 I think that's a good opportunity to leave the floor to Jean Abidboul, Jean Abidboul, who is president of the International Group of LNG Importer and who spent all his career in natural gas. And so, Jean, do you have the floor for ten minutes? So I will preach more or less for my church and mention more specifically natural gas, but I will start. So this one seems a little bit complex, but it shows three different things on the same slide. The size of the square is the size of the world market. So in 2010 and 2022. Then the color shows the different kind of energies and inside one color you can see the different countries. So it's a little bit complex and I will not spend too much time on that, but it gives you all the figures related to the different kind of energy. There was a question about nuclear. Nuclear is in orange pink and you can see that nuclear is still a rather small part of the world energy mix. It was 7% in 2000. It is 4% on the world energy mixed in 2022. So in black you can see the coal. So you can see that the coal is still very important and the increase it shares 25% in 2000, 27% in 2022. So coal is still very important. You can see the growth in green of the renewable 1% in 2000, 7% in 2022. And the size of natural gas is more or less the same, 22% in 2000, 23% in 2022. But of course it's 23% of a larger square. The global energy mix went from 9.2 million tonne oil equivalent to 14.4 million tonne equivalent. Just a snapshot on coal. Coal was 30% in 2010 and is 27% in 2022. And a big part of this decrease in coal consumption has been replaced by natural gas. So as a consequence, next slide, you can see that the GAG emission... I didn't press the button. It's a new one. It looks like the old one, but it's a new one. You can see that the GAG emission, CO2 emission, to be more specific, has been growing by 2.8% per year for 2000 to 2010. And from 2010 to 2022, the growth is only... It can be discussed, but it's a fact, by 0.9% year on year. So the main explanation to that and the fact that the main explanation to that is a replacement of coal by natural gas. There is also a small part from renewable, but the share of renewable is still too low to have today a significant impact on CO2 emissions. Now the LNG, so the VCs, the part of interregional gas trade on the left side, you can see that the pipeline part of interregional gas trade has decreased from 2021 to 2022 by 5% and has been replaced by LNG, so it's a direct consequence of the Ukraine war. On the left, you can see the LNG import by sources and by destination. You can see on the top of the graph the big three export countries, United States, Australia and Qatar. Qatar and Australia are more or less the same, but you can see the growth on United States 21 and 22 and you can see that Europe from 21 to 22 on the downside part of the slide has grown significantly also as a consequence of the Ukrainian war. So in Europe, LNG has filled the gap created by the disruption of Russian gas. You can see on the left the Russian piping port in red or orange, you can see the decrease and you can see on the right the increase of the US LNG to Europe. So to make it short in Europe, the Russian gas has been replaced by LNG from the US. So I like this one because the title of this one could be the invisible hand of the market or could be also entitled Leave Me Alone. What do I mean by leaving me alone? All the governments have tried to do something to cope with the issue of the Russian gas in 2022 and beginning of 2023. So they have tried to imagine new systems in Europe of common purchase, which by the way is illegal and under the competition law. They have tried to imagine price cap. They have tried to imagine common tenders, et cetera, et cetera. One could think that part of these measures have been useful. I believe that the market has done the job. When you look on the left part of this slide, you can see that the LNG imports from 2021 on the top to 2022 on the back. You can see the growth from 70 to 110 million tons per country. And on the next part of the slide, you can see the decrease of LNG imports in Asia per country. And you can see that so there is an increase in Europe of 40 million tons of LNG imports, partially offset by a decrease by about 20 million tons of LNG, which used to go to Asia. And how is it possible that this LNG doesn't go anymore to Asia? But the answer is very simple. The answer is cool. The prices of LNG have skyrocketed so much that some LNG countries, some Asian countries, especially China, India and Indonesia have naturally replaced LNG by coal for their electricity production. It's not an intervention of the government. It's not because Emmanuel Macron has asked to China, please give me some LNG to replace Russian gas. It's just because the market has been working. So there was a double swap called to LNG to call in Asia and LNG from Asia to Europe to replace Russian gas. So the price signals did work without any intervention from the government and from Europe. And since today in the LNG market, 30% of the quantities are spot. You have 20 exporting countries. You have 45 importing countries. You have 734 LNG tankers. So you have a huge fleet of LNG tankers. The market works. We had already seen that during the Fukushima issue where it was exactly the other way around and additional LNG went to Japan to replace the nuke which was cut by the Fukushima issue. So my main message is the LNG market really provides flexibility. The price signals work. Of course, the replacement of LNG by coal in Asia is not a good news as far as CO2 emissions are concerned. But