 Section 9, a report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section 9, Part 4. Russian government links to and contacts with the Trump campaign. Section B, post-election and transition period contacts. Trump was elected president on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the election, individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the Trump campaign and transition team through multiple channels. Sometimes through Russian Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through U.S. persons not formally tied to the campaign or transition team. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump campaign and Russia in its election interference activities. 1. Immediate post-election activity. As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected president, Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new administration. They appeared not to have pre-existing contacts and struggled to connect with senior officials around the president-elect. As explained below, those efforts entailed both official contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches sanctioned at high levels of the Russian government through business rather than political contacts. 2. Outreach from the Russian government. At approximately 3 a.m. on election night, Trump campaign press secretary Hope Hicks received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was calling from a number with a DC area code. Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the person, she could make out the words, quote, Putin call, unquote. Hicks told the caller to send her an email. The following morning on November 9, 2016, Sergei Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line, quote, message from Putin, unquote. Attached to the email was a message from Putin in both English and Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the president-elect. In the message, Putin offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he, quote, looked forward to working with Trump on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis, unquote. Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, quote, can you look into this? Don't want to get duped, but don't want to blow off Putin, unquote. Kushner stated in congressional testimony that he believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the Russian ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016. Unable to recall the Russian ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dmitry Symes of CNI, whom he had consulted previously about Russia, see Volume 1, Section 4A4Supra, and asked, quote, what is the name of Russian ambassador, unquote. Kushner forwarded Symes' response, which identified Kizlyak by name, to Hicks. After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned, Hicks conveyed Putin's letter to transition officials. Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin spoke by phone in the presence of transition team members, including incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn. B. High-level encouragement of contacts through alternative channels. As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-elect and his team, a number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make contact. Pyotr Avon, a Russian national who heads Alpha Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank, described to the office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the flurry of Russian activity. Avon told the office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin. These 50 men are often referred to as oligarchs. Avon told the office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter, Q4, of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election. Avon said that he took these meetings seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings were implicit directives and that there would be consequences for Avon if he did not follow through. As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vino. According to Avon, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin, Putin raised the prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including sanctions against Avon and or Alpha Bank. Putin suggested that Avon needed to take steps to protect himself and Alpha Bank. Avon also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump administration. According to Avon, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and generally did not know the people around the president-elect. Avon, redaction, grand jury, told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alpha Bank shareholders from potential sanctions and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the incoming administration to establish a line of communication. Avon described Putin responding with skepticism about Avon's prospect for success. According to Avon, although Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump transition team, Avon understood that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised. Avon's efforts are described in Volume 1, Section 4B5, Infra. 2. Kareel Dmitriev's transition-era outreach to the incoming administration. Avon's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kareel Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump administration in the months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United Arab Emirates, UAE, Royal Court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Eric Prince, a Trump campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon. In addition, the UAE National Security Advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick Gerson, in late September 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Security of State Rex Tillerson. A. Background. Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, the Russian direct investment fund, RDIF, when it was founded in 2011. Dmitriev reported directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his boss. RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds. Dmitriev regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince Mohammed, in connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE. Putin wanted Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently. Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region and would relay Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed. Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so. According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his and the government of Russia's preference was for candidate Trump to win and asked Nader to assist him in meeting members of the Trump campaign. Redaction, grand jury. Nader did not introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the Trump campaign before the election. Paragraph redacted, grand jury. Eric Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated with the Trump campaign including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone. Prince did not have a formal role in the campaign, although he offered to host a fundraiser for Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian election interference to Bannon. After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower, primarily to meet with Bannon, but on occasion to meet with Michael Flynn and others. Prince and Bannon would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy issues, and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill key national security positions. Although Prince was not formally affiliated with the transition, Nader, redaction, grand jury, received assurances, redaction, grand jury, that the incoming administration considered Prince a trusted associate. B, Kareel Dmitriev's post-election contacts with the incoming administration. Soon after midnight on election night, Dmitriev messaged redaction investigative technique, who was traveling to New York to attend the 2016 World Chess Championship Redaction Investigative Technique. Dmitrie Peskov, the Russian Federation's press secretary, who was also attending the World Chess Championship Redactions Investigative Technique. At approximately 2.40 a.m. on November 9, 2016, news reports stated that candidate Clinton had called President-elect Trump to concede at redactions investigative technique, wrote to Dmitriev, quote, Putin has won, unquote. Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting with the key people in the incoming administration as soon as possible in the light of the great results. He asked Nader to convey to the incoming administration that, quote, we want to start rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understand all of the sensitivities and are not in a rush, unquote. Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump campaign. Dmitriev also told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States, where he would be able to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov was separately traveling to attend the chess tournament. Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and noted that if there was, quote, a chance to see anyone key from the Trump camp, unquote, he, quote, would love to start building for the future, unquote. Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he, Dmitriev, could meet him. Nader did not pass along Dmitriev's invitation to anyone connected with the incoming administration. Although one World Chess Federation official recalled hearing from an attendee that President-elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the investigation did not establish that Trump or any campaign or transition team official attended the event, and the president's written answers denied that he had. Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition officials and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr. Dmitriev told Nader that Putin would be very grateful to Nader and that a meeting would make history. According to Nader, Dmitriev was very anxious to connect with the incoming administration and told Nader that he would try other routes to do so besides Nader himself. Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the incoming administration during Dmitriev's post-election trip to New York. In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming administration officials with Nader in January or February. Dmitriev sent Nader a list of publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump in case they were helpful. C. Eric Prince and Kareel Dmitriev meet in the Seychelles. 1. George Nader and Eric Prince arranged Seychelles meeting with Dmitriev. Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings with Eric Prince on January 3, 2017. Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev. Nader informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump administration. 2. Redaction Grand Jury He told Prince that Dmitriev had been pushing Nader to introduce him to someone from the incoming administration. 3. Redaction Grand Jury Nader suggested, in light of Prince's relationship with transition team officials, that Prince and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of mutual concern. 4. Redaction Grand Jury Prince told Nader that he needed to think further about it and to check with transition team officials. After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met, quote, with some key people within the family and inner circle, unquote, a reference to Prince and that he had spoken at length and positively about Dmitriev. Nader told Dmitriev that the people he had met had asked for Dmitriev's bio and Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it. Nader later received from Dmitriev two files concerning Dmitriev. One was a two-page biography and the other was a list of Dmitriev's positive quotes about Donald Trump. The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him to Prince. Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions, quote, to be used with some additional details for them, unquote, with them referring to members of the incoming administration. Prince opened the attachment at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving them. Prince stated that while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke with Kellyanne Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see Bannon. Cell site location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for approximately three hours. Prince said that he could not recall whether during those three hours he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him. Redaction, grand jury. Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017. The following day, Nader wrote to Dmitriev that he had a pleasant surprise for him, namely that he had arranged for Dmitriev to meet a special guest from the new team referring to Prince. Nader asked Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev agreed. The following day, Dmitriev sought assurance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting would be worthwhile. Redaction, grand jury. Dmitriev was not enthusiastic about the idea of meeting with Prince, and Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming administration. Nader wrote to Dmitriev, quote, This guy, Prince, is designated by Steve Bannon to meet you. I know him and he is very, very well connected and trusted by the new team. His sister is now a Minister of Education, unquote. According to Nader, Prince had led him to believe that Bannon was aware of Prince's upcoming meeting with Dmitriev, and Prince acknowledged that it was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the transition team. Bannon, however, told the office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting with Dmitriev. 2. The Seychelles Meetings Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017, and checked into the Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Nader were staying. Prince arrived that same day. Prince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa with Nader present. The initial meeting lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. 3. Reduction, Grand Jury Prince described the eight years of the Obama administration in negative terms and stated that he was looking forward to a new era of cooperation and conflict resolution. According to Prince, he told Dmitriev that Bannon was effective, if not conventional, and that Prince provided policy papers to Bannon. 4. Redactions, Grand Jury The topic of Russian interference in the 2016 election did not come up. Reduction, Grand Jury Prince added that he would inform Bannon about his meeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was interest in continuing the discussion, Bannon or someone else on the transition team would do so. Reduction, Grand Jury Afterwards, Prince returned to his room where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier had sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with Dmitriev. According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was off the table. Nader wrote to Dmitriev that Prince had, quote, received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately, unquote, and arranged for himself, Dmitriev and Prince, to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons property. At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not accept any Russian involvement in Libya because it would make the situation much worse. Reduction, Grand Jury After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had transpired. Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two reasons. First, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more authority within the incoming administration than Prince had. Second, he had hoped to have a discussion of greater substance, such as outlining a strategic roadmap for both countries to follow. Dmitriev told Nader that, Reduction, Grand Jury Prince's comments, Reduction, Grand Jury, were insulting Reduction, Grand Jury. Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the Seychelles. As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles. Third, Eric Prince's meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles trip. After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was interested in seeking better relations with the incoming administration. On January 12, 2017, Prince contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week. Several days later, Prince messaged her again, asking about Bannon's schedule. Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon's home after returning to the United States in mid-January and briefed him about several topics including his meeting with Dmitriev. Prince told the office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia. Prince had on his cell phone a screenshot of Dmitriev's Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017, and Prince told the office that he likely showed that image to Bannon. Prince also believed he provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact information. According to Prince, Bannon instructed Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a priority for Bannon. Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively uninterested. Bannon, by contrast, told the office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin. Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it, and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place. The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently clarified by reviewing their communications because neither one was able to produce any of the messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and Bannon exchanged dozens of messages. Prince denied deleting any messages, but claimed he did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017. Bannon's devices similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated that he did not know why messages did not appear on his device. Bannon told the office that during both the months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal blackberry and personal email for work-related communications, including those with Prince, and he took no steps to preserve these work communications. D. Kareel Dmitriev's post-election contact with Rick Gerson regarding U.S.-Russia relations. Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE National Security Advisor introduced Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner, who runs a hedge fund in New York. Gerson stated that he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump campaign, other than occasional casual discussions about the campaign with Kushner. After the election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed. When Dmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures between Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF. Dmitriev was interested in improved economic cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in the incoming administration who would be helpful toward this goal. Gerson replied that he would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the new administration took power and before cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the Senate. Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the key person or people were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns and economic matters. Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson that if Russia was, quote, approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can have major breakthroughs quickly, unquote. Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016 about what such a reconciliation plan would include. Gerson told the office that the transition team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev and that he did so on his own initiative and as a private citizen. On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could, quote, share it with Jared or somebody else, very senior in the team, so that they know we are focused from our side on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that, unquote. Dmitriev also asked Gerson if he knew Prince and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time with. After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting. On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for US-Russia reconciliation that he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points. One, jointly fighting terrorism. Two, jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts. Three, developing win-win economic and investment initiatives. Four, maintaining an honest, open and continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement. And five, ensuring proper communication and trust by key people from each country. On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the document to Kushner. Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time. Gerson explained that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev's being well connected. Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right people. Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson. According to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it. On January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document telling him that this was, quote, a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends. Please share with them. We believe this is a good foundation to start from, unquote. Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering it. On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his boss, an apparent reference to Putin, was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal. Dmitriev said, quote, We do not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to try to have the key U.S. meetings in the next two weeks, if possible, unquote. He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday and noted that that information was very confidential. The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his boss again yesterday who had, quote, emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication channel to avoid bureaucracy, unquote. On January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted, quote, To see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the two-pager I sent you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST, unquote. An apparent reference to the call scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied, quote, Definitely, paper was so submitted to team by Rick and me. They took it seriously, unquote. After the call between President Trump and Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that, quote, The call went very well. My boss wants me to continue making some public statements that U.S.-Russia cooperation is good and important, unquote. Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev replied that the document that they had drafted together, quote, played an important role, unquote. Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately March 2017 when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of progressing. 