 Well, let us talk about an example of ethical naturalism. Now, if you look at the screen, we have something called emotivism. Now, we have been talking about ethical naturalism and ethical naturalism as you would remember with understanding moral or ethical judgments in terms of non-ethical judgments. So, this happens to be the crucial defining of ethical naturalism. So, there is a domain of ethical judgments, which can be understood in terms of non-ethical judgments. Now, this was the basis of ethical naturalism. Now, what could be examples of ethical naturalism? We have slightly talked about utilitarianism as an example of ethical naturalism. Today, we are going to explore another example of ethical naturalism, which is called emotivism. Now, emotivism as you would figure out comes from the root emotion or something to do with emotion. Now, we need to understand whether emotions are, what are emotions and what is emotivism as a moral theory, which lays on a foundation of ethical naturalism. Let me briefly remind you of the categorization that we have. Well, the most fundamental layer is metaethics and on top of it would be moral theory and on top of it is applied ethics. So, analogically, this can be seen as a three-layered format or framework in our moral thinking. The bottom layer is metaethics, which is the foundational and on top of that is built moral theory and depending on the moral theory, we have answers to applied questions. Now, ethical naturalism is a form of metaethics. The example of a moral theory is emotivism. It can be anything that you would like or any theory that stands on ethical naturalism and applied ethics is stealing wrong. How do you answer this question? So, if I answer yes, then this is an applied ethical question. Now, having known this, let us go ahead and explore what is emotivism? Well, what are emotions? Emotions are something that we feel. Now, if emotions are feelings, we know that we are introspectively aware of them. Now, if emotions can be barely understood as feelings and how are we aware of them? We are introspectively aware of them. So, you would yourself know whether you are happy or unhappy about a particular thing. Now, let us imagine, how do we sort a moral question or an ethical question? Suppose, the question that we asked in the applied ethics level that well is stealing wrong. Now, various moral theories have various answers to it. Now, in the ambit of ethical naturalism, there is this moral theory called emotivism. Let us see what does emotivism say about it? Well, emotivism very simply put is saying that value judgments are dependent on the emotions that they bring forth. So, this is basically what is emotivism. So, we take, we can understand emotivism is value judgments are determined by emotions or the feelings and as we will further explore, they are useful only to incite further emotions or feelings. Now, let us pay attention on the first part of the claim. The first part of the claim is that value judgments are determined by emotions and feelings. Now, is that the case? Now, let us think over it for a certain time that well, if you are posed with a question or a value question, how do you decide whether it is, how do you answer it? Well, how many of you reason, how many of you look at the benefit that it brings along, how many of you would like to be content and conceive whether it is universalizable, how many of you would be follow the utilitarian way and evaluate or assess how much net happiness does it bring along or if somebody answers that stealing is wrong because I do not feel good about it or I feel bad about it, it brings about a negative reaction in me. I am disdained by the concept of stealing or whenever I hear something stealing. Let us go back and re-examine the example that we talked about. X is killing Y, now that is a statement of fact, but what makes X killing of Y or wrong act or a value judgment of on this act is well the emotion that this such an act brings forth in the agent. If I am an observer and I see that X is killing Y and I just have negative reactions to it, I do not like it, I feel bad about it, I have a bad emotional response to it, then for me that is wrong. Now, if I am an emotivist, I would reason it this way, you could perhaps look around and to find that many people would say that well if you ask Mother Teresa or if you ask any social worker that why do you enjoy doing social work or why do you choose social work. Now, apart from pragmatic necessities, if at a deeper level people are interested because perhaps someone would answer that well because it is my duty to help less privileged, well that is a part of duty ethics, but if someone just says that I do social work because I like it, now this is an is it a explanation or not, how would you count it, now take a look at the question. Now, if the question is if X is any act, X is right because I feel good about it, do you consider this as a justification for the act being good or many of us would perhaps consider that well it is a side effect of the right act that well I do something good or X is right, not because I feel good about it, but X is right therefore I feel good about it. Now, if I term this as statement one and statement two, now if you are in support of statement one, well then you are an emotivist, if you are in support of statement two or you understand right from some other reason and feeling good about it is only a consequence of it, then you are not an emotivist. So, this is an example of an emotivist, this is not an emotivist, so we see that well any act is right because I feel good about it and likewise any act is wrong because I feel bad about it, now let us imagine another example, say if we are we see a person stealing and if you feel bad about it that makes it wrong and if you feel good about it that makes it right. So, what is the conclusion that can be drawn from this is well values or value judgments are expression of the agent's emotional reaction, so this basically sums up that well what is meant by value judgments or by emotivism that value judgments are expression of the agent's emotional reaction. Now, if you agree with this well then you are an emotivist, now you might ask the question that well if value judgments or ethics is subservient to feelings and human feelings where is the objectivity, so this is a question what about ethical objectivity, the same act, act X for agent P, agent Q and agent R can have different ethical values, so for someone it could be right, for someone it could be wrong and for someone it could be well without any moral consequence, so we can call it a moral, now having these three possibilities that the same act can depending on the agent have