 Good morning, everyone, and good morning, good afternoon, good evening to those who are watching on live stream, wherever you are. Welcome to this event entitled Lebanon at the Crossroads, the Middle East Re-alignment and Crises. I'm Michael Yaffe, I'm the Vice President of the Middle East North Africa Center here at USIP. And for those of you who had been to USIP before, welcome back. And for those of you who are new to USIP, let me just give you a very brief word about USIP. We are an institution that was established in 1984 by an act of Congress, and we are dedicated to the idea that peace is practical and possible, and our work and our mission on research in the field is devoted to the idea of how do we prevent, how do we mitigate, and how to resolve violent conflict. Today's event complements an ongoing exhibition here at USIP entitled Imagine Reflections of Peace. The exhibition is just outside our hall here, and we welcome everyone to attend it. Those of you who are here in person to go look at it, and for those of you who are online to make reservations to come see it, the event is carrying on from now until August 1st. In this event, we look at various places where there has been conflict, and it reflects what has happened in those conflicts over the last 30 to 40 years. And one of the areas that is a focus is Lebanon. This today's session actually complements the exhibition itself. It complements it under the theme Imperfect Peace. That since 1989, Lebanon has been struggling with its peace agreement and struggling with a series of crises. It has implications not just within Lebanon, but throughout the region. So today, we have an opportunity to reflect on what has happened in Lebanon and what is the future of Lebanon. To lead us in this discussion, we are very fortunate to have Ambassador Hisham, who is a senior fellow here at the Institute. Ambassador Hisham has served in a number of key positions, very senior positions in the government of Egypt, in the organization of Islamic states and within the Arab League. So I couldn't think of a better person to help moderate the discussion and to introduce our distinguished panelists. So, Ambassador. Thank you very much, Mike. Welcome everybody and in going with the times, this is a hybrid event. So we welcome those who are here in person and we welcome those who are joining us online. As Mike said, this is an important event in relation to the situation in Lebanon and we have three speakers who will be joining us this morning and I'm not surprised that there are a large number of people who are joining us both here and online. The three speakers are Paul Salem and Paul Salem is the president of the Middle East Institute. He has been working for decades on issues pertaining to conflict in the region, political change, transitions and more. Even more importantly, he's also a musician and the composer of Arab Brazilian jazz. It's a pleasure to see you, Paul. And I have to say- Thank you very much. I also have to say that the Middle East Institute has a working group that is focused on Lebanon and the situation in Lebanon and developments pertaining to the situation in Lebanon. Next, we have Ambassador David Chinker, who is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute. He served as an assistant secretary of state for the Near East Affairs, focusing on issues pertaining to the region, starting from Morocco to Iran and more. He administered a budget of over $7 billion, so he had a lot on his plate. And since then, he has been focusing on the Middle East also in the context of his role in the Washington Institute. Finally, last and not least- Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, David. It's a pleasure to see you. Finally, last and not least, we have Mona Yaqubian, a senior advisor at USIP. She has been focusing for decades on Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, three countries that have been in turmoil for a number of decades now. And she served as executive director of the congressionally appointed Syria Study Group only recently and worked on violent extremism, fragility, and resilience. Before that, she was deputy assistant administrator in the Middle East Bureau at USIAID. Of course, this is a very abbreviated introduction and you can find the details of all the bios in their respective institutions. And their publications and what they have contributed can fill a medium-sized library, whether it's books, articles, and otherwise. As Mike said, the Institute has been following the situation in Lebanon for years and it has been going from, unfortunately, from bad to worse. Recent World Bank report indicated that the severe economic and financial crisis in Lebanon is likely to rank as one of the worst that the world has seen in over 150 years. So this is the extent of the severity of the situation. Lebanon remains the country that hosts the largest number of refugees compared to the size of its population in the world. With an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees living in dire conditions and also a large number of Palestinian refugees who have been there for several decades. More recently, it has suffered from a huge devastating explosion in the Port of Beirut and it's so the economic situation go from bad to worse. The lira dropped by 90%. It has shortages in electricity, in gasoline, and in many other basic needs. And it was part of the second wave of revolutions and appraisings in divisions. And elections were held only recently against all odds. So we will discuss all these issues with our three panelists. The elections brought some modest developments that we will be discussing with 13 reform-minded candidates willing, which is rather unusual in the situation in Lebanon for those who follow Lebanon closely. And more recently, there were also tensions with Israel regarding maritime borders and exploration of gas in the Mediterranean. We will be focusing on three themes, many themes. The current situation in Lebanon, regional developments affecting the situation in Lebanon. And finally, what should the US policy be in light of these developments in Lebanon? Let me start by Paul and ask him about the situation regarding elections and how these elections would affect the future of Lebanon because there are different views. There are those who believe that this is a step in the right direction that can lead to further positive developments and there are those who feel that the establishment in Lebanon and the difficulties associated with the political situation in Lebanon will make it more difficult for things to improve. So we'll start by you, Paul, and then move with the same question to David and Mona. Paul, you have the floor. Thank you, Ambassador Hisham. It's a pleasure to be in