 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Robert Scott. The Anti-Federalist Papers, Section 53, Letter Number 5. A Farmer, Letter Number 5, the 25th of March, 1788. I have been long since firmly persuaded that there are no hidden sources of moral agency beyond the reach of investigation. The all-wise and all-bountiful author of nature could never have created human reason unequal to the happy regulation of human conduct. The errors and misfortunes of mankind spring from obvious sources. Religious and political prejudices formed by education, strengthened by habit, maintained by interest, and consecrated by fear are forever arming the passions against the judgment. The celebrated blaze Pascal, the powers of whose understanding were rather miraculous than surprising, closed his painful researches after religious truth with this dogma, as pernicious as untrue. That a religion, purely spiritual, was never intended for mankind. There can be no judgment more unbiased, for there was no mind so strong, no heart more pure, but bred in the bosom of the church. Even her idolatry impressed him with veneration and awe. Notwithstanding his conclusion, the doctrines of Calvin maintain their ground in their primitive simplicity, divested of the aid of ceremony and form. The thunders of the Vatican, which for ages deluged Europe with blood, have dissipated their force, and reason has resumed her spiritual empire. Would to God that the history of temporal despotism had terminated as favorably for the happiness of mankind. In the political world, the chains of civil power, upheld by the numerous lengths of private interest, have proved more equal and permanent in their effects. They have, and I fear for ever must, shackled the human understanding, and it is much to be questioned whether the full and free political opinion of any one great luminary of science has been fairly disclosed to the world. Even when the great and amiable Montesquieu had hazarded a panegyric on the English constitution, he shrinks back with terror into this degrading apostrophe. Think not that I mean to undervalue other governments, I who think in excess of liberty and excess of all things, even of reason itself, a misfortune, and that the happiness of mankind is only to be found in a medium between two extremes. The author of the Persian letters at that moment recollected the afflicting pressure he had felt from the hand of Gaelic government and his pen trembled as he wrote. Is it then possible that governments of simplicity and equal right can have been fairly dealt by in theory or practice? The votaries of tyranny and usurpation stand not alone in bitter opposition. Every man of enterprise, of superior talents and fortune, is interested to debase them. Their banners have ever been deserted because they never can pay their troops. The most amiable and sensible of mankind seem to have made a stand in favor of a mixed government founded on the permanent orders and objects of men. Vither, I suspect, the American government is now tending. If it must be so, let it go gently then, with slow and equal steps. Let each gradation and experiment have a full and fair trial. Let there be no effect without a good, apparent, and well considered cause. Let us live all the days of our lives, and as happily as circumstance will permit. Finally, let moderation be our guide, and the influence of manners will conduct us, I hope without injury, to some permanent, fixed establishment where we may repose a while, unagitated by alteration or revolution. For in sudden and violent changes, how many of the most worthy of our fellow citizens must get their bones crushed. I cannot think that any able and virtuous citizen would, in his cool and dispassionate moments, wish to blend or risk the fundamental rights of men with any organization of society that the Americans can or will make for fifty years. Let us keep these rights of individuals, these unalienable blessings, reserved and separate from every constitution and form. If they are unmingled, the attentive eyes of every citizen wilt be kept fixed upon them. We shall watch them as a sacred deposit, and we may carry them uninjured and unimpaired through every vicissitude and change, from the government we have left into some other that may be established on the fixed and solid principles of reason. Nor can there be, I imagine, any prudent man who would trust the whimsical inventions of the day with that dangerous weapon of standing army in our present unsettled circumstances, striving to substantiate inefficient and unnatural forms. It would wield us into despotism in a moment, and we have surely had throat-cutting enough in our day. Throughout the world, government by representation seems only to have been established to disgrace itself and be abolished. Its very principle is change, and it sets all systems at defiance. It perishes by speedy corruption. The few representatives can always corrupt themselves by legislative speculations, from the pockets of their numerous constituents. Quick rotation, like a succession of terms tenants on a farm, only increases the evil by rendering them more rapacious. If the executive is changeable, he can never oppose large-decided majorities of influential individuals, or enforce on those powerful men who may render his next election the rigor of equal law, which is the grand and only object of human society. If the executive is to be rendered ineligible for a certain period, he will either not do his duty, or he will retire into the unprotected situation of a private individual. With all the sworn animosities of a powerful majority, aristocracy, junctu, the cry of the populace, or perhaps the whole combined to pursue him to the grave, or a public execution, the considerate and good who adorn private life and such only can be safely trusted in high public station, will never commit themselves to a situation where a conscientious discharge of duty may embitter the evening of life, if not draw down ruin and infamy on themselves and families. There was never but one man who stepped from the top to the bottom without breaking his neck, and that was Silla. And although it is true that whilst he was up, he broke the hearts of the Romans, yet his dying, undisturbed in private life, is one of those miracles that must remain forever unexplained. If the aristocracy, or representation of wealth, the principle of which order is to keep all things as they are, for by confusion they may lose more than they gain, is also changeable. There then is nothing fixed and permanent in government. Legislative tyranny commences and exhibits a perpetual scene of plunder and confusion, fearlessly practiced under the sanction of authority and law. It is true that the influence of manners may and will resist for a time, yet that must give way to a general and prevalent corruption. Those who are respectable at home and have permanent in life and such only can give stability to government, will not suffer themselves to be mounted upon the wheel of fortune to be let down again as it turns the mockery of children and fools. Where representation has been admitted as a component part of government, it has always proved defective, if not destructive. What then must be the consequent where the whole government is founded on representation? Every American can now answer. It will be at best, but representation of government. With us, the influence of manners has been great. It is indeed declining fast, but, aided by the solidity of the judiciary establishments and the wisest code of civil laws that ever mankind was blessed with, it has hitherto supported the forms of society, but the people are now weary of their representatives and their governments. We may trace the progress, one candidate to recommend his pretensions discloses and descents on the errors of the preceding administration. The people believe him and are deceived. They change men, but measures are still the same, or injured by the sudden and violent alteration of the system. At least the next candidate asserts it is so. Is again believed and his constituents again deceived. A general disgust and sudden silence ensues. Elections are deserted. Government is first despised and then cordially hated. There can be no fixed and permanent government that does not rest on the fixed and permanent orders and objects of mankind. Government on paper may amuse, but we pay dear for the amusement. The only fixed and permanent order with us at present are the yeomanry, and they have no power, whatever, unless the right of changing masters at a certain period and devolving on their changeable representatives their whole political existence may be called power. The order of gentry with us is not a fixed and permanent order at all, and if they attempt to erect themselves into one at present it is usurpation, and they will be pulled down, and yet, in my opinion, such an order is essential to a perfect government founded on representation. Every other mode of introducing wealth into power has proved vicious and abominable. With us delegates become, by selection, themselves a species of subaltern aristocracy. They intrigue with the Senate's, who by a refined mode of election are a misbegotten side-blow representation of wealth, and they both form an imperfect aristocracy on the worst principles on which that order can be admitted into government. And the democratic influence, which is thus amalgamated and not divided, but unformed, becomes vicious from its impudence. These defects spring from our attempting to erect republican fabrics on the ruined and imperfect pillars of an old corrupt monarchy, not less absurd than to expect the limbs to perform the functions of life after cutting off the head. The opposition, which brought Charles I to the block, was composed of some of the ableist and most virtuous characters that ever adorned any age or climb, Hampton, Pym, Selden, Sir Harry Vane, Sidney, Marvel, and many others. They pursued their old model, attempted to form a government by representation, which was at first studied and restrained by the best Senate in the world, the English House of Lords. The two houses soon disagreed, and there being no third power to interpose, the representatives voted the House of Lords useless, new modeled the government into a single branch and then began to plunder most unmercifully. At last Cromwell kicked them all out of doors, and after his tyrannical usurpation and death, the nation were very happy to take shelter again under the regal government, and even restored an unworthy family which they had irritated beyond forgiveness to the throne. A farmer, to be continued. 