 Good evening everyone. Welcome to the fifth annual Declos Johnson Lecture. My name is Meinar De Waal. I'm the Director of the Marina Environmental Law Institute, the host of this event. And I guess my role in this is to just chair the proceedings. And I can assure you that I won't delay the proceedings very long at all. In fact, I see my main role as being to step out of the way so we can hear from the other presenters and our main speakers. And so I'll ask Dean Brooks to come up and say a few words of welcome. Thanks Michael. So I'm Kim Brooks, the Dean here at the Schulman School of Law. It's just a pleasure to be here amongst so many friends. Thank you for coming out this afternoon to the fifth annual lecture. It's a great pleasure to be at a school that has such enormous fed strength in the areas of primary maritime environmental law at the school. And you may know, and certainly if you don't, we'll hear a lot more about that. The Institute itself is approaching its 40th anniversary. So we're expecting lots of celebratory moments over the course of the next year or so. This lecture is a key part of what we do at the Institute and at the school. It's a great honor to have both our colleagues and some of the associates of the Institute here. They are the leading thinkers in this area around the world. When I'm out traveling, I regularly ask questions about our Institute and the scholars and how they're possibly so active. It seems like there must be at least 45 of them attached to the school. And I reassure people in fact there are 45 of them who are just a huge marine environmental law institute here at the school. Six or so have been pulled down the corner very nicely. So without more, let me turn it to Professor Aldo Kirchhoff who's going to actually say a few words about Douglas Johnson himself. And then I take it we'll get an introduction to the speaker by Professor Wendersweig. Thank you. Thank you, Kim. Douglas Millard Johnson. He was born in 1931 in Dunneby, Scotland and died in 2006 in Victoria, British Columbia. He was a leading teacher, scholar, writer and internationalist in the field of public international law. And especially in the law of the sea and international environmental law. He completed his graduate education at McGill University and Yale University. He was a professor of law at Schulich since the early 1970s. And until he was viewed away by the competition at UV in 1987. So he spent a long time in the classroom. And despite his departure he always remained close to Dalhousie. Douglas profoundly influenced the development of marine and environmental law research and teaching at the Schulich School of Law. And indeed he was co-founder with Professor Edgar Gold of the Marine and Environmental Law Program, which next year will celebrate its 48th anniversary. He was also principally responsible for the launching of our doctoral program. Together with Professor Edgar Gold and in cooperation with other colleagues at the time in particular, Sarah Grande, Professor Art Hansen and also of course Brian Flanke who is in the room with us. He launched what we call the Dita in the Dalhousie Ocean Studies program. And indeed it made a very large impact on ocean studies at Dalhousie which we still feed today. Both at and outside Dalhousie he was a true internationalist. And one of his most remarkable achievements was the initiation of the Southeast Asian Programme notion law policy and management centered in Bangkok, Thailand. Douglas was a prolific writer and institution builder. Indeed his last book was published posthumously and it received really top recognition from the American Society of International Law which received basically their top award. I among several of my colleagues at the school and across other Canadian law schools was fortunate enough to have him as a teacher and colleague and most especially as a close friend. It is certainly with ample good reason that we take time every year to honour him and to recall his legacy. Time has changed threats becoming immense and countries like Canada seem to do quite little on the mitigation front. Geoengineering proposals seem to be becoming more important to forefront. So we have that topic today on a large topic and how are we doing international law wise to regulate that whole prospective developments down in the future. To provide this overview we have Professor Karen Scott with us. She's a business from University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. We're privileged because she could have spent part of sabbatical at UBC or at Ottawa and I think she could have spent a few days in Ottawa coming up but she's going to spend a couple weeks here at the housing. She's actually published extensively in this area of Geoengineering in articles in 2013 including Michigan Journal of International Law on that topic. She's taught in international law topics at University of Canterbury, public international law, law of the sea, international trade law and I think next term you're going to teach international environmental law as well. She's written extensively on Antarctic law and policy, international environmental law, international environmental governance, various topics. She's shown a great knack for creative titles. I don't read you one but I found your CV. Like Edgar Allen Co-Bride, Safety of Shipping in the Southern Ocean, 2010 article in Journal of Maritime Law. You have time and you can tell us what that was about but I don't have time to get into that article. She's also a Vice President of the Australian New Zealand Society of International Law. She also directs the LA-11 program on international law and politics at University of Canterbury. So any students who might be interested in doing graduate work, take time and stay in law while you're here and I think you'd be glad to talk to some of the students as well. So welcome Karen, we're very glad you came to Halifax and hope you enjoy the cool fall weather and lack of rain that you'd like to experience. Thank you. Well thank you David for that very kind and generous introduction and I would in fact like to begin by thanking the Marine and Environmental Law Institute at the University