this panel with USIP with my good friends, Mona and David and greetings to those at USIP and following online. Yeah, you described the situation rather well. People are familiar with the disastrous situation at the social and economic level. You mentioned the collapse of the Lebanese pound. Poverty rates are up around 80% from a country which used to be a middle income country. So those socioeconomic conditions are very dire. The elections indeed, as you mentioned, were held. One would have to say that they were somewhat positive in bringing limited change to the parliament, but it's also the case that that will not directly change the sort of status quo in Lebanon in terms of the challenges ahead for governance and the things that need to be done. In particular, after these parliamentary elections, there is a need to form a government as efficiently as possible. That is not going to be easy. No coalition or group has a solid majority in parliament. It's easy and it's hard in normal times to select the prime minister and for that prime minister to try to put together a government. It's probably gonna be even more challenging now, but at a time when Lebanon desperately needs an effective government to implement the needed reforms, to sign the necessary deal with the IMF and to begin to turn the economic situation around. I'm rather pessimistic that that will happen, particularly that the term of the president, the president down ends this October, ends in the end of October, and then there will be a challenge to elect a new president. Again, I find it very difficult to imagine that there will be agreement on selecting a president by parliament in October, and I fear that there will be a long period, maybe many months long, could be a year or more in which a president is not agreed upon. So I fear that there's going to be continued drift in terms of capacity to govern capacity, to implement reforms that would begin a socioeconomic recovery. Hence, in the absence of such decisions, I fear a continued deterioration, further deterioration of the monetary, economic, and social situation which has rendered life in Lebanon for many, many people very, very desperate. It is important to note there are some small, positive potentials, and I'm sure David can talk much more about that, but there is some movement on the maritime talks with Israel. There is some hope that a U.S. broker deal to bring Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity to Lebanon in a couple of months, two or three months might improve the electricity situation. There have been, and there has been a staff agreement with the IMF and continued talks, so there are pathways, but I'm pessimistic that we'll be able to turn anything around dramatically, and I'll close by saying hanging over all of this is geopolitical issues, like U.S.-Iranian relations, how will that impact Hezbollah, its policies in Lebanon, and Hezbollah-Israeli dynamics are also, there are some linkages with other issues, but I'm sure we'll get to that later. Thank you, Ambassador Ishaq. Thank you, Paul. We'll get to that in the next question, absolutely. Let me go to David. David, Paul is rather pessimistic, and he feels that the situation will deteriorate further. Do you agree with that, or do you think that there is still some hope? Paul, Ambassador, it's good to be with you. It's good to be on the panel with Paul and Mona. Although I don't say it very often, I agree with Paul. I think his assessment is correct, which is that although the parliamentary elections, I think, were indicative of an expression of popular discontent that was measurable, but the institutional barriers to significant change because of the different array in parliament still exist. And so I'm not particularly optimistic about the prospects for broad change. That is going to be dictated by this new parliament. We still have the same, the very same speaker of parliament, who has certain alliances and interests. I think that even with these new candidates that there's a broad range of opinion, even as you can characterize them as a reform oriented, perhaps they're not necessarily unified on a bunch of other issues. And so Hisbulla still exists, and Hisbulla along with its allies in the country are not particularly known for their orientation and support for reform. These are groups, people that profit off the corruption, do not want to see, they move toward transparency and something that, so I'm not particularly optimistic. I also think that when you have such a difficult economic, political situation, man-made, of course, by and love these political elites, that oftentimes this drives people toward more sectarianism. You look back to your sect for protection, and so this, in a way, even as there was an expression of discontent with traditional political elites loving on, there may be a grabbing onto or holding onto these traditional elites because of the deterioration. Finally, maritime gas electricity, as Paul said, there may be some movement, even on this regard. I think we're a little premature, perhaps there will be a gas deal and or electric. There's some issues with Congress, there's also some issues in Lebanon that are preventing that from happening. But the maritime, I think, is still probably far from done, and even if it does get done, this is not a country necessarily that will embrace the idea of a transparent, sovereign wealth fund. And so it may not be everything that's cracked up to be for benefiting the people of Lebanon. So I'll end up on there. Thank you, David. Mona, now two rather pessimistic views of the developments. So I'm going to inject a note of hope and optimism. I feel compelled to do it. First, thank you, Hisham, and it's great to be with Paul and David even virtually. Thank you both for joining. So, yes, I think Lebanon is in an incredibly fraught moment. And I think I have to, I feel compelled to add, in addition to all the statistics, Lebanon is also going to be very adversely impacted by the Ukraine conflict and the global food crisis. There are about three quarters of Lebanese families who cannot afford to put food on the table, which is pretty astounding when one considers that this was really a solidly middle income country. And now we've seen the Lebanese middle class essentially vanish before our eyes, which is pretty extraordinary when you think about it. In addition, I think I fully concur with both Paul and David's analyses. And I think, unfortunately, there is a good chance we are headed into a period of gridlock and stalemate with a divided parliament with incredible difficulties ahead in terms of cabinet formation, the election of a president. This is something Lebanon simply cannot afford. This level of inaction, unfortunately, only leads to further