there is today such flexibility in the LNG market that LNG market can cope with crisis. So the next slide is expectation on the future. I will not spend too much time on that, but it is numbers coming from the EIA in two assumptions. The one on the top is stated policies scenario. And the one on the downside of the slide is announced pledge scenario. So on the top it is a state of the art assumption. And on the back when you can see what would be the consequences of what the different states have announced in terms of pledges to reduce green gas emission. On the right, just for information, you can see different scenario on the growth of LNG. You can find the big three, United States, Qatar and Australia. And there are two countries which can provide additional LNG. It's United States and Qatar on a significant point of view. So this is basically what I wanted to say. Thank you. So I leave the floor for a few questions. Jean, this Russian attack of Ukraine, do we have an idea how much it costs to Europe or to Europe consumers? To shift from Russian gas to American, do you have a vague assessment of how much it costs the European consumer? And my second question is in terms of carbon emission, the fact that we saw that India, China and Indonesia went back to coal. What is the impact on the carbon emission of the decision of the West to stop importing Russian energy? So these are good questions and I'm not sure to have the full answer to those questions. On the first question, I read, not by you of course, but others which are less informed, that the replacement, the US have made, Europe has paid a huge amount of money because Russian gas has been replaced by US LNG. This is factually true because to make it simple, in Europe the spot prices were around, let's say, 8, 10 dollars per million BTU, Olivier, the order of magnitude. So this is the order of magnitude, after the invasion of Ukraine, this number went at the maximum of the crisis to 50 dollars per million BTU. So it's increased by 400%. So people said the US LNG costs a huge amount of money to the European consumer. No, it's not the US LNG, it's because there was less LNG in the market and the price signals did work. And if there was not US LNG to replace part of the Russian gas, the prices would have been maybe not 50 dollars per million BTU, but maybe 100, 200 or whatever it is because there would be a physical gap. In the supply demand of LNG and this gap would have not been filled by prices and we would have to cut the gas in Europe to consumer or to industrial consumer, whatever, which has not been done. Having said that, it's true that multiplying the prices by 4 or 5, even for a limited period of time, it has cost a lot of money because US LNG, mainly US, there was a competition between Europe and Asia and it took time to displace gas in Asia to be replaced by coal. So the exact numbers, I have no idea, but if you take maybe Olivier, you have an idea, if you have an increase of 400% of the gas prices during three months, this is the equivalent of doubling or tripling the prices during one full year. So if I multiply by, I need a few seconds to do the multiplication. I gave some figures in my presentation and in fact the cost for Europe of the crisis, there are two crises, the crisis of the European market of gas and electricity in 2021 and on the top of that there is a crisis of Ukraine. And the figures I presented is that the spending on energy in Europe represents 2.2% of the GDP in 2020, it moved to 4% in 2021 and 8% in 2022. This may mean that the crisis in Europe of the markets, electricity and gas market, cost 2% of GDP and on the top of that 4% due to the Ukraine crisis, just rough idea. It's very interesting to look. Maybe if you give me one second to address the second question of Renault on the cost in terms of CO2 emission. So in rough numbers, in China, there was an increase, I would say by the mid 50, 30 million tonne oil equivalent of coal increase. 30 million plus, I would say 50 million, I would say 100 million tonne oil equivalent and each time you replace gas by coal, you multiply by two. The CO2 emission, so I ask for help from my friends, Nicolas Olivier, on 100 million tonne oil equivalent if you multiply by two, how much CO2 does it cost? I'll give you the figures afterwards. Please, so there are two questions. Thank you, Olivier. It's not necessarily a question, more of a comment. It's very interesting to look from the policy point of view of the cost after, but I will kindly put for the analysis to look what were the costs before because of the dependency of Europe of the Russian gas. And Olivier, in a humble way, I can challenge that actually the winner of Nord Stream 2 was the United States. In my humble opinion, I think the big winners were the central eastern Europe countries who got their chance to not be prisoners of the Russian gas used by Putin as a weapon. And I can tell you from my personal experience when I was deputy prime minister in 2018, it was Romania and Poland who was saying in Brussels on the record and off the record take away the energy from Putin's hands because he's going to use it as a weapon. Unfortunately, we were right. So maybe as we are talking from the policy point of view, it will be interesting to look what were the costs of being so dependent on the Russian gas. It's not necessarily the case of my country, Romania, because we've been quite wise in terms of having the energy mixed and we were practically from all the central eastern Europe countries, we had the less dependency. But I can tell you, for that 15% that we were getting