libya making deals with various actors, whether they're militias, whether they're the government to stop the boats. It's all quite secretive. It's hard to know what's actually going on in terms of deal-making in Libya. Attempts at pushing the fact of EU border control to Libya's southern border so that people don't get as far as into Libya to make the last stage via boat. There's also a strong element of deterrence in European and EU policy on irregular migrants. So with the conclusion of the EU-Turkey deal, about 50,000, 60,000 migrants and refugees were stranded in Greece. They couldn't move further because the border northwards was closed. They live in very dismal conditions. It's quite hard to imagine that in the EU today people can live in such squalor, but they do. And it's the same thing happening in Libya too. So life is made very difficult for the migrants who are stranded and not able to go forward in order to try to push them back and to deter others from doing the same, from trying the route. There's also a lot of attempts at creating migration compacts or agreements with so-called priority countries which are African countries on the route, the migration route, mostly from West Africa but also from the sort of conflict belt of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. So the long-term ambition of these compacts is very good. It's about creating economic growth, inclusive growth, job creation, and also to create formal migration opportunities. So it doesn't have to be done this dangerous in a regular way about having refugee quotas, et cetera. In practice, what's happened so far is it's all about border control. It's about crackdown on smugglers, at least in theory. It's about return agreements or failed asylum seekers because the internal debate in the European Union now doesn't allow for discussion about actually having formal migration from Africa to Europe. So my argument is that this is creating a rescued relationship between the EU and Africa. Migration priorities are increasingly influencing aid agendas, for instance, without much thought about how you can use aid to stop migration, which means I think it'll be very likely a wasteful, inefficient strategy. It gives some African countries better bargaining chips with the European Union, while others are being ignored, and it creates all in all a very transactional relationship that can be abused for blackmail and... Yeah. I'm gonna run through quickly the last some concluding thoughts. As someone who works on refugees mostly, it's sort of sad to say that the deterrence of the European Union has sort of worked. So numbers of irregular migrants arriving in Europe is much, much lower now than, certainly, than 2015, but also they're lower than 2014, so before the whole thing happened. But, of course, migration pressures from Africa to Europe due to demographics will not go away and economics. I won't talk about sustainable development goals now, but there is a lot to talk about how international migration should be part of the development of poorer countries and the future of people. So we need a more positive debate and a recognition that, yes, you have to have migration control, but the way it's being done right now, it's not very productive for anyone, and certainly not for the migrants caught up in it. So I'll stop there. Thank you. Anders. Thank you. Well, my presentation actually follows very naturally from what Christian and Anne has done. And I'm not an expert on immigration. I'm a policy thinker. It's what I really want to basically say from my own background, which is that my family were refugees and then migrants. And so I now live in Malaysia. But we have a 30 million population with officially 3 million migrant workers, but probably unofficially up to 7 million. And, of course, luckily it's not highly populated, but migration has huge economic consequences, particularly on our own labor force and our industrial policy, which we need to think about. But I really want to say is very quickly is that the policies has traditionally been considered on a national basis, the Westphalian nation state. But unfortunately climate change, which I'm going to argue is probably one of the major drivers of migration, has regional and even conflict issues, which particularly is going to be very difficult for emerging markets. And so we need a very systemic way to think about this issue where we take geopolitics, economics, technology, social inequities, and climate change on this migration issue. And rich states like Europe, which Anne and Christian have addressed, clearly needs to address this. Now, very quickly, this is a lot of material available on how the migration started. And you can see a lot of it comes from the Middle East and a lot of it's going to Europe. And then Africa is also a major driver. Migration's got a historical trend according to McKinsey data. It's moved from 3.1% in 1960 to 3.4% on generally. 90% voluntary, remaining 10% are refugees and asylum. And there are over 347 living outside the country of birth, myself included. The UNHCR is finding huge fiscal stress with $65 million, according to their data, forcibly displaced, 22.5 million refugees, all these data, a lot you know. Now, we go back to this Huntington stuff. Weiner in 1995 basically argued that migration creates its own flow. And then a lot of it, the West may not be able to control according to Huntington. Now, it's very interesting. In a very major study by Rouveni, 38 cases of global environmental migration have had violence and half had less. But 36 of them were in emerging markets, only two in advanced countries. So the bulk of the burden arises from migration and including the hosts are emerging markets. And quite a lot of them involve migration. The big picture, of course, is that water stress causes civil unrest. I, myself, looking into the Syrian crisis, realized that four years, this is what the scientists say, four years of drought in Syria with an incompetent government created regional interference and then unmanageable and then huge migration issues. Now, those of you who had a chance to reach Jeffrey Parker said that climate change has recently caused massive destruction through global cooling, then global warming up. All these, one knows quite well. And the basic projects by the World Bank