deterioration in living standards. And I do think bottom-up social explosion in that scenario needs to be considered as people become increasingly desperate, as living conditions continue to deteriorate. Okay, so where's the hope? The hope is, I think we have to pause for a moment and just acknowledge a few things. One, that the election took place at all. Yes, it was fraught with the typical vote buying and corrupt practices, unfortunately, that mar Lebanese elections, but it took place without violence. It took place with a participation rate that largely matched the previous election, which was before all kinds of horrible things befell Lebanon. But most importantly, I think we should focus for a second on these 13 MPs, who comprise now 10% of the parliament. And while it is important to note that there is actually no parliamentary majority, which by the way is a plus, let's not forget, Hezbollah held the parliamentary majority before. And so that does potentially bode ill for moving legislation forward. I think those 13 MPs deserve more kind of thought and attention as to what they can do. Can they be a force, number one, can they unify? Can they form their own kind of coalescing block? Big question, unfortunately, the opposition movement in Lebanon has been marred by political and personal differences. But this is an important moment. And they all share, I think, a strong perspective on the need for reform. So that's the first question. The second question, can this block then become a leverage point within the parliament for elements legislation that the parliament can pass that will help to put Lebanon even gradually on a path toward reform. Can they pass a budget? Can they pass longstanding legislative issues that are necessarily part of an IMF rescue package? So things like amending the banking secrecy laws, establishing capital controls. Let me be clear, these are very difficult issues, but at least you have people who are elected with that kind of sentiment behind them, that the country is in dire need of reform. And lastly, I think it's important, we've all talked about Lebanon's system. We talked about the fact that this is an entrenched, corrupt patronage system. It is a relic of the courts and the ways, the sort of unfinished vision of peace in Lebanon. But the election of these 13 MPs, in my view anyway, is a very important, small, but important, gradual first step toward, ideally, more peaceful political change and reform in Lebanon. Thank you for injecting us with this movement. If I may add Ambassador Hisham, if I may, I'd like to add to Mona's, not so much optimism and pessimism, it's what are the good elements and what are the obviously worrisome elements. I do wanna double down on the social political change that has been happening in Lebanon since 2019. The uprising of 2019 and then the blast and the continuing activity, mobilization that we've seen in Lebanon at an intensity and an activity that I don't think Lebanon has seen since maybe the 1950s or 1960s. Yes, this movement has been plagued by division. It could have done much better. But as Mona said, it had a real presence. It now has a real presence in the country as well as in the parliament. Getting going almost from zero to 10% is no joke. I look at this in the medium term, that this proves that there is something, sort of the socio-political that is changing in Lebanon. The traditional leaders and parties that dominated the post-war landscape are not gaining ground, they're losing ground. And there is definitely throughout the country, from north to south, from east to west, an appetite for change. The challenge ahead is that not only that, these 13 deputies, as Mona said, they can play possibly an important role in a hung parliament. They might be determined majorities here and there, so their work in the parliament will be very important and they need to be helped and supported to play a positive role within parliament. But the results of these elections have given new hope to civil society groups, a population which even on the eve of elections, had almost given up hope and did not expect any positive results. And I think gives new momentum to continued organization after the elections. The next immediate challenge is the local elections, which are supposed to be held in the spring of 2023. Those are very, very important elections for over 10,000 municipal seats. And that, if again, the civil society groups throughout the country organize, they could secure 10 thousands or tens of thousands of seats and that would be very important for the next parliamentary election. So I'm hoping that Lebanon is in a period of political transformation that I don't think will at all be total, but I think it might in a positive scenario end up becoming 25, 30% or something around that in the electorate and that could be really significant. But in the short term, in the next few months, we are in very dire straits. We need an executive branch that makes these decisions and that's where I think our problem is. It's sort of like, somebody living on the 10th floor of an apartment is pushed out of his apartment window and is crashing down towards the ground. And somebody says, situation doesn't look too good for you in the short term, but in the long term, you're gonna have new furniture and the apartment's gonna look great. There's a lot of focus on the short term crisis that's in front of us. Thank you. I would add, if I can, Ambassador, there's an incredible amount of bad things that can happen before we get a president and administration in this country. We have a caretaker government. The curation is severe. More and more people are leaving the country and may not be coming back. There are changes that are underway and trends in the country that are going to be hard to reverse. So, while I do think this is an important signal, what happened in the parliament, and I hope, Paul, that you are right, that this is a harbinger of future parliamentary elections and a trend and they can get up to 30%. We have to remember, if there's not a single Shiite who got elected, that wasn't Isvalo or Homo. There's a large block there that is going nowhere and that Isvalo still has its allies and there is an effective veto of who will be the president and the administration of this country and that's not going to change any time in your future. Just two very, very quick points. One, just to respond to David, I mean, I think he's absolutely right. Hezbollah and Homo held all their seats but there were some notable losses by others in Hezbollah strongholds, both in the south and the Bacock. That's notable. I think that's really important. And the second point which I neglected to say is, the other reason I think this is notable is that we saw street