of Dalhousie for their generous invitation to give this, the fifth annual Douglas M. Johnson Ocean Governance Lecture. We'd be very honoured to have been asked and indeed to do so. As also mentioned in his remarks, introducing Douglas M. Johnson. Professor Johnson had a particular interest in the law of the sea and indeed international environmental law and he regularly dealt with new and challenging issues from the perspective of international law and politics. I hope that he would approve of my topic this afternoon which undoubtedly has relevance for both the law of the sea and international environmental law but just as importantly in my view creates very real governance challenge for international law more generally. My particular interest in geoengineering in international law goes beyond the question of whether international law has the appropriate tools to manage the environmental risks posed by geoengineering although such a question is obviously of vital importance. My principal concern and one I'm going to explore this afternoon is whether international law is capable of addressing some of the very real ethical questions which geoengineering raises and whether in the very natural rush to begin to regulate these new technologies these ethical questions are likely to be overlooked or indeed even deliberately ignored. Now in my view the ethics of geoengineering needs to be directly engaged with head on by international lawyers as well as international policy makers and scientists and anybody else really with an interest in geoengineering and I hope to make a small contribution to this debate this afternoon. So beginning with the two terms central to my lecture I suppose with respect to titles one is also perhaps a little bit of an unusual title international law and the miss Anthropocene responding to the geoengineering challenge. So taking really the two terms which are sort of central really to my lecture this afternoon. First off the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is a term created just over a decade ago by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stomer to describe a new geological epoch an epoch dominated by humans and characterized by environmental change on a geological scale as a direct result of the collective action of humankind. Some supporters of this new geological era such as Paul Crutzen and Will Steffen suggest that we moved from the Holocene to the Anthropocene in 1784 a very specific date the date that James Watt invented the steam engine and essentially we entered the industrial age or the beginning of the industrial revolution. Others including William Ruderman chart a much more gradual transformation to the Anthropocene from between 8 or 5 and 8000 years ago with the development of agriculture the clear cutting of forests and the cultivation of rice. Overwhelmingly the concept of the Anthropocene is intimately linked to climate change and whilst perhaps as one might expect the concept is very much debated and indeed disputed by scientists politically the concept of the Anthropocene is increasingly being used as a graphic call to arms to take action and indeed to respond to climate change. The second term geoengineering is defined as the intentional large scale manipulation of the planetary environment the climate change mitigation purposes. Geoengineering seeks either to reduce the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases or to lower the surface temperature of the earth it seeks to achieve one or both of those aims without the need for expensive emissions reductions and of course in that lies its considerable appeal. What sets geoengineering apart from other strategies for mitigation of or adaptation to climate change is the deliberate large scale and potentially irreversible interference with natural planetary systems. Although climate change itself results from large scale and potentially irreversible at least on a human time scale interference with the atmosphere that interference has been inadvertent or at least an unintentional byproduct of human industrial and other activity. With geoengineering we're not just playing God we know that we're playing God. First coin does a term to apply to the manipulation of planetary systems for climate change purposes by Cesar Marchetti in an article in the first edition of the Journal of Climate Change in 1977. Geoengineering has undoubtedly moved from the fringes some would suggest the lunatic fringes to the mainstream of scientific debate over the last five to seven years. In fact it was actually local laureate Paul Crotson who was largely credited with facilitating his transition. In an article he wrote in 2006 also for the Journal of Climatic Change whereby he advocated the injection of sulfur into the atmosphere in order to reflect sunlight and cool the planet. It is I think notable and perhaps with hindsight even inevitable that one individual Paul Crotson should both develop the concept of the Anthropocene and begin a serious debate on geoengineering. In advocating the deliberate and large scale manipulation of the environment geoengineering is the veritable poster child of the Anthropocene. Over the last five years however geoengineering is not only significantly increased in profile but perhaps more importantly it's also increased in respectability. It's been the subject of several high profile reports within a number of countries notably the United Kingdom and the United States government and respected scientific societies. In the UK the 2009 report of the Royal Society did a great deal to generate public debate over the issue. It's also been the subject of various reports by a number of international organisations. Perhaps the most recent sign that geoengineering is being taken seriously is its reference in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Working Group 1 which was released just over a month ago. Two paragraphs which I've taken from the summary for policymakers are I think particularly pertinent. The first paragraph acknowledges that a large fraction of the anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial timescale except in the case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere on a sustained period. The second paragraph specifically acknowledges geoengineering as an option although it notes that there's insufficient evidence to permit a meaningful assessment of its potential effectiveness at least at this stage. That'll be very interesting to see how geoengineering is assessed in the third working group on mitigation of climate change which is due to report in April of next year. But its recognition as an option by the IPCC combined I think with the conclusion or with its conclusion that large scale negative emissions as the only means to address climate change already occurring is undoubtedly music to the ears of geoengineering enthusiast. Now as the IPCC report indicates and as that paragraph suggests geoengineering is divided into two categories designed either to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere or to manage solar radiation. Techniques aimed at the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere primarily focus on enhancing or expanding mechanisms that naturally perform this function. Examples include a forestation or reforestation, soil carbon sequestration commonly referred to as biochar, the use of CO2 absorbing algae on building surfaces and even the capture and storage of atmosphere by artificial trees. In terms of capacity the oceans constitute by far the largest reservoir of carbon dioxide and it's perhaps not surprising that significant scientific effort to date has been put into ways of actually developing a means of enhancing that reservoir. In particular scientists are exploring ways to improve the efficiency of the biological pump through which phytoplankton transports CO2 from the atmosphere to the oceans deaths particularly in regions where plankton biomass is low such as the Southern Ocean or the Equatorial Pacific. Thirteen experiments have been carried out to date involving the stimulation of plankton biomass or algal blooms through the addition of mission nutrients such as iron. Now although the growth of phytoplankton has increased in each case so far the effectiveness of this as a climate change mitigation technique is as yet unproven. An alternative or perhaps an additional ocean based technique is designed to stimulate the ocean's solubility pump which also transports CO2 from the surface to the depths of the ocean by means of increasing the alkalinity of the oceans through the addition of limestone powder or solar ash. Known as weathering this technique is designed to increase the oceans capacity to store CO2 whilst also quite usefully reducing the effects of ocean acidification. By contrast solar radiation management techniques are not designed to reduce atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. Rather they attempt to offset the temperature increases associated with climate change through reflecting sunlight back into space or deflecting it from the earth altogether. Techniques range from the benign but likely and effective urban albedo enhancement to the rather more ambitious whitening of marine clouds or the stratosphere in order to reflect solar radiation back into space. The most radical ideas actually seek to deflect rather than reflect solar radiation through the placement of strategic mirrors or sunshades between the earth and the sun or in orbit around the earth. Now most of these geoengineering proposals embody a level of risk to the global environment. Some of them embody quite a significant level of risk. Stratospheric whitening for example risks potential damage to the ozone layer and disruption of rainfall patterns across Asia and Africa. Ocean fertilization on the other hand may lead to toxic algal blooms, eutrophication and anaxia and even the release of other greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide. Techniques such as reforestation and urban albedo enhancement are relatively low risk but equally are unlikely to make a sufficient contribution to reducing the impacts of climate change to make them worthwhile for the next few years on their own. More generally, none of these techniques have been proven in terms of their effectiveness to mitigate climate change and most are actually based on technologies or mechanisms that will require a huge investment in resources and are simply not economic. For example, to draw down a meaningful level of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere scientists have estimated that an area larger than the southern ocean would need to be fertilized with iron. The delivery of sulfate aerosols designed to whiten the stratosphere would apparently require millions of flights of four-hour duration every year. The potential costs associated with space-related geoengineering are even more formidable with commentators in the US government recently concluding that the economics of such technologies are simply not viable. Moreover, all of these strategies with the exception of ocean weathering are focused on either removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere or reducing the surface temperature of the Earth. They don't seek to address the other climate change problem, ocean acidification. In fact, to the extent that they involve increasing the ocean reservoir of carbon dioxide deliberately through fertilization or naturally through a focus on solar radiation management rather than emissions reduction, geoengineering is actually likely to make ocean acidification much worse. So why are we even considering geoengineering? In normal times, and I'm not quite sure what that expression means, but perhaps not the times that we're in, really an assessment of the environmental risks, the economic costs, and the potential benefits of geoengineering were counsel against manipulating planetary systems for any ends. But these really are not normal times. In May of this year it was announced that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide had reached 400 parts per million. Rising from approximately 280 parts per million at the onset of the industrial revolution, the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide is now higher than at any point in the last three to five million years. Arctic sea ice shrank to