3. Ambassador Kislyak's meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower following the election. On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak. That same day, Vargas sent Kushner an email with the subject, quote, Missed call Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Sergei Ivanovich Kislyak, unquote. The text of the email read, quote, Re, setting up a time to meet with you on 12-1, LMK how to proceed, unquote. Kushner responded in relevant part, quote, I think I do this one. Confirm with Dmitriev signs of CNI that this is the right guy, unquote. After reaching out to a colleague of signs at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was, quote, the best go-to guy for routine matters in the U.S., unquote. While Yuri Ushakov, a Russian forward policy advisor, was the contact for, quote, more direct slash substantial matters, unquote. Bob Forrestman, the UBS Investment Bank Executive who had previously tried to transmit to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, C volume 1, section 4A1D2Supra, may have provided similar information to the transition team. According to Forrestman, at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his designated deputy, KT McFarland, in New York, Flynn asked Forrestman for his thoughts on Kislyak. Forrestman had not met Kislyak, but told Flynn that while Kislyak was an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin. Forrestman subsequently traveled to Moscow, inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. National Security Advisor. Forrestman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in Russia, but told the office that he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn and that he worked to get a face-to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do so. Email correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward, but Flynn has no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting. The investigation did not identify evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov after being given his name. In the meantime, although he had already formed the impression that Kislyak was not necessarily the right point of contact, Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had requested on November 16. It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016. At Kushner's invitation, Flynn also attended. Bannon was invited but did not attend. During the meeting which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the incoming administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian relations. Kushner also asked Kislyak to identify the best person, whether Kislyak or someone else, with whom to direct future discussions, someone who had contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him. The three men also discussed U.S. policy towards Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of having Russian generals brief the transition team on the topic using a secure communications line. After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the transition team offices, Kushner asked Kislyak if they could communicate using secure facilities at the Russian Embassy. Kislyak quickly rejected that idea. 4. Jared Kushner's meeting with Sergei Gorkov On December 6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set up a second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner. Kushner declined several proposed meeting dates, but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second meeting. Kushner told the office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had already decided Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he arranged to have one of his assistants, Avi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyak in his stead. Although Embassy official Sergei Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it important to, quote, continue the conversation with Mr. Kushner in person, unquote, Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet instead with Berkowitz once it became apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting. Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12, 2016 at Trump Tower. The meeting lasted only a few minutes during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet someone who had a direct line to Putin. Sergei Gorkov, the head of the Russian government-owned bank, Vinesh Ekonombank, VEB. Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov. The one-on-one meeting took place the next day, December 12, 2016, at the Colony Capital Building in Manhattan where Kushner had previously scheduled meetings. VEB was and is the subject of Department of Treasury Economic Sanctions imposed in response to Russian's annexation of Crimea. Kushner did not, however, recall any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or sanctions more generally. Kushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for the meeting and that no one on the transition team even did a Google search for Gorkov's name. At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts, a painting and a bag of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner's family originated. The accounts from Kushner and Gorkov differ as to whether the meeting was diplomatic or business in nature. Kushner told the office that the meeting was diplomatic with Gorkov expressing disappointment with U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for improved relations with the incoming administration. According to Kushner, although Gorkov told Kushner a little bit about his bank and made some statements about the Russian economy, the two did not discuss Kushner's companies or private business dealings of any kind. At the time of the meeting, Kushner companies had a debt obligation coming due on the building it owned at 666 Fifth Avenue and there had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the property and possible conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of his companies borrowing from foreign lenders. In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in Kushner's capacity as CEO of Kushner companies for the purpose of discussing business rather than as a part of a diplomatic effort. In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with Kushner as a part of a series of roadshow meetings with representatives of major U.S. banks and business circles, which included negotiations and discussion of the most promising business lines and sectors. Forrestman, the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume 1, Sections 4A1 and 4B3 Supra, told the office that he met with Gorkov and VEB Deputy Chairman Nikolai Tsikomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner. According to Forrestman, Gorkov and Tsikomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss post-election issues with U.S. financial institutions and that their trip was sanctioned by Putin and that they would be reporting back to Putin upon their return. The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and Gorkov or determined whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature, as Kushner stated, focused on business as VEB's public statement indicated, or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting. Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, quote, Hi, please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response, unquote. Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts. On February 8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, Berkowitz, to try to set up another meeting and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed. According to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding the Russia investigation and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request. 