movements translate their activism into political assets in parliament and that's not something we've seen much of in the Arab world. I think it's notable. One of the key real takeaways from the so-called Arab Spring was the inability of Arabs demanding change to translate street protests and demonstrations into viable political action with real resonance and we've seen that in Lebanon and I think it's notable. Thank you. Well, the tea of you mentioned regional aspects in different ways in your first interventions. Let me go again to go somewhat deeper on regional issues and how regional issues will affect developments in Lebanon. Whether it's we can reach a nuclear deal between the United States and Iran, the situation in Syria, the issue of the maritime borders, how this will impact the situation in Lebanon. Mona also mentioned the situation in Ukraine and how this is affecting developments in Lebanon, particularly in as far as food security is concerned. So I hope somewhat briefly this time to address how the regional implications would affect the situation in Lebanon and then we will go to aspects pertaining to your policy because I want to take questions from those who are participating both here and virtually. So let's start this time with Mona and then go to David and then Paul. Mona. I'm going to defer to David on the maritime negotiations because he's far more steeped and will have a much more cogent analysis than I will. But I think for me the issues around the regional aspects again are two competing dynamics. One of de-escalation in the region and we've seen that as with this perceived US withdrawal and efforts by the Iranians and the Saudis or the Saudis and the Iranians to de-escalate tensions. We've seen moves of course toward normalization with Israel. We've seen moves toward normalization with the Assad regime. So there is that trend and I think Lebanon in the sense of there being more quiet has benefited from it. However, equally and maybe perhaps more concerning at least from my perspective is this trend toward escalation and unintended escalation and I think it ties directly to faltering JCPOA negotiations. I also think there's an interesting development to watch in Syria, which is as the Russians pivot their attention and their strategic bandwidth more toward Ukraine, we are seeing that the stalemate that has pertained in Syria may be upset that we might begin to see more instability in Syria which could have implications for Lebanon in the region and in particular what concerns me is the ways in which Iranian elements on the ground are seeking to take advantage of Russia's repositioning, moving perhaps closer to the Israeli border and the ways in which Israel is signaling its deep discontent with Iran and we've seen this very bold assassination of an IRGC Colonel in Tehran. We saw just a matter of a few days ago the Damascus airport shut down like disabled entirely which is actually if you just take a step back and think about it astounding. I worry and the Russians sort of seeming to step back or perhaps, to me it's not clear what the Russian role is although I will say we are also seeing increased Russian Israeli tensions and that's also being played out in Syria. All of which is to say, I think there are these two competing dynamics and my own feeling is that we are entering perhaps a very worrisome period in the region that could be marked by miscalculation, unintended escalation with perhaps negative ramifications most likely in Syria and Iraq which interestingly enough is where those tensions are being played out far more than in Lebanon but potentially Lebanon as well. Thank you, Mona. David. Thanks, Ambassador. Well, we'll see where the JCPA goes. I think you have Iran doing things throughout the region but you also have unexpectedly perhaps Iran encouraging the Houthis to maintain the ceasefire. Now, perhaps that will be over in a short period of time but it's a remarkable development. How this plays out in Lebanon, I don't know what Iran is going to do or encourage Hispala to do but I know independently of what Iran is doing. You're seeing a dramatically increased tensions along the border. You're seeing more Hispala weapons along the border. You're seeing the precision guided munitions program moving along a pace. You're seeing the new green without borders positions very close to the borders. You're seeing unifil being beaten up on a weekly basis by pro-Hispala or Hispala operatives in South Lebanon. Decreased Israeli overflights of Lebanon and that's a counter indication actually. It means that it's increasingly dangerous to fly over Lebanon and makes a war almost more likely. So I'm concerned about this but I don't know if that's necessarily because of a regional development or what happens with the JCPA along these lines over for talking regional. I was in Saudi a short while back. I don't think the Saudis have a great deal of interest in really playing in Lebanon again. So that some people think that's a good thing. Some people think it's a bad thing. I think it just reflects Saudi frustration with Lebanon and the trajectory there. As for maritime, the latest deal that may be on the table that's Kana for Kareesh, the Lebanese oil field for exchange for provision of an oil field to Israel and then the line 23, I think this is a creative solution and yet one that may not be acceptable to all parties. I think the Lebanese came in actually interestingly enough the leading supporters of the Maximus line, the 29 line in Lebanon happened to be seemingly the 15 or 13 new independent reform minded politicians in parliament, it's an interesting development but it may be that this negotiating tactic of going for a Maximus line and then falling back to the 23 line, like I said isn't gonna be acceptable for the Israelis. So I would expect in any event that the extraction and development of this resource, it will take what seven years to get a single molecule of gas out of the ground and for Lebanon to get any real impact. But as far as the tensions, we're seeing this play out with Hezbollah, which in my view, doesn't really wanna solve any of the outstanding issues between Israel and Lebanon lest it undermine the raison d'et and encourage more people to talk about why Hezbollah doesn't need its weapons. Thank you very much, David. Paul. Yeah, I mean, let me start by saying when you look at the regional situation in Lebanon, the first thing to say is that the presence of Hezbollah like it is today is a fundamental violation of Lebanese sovereignty or the capacity of a Lebanese state to even exist. Hezbollah has its own army, its own foreign policy, its own intelligence networks, own financing, own defense and attack policy. The presence of Hezbollah makes it almost impossible for