28 March 1788. Continued from our last. After every consideration I can give this subject, I am satisfied that government founded on representation, indispensable requires, at least, an executive for life whose person must be sacred from impeachment, and only his ostensible ministers responsible. A Senate for life, the vacancies to be filled up, and the number occasionally increased, but under a limitation by the executive. The hand that holds the balance must have the power of adding weight and influence to the lightest scale, and of frequently removing turbulent men into a higher and inoffensive situation. I am inclined to think that an important portion of American opinion leans that way at this moment. My fear is that our general government may ultimate, in a hereditary authority, if not despotism, to avoid the farmer, great attention should be paid to the important office of Vice President, at present, but little understood. A Vice President, to succeed on a vacancy, prevents those evils which have ruined Poland and all the northern kingdoms. Thus we see the King of the Romans has secured Germany from every evil of elective monarchy, and had the Golden Bull prevented one of the family, or kindred, of the reigning emperor from filling the office of the King of the Romans. This part of the Germanic constitution would have been perfect, and the House of Austria would never have been enabled to usurp the imperial crown as a patrimony and desolate Europe with her ambitious views. She would have continued in that beggarly condition from which Randolph of Habsburg raised it. The American constitution is much better guarded, but not by any means completely so. If this is the best we can hope for, if this is the best reward we can expect for the sons of America slain, and the distresses we shall long continue to feel, is it not incumbent on us to examine minutely all its consequences? Let us view government by representation in its favorite form. The Constitution of England Its uncommon success, and length of duration there, has drawn on it very unmerited encomiums from the enlightened Genovan de Lone, the only great political writer who does not seem to hold representation in contempt. Indeed, the viewing it through this favorable medium has always animated our hopes and led many sensible Americans to imagine this old and universal experiment to be peculiar to that isle. In pursuing my inquiry into the principles and effects of the British government, I shall first grant that it is a rational system founded on solid, safe principles. And one of the best governments for the higher ranks of mankind in the world. But then I must insist that it was hardly a government at all until it became simplified by the introduction and regular formation of the effective administration of responsible ministers on its present system. Which we cannot date higher up than the appointment of Lord Stafford and others by Charles I. Moreover, I do not know how far the system of bribery introduced by Sir Robert Walpole and the influence of the numerous body of public creditors are not now absolutely necessary to its present stability. And, after all, I am not satisfied how such a simplification as would produce a responsibility can be affected in a government complicated by so many subordinate and powerful corporations as the American states will be. And yet, responsibility must be attained and an easy and certain mode adopted of changing measures and men without commotion or liberty will be lost in the attempt. I am confused and bewildered when I arrive at this point of reflection and despotism meets me at every turn. There are but two modes of governing mankind by just and equal law enforced impartially on all ranks of society or by the sword. If such laws cannot be obtained or the attainment is attended with too much difficulty, the sword will supply their place. At inter-arma, legas, salent. When arms command, the laws are disobeyed. Shall we have patience with the disorders of our complicated machine? As Alexander dissolved the Gordian knot with the sword, so I fear a standing army will simplify the governments of America. I have said that the government of England afforded firm protection of property. It certainly does so comparatively speaking. Yet the history of its frequent revolutions will discover that even property is insecure there. During the civil wars in which the stewards involved this nation two-thirds of the property of the kingdom changed masters and in those between Lancaster and York and before the firm establishment of the line of tutor almost all the old families perished and their property became dissipated. And yet its protection of property is its favorable side. Turn your eyes to the lower order of citizens and they are pressed into the earth by taxation and imposition. Very rarely will industry enable the husband men to rear a family. Where the sons of agriculture are so poorly rewarded government must be ulcerated to the heart. The miserable poor who pursue the dictates of nature and religion in that connection which is destined to sweeten the bitter draft of life are commonly handed from constable to constable until their unfortunate birth compels some parish to own them. The people of England have always and forever will emigrate. The people of England never repair to arms to repel foreign invasion and they never will unless compelled. To conquer England it would only seem necessary from past example to escape their floating defenses and land on the island passing by former invasions and conquests. As late as the year 1745 Prince Charles Edward at the head of an undisciplined rabble belonging to some Highland clans attached to his family marched undisturbed through the most populous counties in the heart of the kingdom and the capital containing 200,000 fighting men trembled for its safety at the approach of an unexperienced boy followed by four or five thousand half armed peasants. Scarcely a man in the kingdom shouldered a musket until the danger disappeared and government owed its safety to the protection of foreign mercenaries or rather the weakness and irresolution of the assailant. The fact is the people will never fight if they can help it for representatives, taxes and rags. Let us now contrast this scene with one where the people personally exercised the powers of government. The three small democratic cantons of Urie, Schuetz and Underwald broke the chains of their former servitude and laid the foundation of the Swiss Confederacy. They affected the revolution and in conjunction with other democratic cantons and their democratic allies the Orissons have supported the grand fabric of Hellavic liberty to this day. Every Swiss farmer is by birth a legislator and he becomes a voluntary soldier to defend his power and his property. Their fathers have been so before them for nearly 500 years without revolution and almost without commotion. They have been the secure spectators of the constant and universal destruction of the human species which the usurpations of the few have ever created and must I fear forever perpetuate. Willstall Europe were butchering each other for the love of God and defending the usurpations of the clergy under the mask of religion the malignant evil crept into this sacred asylum of liberty. But where the government resides in the body of the people they can never be corrupted by the artifice or the wealth of the few. They soon banished the daemon of discord and Protestant and Papist sat down under the peaceful shade of the same tree. Willstown every surrounding state and kingdom the son was dragging the father and the brothers their brothers to the scaffold under the sanction of these distinctions. Thus these happy Helvetians have in peace and security beheld all the rest of Europe become a common slaughterhouse. A free Swiss acquires from his infancy a knowledge of the fundamental laws of his country and the leading principles of their national policy are handed down by tradition from father to son. The first of these is never to trust power to representatives or a national government. A free Swiss pays no taxes on the contrary he receives taxes every male of 16 years shares near 10 shilling sterling annually which the rich and powerful surrounding monarchies pay for the friendship of those manly farmers. Whenever their societies become too large as government belongs to the citizens and the citizens are the property of no government they divide amicably and each separate part pursues the simple form recommended by their ancestors and becomes venerable by the glorious and happy experience of ages of