is that the water stress will then reduce GDP, and particularly in the high stress areas. For example, in India, one reason why the Himalayans is so important is that seven or eight of the world's largest river feeding the bulk of the population in Asia, the Indus, the Irawadi, the Mekong, the Yellow River, the Yangtze, they feed nearly 3, 4 billion people. And if that dries up or melts, 60% of Indian agriculture depends upon well water, and this is dropping very, very fast. So one of the things that struck me, according to Walter Scheidel, his latest book, is that inequality is solved fundamentally through violence and war. And if you add that into climate change, according to the third demographic transition, David Coleman, the share of national population that is of all foreign origin will reach between a quarter and a third out of six out of seven countries in the EU. Now, if you look at the latest election victories, or the winning government has only 31% of the vote, and if the population reaches 10%, 15%, that changes the voting pattern dramatically. Now, if you then look at the Middle East and North Africa, the conflicts are proliferating. Maine accounts for 56% of the world's internally displaced refugees, not including Sahel, which is even more water stressed than the Middle East. And it has the world's largest, fastest growing young and working population. So they present very huge challenges for workers. Now, from a rich country point of view, it's very good to bring in the workers, but exactly as Christian has said, it has none economic, social, cultural reactions. Let me put it very, very mildly. So 90% of the refugees are under the age of 18. I recently visited the refugee camp in Jordan, mostly Syrian workers, and it was an interesting statistic I had not realized. The average Syrian is used to using per capita water eight times that of the Jordanians. And you have to fund these, bring water to 80,000 of these refugees by trucks. You can't even put pipe water in because they're supposed to be temporary. So it struck to me how difficult these humanitarian, as well as fiscal, as well as logistical issues these are. And of course, as the IMF has did in a very useful study on this, is that the impact on GDP on the major countries, not just on the exporting country, but on the host country, is going to be a big shock. And then where is the money going to come from? So it's a serious issue. So what are the key policy choices? Well, if you're the rich country, if the world is going to warm up, where, and particularly, it's going to heat up in the equator, which is underwater stress, where will they go, up north into cooler climates, and where there is more land, more water, less population. And is it going to be stoppable, no matter what are your options? And so there are the three options. The one is to allow the inflows, which is on humanitarian grounds, but it causes the populist reaction that Anne has talked about. The second is to spend money on the two preempt in the so-called home countries, which are failing, failed, and fragile. But if they are struck by continuing years of drought, you end up with worse governments that cannot cope, and then it will have a problem. And so the third solution is to have a global compact on how to deal with the negative effects of climate change holistically. But at this particular point, we are in deep trouble, because after the 207-208 crisis in the advanced countries, they don't feel so generous anymore because they've got the big debt, and they've got the debt overhang, and the fiscal issues. And so we do need a global taxation problem, and we can't do this in a Westphalian world. And why is the Westphalian model failing? If you look back at the Africa and all these countries, a lot of the borders are completely drawn during the colonial period as straight lines, which have no bearing on actually tribes, culture, religion, even geographical issues. And so since a lot of these borders were not quite patrolled, the migration has always been there. But if the water is not a problem, then you won't have migration outside the region. But today, the climate change issues are going to be very big. And so it raises a very fundamental global public good issue, which is that the humanitarian approach to refugee handling is neither operationally nor fiscally sustainable. Just think about the scale. The three hurricanes, just for the United States, including Puerto Rico, excluding Dominica and Cuba and all the others, is estimated at $280 billion. Three quarters of the total assets of the World Bank. And how much is the World Bank lending every year? $23 billion, and net only $9 billion. This is supposed to be the premier institution to do this. In the meantime, of course, I'm a former central banker. So printing billions, trillions. The total size of the central banking community is $22 trillion at the last count. And they claim that they have nothing to do with climate change or policy resource allocation issues. But the problem is that out of this $280 billion, you already saw this. If it is Texas and Florida, a very quick reaction. If it's on Puerto Rico, not necessarily. And who is going to help invest in Dominica, Cuba, and all the others, where they can't deal with this? So if we go through a series of climate warming issues, which we are going to see, where is the money to help contain the damage, improve the infrastructure, and deal with keeping the migration at a stable level? Because if not, it will be driven. So we cannot hope that climate change will not worsen. Some of you don't even think about this, may not have thought about this. I certainly didn't. If the why are the hurricanes occurring? If the hurricane, if the water is more warm, it creates that air change. But if the more icebergs melt, the huge amount weight of water actually costs the continental shelves to shift, then creating earthquakes and tsunamis and natural disasters. Some of the people think, although this is not proven, that the earthquake in China may have been caused in 2008, 2009, was caused by the three gorges, which was a heavy weight of water causing the more recent earthquakes. So nobody's making estimates of how much these things could cost. We make our fiscal budgets, and including our aid, very much on a pay-as-you-go basis.