the Lebanese state to control all of its borders or its ports or its airports. And the fact that a regional country Iran continues to support this policy and expect Lebanon or other countries in the region to normalize in that way is from a Lebanese perspective is very difficult. Having said that, I mean, that simply explains that Lebanon's main dysfunction is gonna continue. There's no scenario in the foreseeable future where Hezbollah will integrate into the Lebanese state or become part of the Lebanese Republic. I can see no scenario where that happens. So the basic dysfunction is gonna continue, maybe a little bit of change here, a little bit of change there, a new president, maybe at some point, some changes in parliament. So that is very, very unfortunate until something major happens to change that. Now, within that dynamic, the outcome of the US, the JCPOA could be relevant. Even from Rob Malley's latest testimony, it's not clear that actually it's gonna be such a thing. But let me just throw out there two scenarios. But if there is a return to the JCPOA and the US and Iran managed to eke out a deal of some kind, it is possible that diplomacy, some level of maybe backdoor diplomacy, that involves US, Iran, Gulf countries, France and so on, could nudge Lebanese diplomacy or Lebanese politics along and enable the election of a president, empower a government and nudge the country forwards in terms of reform. That has happened before in recent Lebanese history where regional diplomatic breakthroughs enable a small Lebanese breakthrough. So there could be a positive scenario there, even though if you had a JCPOA, it means Hezbollah would have more money, not less, but even with less money, they don't seem to have become any weaker. So maybe that's not a big variable. The other scenario is if really the deal completely falls through, there is no such a pathway, in which case we will see more worries about escalation, about tension, and probably more obstructionism in Lebanon, and hence we might enter a longer period, one or two years without a president, without a government, a darker scenario. So I think there's relevance there. On the Syrian side, it is noteworthy that while there was some talk in recent months that Syria's coming back, some countries are normalizing with it and so on, that Syria's allies in the Lebanese elections almost to a candidate lost. And that is an interesting signal. It doesn't seem that Syrian political influence is returning to Lebanon while Iranian influence remains very, very high. It is also worrisome to me that Syria has turned increasingly into a narco state with billions of dollars of production and smuggling. That can only have sort of negative and dangerous impacts on Lebanon and networks in Lebanon and airports and ports and mafia things. I'm worried about that as well and any escalation between Israel and Iran or Israel and Hezbollah would certainly take Lebanon another 30, 40 years backwards. We hope that does not happen. Thank you, Paul. Let me go to David, to start with David this time because he has probably done this many times before. The elevator pitch, if you have the ears of the president or the secretary of state for one or two minutes to tell him what the US policy should be in Lebanon in the near term. So let me go to you, David first, and then go to Paul and then Mona once again. David. Well, thanks, Ambassador. Listen, I think the ability to impact the trajectory on the ground in Lebanon is somewhat limited. We have diplomatic, financial tools, et cetera, disincentives. I would tell the president first, to continue the humanitarian aid. We didn't cause this financial collapse, this Ponzi scheme. This was made by Lebanon, but we as the United States should help feed the Lebanese people and I think we are the most generous international donor to Lebanon. We should make sure the Lebanese know that we are doing this. Second, the pillar of US policy in Lebanon has been for some time now the supports of the LAF. This is a controversial, increasingly controversial topic in Washington. I don't think that's going to change and I do see some continued utility in helping stabilize, provide support to this institution. It's no panacea, it's problematic. It collaborates with Hezbollah and de-conflicts with Hezbollah. That is a problem and perhaps most egregiously, it is not fulfilling its duty, these are the unifil. And the government of Lebanon, neither is the government of Lebanon. So I'd say that while we support Lebanon, we have to hold the LAF and the government of Lebanon to a higher standard. We should be calling them out. The government of Lebanon, like Unifil, has started to do for not meeting their obligations, not prosecuting people who attack Unifil convoys for not investigating. They're not solving these crimes and the LAF cannot any longer obstruct Unifil. In fact, this is something that they have been doing. We can read about it in all the reports. I think that this money should be in part conditional on how the LAF behaves. And finally, I think that the idea about the policy we put in place when I was in government, which is no more bailouts for Lebanon without implementation of reforms, I think that's the right policy. It's increasingly hard to do. I think the French and others want to do more for Lebanon and I think the principle of that the United States cannot help Lebanon unless Lebanon helps itself, I think still stands at the government level. People have to make difficult choices there and that includes reform. And to incentivize that, of course, I think we should be implementing global magneticity sanctions for the most corrupt in Lebanon continue with that practice. So I'd leave there. Thank you, David. Paul? Yeah, I would say, I mean, the US policy towards Lebanon has been quite forward-leaning in the amount of support it's provided to the Lebanese Army. The Army is not perfect, that big institution in a small country that some things are able to do others. They're not, but I would say on balance, they've played a tremendous role in maintaining stability, preventing a real full state collapse and complete disorder. They remain a backbone of what exists of Lebanese stability and Lebanese legitimacy. And a lot of that is due to strong and continued US support and that's extremely valuable. The US has also been very forward-leaning on humanitarian support, as David indicated, the most generous presence that definitely needs to continue for the sake of the Lebanese people and if you wanna be less sort of altruistic to prevent mass refugee exodus to countries west and so on. As I would say, US policy generally is in the right direction. I would emphasize that the remaining half of this year is going to be politically intensive and requires