prosperity. Their frugal establishments are chiefly supported by the pay which the officers of government receive from the services they render individuals. With a country the most unfriendly to industry in the world they have become in a series of years past an uninterrupted but moderate labor frugality peace and happiness the richest nation under the sun. I have seen a computation by which it appeared that the interest of the money they have beforehand and that which is do them from the rich nations of Europe would support themselves and their posterity forever without further exertion and this will every other government is actually as much or more in debt than it is worth. An intelligent author has remarked that passing from a democratic to an aristocratic canton of Switzerland you quit the society of men to contemplate the regular labor of brutes. They are compelled indeed in the aristocratic cans to be extremely moderate in their government and to lay few or no taxes where they would drive their subjects into the neighboring free states. As it is they are well clothed well fed and taken good care of. The same author remarks that the line which separates all Switzerland from the countries around where men like cattle are the property of their proud lords and kept chained to the soil is the line of division between light and darkness between happiness and horror. The love of switzers for their country is altogether romantic and surpasses the bounds of credibility. Those memorable relations authenticated by the common consent of all historians of their beating on all occasions the flower of the Austrian and French troops who have invaded them with numbers so unequal and trifling as scarce to exceed their enemies outguards. The instances of hundreds of citizens devoting their lives for the safety of their country of their frequently disdaining life and refusing quarter when overpowered by numbers have astonished and terrified the neighboring powers and seem incomprehensible to a people dispirited by taxes overloaded with debts and disgusted with government. I cannot omit a striking characteristic authenticated by Cox and others whose authority will not be questioned. They relate that there is a rustic tune familiar in the mountains of Switzerland. It is called the Rantz des Vox. It consists of a few simple notes of native wild melody. The French and Dutch governments have been compelled to forbid under very severe penalties the playing of this woodland music to those Swiss troops which they hire for a limited time. The well-known notes revive instantly all the fond images which are impressed on their youthful bosom. Their friends, their parents, their relations and their beloved country rush into their imaginations in a full tide of affection. No persuasion can detain them. They desert home and regiments or if retained by force they pine away in the deepest melancholy. No instance has yet occurred of Swiss troops serving in any part of Europe who have not returned with the diligence and anxiety of affectionate children on the first appearance of danger to their parent country. The same Amour Patre, the same divine love of their country, universally pervades the bosom of every citizen who in his right of birth legislates for himself. Grossly relates that he saw in Rome a poor fellow who had travelled through great part of Europe and Asia afoot, declaiming to a crowd with the most passionate zeal in praise of his own country, boasting of her happiness and preferring San Marino to all the world besides. This democratic republic is a little beehive of free citizens who have made a delicious garden of the top of a bleak barren mountain situated in the midst of the finest and most fruitful plains of Italy which tyranny has depopulated around them. Look into the human breast. We love that power which we exercise ourselves but we detest that which others exercise over us, be they representatives, lords or kings and to this source we may trace the abuse which the Americans bestow on their country and their governments. But we are told that Switzerland should be no example for us. I am very sorry for it. They are the only, the only part of the human species that sustains the dignity of character belonging to the divine resemblance we bear. They are, few in number, it is said. This is not true. They are more numerous than we are. They cover a small spot of territory. This is also not true. They possess a large tract of country in the very heart of Europe, but this is not all. The Helvetic Confederacy, including the three leagues of the Orisons, comprehends one hundred, perhaps two hundred, independent governments and states. Nor is there any reason for their history or present state to doubt that the same plan of confederation might not be extended with his lasting and happy effects to one thousand independent governments. But, it is also said, they are poor, frugal people. As to their poverty, that is likewise untrue. They have great sums of money beforehand and owe not a six pence. They indeed are wise and consequently a frugal people, though they still have great estates and even luxury among them too. But, should we despair their poverty or their frugality? We who are so many millions worse than nothing? But still, we are told we must not take example from them. We must take example from Holland and Germany. They had better at once tell us that we must desert the worship of God and follow that of the devil. From the first dawn of light that broke in upon my reason, I became devoted to governments of simplicity and equal right. The names of heroes whose blood has bedewed the altars of freedom vibrate like the shock of electricity on my frame. And when I read the story of Brutus and of Cassius, the most noble and last of the Romans, tears of admiration, gush from my eyes. Under these impressions which only the grave can erase, I feel unspeakable horror at every step which removes power and rights at a greater distance from the body of the people to whom they belong and confines them in the hands of the few. I have proposed to myself this question. If representatives cannot govern the people, if they abuse the power entrusted to them, shall they devolve this power on a still smaller number who must be more liable to corruption from the increase of temptation? Or should they restore it into the hands of the people from whom they received it, who alone are incorruptible, because the wealth of the few can never bribe them many against the duty they owe to themselves? If I am told that the people are incapable of governing themselves, I shall answer that they have never been tried in America except among the native Indians who are free and happy and who prove that self-government is the growth of our soil. And I also answer that they are more fit for self-government than they are at present for any of the safe and solid governments founded on representation. When I see all these principles established by the example of the Swiss, who have remained under the simplest of all forms of government for near five hundred years in uninterrupted tranquility and happiness, whilst every other invention of genius, devise of art, or imposition off-array has been torn up by the roots with every aggravated circumstance of horror, I can no longer doubt all the mists of theory and speculation vanish before an experiment like this. The greatest human discernment ever concentrated in the mind of one man was the portion of the celebrated Nikolas Machiavelli, a name loaded with abuse by tyrants, flatterers, and the mushrooms of science, because he told the truth, because he was a Republican and the friend of mankind in times of usurpation, or because they have never read or do not understand his works. After every inquiry, which the most unbounded information and reflection, with a long experience in high public office afforded, Machiavelli delivers his deliberate opinion in favor of the body of the people as the only safe depository of liberty and power. He prefers it to the aristocracy and the prince, but he does not disgrace the inquiry by mentioning representation. If this was the opinion of Machiavelli, a citizen of Florence, where a numerous populace, confined and crowded within the walls of a city, formed the most turbulent republic that ever disgraced the cause of freedom by cruelty and anarchy. How much more favorably must his decision apply to the Yeomanry of America? Landholders, and consequently the most independent of mankind, mild by nature, moderate by manners, and preserving in every honest pursuit. Surely, if ever men were worthy of being entrusted with their own rights, the freeholders of America are. Make them, then, and their posterity legislators by birth. I mean not the lowest populace, I mean that class of citizens to whom this country belongs. Numbers unqualified by property should have their influence. They should be protected. They might preserve the right of election, but they, who hold the property of the soil, are alone entitled to govern it. To effect this, there would need be little change in the present forms. They might all stand. But the laws which pass the legislature, before they become binding, should be referred to the different counties and cities, printed reasons drawn by committees, might, if necessary, accompany each. Together, with an annual estimate of public wants, and a detail of the expenditures of former sums granted, let these laws be submitted to the free deliberation of the freeholders of the counties and cities. The numbers of the yeas and nays be taken on each by the presiding magistrate and transmitted to the executive, who