its lowest recorded level in September 2012. The first decade of the 21st century was characterized by extreme weather events and was the warmest on records since records began in 1850. The IPCC, which as I mentioned earlier released the report of the first working group of the fifth assessment just last month, has concluded that the warming of the climate is unequivocal, and since the 1950s many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentration of greenhouse gases have increased. However, notwithstanding this overwhelming evidence of climate change, globally states have failed to put in place mechanisms to effect meaningful reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases. Despite agreement by 195 states to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system under Article 2 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the more specific targets under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, CO2 emissions were 40% higher in 2008 than in 1919. Major developing and newly developed emitters such as China, India and Brazil have of course not committed to emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, nor has the United States. Canada of course is withdrawn from the protocol, and other states including Russia and I'm ashamed to say New Zealand have refused to sign up to the 2012 Doha amendments to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol which essentially extend the Kyoto commitment period. Whilst the parties to the UNFCCC decided in 2011 to launch a process to develop a post-Kyoto instrument by 2020, at this stage it's uncertain what shape this instrument will take even if we are able to adopt such an instrument. So the ethical and legal evaluation of the risks and benefit of geoengineering must therefore be undertaken within the broader ethical context of climate change itself. To an increasing minority geoengineering provides a potential solution essentially a get out of jail free card or option to solve climate change. So given the interest in geoengineering it's obvious appeal to state and indeed potentially non-state actors and the evident risks it poses is it controlled under international law? Well the answer is yes we have a basic regulatory framework but with two narrow exceptions that framework is at a relatively basic or minimal level. So what are the regimes of relevance to geoengineering? I'm just going to give you just a few examples of at least some of the regimes it's not in any way a complete overview. So the first regime of direct application to geoengineering is the 1997 QA to protocol and this is in relation to forestry and afforestation projects. So the protocol promotes the enhancement of forest sinks and permits states to actually count reforestation and afforestation activities against their overall targets to reduce greenhouse gases as set out in Article 3 of the protocol. Initiatives in fact adopted in 2010 and 2011 have actually created new incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and a wider range of land use change activities are currently being considered for potential eligibility under the clean development mechanism. Now proponents of reforestation and reforestation tend not to describe these techniques as geoengineering on account of the negative connotations associated with this term. And in fact the most recent decision of the Biodiversity Convention on geoengineering, which I'm going to mention in a moment, appears to actually exclude reforestation and afforestation from the scope of geoengineering. Nevertheless in terms of the basic definition of geoengineering these techniques do fall within the scope of that particular concept. More generally the climate regime climate change regime doesn't in fact address geoengineering although its overall objective which as I mentioned earlier is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere would appear to preclude an endorsement of solar radiation management techniques that seek to reduce surface temperature without addressing the level of atmospheric CO2. The second instrument of relevance is the Biodiversity Convention and the Biodiversity Convention has actually provided a forum for the discussion of the implications of geoengineering for biodiversity on three occasions so far. In 2008 the conference of the parties adopted a resolution calling on parties to refrain from ocean fertilisation until that can be justified or fertilisation can be justified by science and is subjected to an effective regulatory mechanism. A further resolution was adopted in 2010 which more generally cautioned against the deployment of climate related geoengineering in the absence of a science-based global transparent and effective control mechanism. A third resolution adopted in 2012 primarily sought to actually highlight and disseminate a recent report commissioned by the CBD focusing on the impacts of geoengineering on biodiversity and again reiterated the importance of caution and science with respect to the deployment of these mechanisms. The third instrument is in fact the only instrument so far to actually directly regulate geoengineering and in fact we're only dealing really with one particular type of geoengineering mechanism here, ocean fertilisation. And this is the 1996 protocol to the 1972 London Convention on dumping. The general applicability of the dumping regime to ocean fertilisation activities has actually been much debated particularly in light of iron or other ocean fertiliser is disposed of for the purposes of the Convention or whether it constitutes placement which is not contrary to the aims of either the Convention or the protocol. I don't intend to talk in any detail about that and I have written about it and I'm certainly happy to talk about that in questions. However, in response really to the development of ocean fertilisation as a potential measure in 2007 the parties to the Convention and protocol issued a statement of concern about ocean fertilisation and this was followed up in 2008 by a non-binding resolution which asserted that the Convention and protocol did have jurisdiction to manage fertilisation and which sought to prohibit ocean