intensive diplomacy. So the basic policies in place, I think, are good. I'm heartened that certainly US diplomacy is very active. We have a very active and excellent ambassador in the country. Amos Hochstein has been giving a lot of his time on the energy side of things. Secretary Blinken has been in the region and President Biden is going to the region. Lebanon in the next six months, I think needs intensive diplomacy with heavy US engagement or leadership to make sure we reach the end of the year with an effective president, with an effective prime minister, with an effective government so that by early 2023, the country can respond to the needs of its people and really begin making the decisions, passing the laws that need to happen. And I think there is no substitute for US diplomacy. It's done it in the past. We have a lot of friends in Europe, a lot of friends in the region. We do need the Gulf countries to re-engage. Both the Gulf countries in the US and Europe are in the right place by saying to the Lebanese government that you have to do your homework first, no more bailouts, but bringing the Gulfies back in in a proactive way would have a very positive effect as well. So I would urge intense diplomacy over the next few months. Thank you. Thank you, Paul. There is a general trend in the same direction. Yeah, I will continue it. So basically, I mean, I would agree largely with the recommendations of the US really essentially needing to stay engaged. The humanitarian crisis cannot be over-exaggerated. I think the need to, particularly because of the Ukraine conflict impact now on food security in Lebanon, it will be essential that we increase our food assistance to Lebanon. We should also think about expanding the amount of cash assistance to the most vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees. And this is a cash assistance that goes directly to these vulnerable populations. It has nothing to do with the Lebanese government. I fully concur that no bailouts for the Lebanese government, they must implement reform. It's egregious. It goes beyond, egregious doesn't begin to describe their behavior and their unwillingness to address the issues that have plagued this country now for years. I would add, I think we need to up our game with respect to political assistance, democracy, promotion, types of activities. We need to, in a smart way, provide parliamentary training, for example, to these new MPs. We need to think about assisting with political party formation, perhaps a coalition building. We now have people we can work with in the parliament. And I think it's really important to underscore that. Lastly, I think we need to really put a lot of pressure on the powers that be in Lebanon to form a technocratic government as soon as possible. Because the magnitude and the severity of the challenge is so significant that we can't wait for the typical Lebanese horse trading and politics and political vacuums to play out. If Paul's person falling out of the window may well be appropriate, and if we wait too long, there'll be nothing really to rescue. So I think it's incumbent on our government to pressure and demand that a technocratic government that can begin to actually do the hard work of implementing IMF reforms, very clear what needs to be done, that we prioritize that as a very urgent first step that needs to be taken in the wake of the parliamentary elections. Thank you, Mola. Now questions from both those who are participating in person and those online. Those online can go to the event page on the USIP website, and you can type your questions there. And those who are present here, I think we have a microphone at the end of the room that is ready for anyone who wants to ask a question. Any questions from those who are in the room? Is that Hank? Yeah, a microphone is coming. Thank you. And if you can say who the question is directed to, please. Yeah, I'll actually probably direct it to all of them and whoever takes it. First of all, thank you very much, Sir Hamas-Aid with USIP. The 2003, as Iraq, Saddam was removed from power, one Iraqi leader said, Iraq will not be lemonized. And at that time, I did not understand the depth of that term. Several years after, now I have seen that how actually the dynamics in Iraq and Syria and Iraq and Lebanon have, they're repeating things that happens on each side. I want to go back to some recent elections, government information stuck and all of that. I want to go back to something that Paul said, which is about transformation in Iraqi society, which is a term that I view as well as he saw the term transformation in the Lebanese society. And that was in 2019 in October. There were demonstrations in both sides. We understand that international community to remain invested. There has to be something that you can work with. And that energy on both sides, I think, helps. But in Iraq, we're seeing that the limitations of that. We have seen the limitations of a larger number of parliamentarians there. So there is a hope and there is a limitation. But within the existing actors in Iraqi, we see Muhtar al-Sadr trying to shape the politics in a certain way. We see the Sunni leadership, the Kurdish leadership trying to shape it in a certain way. Is there an equivalent or similar dynamics on the Lebanese side where from the existing parties who are dominating that other avenues of change could be found? Thank you. Thank you, Sir Hank. Any additional questions from the police? If you can say to your name and affiliation. Thank you. The Shah Ibn Eid of the American Test Force in Lebanon. I'm interested in that when you looked at the region, we got Russia, Syria, the Gulf. There was no mention of Turkey. And yet one thing we've noticed that over the last three, four years is Turkey heightening its presence in Lebanon, particularly with the Sunni communities in the north and the south. Do you see Turkey's involvement in Lebanon as a positive or negative? Thank you very much. We also have a question coming online and then I'll give the floor to these three speakers for their reactions on any questions that they would like to respond to. A question coming from Wolfgang Müllerberger. And he's talking about the parliamentary elections and a number of opposition platforms that have been able to push candidates that are reform-minded. And he's asking what is the future role of these opposition platforms? I think this was addressed in the statements and interventions by the speakers. But if they want to add any additional remarks in this regard, that would be good. Let me start by Mona and then we'll go to Paul and then David. Okay, so very quickly, I'll just say a word on the Lebanon-Iraq parallel because I think Sarhan, you framed it right. I think today the