5. Piotr Ovan's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume 1, Section 4B1B Supra, Piotr Ovan attended what he described as a separate, all-hands oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen. As in Ovan's one-on-one meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions. After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Ovan tried to establish a connection to the Trump team. Ovan instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump administration. Burt was on the board of directors for Letter 1, L1, another company headed by Ovan, and had done work for Alpha Bank. Burt had previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his primary roles with Alpha Bank and L1 was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries. While at an L1 board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Ovan pulled Burt aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump transition team. Ovan asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the transition team. Although Burt had been responsible for helping Ovan build connections in the past, Burt viewed Ovan's request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Ovan. Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI, discussed at Volume 1, Section 4A4, Supra, decided to approach CNI President Dmitry Symes for help facilitating Ovan's request, recalling that Symes had some relationship with Kushner. At the time, Symes was lobbying the Trump transition team on Burt's behalf to appoint Burt U.S. Ambassador to Russia. Burt contacted Symes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming administration. Symes told the office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the U.S. presidential election. According to Symes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret channel and Symes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian government and the incoming administration. Based on what Symes had read in the media, he stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by Russia and Symes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement in facilitating any connection. In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Ovan his conversation with Symes. Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the need to establish such a channel, but the individual emphasized that at this moment with so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber hacking and who ordered what, Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to discuss it again after the new year. I trust the individual's instincts on this. If this is unclear to you or you would like to discuss, don't hesitate to call." According to Burt, the very influential person referenced in his email was Symes, and the reference to a trusted third party was a fabrication as no such third party existed. Project A was a term that Burt created for Ovan's effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Ovan was requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential election. According to Burt, his report that there was interest in a communications channel reflected Symes' views, not necessarily those of the transition team, and in any event Burt acknowledged that he added some hype to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the transition team than may have actually existed. Ovan replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying, quote, thank you, all clear, unquote. According to Ovan, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue. Burt spoke to Ovan some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trump team, explaining to Ovan that the current environment made it impossible. Reduction, grand jury. Burt did not recall discussing Ovan's request with Symes again, nor did he recall speaking to anyone else about the request. In the first quarter of 2017, Ovan met again with Putin and other Russian officials. At that meeting, Putin asked about Ovan's attempt to build relations with the Trump administration, and Ovan recounted his lack of success. Reduction, grand jury. Putin continued to inquire about Ovan's efforts to connect to the Trump administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings. Ovan also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI. As part of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump administration. According to Ovan, the officials showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to care. In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump campaign, former campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page again visited Moscow in an attempt to pursue business opportunities. Reduction, grand jury. According to Constantine Kalimnik, Paul Manafort's associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kalimnik wrote, Carter Page is in Moscow today sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine. On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrei Krikovich. Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page. Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump's election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia. Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition to begin a discussion on future cooperation, Redactions, Grand Jury. Dvorkovich separately discussed working together in the future by forming an academic partnership, Redactions, Grand Jury. Seven, contacts with and through Michael T. Flynn. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the transition team's primary conduit for communications with the Russian ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive matters during the transition period. A United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian government's reaction to the United States' imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the 2016 election. Despite Kushner's conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside the Russian government, the transition team turned to Flynn's relationship with Kislyak on both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to KT McFarland, his incoming deputy, to prepare for his call to Kislyak. McFarland was with the president-elect and other senior members of the transition team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. Although transition officials at Mar-a-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did not identify evidence that the president-elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29, 2016, and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia exceeded to that request. A United Nations vote on Israeli settlements On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory. The Security Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day. There was speculation in the media that the Obama administration would not oppose the resolution. According to Flynn, the transition team regarded the vote as a significant issue and wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution. On December 22, 2016, multiple members of the transition team, as well as President-elect Trump, communicated with foreign government officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat the resolution. Kushner led the effort for the transition team. Flynn was responsible for the Russian government. Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December 22, Flynn called Kislyak. According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the transition team's opposition to the resolution and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Later that day, President-elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about the vote. Ultimately, Egypt postponed the vote. On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New England, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the resolution. Throughout the day, members of the transition team continued to talk with foreign leaders about the resolution with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian government through Kislyak. When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it. The resolution later passed 14 to 0 with the United States abstaining. Flynn was also the transition team member who spoke with the Russian government when the Obama administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12.01 a.m. the following day and imposed sanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities. On December 29, 2016, the Obama administration also expelled 35 Russian government officials and closed two Russian government-owned compounds in the United States. During the rollout of the sanctions, President-elect Trump and multiple transition team senior officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon, and Reintz Priebus, were staying at the Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida. Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic, but was in daily contact with McFarland. The transition team and President-elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions would harm the United States' relationship with Russia. Although the details and timing of sanctions were unknown, on December 28, 2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory measures from the Obama administration against Russia were forthcoming when asked about imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election. President-elect Trump told the media, quote, I think we ought to get on with our lives, unquote. Russia initiated the outreach to the transition team. On the evening of December 28, 2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, quote, can you kindly call me back at your convenience, end quote. Flynn did not respond to the text message that evening. Someone from the Russian embassy also called Flynn the next morning at 10.38 a.m., but they did not talk. The sanctions were announced publicly on December 29, 2016. At 1.53 p.m. that day, McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple transition team members and advisors about the impact the sanctions would have on the incoming administration. At 2.07 p.m., a transition team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions. At 2.29 p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk. Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon discussed the sanctions. According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia and that Russian escalation would make things more difficult. McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak later that night. McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night. At 3.14 p.m., Flynn texted a transition team member who was assisting McFarland, quote, time for a call, unquote. The transition team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a transition team senior official, to which Flynn responded, quote, tit for tat with Russia not good. Russian ambo reaching out to me today, unquote. Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago. He first spoke with Michael Ladine, a transition team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters for 20 minutes. Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions. On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump administration's foreign policy goals. McFarland and Flynn also discussed that transition team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation. They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand. Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak. Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video teleconference between President-elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming terrorism conference, and Russia's views about the Middle East. With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a tit for tat, and only respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner. Multiple transition team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus at 4.43 p.m., McFarland sent an email to transition team members about the sanctions, informing the group that, quote, Jen Flynn is talking to Russian ambassador this evening, unquote. Less than an hour later, McFarland briefed President-elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other transition team members were present. During the briefing, President-elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did it, meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election. McFarland said yes, and President-elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians. McFarland also discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions and said Russia's response would be an indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward. President-elect Trump opined that the sanctions provided him with leverage to use with the Russians. McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting someone may have mentioned to President-elect Trump that Flynn was speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening. After the briefing, Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone. Flynn reported on the substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions. According to McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming administration. McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-elect Trump. The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov remarked that Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions. Putin superseded that comment two hours later, releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-elect Trump tweeted quote, great move on delay by V. Putin, end quote. Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other transition team members. The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed with Kislyak. Flynn told the office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama administration's foreign policy. On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the request. Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with Kislyak. According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better relationship and that the relationship was back on track. Flynn also told McFarland that he believed his phone call had made a difference. McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in response. Flynn spoke with other transition team members that day but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions. Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon that day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak. Bannon, for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day but said that he did not remember discussing sanctions with him. Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak and the handling of those discussions by the transition team and the Trump administration is provided in Volume 2 of this report. In some, the investigation established multiple links between Trump campaign officials and individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers of assistance to the campaign. In some instances, the campaign was receptive to the offer while in other instances the campaign officials shied away. Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that the campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election interference activities. End of Section 9, recording by Amy Conger, San Francisco, California.