may then, upon comparing the returns from the several counties and corporations, declare what laws are the will of the people. On the appearance of any sudden danger, the two houses, or indeed a majority of one house, might invest the executive with the authority exigency might require for the safety of the republic, until remedy should be provided by law. The number of representatives might be decreased, and an expense saved. This would, at one blow, destroy all legislative speculations. The influence of demagogues or oligarchic junctues must then cease. The assemblage of the freeholders, separate in different counties, would prevent disturbance. As no new law could be made in them, little confusion would ensue. After some years, or even immediately, if confined to future cases, the celebrated law of Geneva might be introduced, and no freeholder admitted to the assembly until he had paid his father's debts. Sumptuary laws, permitting the use, but prohibiting the abuse of wealth, might be interposed to guard the public manners. The governor and two members of the senate might constitute a council of censors to punish offenders against the sumptuary laws and the laws of morality by a removal from office, and even disenfranchisement if necessary, with an appeal to the people of the county where the offender resides in the later case and to the people of the state in the former. Seminaries of useful learning with professorships of political and domestic. Economy might be established in every county, discarding the philosophy of the moon and skies we might descend to teach our citizens what is useful in this world. The principles of free government, illustrated by the history of mankind, the sciences of morality, agriculture, commerce, the management of farms, and household affairs. The light would then penetrate where mental darkness now reigns. Do these things, and in a very few years the people instead of abusing would wade up to their knees and blood to defend their governments. For some years past this has been the darling object of my life, to which all my views have tended, and I now think that nothing intermediate would be lasting or worthy the pursuit. Whenever I fairly lose sight of this, as soon as I turn my back forever on these dear illusions, which will be as soon as the proposed foedral government is adopted, I shall turn all my wishes to that social state, whether that government will lead us. And I both hope and expect that with those amendments and guards, which it seems to be the general disposition to provide, it will gradually mature in a safe and reasonable government. Until that adoption, I speak to my fellow citizens in the words of the proverb. Do not that by others, which you can do yourselves. A farmer. End of letter 5, section 53, recorded by Robert Scott, June 19, 2007. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Anti-Federalist Papers, section 54. Patrick Henry, speaking at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Thursday, June 5, 1788. Mr. Chairman, I am much obliged to the very worthy gentleman for his uncommon. I wish I was possessed with talents, or possessed of anything that might enable me to elucidate this great subject. I am not free from suspicion. I am apt to entertain doubts. I rose yesterday to ask a question which arose in my own mind. When I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation was obvious. The fate of this question and of America may depend on this. Have they said we the States? Have they made a proposal of a compact between States? If they had, this would be a confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The question turns, sir, on that poor little thing, the expression, we the people, instead of the States of America. I need not take much pains to show that the principles of this system are extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous. Is this a monarchy like England? A compact between prince and people with checks on the former to secure the liberty of the latter? Is this a confederacy like Holland? An association of a number of independent states, each of which retains its individual sovereignty? It is not a democracy wherein the people retain all their rights securely. Had these principles been adhered to, we should not have been bought to this alarming transition from a confederacy to a consolidated government. We have no detail of these great consideration, which in my opinion ought to have abounded before we should recurred to a government of this kind. Here is a resolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition. Our rights and privileges are endangered, and a sovereignty of the States will be relinquished, and cannot we plainly see that this is actually the case. The rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your amenities and franchises, all pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered insecure if not lost by this change so loudly talked about by some, and inconsiderately by others. Is this tame relinquishment of rights worthy of free men? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude that ought to characterize Republicans? It is said eight states have adopted this plan. I declared that if twelve states and a half had adopted it, I would with manly firmness and in spite of an erring world rejected. You were not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor how you are to become a great and powerful people, but how your liberties can be secured for liberty ought to be the direct end of your government. Having premised these things, I shall with the aid of my judgment and information which I confess are not extensive go into the discussion of this system more minutely. Is it necessary for your liberty that you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system? Is the relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press necessary for your liberty? Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend to the security of your liberty? Liberty, the greatest of all earthly blessing, give us that precious jewel, and you may take everything else. But I am fearful. I have lived long enough to become an old-fashioned fellow. Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man may, in these refined enlightened days, be deemed old-fashioned. If so, I am content to be so. I say the time has been when every pulse of my heart beat for American liberty, and which I believe had a counterpoint in the breast of every true American. But suspicions have gone forth. Suspicions of my integrity publicly reported that my professions are not real. Twenty-three years ago was I supposed a traitor to my country? I was then said to be the bane of sedition because I supported the rights of my country. I may be thought suspicious when I say our privileges and rights are in danger, but, sir, a number of the people of this country are weak enough to think these things are too true. I am happy to find that the gentlemen on the other side declare as they are groundless. But, sir, suspicion is a virtue as long as its object is the preservation of the public good, and as long as it stays within proper bounds. Should it fall on me, I am contented. Conscious rectitude is a powerful consolation. I trust there are many who think my professions for the public good to be real. Let your suspicion look to both sides. There are many on the other side who possibly may have been persuaded to the necessity of these measures, which I conceive to be dangerous to your liberty. Guard with jealous attention to public liberty. Suspect everyone who approaches that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright force. Whenever you give up that force you are inevitably ruined. I am answered by gentlemen that, though I may speak of terrors, yet the fact was that we were surrounded by none of the dangers I apprehended. I conceive this new government to be one of those dangers. It has produced those horrors which distress many of our best citizens. We are come hithered to preserve the poor commonwealth of Virginia. If it can be possibly done, something must be done to preserve your liberty in mind. The Confederation, this same despised government, merits in my opinion the highest encomium. It carries us through a long and dangerous war. It rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with the powerful nation. It has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses, and shall a government which has been thus strong and vigorous be accused of imbecility and abandoned for want of energy? Consider what you are about to do before you part with the government. Take longer time in reckoning things. Revolutions like this have happened in almost every country in Europe. Similar examples are to be found in ancient Greece and ancient Rome. Instances of the people losing their liberty by their own carelessness and the ambition of a few. We are cautioned by the honorable gentleman who presides against faction and turbulence. I acknowledge that licentiousness is dangerous, and that it ought to be provided against. I acknowledge also the new form of government may effectively prevent it. Yet there is another thing it will as effectually do. It will oppress and ruin the people. There are sufficient guards placed against addition and licentiousness. For when power is given to this government to suppress these, or for any other purpose, the language is assumed as clear, express, and unequivocal. But when this constitution speaks of privileges, there is an ambiguity, sir, a fatal ambiguity, an ambiguity which is very astonishing. In the clause under consideration, there is the strangest language