question more is how does Lebanon now avoid the Iraq scenario? I mean Iraq is now entering a very, very dangerous moment of tumult. Lebanon has been there before. The problem is Lebanon has not suffered the depth of humanitarian, social, and economic crisis that it's in. It simply cannot afford to go into a long political vacuum that in the case of Iraq could turn violent. I think the answer here really is to look back and think about the cross-sectarian nature of political reform advocates in Lebanon. That's what was so remarkable about the 2019 protests is that geographically it encompassed all of Lebanon and it also kind of eschewed sectarian identity and took a cross-confessional approach to the need for reform. That's why I'm saying we need to push, we are government needs to push for a technocratic government so that we avoid that kind of vacuum and we don't get into, I think David is absolutely right. As this goes longer, the Lebanese will fall back on their sectarian identity and they will fall back into these ways. They already are on some level because of the depth of the humanitarian crisis and falling back on confessional protectors, if you will, to provide things. So that's why I put that out there as an important first step. On the role of Turkey, Jean, I haven't followed it very closely. We are seeing Turkey play a very menacing role or threatening in Syria with a further incursion which is very concerning. My own view on Turkey is if its role is one to deepen sectarian identity and therefore sectarian divides, that is not helpful for Lebanon. And I don't think that is the way forward. It's interesting to watch the Saudis in this regard where on the one hand, perhaps they are looking to reprise in a very limited way, a role of supporting sectarian blocks that would be more akin to where they fall as opposed to the, of course, Hezbollah and Iran. On the other hand, they're providing humanitarian assistance primarily to Tripoli, which is of course a Sunni-dominated city. But the question to my mind is can we, if Turkey or Saudi or whomever are going to engage, Lebanon's problems are so significant. The US certainly isn't gonna be the one to provide all of the humanitarian assistance. It is essential that that engagement not come with a sectarian agenda. And so I worry a bit about the Turks in that regard. And then finally on the future role of a reform platform, I mean here my question is how do we deepen the political skills of these reform-minded candidates both in parliament and of course there were a slew of candidates who didn't win but who retained that energy and that desire and who are strong advocates for reform. So I think deepening political training for these groups. And then finally thinking about establishing, I did speak with some reform advocates, Lebanese reform advocates. One of the points that was made to me was the importance of political party formation. Parties that are formed not based on sect but that are based on shared agendas that have to do with reform. This is a long road for Lebanon but I think that's perhaps the way to go. Thank you Mona. Let's go to Paul and then David. Paul? Yeah, let me start with the Turkey question. I would say that particularly looking at the recent elections, it turns out that Turkey for whatever reason does not have a much current influence in Lebanon is not investing in any big way and hasn't really made any big gains. Maybe it's investing elsewhere but it's not a major factor in Lebanese politics. It hasn't chosen to be. I still look at Turkey when I think about Lebanon more in longer term, what are the future of relations in the Eastern Med going to be? What are the trade routes? What are the gas routes? Turkey is a very important player but I see no short-term interest or role that Turkey really has made. In Lebanon, I think the relations, particularly of the Sunni community, remain joined to the Gulf countries for many economic and historical reasons. The Gulf continues to sort of stay on the sidelines although there's a bit more interest than before and we'll see how that goes. Lebanon-Iraq-Sarahan gets such a fascinating, both extremely complex. On the one side, I sort of say, well, after 5,000 years of top down rule from Hammurabi to Saddam, it will take a while for self-government to take root. It will take a while to figure out how politics in a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian or multi-communal country like Iraq that can find some balance. That alongside high levels of corruption, a lot of militias. So when you look at the glass half fold, of course, it's never gonna be easy. There are a lot of parallels between what's happening in Lebanon and Iraq. Maybe we'll try to learn here and there from each other about what might work, what might not work. One striking difference is communal. It's that in Iraq, the, I mean, to put it bluntly, the Shi'ite community, the Shi'ite community in Lebanon has been almost completely taken over by Iraq, hook, line, and sinker to a large degree. I will note that in the last elections, there is a growing opposition movement in the traditional Shi'ite areas. And it was manifested in the loss of several non-Shi'ite candidates on Hezbollah's list, which previously it used to automatically be able to get elected. And so there is change afoot. It remains very much a minority thing. I don't know if it'll be a game changer anytime soon. But in Iraq, you have a very solid, what do you want to want to call it, Arab? Iraq and Arab is the kind of Shi'ism which much more effectively is trying here and there to resist, you know, Iranification. And that's a very big difference, at least at the communal level, but both have very challenging politics ahead. I won't add anything more about the reformist candidates. We've talked about them other than to say, and I'm in touch with, you know, many of the groups in Lebanon. For us and the groups in Lebanon, the priority is unify, unify, unify. And that continues to be the need. Doesn't mean unify absolutely everybody, but there needs to be one solid opposition reform block that can become sort of the national brand, can become the solidarity of Lebanon, can become, you know, the ANC of Lebanon. And that hasn't happened yet, but the success in parliament shows that there is an appetite there and there is enough political know-how to leverage, but we need to make more progress inside the country and unify. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Paul. David? Hi. Yeah, thank you. I don't have a whole lot to add to what's been said. I think the question about the parallels between Iraq and Lebanon is, I think, the salient, the Mohassa, the Ta'athiyah, there are a lot of parallels, parallels in dysfunction as well, the inability to coalesce around issues. You know, you had the same protest movements, anti-corruption in Lebanon, in Iraq violently, especially violently repressed in Iraq, but still struggling with the same fundamental issues here, not only sectarianism, but the notion of whether you can actually, in any of these countries, actually have a majoritarian government that is not here in a majority, but that actually pursues a positive agenda and is not held hostage to the consensus or the Tilt-Malata or whatever you want to call it. Turkey, I'm with where Paul is. I don't see any particularly profound impact of Turkey during the last elections. As for the Saudi role, what's got a little bit more diplomatically involved than they were, I always used to joke that the Saudis' favorite Sunni in Lebanon was Sameer Jhaja. So I don't think they're necessarily, you know, the funding Sunni community, they're looking past the people that they share common objectives with. And yeah, I think I'll leave it at that. Thank you very much. As we come very close to our end of our event, there is a small question that came through those who are participating virtually, and it's probably addressed to Mona, since she was the one who mentioned the technocratic government. And the question is from Elti, asking how can the technocratic government be formed given the presence of Hezbollah? So I'll give the floor to Mona and also to see if she has any final reflections for one minute. So one minute each if you have any final reflections and then we will end our session. So Mona. So my push for a technocratic government really stems from the fact that again, Lebanon doesn't have the time to lose on the typical shenanigans. And I think a combination of external pressure and frankly internal pushing on this from various form elements. And frankly, the extent to which one sees more unrest, social unrest, which is there at a low level, those are all factors that I would say, and others may disagree. I don't think it is in Hezbollah's interest to have Lebanon fall into a complete social implosion. I don't think that plays to their advantage necessarily. And so to my mind, it's not a foregone conclusion that Hezbollah would obstruct the formation of a technocratic government with the sole mandate of implementing the IMF demanded reforms so that the country can avail itself of much needed financial resources and begin to put itself on a path toward reform. The only other thing I'll say in closing is, I think this is an incredible moment in Lebanon's history. It is a moment that is fraught with all kinds of challenges, the likes of which in some ways we haven't seen. But I also think it's a moment of hope. And I think the extent to which first and foremost, the Lebanese themselves take matters into their hands as they have and demonstrated a desire for change, and then the extent to which the international community to include the United States reflects back that desire and responds in kind in ways that help forward that agenda is all to the good. Yes, time is of the essence, but I don't. Time is of the essence, so. But I know that Hezbollah would agree to a technocratic government, we'll see. David, and then the final word goes to Paul. David. Thanks, yeah, I am skeptical about the technocratic government. It may be a great idea and what's best for Lebanon, but whether the powers that be who are still incredibly corrupt, self-serving, and have interests narrowly defined that do not include among them the well-being of the people of Lebanon, these are the same. So I'm a little concerned that we would be able to move ahead with that. And of course, with the presidency out there, this is going to complicate things greatly, any kind of government in Lebanon. But I would say the one thing that is unusual, but that is a positive is that there appears to be at least among the sort of whether you want to call it the Lebanon support group, I think everybody excluding Iran agrees that there should be no bailout that the Lebanese people have to take responsibility that there has to be reform. And then there will be a huge amount of help for Lebanon. But this is a unique opportunity, not only because the Lebanese people spoke to a certain extent in the elections, but because you have this sort of broader consensus among the countries abroad that are actually interested in what happens in Lebanon with the notable exceptional course of Iran. So I'll leave it there. Thank you. Paul? Yeah, I would say for inside the country, I mean, the priorities to me are social solidarity and helping those who are desperately in need that the Lebanese work together on the social side. And secondly, politically, as I said, build on the limited success that the 2019 revolution brought, success but limited, build on that a wider national movement that's more unified, focus on the next elections and the local municipalities, support the 13 that are in parliament so that their experience is one of success. For the international community for the next six months, I would reiterate an intensive diplomatic effort led by the US and other like-minded countries and maybe would need a back channel to Iran to make sure that Lebanon elects a new president and effective president, not a client president, and that it also selects an effective prime minister and forms an effective government. That is critical for Lebanon to be able to move forward and I fear that left to themselves, the Lebanese political dynamics will not produce that and the region and the world should, cannot afford another completely failed state on the Eastern Mediterranean. So there's an interest in putting some effort in that. And thank you for USIP for hosting this. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I think this was a very rich discussion and we will continue to follow the situation in Lebanon, both internally to see the formation of the government, the election of the president and the performance of parliament and then also at the regional level, what will happen with issues pertaining to the maritime negotiations, the impact of the nuclear file on the situation in Lebanon, the situation in Syria, and internationally how developments in Ukraine will affect the situation in regarding food security in Lebanon. All what remains for me is to thank you all, the three speakers, Mona Akhobyan, Paul Salem and David Schenker. It was a pleasure to have you all and perhaps we will continue to follow this issue. Maybe we'll have another discussion by the end of the year or so. Let me also ask those who would be in the Washington area to visit our USIP website and perhaps buy some free tickets to come to visit the Imagine exhibit. And thank you very much and hope to see you soon in other events by USIP. Thank you. Thank you.