different judgments, so where what can we have an objective judgment about X, well the answer for most emotivists would be well no nothing trans agent that is let me put that again clearly, so value judgments then become a consequence of the agent, so if the agent is having a positive reaction to it the action is right, if he is having a negative reaction to it the action is wrong and if agent does not have a value reaction to it can call it as a moral, well then what use are more value judgments that is a valid question that we could ask, now let us look at it this way, if we find that well there are there is a dilemma, there is a value dilemma and some of the people choose to be emotivists and say that well whatever reaction we have to it that determines the value judgment of that reaction to it, so whatever emotional reaction we have, so a social worker says that I feel good about social working, so I do social work, a selfish person would say that I feel good about being selfish therefore I am selfish, a selfless person would say that I feel good about being selfless and bad about being selfish, so I am selfless, so how can we judge the other, yes this definitely tends to fall into the domain of emotional or ethical relativism that well, then there is no objective criteria, what some philosophers have tried to go ahead and build a system to justify emotivism is that well are basic moral apparatus as human beings remains the same and thereof we do have standard emotional response to a situation, so compassion is for instance, a compassion is a standard reaction, so feeling bad or having a negative emotional response to somebody else's suffering is perhaps something that is a part of our frame work of approaching the world and therefore we do not like suffering and others suffering and therefore we have, we think that suffering is bad even for the other where it is not for the self, so this is kind of a postulation of a universal human nature and therefore a universal human reaction is a possible justification of emotivism, so if you take a look one of the justification run up is universal human nature which leads to standard emotional reactions again which leads to common values, this could be a justification of emotivism, so this emotivism as objective, well, but this is a weak justification from more than one angles because how do we postulate a universal human nature or how do we thereof build the standard human emotional reaction because why by very definition our emotional reactions are determining values, so they are more fundamental than values, so an implicit claim here is in emotivism is that emotions more fundamental than values, now if this is the case that emotions are more fundamental than values then emotivism holds the case, well then let us tackle this question again what use are value judgment, one is very much justified in asking utility of value judgments as per emotivism, well emotivists have tried to answer this question by saying well it is if you would remember the second part of the definition that we talked about the definition of emotivism that we talked about to incite similar emotion and therefore consequent action, so emotivists have said that value judgments are nonsensical because they have no truth value but are a kind of necessary nonsense, now how does this make sense, well let us say what is the utility of value judgments, well as per emotivism value judgments incite similar emotion as the emotion felt by the agent, emotion of approval or disapproval and therefore that brings about a consequent action, now value judgments are nonsensical that is they have no truth value but are kind of a necessary nonsense, why a necessary nonsense, before we let us handle the question one by one, now let us say let us look at it this way now, let us say if a soldier before a final battle charge is addresses his fellow soldiers or his subordinates, well that is a very inspiring speech generally, what does it inspire, where we talk about freedom, they talk about justice, about fairness, about martyrdom, now this justification or this speech from the emotivist perspective is just an emotivist judgment and the leader feels that way and the purpose of this emotivist speech is to incite such a feeling in this subordinate soldiers, so that the entire team performs to the best of their ability, so it is irrelevant that for the leader or that whatever he says is true or false in the world out there, but what matters is that it incites the others subordinates to go ahead for a battle charge, so that is the justification that emotivist give, so yes the statement of the leader is nonsensical or because it does not have any truth value, it is mere exhortations, it is an appeal which is not verifiable, but it is necessary because it brings about similar emotional reaction to the, in the listeners. Now this example could be put forth into poetry, into songs of valor, poems of valor of movies and any kind of an, when one agent tries to influence the other agent, their value judgments are of a certain utility that emotivism, that value judgments are emotional reactions incites that there should be the followers of the subordinates to go ahead for another action. Now this is what emotivists have called the thrust or the utility of value judgments. Now so this we see as an example of value emotivism, value judgments being emotional, emotive, but necessary nonsense because they exhort action, so this happens to be the utility of emotivism. Now emotivism was a kind of ethical non-naturalism. Now I would like you to think that well we have talked about ethical naturalism, what could be the weapons or arsenal in the hands of the ethical non-naturalist. Now if you are an ethical naturalist, you could be an emotivist, you could be a utilitarian, you could be any theory which has an empirical correlate, but if you are a non-naturalist then what? Then what you have in your ambit? If what does the ethical non-naturalist have in his arsenal? Now that is a question that you must wonder about that well perhaps whatever we meant by ethical naturalism is almost synonymous, but not totally with what is empirically available to us, empirically or you can understand it clearly as experientially. Now what is available from experience? Now what is a dilemma or a moral question? That experience gives it to us, but what is the solution? How do we arrive at that? Now if we do not have a naturalistic or empiricistic reaction pattern, how do we determine what is right or wrong? If it is not reasons, if it is not feelings then what is in the arsenal of ethical non-naturalist to make value judgments? So we will look at ethical non-naturalism as a meta-ethical claim now.