I can conceive. I mean, when it says that there shall not be more representatives than one for every 30,000. Now, sir, how easy is it to evade this privilege? The number shall not exceed one for every 30,000. This may be satisfied by one representative from each state. Let our numbers be ever so great that this immense continent may, by this artful expression, be reduced to have but 13 representatives. I confess this construction is not natural, but the ambiguity of the expression lays a good ground for quarrel. Why was it not clearly and unequivocally expressed that there should be entitled to have one for every 30,000? This would have obviated all disputes, and was this difficult to be done? What is the inference? When population increases, and a state shall send representatives in its proportion, Congress may remand them because the right of having one for every 30,000 is not clearly expressed. This possibility of reducing the number to one for each state approximate the probability by that other expression, quote, but each state shall have at least one representative, end quote. Now, is it not clear that from the first expression, the number might be reduced so much as that some states should have no representatives as all, were it not for the insertion of this last expression? And as this is the only restriction upon them, we may fairly conclude that they may restrain the number to one from each state. Perhaps the same horrors may hang over my mind again. I shall be told I am continually afraid, but, sir, I have strong cause of apprehension. In some parts of the plan before you, the great rites of free men are endangered. In other parts, absolutely taken away. How does your child by jury stand? In civil cases, gone, not sufficiently secured in criminal, the best privilege is gone. But we are told that we need not fear because those in power being our representatives will not abuse the powers we put in their hands. I am not well versed in history, but I will submit to your recollection whether liberty has been destroyed most often by the licentiousness of the people and the tyranny of rulers. I imagine, sir, you will find the balance on the side of tyranny. Happy will you be if you miss the fate of those nations who, omitting to resist their oppressors or negligently suffering their liberty to be wrestled from them, have groaned under intolerable despotism. Most of the human race are now in this deplorable condition. And those nations who have gone in search of grandeur, power, and splendor have also fallen a sacrifice and have been the victims of their own folly. While they acquired those visionary blessings, they lost their freedom. My great objection to this government is that it does not leave us the means of defending our rights or of waging war against tyrants. It is urged by some gentlemen that this new plan will bring us an acquisition of strength, an army, and the militia of the states. This is an idea extremely ridiculous. Gentlemen cannot be earnest. This acquisition will trample on our fallen liberty, let my beloved Americans guard against that fatal lethargy that has pervaded the universe. Have we the means of resisting disciplined armies when our only defense, the militia, is put in the hands of Congress? The honorable gentleman said that the great danger within Sue if the convention rose without adopting this system, I ask, where is that danger? I see none. Other gentlemen have told us within these walls that the Union is gone, or that the Union will be gone. Is this not trifling with the judgment of their fellow citizens? Till they tell us the grounds of their fears, I will consider them as imaginary. I rose to make inquiry where those dangers were. They could make no answer. I believe I never shall have that answer. Is there a disposition in the people of this country to revolt against the dominion of laws? Has there been a single tumult in Virginia? Have not the people of Virginia, when laboring under the severest pressure of accumulated distress, manifested the most cordial acquiescence in the execution of the laws? What could be more awful than their unanimous acquiescence under general distress? Is there any revolution in Virginia? Wither is the spirit of America gone. Wither is the genius of America fled. It was but yesterday when our enemies marched in triumph through our country. Yet the people of this country could not be appalled by their pompous armaments. They stopped their coward and victoriously captured them. Where is the peril now compared to that? Some minds are agitated by foreign alarms. Happily for us there is no real danger from Europe. That country is engaged in a more arduous business. From that quarter there is no cause of fear. You may sleep in safety forever for them. Where is the danger? If, sir, there was any, I would recur to the American spirit to defend us. That spirit which has enabled us to surmount the greatest difficulties. To that illustrious spirit I address my most fervent prayer to prevent our adopting a system destructive to liberty. Let not gentlemen be told that it is not safe to reject this government. Wherefore is it not safe? We are told there are dangers, but those dangers are ideal. They cannot be demonstrated. To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us that there is a plain easy way of getting amendments. When I come to contemplate this part, I suppose that I am mad, or that my countrymen are so. The way to amendment is, in my conception, shut. Let us consider this plain easy way. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution. Or, on the application of the legislature of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by the conventions in three-fourths thereof. As the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress, provided that no amendment, which may be made prior to the year 1808, shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses of the ninth section of the first article, and no state without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." Hence, it appears that three-fourths of the states must ultimately agree to any amendments that may be necessary. Let us consider the consequence of this. However untratable it may appear, yet I must tell my opinion, that the most unworthy characters may get into power and prevent the introduction of amendments. Let us suppose, for the case is supposable, possible, and probable, that you happen to deal those powers to unworthy hands. Will they relinquish powers already in their possession or agree to amendments? Two-thirds of the Congress, or of the state legislatures, are necessary even to propose amendments. If one-third of these be unworthy men, they may prevent the application for amendments. But what is destructive and mischievous is that three-fourths of the state legislatures, or of the state conventions, must concur in the amendments when proposed. In such numerous bodies there must necessarily be some designing bad men, to suppose that so large a number as three-fourths of the states will concur, is to suppose that they will possess genius, intelligence, and integrity approaching to miraculous. It would indeed be miraculous that they should concur in the same amendments, or even in such as would bear some likeness to one another. For four of the smallest states that do not collectively contain one-tenth part of the population of the United States, may obstruct the most salutary and necessary amendments. Nay, in these four states six-tenths of the people may reject these amendments, and suppose that amendments shall be opposed to the amendments which is highly probable. Is it possible that three-fourths can ever agree to the same amendments? A bare majority in these four small states may hinder the adoption of amendments, so that we may be fairly and justly conclude that one-twentieth part of the American people may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and oppression by refusing to accede to the amendments. A trifling minority may reject the most salutary amendments. Is this an easy mode of securing the public liberty? It is, sir, a most fearful situation when the most contemptible minority can prevent the alteration of the most oppressive government, for it may, in many respects, prove to be such. Is this the spirit of republicanism? What, sir, is the genius of democracy? Let me read that clause of the Bill of Rights of Virginia, which relates to this. Third clause, that government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community. Of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration. And that whenever any government shall be found inadequate, or contrary to those purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public will. This, sir, is the language of democracy. That a majority of the community have a right to alter government when found to be oppressive. But how different is the genius of your new constitution from this? How different from the sentiments of free men that a contemptible minority can prevent the good of the majority? If, then, gentlemen, standing on this ground, or come to that point that they are willing to bind themselves in their posterity to be oppressed, I am amazed and expressively astonished. If this be the opinion of the majority, I must submit, but to me, sir, it appears perilous and destructive. I cannot help thinking so. Perhaps it may be the result of my age. These may be feelings natural to a man of my years when the American spirit has left him and his mental powers like the members of the body are decayed. If, sir, amendments are left to the twentieth or tenth part of the people of America, your