fertilisation with the exception of fertilisation carried out for scientific experimentation purposes. In 2010 the Convention adopted a risk assessment framework quite a complex and sophisticated instrument which is really designed to manage fertilisation experiments through a system of environmental impact assessment. Both those resolutions are persuasive but formally non-binding. However, just two weeks ago on the 18th of October the parties to the protocol actually adopted amendments to the protocol in order to manage ocean fertilisation. Now the final text of the amendments has actually yet to be released. I've been checking over the last few days but frustratingly all I have is the report produced on the 7th which has quite a number of track changes so please bear with me and I would ask you when it is released to obviously check the final text. But it would certainly appear that the amendments do a number of things. First off they insert a definition of marine geoengineering into the protocol. So the idea is that they are creating a platform within which to regulate potentially other means of marine geoengineering not simply ocean fertilisation. So this will be inserted as article 1 paragraph 5 and the definition reads and as I say do treat this with caution because it isn't the final version unfortunately but it defines it as marine geoengineering meaning there is a deliberate intervention in the marine environment to manipulate natural processes including to counteract anthropogenic climate change and or its impacts and it has the potential to result in deleterious effects especially where those effects may be widespread long lasting or severe. Secondly amendments insert a new article into the protocol article 6 this which prohibits parties from allowing the placement of matter into the sea from vessels aircraft and platforms at sea for marine geoengineering purposes unless that activity is listed in annex 4 and is authorised under a permit. So this article again it regulates or is designed to regulate all marine geoengineering activities provided of course it constitutes placement of matter into the marine environment. Third the amendments insert a new annex into the protocol annex 4 within which permitted geoengineering activities are listed at the moment this is confined to ocean fertilisation for scientific purposes and finally the amendments insert a second annex annex 5 into the protocol which contains the risk assessment framework as amended this was the assessment framework which was adopted in 2010 but looking at the report it does look as though it has been substantially amended in the latest meeting and what this does is essentially makes that framework mandatory. Now this of course is a very positive development although I will come onto my principle reservation in a few moments it's rather too soon to do a comprehensive analysis particularly as we haven't got the final text but I would like to make just a few fairly basic self-evident points but just to sort of demonstrate a bit of caution before we get too excited about this development the first point I would make is that of course these amendments need to enter into force now it's a very self-evident point but as international lawyers I'm sure we're all aware that the adoption of an instrument or indeed amendment to an instrument is not the same as those amendments for entering into force and sometimes it can take a very long time before instruments or amended instruments enter into force the second point is that the protocol currently binds 43 states so once these amendments enter into force they will bind those 43 states but they will obviously not bind those states not party to the protocol but which are party to the convention or states which are not party to either instrument and finally for those of you familiar with the law of the sea you'll know that article 210 and article 216 of UNCLOS incorporates the standards of the London Convention within UNCLOS and effectively imposes those standards as a minimum on those states party to UNCLOS now there's no provision within UNCLOS for determining if and at what point those standards under the convention are replaced by the standards under the protocol so at the moment the UNCLOS standards essentially refer to the convention which currently does not address geoengineering as opposed to the protocol which is intending to do so moreover I think it's also worth noting the text of UNCLOS when it refers to those international standards very much seems to be focused on dumping as opposed to placement and therefore I think there are very real questions as to whether UNCLOS could even if it was determined to refer to the protocol standards actually apply to the geoengineering placement standards as opposed to simply the dumping standards so I suppose the general point I'm making in relation to all of those factors at the moment these provisions in relation to ocean fertilization bind a relatively few number of states and there may well be challenges in actually extending the application of those amendments without actually expanding the membership of the protocol itself now the final instrument which I think is worth highlighting because it often gets referred to in the context of geoengineering but I don't think it's actually 1976 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques the so-called N-MOD convention now this convention seeks to regulate environmental modification under article 2 of the convention and the definition of environmental modification is undoubtedly broad enough to cover geoengineering however as the title of the convention indicates the focus of N-MOD is on limiting environmental modification for military or hostile purposes rather than other purposes and in fact article 3 one of the convention actually stipulates that the provision of this convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes so I think whilst N-MOD the N-MOD convention does create potentially quite a number of useful obligations related to cooperation and notification with respect to geoengineering and environmental modification its value as a broader framework for geoengineering at least for climate change