from Russia, the same gas from Russia for Romania was the highest. Actually, there was another country who paid higher was Republic of Moldova. Then it was Romania and the same amount of gas and the same day from Russia, we were paying the highest price where other countries in Europe, in European Union, quite frankly, were paying the cheapest. So I think looking at, you know, from drawing some lessons and recommendations from the future is, you know, look what was happening and how energy is practically a matter of security, in my opinion, it should be treated this way. I think I agree when I said that the U.S. where the winners, it's on the economic point of view because it reinforced and now the European Union is depending more and more on U.S. LNG. I would like to highlight, we discussed about Ukraine. I would like to highlight the fact that in 2014, the share of Russia in the supply, in gas supply of Europe was 30%. And after and in 2014, there was the invasion of Crimea and the share increased for 30% to 40% how blind we are, especially Germany. I would like if you allow me, Olivier, to say a few words about the winner U.S., etc. I think you are right when you say that U.S. was against Nord Stream, it's of use. It's because U.S. was not comfortable of having Europe too dependent on Russia for strategic reasons. And they were right. But it doesn't mean that the aim was to replace Russia with U.S. LNG. It's two different issues because in the U.S. there is a debate. There are people who believe that it's not a good idea to export gas from the U.S. They believe that the consequence would be first to increase the price of gas for domestic consumers. And they also believe that in doing that, U.S. is not keeping for itself its strategic advantage of having cheap energy. So there is a real debate on that. And until Chénière built its first export facility in Sabine Pass, exporting natural gas from the U.S. was illegal. The law forbids the U.S. to export gas. So in order to do that, U.S. had, it was during President Obama's mandate, they had to change the law. So I don't believe that the U.S. had in mind to do something which at the end of the day would allow them to export gas to Europe. Sorry, sorry. The time is moving rapidly. I would like to clarify. I was not implying that. But I was just saying that, you know, energy was treated as a matter of security. And exactly from that point of view, yes, I don't think I was wise for Europe to be so dependent on the Russian gas. And as a matter of principle, I think going for the future, we should be very careful not to replace one dependency with another dependency. This regarding the names, just as a matter of principle and as a lesson going forward. I'm afraid that when, if Trump is coming back, it will be very difficult to find natural gas for the supply of Europe. And anyway, it will be very, very expensive. So, but just a comment. Yeah, just a short question and short answer. Short comment, short question, short comment. That is that you focus on U.S. exports of LNG. Remember that just from July to August, July 22 to August 23, the exports of U.S. coal to Europe rose by 50%. Export of U.S. oil to Europe to the point that now the dollar is a commodity currency. That's just a point. No, my question is we spoke about the price of natural gas. Usually we had three markets. We had the U.S. market, we had the European market, and we had the LNG market in Asia. We have still the American market and more and more the European market is linked to the LNG market in Asia. That LNG market used to be for a long time a market of long term contracts. In recent years, spot transactions developed and all the prices you mentioned were on spot transactions. What is the situation nowadays? I heard that, for example, Total has signed a 27-year contract with Qatar. Any and shall have more or less done the same. I don't know what are the conditions of prices, but does this mean that the reference of prices will be an eventual spot market? What kind of spot market? We don't have for the moment any futures on LNG. What do you think could be the future knowing that the price of gas in Europe now is subject to what happens to strikes at chevron and shells facilities in Australia or eventually the absence of export of Israeli gas to Egypt? Do you think we'll have globalization of LNG market with spot and futures? Or we will go back to, I don't know if Total could tell us how much they will pay in 27 years, the natural gas they will import from Qatar. But what kind of price mechanism are you or are we going like any other commodities just on spot and futures? Oliver, we have three more speakers. Would it not be four more speakers? Perhaps it was a very good question, but we should have the speakers first, perhaps. I'll be very quick. First, what we need to keep in mind is that today's LNG market is very tense. And it will remain so for three, four years. So any event, the price goes up very quickly. But then a lot of projects are coming. So by 2028 probably it's going to change. That's number one. Number two is long-term contracts. Yes, of course. Everybody is in favor of long-term contracts. We advocate for long-term contracts. The problem is that to take a long-term commitment, you need to have a long-term visibility. And in Europe it's a problem. Because in Europe, you know, if the EU is saying we want to eradicate gas from the energy mix, then how do you want people to build infrastructures and take long-term commitments on gas? So it's complex and in fact there is a risk that we're going to pay the price for this in Europe.