liberty is gone forever. We have heard that there is a great deal of bribery practiced in the House of Commons in England, and that many of the members raise themselves to preferments by selling the rights of the whole of the people. But, sir, the tenth part of that body cannot continue oppression on the rest of the people. English liberty is, in this case, on a firmer foundation than American liberty. It will be easily contrived to procure the opposition of one-tenth of the people to any alteration, however judicious. The honorable gentleman who presides told us that, to prevent abuses in our government, we will assemble in convention, recall our delegated powers, and punish our servants for abusing the trust reposed in them. Oh, sir, we should have fine times indeed if to punish tyrants that were only sufficient to assemble the people. Your arms, wherewith you could defend yourselves, are gone, and you have no longer an aristocratical, no longer a democratical spirit. Did you ever read any of the revolution in the nation brought about by the punishment of those in power as inflicted by those who had no power at all? You read of a riot act in a country which is called one of the freest in the world, where a few neighbors cannot assemble without the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery or the engines of despotism. We may see such an act in America. A standing army we shall have also to execute the extricable commands of tyranny, and how are you to punish them? Will you order them to be punished? Who shall obey these orders? Will your mace-bure be a match for a disciplined regiment? In what situation are we to be? The clause before you gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded and unlimited exclusive power of legislation, in all cases whatsoever for ten miles square and over all places purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, etc. What resistance could be made? The attempt would be madness. You will find all the strength of this country in the hands of your enemies. Their garrisons will naturally be the strongest places in the country. Your militia is given up to Congress also, in another part of this plan. They will therefore act as they think proper. All power will be in their own possession. You cannot force them to receive their punishment? Of what service would militia be to you when most probably you will not have a single musket in this state, for arms are to be provided by Congress. They may or may not furnish them. Let me here call your attention to that part which gives the Congress the power, quote, to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. Reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, end quote. By this, sir, you see that their control over our last and best defenses is unlimited. If they neglect or refuse the discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless. The states can do neither. This power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing officers over men not disciplined or armed is ridiculous, so that this pretended little remains of power left to the states may, at the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nougatory. Our situation will be deplorable indeed, nor can we ever expect to get this government amended, since I have already shown that a very small minority may prevent it, and that small minority interested in the continuance of the oppression. Will the oppressor let go of the oppressed? Was there ever an instance? Can the annals of mankind exhibit one single example where rulers overcharged with power willingly let go of the oppressed, though solicited and requested most earnestly? The application for amendments will therefore be fruitless. Sometimes the oppressed are got loosed by one of those bloody struggles to desolate a country, but a willing relinquishment of power is one of those things which human nature never was nor ever will be capable of. The honorable gentleman's observations respecting the people's right of being the agents of the formation of government are not accurate in my humble conception. The distinction between a national government and a Confederacy is not sufficiently discerned. Had the delegates who were sent to Philadelphia a power to propose a consolidated government instead of a Confederacy? Were they not deputed by states and not by the people? The assent of the people and their collective capacity is not necessary to the formation of a federal government. The people have no right to enter into leagues, alliance, or confederations. They are not the proper agents for this purpose. States and foreign powers are the only proper agents for this kind of government. Show me an instance where the people have exercised this business. Has it not always gone through the legislatures? I refer to you the treaties of France, Holland, and other nature. How are they made? Were they not made by the states? Are the people therefore in their aggregate capacity the proper persons to form a Confederacy? This therefore ought to depend on the consent of the legislatures that people having never sent delegates to make any proposition for changing the government. Yet I must say at the same time that it was made on grounds the most pure. And perhaps I might have been bought to consent to it so far as to the change of government. But there is one thing in it which I never would acquiesce in. I mean the changing it to a consolidated government which is so abhorrent to my mind. Parentheses? The honorable gentleman then went on to the figure we make with foreign nations. The contemptible one we make in France and Holland, which according to the substance of the note so he attributes to the present feeble government. And parentheses. An opinion has gone forth we find that we are contemptible people. The time has been when we were thought otherwise. Under the same despised government we commanded the respect of all Europe. Wherefore are we now reckoned otherwise? The American spirit has fled from hence. It has gone to regions where it has never been expected. It has gone to the people of France in search of a splendid government. A strong energetic government. Shall we imitate the example of those nations who have gone from simple to a splendid government? Are those nations more worthy of our imitation? What can make an adequate satisfaction to them for the loss they have suffered in attaining such a government? For the loss of liberty? If we admit this consolidated government it will be because we like a great splendid one. Somewhere or another we must be a great and mighty empire. We must have an army and a navy and a number of things. When the American spirit was in its youth the language of America was different. Liberty, sir, was then the primary object. We are descended from a people whose government was founded on liberty. Our glorious forefathers of Great Britain made liberty the foundation of everything. That country has become a great mighty splendid nation. Not because the government is strong and energetic, but, sir, because liberty is its direct end and foundation. We drew the spirit of liberty from our British ancestors. By that spirit we have triumphed over every difficulty. But now, sir, the American spirit assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation is about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire. If you make the citizens of this country agree to become the subject of one great consolidated empire of America, your government will not have sufficient energy to keep them together. Such a government is incompatible with the genius of republicanism. There will be no checks, no real balances in the government. What can avail your specious imaginary balances, your rope dancing, chain rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contrivances? But, sir, we are not feared by foreigners. We do not make nations tremble. Would this constitute happiness or secure liberty? I trust, sir, our political hemisphere will ever direct their operations to the security of those objects. Consider our situation, sir. Go to the poor man and ask him what he does. He will inform you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor under his own fig tree with his wife and children around him in peace and security. Go to every other member of society. You will find the same tranquil ease and content. You will find no alarms or disturbances. Why them tell us of danger to terrify us into adoption of this new form of government, and yet who knows the dangers that this new system may produce? They are out of sight of the common people. They cannot foresee latent consequences. I dread the operation of it of the middling in lower classes of people. It is for them I fear the adoption of this system. I fear I tire the patience of the committee, but I beg to be indulged with a few more observations. When I thus profess myself an advocate for the liberty of the people, I shall be told I am a designing man, that I am to be a great man, that I am to be a demagogue, and many similar illiberal insinuations will be thrown out. But, sir, conscious rectitude outweighs those things with me. I see great jeopardy in this new government. I see none from our present one. I hope some gentleman or other will bring forth in full array those dangers, if there be any, that we may see and touch them. I have said that I thought this a consolidated government. I will now prove it. Will the great rights of the people be secured by this government? Suppose it should prove oppressive. How can it be altered? Our bill of rights declares, quote, that