mitigation is probably limited now more generally of course geoengineering undoubtedly creates a significant risk of serious harm to the global environment so I would argue that it's clearly subject to principles of international environmental law found under treaties, customs and indeed the general principles and in an article I published earlier this year I actually identified seven principles which I thought were particularly applicable these comprise the duty to prevent harm and pollution, the obligation to protect vulnerable ecosystems and species the precautionary principle principles of cooperation, information exchange and environmental impact assessment the principle of due regard for other users and the principle of state responsibility and polluter pay now I'm not going to talk about these principles this afternoon except really to note that the extent that these principles or to the extent that these principles are customary in nature and some of them I would argue are they're also ergo omnis in the sense of being owed to the international community as a whole and therefore applicable to all however their customary origin external to any individual treaty regime also leads to a level of uncertainty with respect to their content and the interpretation of that content by individual state consequently I think whilst these principles may serve to constrain certainly the most radical of geoengineering proposals designed to have a major impact on the atmosphere, biosphere or hydrosphere their impact may be more limited with respect to less ambitious proposals or proposals which are simply at the research stage moreover I think it's worth noting that the decentralized nature of international law currently places individual states as interpreters and arbiters of these international obligations international environmental law as it currently stands therefore represents I think the start but certainly not the end of the regulatory framework for geoengineering moreover it's focus on risk management though clearly important is I think insufficient as international law is I think what we need to do now is actually engage with some of the important ethical questions if we're actually going to develop a much more comprehensive and robust regulatory regime for geoengineering so what are my ethical questions well I've identified five although I would suggest that this is not in any way an exhaustive list but I think these five are particularly important for international lawyers my first ethical question is probably my biggest question of all and this is is geoengineering a morally appropriate response to anthropogenic climate change now with its secular Anglo-European foundations modern international law has traditionally been quite reticent about making moral judgments or prioritizing one set of values over another this however is changing the advent of the human rights movement in the 1940s and the recognition of environmental values really from the 1970s onwards means that we've really begun the process of identifying a core set of international values from which states are creating fundamental concepts and principles and even a nasty entire hierarchy of obligations within international law states have made moral judgments on issues such as the use of chemical weapons which of course has been very much in the news with respect to Syria over the last few weeks and the prohibition of genocide and the effects of climate change itself states have decided that its effects are the common concern of mankind and have acknowledged the historical responsibility to develop states in both terms of the problem and the solution so international law has already begun to engage with moral issues both generally and more specifically in relation to climate change however in the context of geoengineering at the moment there isn't an obvious international forum within which we can begin to have these debates as to the moral appropriateness of geoengineering as a climate change mitigation measure so far the legal response to geoengineering has been fragmented and limited ocean fertilization has received the most regulatory attention to date under the auspices of the dumping regime as I mentioned just a few moments ago and certainly the efforts of the parties to develop a comprehensive sophisticated risk assessment framework and most recently binding rules of marine geoengineering is commendable however at no stage have the parties engaged in any real debate as to the ethics of ocean fertilization as a climate change mitigation measure still less the role that should be played by geoengineering more generally this fragmented approach to regulation in my opinion risks inadvertent endorsement by implication of geoengineering as a climate change mitigation measure so for example the London Convention and Protocol has effectively endorsed and authorised climate change climate related ocean fertilization research activities provided those activities comply with certain environmental criteria as set out in the risk assessment framework and other regimes may more follow suit with respect to techniques which come within their remit whilst these individual regimes may have the appropriate expertise to regulate individual geoengineering activities and indeed to set down conditions in order to protect the environmental sphere they have responsibility for whether that's the ocean, the biosphere or the atmosphere or indeed even outer space they do not and arguably cannot address the broader ethical question should we geoengineer our planet in order to mitigate the effects of climate change the question of whether we should mitigate climate change through geoengineering is closely related to my second ethical issue the relationship between geoengineering and other climate change mitigation strategies most notably emissions reductions arguably the greatest ethical risk associated with geoengineering is the so-called moral hazard that geoengineering will divert attention and resources from emissions reductions and will be effectively regarded as a get out of jail free option for governments reluctant to commit to reductions now given the urgency of the need