 Αυτό είναι ένα πολύ ανθρώπτο τρόπο για να αντιμετωπίσουμε το Πεσημίστικο Ανδάξιον, που ήταν δημιουργείed από τον Ιωάννη Βόρελ τελευταία του 1980ς και που έχει γίνει πολύ ανθρώπτο, όχι τελευταία, είναι καλύτερος ως στραξοριαλισμός. Η ιδέα του στραξού της κόσμου πίσω της παράδειγης είναι δημιουργείο, αλλά όχι δημιουργείο, το κοντενό, που κάνει αυτή η στραξία δεν είναι δημιουργείο. Οι ιστορικές υπάρχουν δύο στραξοριαλισμούς. Έχω πάρει στο Μπέρτραν Ράσελ, στην αριθή 20ης, 1912, και η ιδέα του στραξού της κόσμου είναι ότι υπάρχει μία τελευταία δημιουργείο, ένα στραξόριας δημιουργείο, από το στραξόριο των εφαίτες, από τις παράδειγες. Αλλά υπάρχει πολύ καλύτερο πρόβλημα με αυτή η δημιουργείο, που θέλω να συγγράψω σε αυτή η δημιουργείο. Η άλλη δημιουργείο είναι η Μαξουέλιανς, η Βοράλιανς δημιουργείο, γιατί πρέπει να πάρει back to an idea put forward by Grover Maxwell, in the early 1960s, and it was developed in an independent way by John Warrell in the late 1980s. The idea here is that the world has excess structure over the appearances, but this excess structure can be captured hypothetically by the so-called Ramsey's sentence of an empirically adequate theory. There is a problem there and the problem is that on a Ramsey's sentence account of theories it turns out that an empirically adequate theory has to be true. The supposed excess content or excess structure of the world turns out to be illusory. There is another root of structuralism which goes back to Poincaré and Pierre Duem. They both took mathematics to offer a framework which the empirical findings of science were embedded and organized. Faced with the problem of discontinuity changed, Poincaré argued that there is nonetheless some substantial continuity at the level of mathematical equations that represent empirical as well as theoretical relations. From this he concluded that these retained mathematical equations together with the retained empirical content fully captured the objective content of scientific theories. By and large he thought the theoretical content of scientific theories is structural. If successful, a theory represents correctly the structure of the world. In the end the structure of the world is revealed to us by structurally convergent scientific theories. Poincaré famously said still things themselves are not what science can reach as the naive dogmatists think but only relations between things outside of these relations there is no knowable reality. He continued these equations express relations and if the relations remain true it is because the relations preserve the reality. They teach us now as then that there is such and such a relation between this thing and some other thing only this thing something we currently call motion we now call it electric current but these appellations were only images substituted for the real objects which nature would eternally hide from us. The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain to and their only condition is that the same relations exist between these objects as between the images which are forced to put in their place. John Warrell took up this position in the late 1880s and he developed it in a more rigorous way according to Warrell's position the structural realist insists that it is a mistake to think that we can ever understand the nature of the basic furniture of the universe. In opposition to scientific realism structural realism somehow restricts the cognitive content of scientific theories to their mathematical structure together with their empirical consequences. But in opposition to instrumentalism and structural realism suggests that the mathematical structure of a theory reflects the structure of the world that is real relations between things. Now what is the key argument for structural realism of this kind of flavor it's a version of the no miracles argument which is a major argument for scientific realism. Successful predictions suggest that the theory is on the right track the carried over mathematical structure of the theory correctly represents the structure of the world and this best explains this predictive success. Now if this argument is to lend any credence to structural realism then it must be the case that the mathematical structure of a theory somehow exclusively responsible for the predictive success of the theory. But this is not true. It's not true that the mathematical equations alone devoid of their physical content can give rise to any kind of predictions. If structural realism is to employ this argument in order to claim that to retain mathematical equations reveal real relations in the world then it should also admit that some physical content not necessarily empirical and low level but also theoretical is retained. Such an admission would undercut the claim that the predictive success vindicates only the mathematical structure of a theory and similarly it could undercut the epistemic dichotomy between the structure and the content of a physical theory.