to take action in relation to emissions reductions any delay whilst states explore these alternative technological options could render these other mitigation options such as emissions reductions redundant and make them much more drastic options offered by geoengineering inevitable geoengineering therefore really needs to be considered a long sigh rather than an isolation of climate change mitigation options and its relationship to these options need to be actively explored my third ethical issue is by no means confined to the context of geoengineering but is perhaps quite clearly demonstrated by it and this is the regulation and control of scientific research now all geoengineering is at the research stage and most of it is at a pretty early pre-field trial stage of research so my question is well to what extent should research and scientists be subject to international regulatory control and should research in some areas even be prohibited now the freedom to engage in scientific research is valued by most societies whilst there's perhaps no formal legal right to conduct research the freedom of scientific research is an important philosophical concept and I think as academics and students even as non-scientists and some of you may will be scientists I think we're very sympathetic to the idea of the freedom of scientific research in part this view of the freedom of scientific research is justified on the basis that research and indeed technology is inherently neutral in terms of values and therefore only becomes relevant at the point of application where that research or that technology takes on values good or evil however the division between research and application is increasingly permeable and in some cases really non-existent scientific and technological research carried out by Nazi scientists and engineers during the Second World War perhaps provides the most graphic illustration of the creation of value laden technology scientists and engineers need not harbour nefarious purposes in order for their research to fundamentally challenge or even transform international society irrespective of application moreover as demonstrated by the history of nuclear research and regulation controlling a technology once it's been developed can be challenging if not effectively impossible on a more mundane level scientists, engineers and institutions become invested in their research scientists carry out research for a whole range of reasons including research funding and advancing of their personal careers and really the longer it's left before research is subject to regulation the more difficult it becomes to actually route out ethically misguided projects research into geoengineering is arguably value laden the purpose of geoengineering research is to develop a quick fix for climate change therefore in my view between research and application it's particularly permeable if not really non-existent more subtly the fact that research is actually taking place into geoengineering will affect arguably is already affecting how political and policy debates on climate change are framed confining regulation to the application as opposed to the research stage of geoengineering constitutes the equivalent of closing the stable door after the proverbial bolted but how should scientific research into geoengineering be controlled and who should set the scientific agenda traditionally scientists quite understandably favor decentralized ethical frameworks either at the individual or the institutional level or within an area or industry often referred to as self-governance an attempt an example of an attempt at self-governance in fact has already occurred with respect to geoengineering with the adoption of guidelines in 2010 at Asilema but this highly decentralized approach to the governance of scientific research doesn't really assist us in providing a forum or a framework within which to address those ethical those broad ethical questions which I mentioned a moment ago should we morally engage in geoengineering and how do those geoengineering techniques relate to climate change mitigation more generally we therefore need to ask how far should regulation interfere with the freedom of scientific research and who should decide the level of control even whether certain areas of research should in fact be prohibited altogether the question of who decides raised a moment ago in the context of the regulation of scientific research is fundamental to my fourth ethical issue associated with geoengineering now just as climate change is likely to affect all states regardless of their respective contributions to greenhouse gas concentrations environmental changes wrought by geoengineering are likely to be equally globally applicable in fact the very purpose of geoengineering is to affect the global climate the question of who decides who decides whether we carry out geoengineering is therefore of great significance to all states and all individuals geoengineering technologies are such that potentially a decision to engineer a planetary solution to climate change could actually be made by a group of states or a single state or even a large corporation acting unilaterally but all states have an interest in that decision as indeed do groups of interests that transcend traditional state boundaries but does the current international legal framework permit democratic decision making in so far as a notion of democracy can be applied at the international level in respect of geoengineering well certainly the fragmented regime focusing on the management of environmental risks which I outlined earlier in this paper really is anything but conducive to maximizing the democratic participation in the ethical geoengineering debate the following ethical issue again really foreshadowed in my previous ethical issue relates to the role of private actors and geoengineering compared to the costs associated with emissions reductions it's been argued that geoengineering offers a comparatively cheap quick fix now I think it's worth noting here that the economics of geoengineering are highly disputed but nevertheless some would argue that there exists a very real possibility that technologies could be taken up by entrepreneurs seeking to make money or generate carbon credits or even by philanthropists seeking to mitigate climate change for the benefit of humanity now I've actually seen an example of such a private activity within this particular region within the Canadian region as I'm sure you're aware in July 2012 the Haider Salmon Restoration Corporation made international headlines when it deliberately dumped 100 metric tons of iron sulfate into the ocean off the coast of western Canada now the scheme which dumped 5 times more iron into the ocean than any of the previous official 13 iron fertilizations carried out to date was ostensibly designed to both increase salmon populations and more significantly to sequester carbon dioxide ocean fertilization in fact has actually generated quite a lot of private interest with a number of U.S. firms being involved in a climate plant or some atmosphere for example more generally Bill Gates has been reported to be providing one and a half million U.S. dollars each year to assist researchers to study the options. So really in light of the potential for wide scale and potentially damaging environmental change to be brought about by private actors for profit or for otherwise an effective regulatory regime needs to be in place to govern all geoengineering activities. So considering these ethical questions what are the options available to us? Well whilst the current framework provides a basic safety net with a particular emphasis on managing the environmental risks of geoengineering functionally I think the ethical questions I've identified can only really be addressed within a dedicated geoengineering forum and within the context of a legally binding regulatory framework. So I think there are three options or at least three potential options which I've identified for the purposes of this paper. The first comprises the creation of a designated instrument on geoengineering together with associated institutional bodies such as a conference or meeting of the parties and technical bodies to provide advice and supervision. This model follows that typically established by the multilateral environmental agreement those of you familiar with international environmental law being quite familiar with that basic setup. One of the advantages of such a setup is establishing a basic framework agreement within which general principles and concepts can be established with a view to creating a much more specific standards at a later stage as matters progress. There are however I think two principal disadvantages to this option. First as a standalone instrument the opportunities for integrating geoengineering options with other climate change mitigation strategies including emissions reductions may be limited. So one of the difficulties with a standalone single framework is that again you're treating geoengineering in isolation of climate change more generally. Second more prosaically but arguably just as importantly states may be unwilling to meet the cost of establishing yet another treaty regime. Treaty congestion is a common lament within the field of international environmental law and states increasingly prefer to promote cooperation and coordination between existing treaties rather than establishing new ones. The second option seeks to avoid the full extent of the costs of establishing a new regime by utilizing an existing institution such as the United Nations Environment Program or UNEP or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO. Both organizations provide for hosting conferences and the negotiation potentially of treaties and other legal instruments. In particular has potential in the context of geoengineering giving its focus on scientific and research activities. However many states including the United States are traditionally quite skeptical of the efficiency and efficacy of UN organizations and may will be unwilling to support the UN being used as a forum within which to address geoengineering. And like the option of a designated treaty regime, UN bodies may also be seen as being operating in isolation to the climate change regime more generally. The final and indeed my preferred option utilizes the climate change regime itself but I do have some quite significant reservations with respect to that option. And essentially the proposal here is to advocate the adoption of a protocol under the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC benefits from near universal support and the regime comprises the decision making body, the conference of the parties plus various technical and implementation related institutions. The framework model developed by the UNFCCC is easily adaptable to addressing new climate related issues such as geoengineering arguably through the adoption of protocols. Now the greatest example I think of this option is that geoengineering is properly integrated into the climate change debate and its ethics, environmental risks and economic risks within the broader context of mitigation and adaptation. I should just say that my suggestion envisages quite close coordination with those other regimes and institutions which have particular expertise with respect to particular techniques such as fertilization or stratospheric whitening. The biggest risk and I think it's a very real risk with utilizing the UNFCCC is that we're essentially would be seeking to address another issue within an already stretched and increasingly polarized regime. So I think it's a very real question as to whether actually this would be essentially a result in sort of a stymied negotiations. However, I think if we want to move beyond our focus on the environmental risks of geoengineering which are clearly important, I'm not going to talk about those risks and actually begin to consider the ethics of geoengineering within a framework of international law essentially to manage our transition to the Anthropocene rather than to the Miss Anthropocene. The climate change regime arguably represents our best and at least at the moment I think our only option but I'd be very interested to hear the views of you as the audience on such a suggestion. So thank you very much.