a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unanimal, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public wheel. I have just proved that one-tenth or less of the people of America, a most despicable minority, may prevent this reform or alteration. Suppose the people of Virginia should wish to alter their government. Can a majority of them do it? No, because they are connected with other men, or in other words, consolidated with other states. When the people of Virginia, at a future day, shall wish to alter their government. Though they should be unanimous in this desire, yet they may be prevented therefrom by a despicable minority at the extremity of the United States. The founders of your own constitution made your government changeable, but the powers of changing it is gone from you. Withers it gone. It is placed in the same hands that hold the rights of twelve other states, and those who hold the rights have right and power to keep them. It is not the particular government of Virginia. One of the leading features of that government is that a majority can alter it when necessary for the public good. This government is not a Virginia, but an American government. It is not, therefore, a consolidated government. The sixth clause of your Bill of Rights tells you, quote, that elections of members to serve as representatives of the people and assembly ought to be free, and that all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to the community have the right of suffrage and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for public good. End quote. But what does this constitution say? The clause under consideration gives an unlimited and unbounded power of taxation. Suppose every delegate from Virginia opposes a law laying a tax. What will it avail? They are opposed by a majority. Eleven members can destroy their efforts. Those feeble ten cannot prevent the passing, the most oppressive tax law, so that, in direct opposition to the spirit and express language of your declaration of rights, you are taxed, not by your own consent, but by people who have no connection with you. The next clause of the Bill of Rights tells you, quote, that all power of suspending law or the execution of laws by any authority without the consent of the representatives of the people is injurious to their rights and ought not to be exercised, end quote. This tells us that there can be no suspension of government or laws without our own consent. Yet this constitution can counteract and suspend any of our laws that contravene its oppressive operation, for they have the power of direct taxation which suspends our Bill of Rights. And it is expressly provided that they can make all laws necessary for carrying their powers into execution and it is declared paramount to the laws and constitutions of the states. Consider how the only remaining defense we have left is destroyed in this manner. Besides the expenses of maintaining the Senate and other House and as much splendor as they please, there is to be a great and mighty president with very extensive powers, the powers of a king. He has to be supported in extravagant magnificence so that the whole of our property tax may be taken by this amendment. The American government by laying what taxes they please, giving themselves what salaries they please and suspending our laws at their pleasure. I might be thought too inquisitive, but I believe I should take up very little of your time in enumerating the little power that is left to the government of Virginia, for this power is reduced to little or nothing. There garrisons, magazines, arsenals, and forts which will be situated in the strongest places within the states, their ten-mile square with all the fine ornaments of human life added to their powers and taken from the states will reduce the power of the latter to nothing. The voice of tradition, I trust, will inform posterity of our struggles for freedom. If our descendants be worthy of the name of Americans, they will preserve and hand down to their latest posterity the transactions of the present times and, though I confess my exclamations are not worthy of the hearing, they will see that I have done my utmost to preserve their liberty, for I never will give up the power of direct taxation but for a scourge. I am willing to give it conditionally, that is, after non-compliance with requisitions. I will do more, sir, and what I hope will convince the most skeptical man that I am a lover of the American Union that, in case Virginia shall not make punctual payment the control of our custom houses and the whole regulation of trade shall be given to Congress and that Virginia shall depend on Congress even for passports till Virginia shall have paid the last farthing and furnished the last soldier. Nay, sir, there is another alternative to which I would consent. Even that they should strike us out of the Union and take away from us all federal privileges till we comply with federal requisitions. But let it depend upon our own pleasure to pay our money in the most easy manner for our people. We are all the states, more terrible than the mother country to join against us. I hope Virginia could defend herself. But, sir, the dissolution of the Union is the most abhorrent to my mind. The first thing I have at heart is American liberty. The second thing is American Union. And I hope the people of Virginia will endeavor to preserve that Union. The increasing population of the southern states is far greater than that of New England. Consequently, in a short time they will be far more numerous than the people of that country. Consider this, and you will find this state more particularly interested to support the American liberty and not bind our posterity by an unprovident relinquishment of our rights. I would give the best security for a punctual compliance with requisitions, but I beseech gentlemen at all hazards not to give up this unlimited power of taxation. The honorable gentleman has told us that these powers, given to Congress, are accompanied by a judiciary which will correct all. On examination, you will find the very judiciary oppressively constructed, your jury trial destroyed, and the judges dependent on Congress. In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find two sets of tax-gatherers, the state and the federal sheriffs. This, it seems to me, will produce such dreadful oppression that the people cannot possibly bear. The federal sheriff may commit what oppression, make what distress he pleases, and ruin you with impunity. But under you to tie his hands, have you any sufficiently decided means of preventing him from sucking your blood by speculations, commissions, and fees? Thus thousands of your people will be most shamefully robbed. Our state sheriffs, those unfeeling bloodsuckers have, under the watchful eye of our legislature, committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on our people. It has required the most constant vigilance of the legislature to keep them from totally ruining the people. A repeated succession of laws has been made to suppress their iniquitous speculations and cruel exhortations, and as often their nefarious ingenuity defies methods of evading the force of those laws, in the struggle they have generally triumphed over the legislature. It is a fact that lands have been sold for five shillings, which were worth one hundred pounds. If sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye of our state legislature and judiciary, have dared to commit these outrages, what would they have not done if their masters had been in Philadelphia or New York? If they perpetrate the most unwarrantable outrage on your person or property, you cannot get redress on this side of Philadelphia or New York, how can you get it there? If your domestic avocations could permit you to go thither, there you must appeal to judges sworn to support this constitution in opposition to that of any state, and who may also be inclined to favor their own officers. When these harpies are aided by excise men who may search at any time your houses and most secret recesses, will the people bear it? If you think so, you differ from me. Where I thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I would grant power with a niggardly hand, and here there is a strong probability that these oppressions shall actually happen. I may be told that it is safe to err on that side, because such regulations may be made by Congress as shall restrain these officers, and because laws are made by our representatives and judged by righteous judges. But, sir, as these regulations may be made so they may not, and many reasons there are to induce a belief that they will not, I shall therefore be an infidel on that point till the day of my death. This constitution is said to have beautiful features, but when I come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly frightful. Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting. It squints towards monarchy, and does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true American? Your president may easily become king. Your Senate is so imperfectly constructed that your dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority, and a very small minority may continue forever unchangeably this government, although horribly defective. Where are your checks in this government? Your strongholds will be in the hands of your enemies. It is on supposition that your American governance shall be honest, that all the good qualities of this government are founded. But its defective and imperfect construction puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mischiefs, should they be bad men. And, sir, would not all the world, from the Eastern to the Western Hemisphere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights upon the contingency of our rulers being good or bad? Show me that age in country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance that the rulers being good men without a consequent loss of liberty. I say that the loss of the dearest privilege has ever followed with absolute certainty every such mad attempt. If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how easy is it for him to render himself absolute? The army is in his hands. And if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him, and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first auspicious moment to accomplish his design. And, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens? I would rather infinitely, and I am sure most of this convention are of the same opinion, have a lord, kings, and commons, than a government so replete with such insupportable eagerness that it is not a good thing to do. If we make a king, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them. But the president, in the field at the head of the army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far that will puzzle any American ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke. I cannot with patience think of this idea. If he ever violates the laws, one of two things that I would like to say is to think of this idea. If he ever violates the laws, one of two things will happen. He will come at the head of his army to carry everything before him or he will give bail or do what Mr. Chief Justice will order him. If he be guilty, will not the recollection of his crimes teach him to make one bold push for the American throne? Will not the immense difference between being master of everything and being ignominiously tried and punished powerfully excite him to make this bold push? But, sir, where is the existing force to punish him? Can he not, at the head of the army, beat down every opposition? Away with your president. We shall have a king. The army will salute him monarch. Your militia will leave you and assist in making him king and fight against you. And what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you and your rights? Will not absolute despotism ensue? What can be more defective than the clause concerning the elections? The control given to Congress over the time, place, and manner of holding elections will totally destroy the end of suffrage. The elections may be held at one place and the most inconvenient in the state or they may be at remote distances for those who have a right of suffrage. Hence, nine out of ten must either not vote at all or vote for strangers. For the most influential characters will be applied to to know who were the most proper to be chosen. I repeat that the control of Congress over the manner, etc., of electing well warrants this idea. The natural consequence will be that this democratic branch will possess none of the public confidence. The people will be prejudiced against representatives chosen in such an injudicious manner. The proceedings in the Northern Conclave will be hidden from the omenry of this country. We are told that the yeas and nay shall be taken and entered on the journals. This, sir, will avail nothing. It may be locked up in their chests and concealed forever from the people, for they are not to publish what parts they think require secrecy. They may think and will think the whole requires it. Another beautiful feature of this Constitution is the publication from time to time of the receipts and expenditures of the public money. This expression from time to time is very indefinite and indeterminate. It may extend to a century. Grant that any of them are wicked. They may squander the public money so as to ruin you, and yet this expression will give you no redress. I say they may ruin you for where, sir, is the responsibility. The yeas and nays will show you nothing unless they be fools as well as naves for after having wickedly trampled on the rights of the people, they would act like fools indeed where they the public and devolve their iniquity when they have it equally in their power to suppress and conceal it. Where is the responsibility? That leading principle in the British government. And that government, a punishment certain and inevitable, is provided. But in this, there is no real actual punishment for the grossest mal-administration. They may go without punishment, though they commit the most outrageous violation on our immunities. That paper may tell me they will be punished, I asked. By what law? They must make the law. For there is no existing law to do it. What? This, sir, is my great objection to the Constitution, that there is no true responsibility and that the preservation of our liberty depends on the single chance of men being virtuous enough to make laws to punish themselves. In the country from which we are descended, they have real and not imaginary responsibility, for their mal-administration has cost their heads to some of the most saucy geniuses that ever were. The Senate, by making treaties, may destroy your liberty and laws for one of its responsibility. Two-thirds of those that shall happen to be present can, with the President, make treaties that shall be the supreme law of the land. They may make the most ruinous treaties, and yet there is no punishment for them. Whoever shows me a punishment provided for them will oblige me. So, sir, notwithstanding there are eight pillars they want another. Where will they make another? I trust, sir, the exclusion of the evils wherewith this system is replete in its present form will be made a conditioned precedent to its adoption by this or any other state. The transition from a general unqualified admission to offices to a consolidation of government seems easy. For, though the American states are dissimilar in their structure, this will assimilate them. This, sir, is itself a strong consolidating feature and is not one of the least dangerous in that system. Nine states are sufficient to establish this government over those nine. Imagine that nine have come into it. Virginia has certain scruples. Suppose she will consequently refuse to join with those states. May not she still continue in friendship and union with them? If she sends her annual repositions and dollars, do you think their stomachs will be so squeamish as to refuse her dollars? Will they not accept her regiments? They would intimidate you into an inconsiderate adoption and frighten you with ideal evils that the union shall be dissolved. Tis a bugbear, sir. The fact is, sir, that the eight adopting states can hardly stand on their own legs. Public fame tells us that the adopting states have already heartburns and animosity and repent their precipitate hurry. This, sir, may occasion exceeding great mischief. When I reflect on these and many other circumstances, I must think those states will be found to be in confederacy with us. If we pay our quota of money annually and furnish our rightful number of men when necessary, I can see no danger from rejection. The history of Switzerland clearly proves that we might be in amical alliance with those states without adopting this constitution. Switzerland is a confederacy consisting of dissimilar governments. This is an example which proves that governments of dissimilar structures may be confederated. That confederate republic has stood upwards for 400 years and although several of the individual republics are democratic and the rest aristocratic, no evil has resulted from this dissimilarity, for they have braved all the power of France and Germany during that long period. The Swiss spirit, sir, has kept them together. They have encountered and overcome immense difficulties with patience and fortitude. In the vicinity of powerful and ambitious monarchs, they have retained their independence, republican simplicity and valor. Look at the peasants of that country and of France and mark the difference. You will find the condition of the former far more desirable and comfortable, no matter whether the people be great, splendid and powerful if they enjoy freedom. The Turkish grand senior alongside of our president would put us to disgrace, but we should be as abundantly consoled for this disgrace when our citizens have been put in contrast with the Turkish slave. The most valuable end of government is the liberty of the inhabitants. No possible advantages can compensate for the loss of this privilege. Show me the reason why the American Union is to be dissolved. Who are these eight adopting states? Are they averse to give us a little time to consider before we conclude? Would such a disposition render a junction with them eligible? Or is it the genius of that kind of government to precipitate people hastily in the measures of the utmost importance and grant no indulgence? If it be, sir, is it for us to accede to such a government? We have a right to have time to consider. We shall therefore insist upon it. Unless the government be amended, we can never accept it. The adopting states will doubtless accept our money and our regiments and what is to be the consequence if we are disunited. I believe it is yet doubtful whether it is not proper to stand by a while and see the effect of its adoption on other states. In forming a government the utmost care should be taken to prevent its becoming oppressive and this government is of such an intricate and complicated nature that no man on this earth can know its real operation. The other states have no reason to think from the antecedent conduct of Virginia that she has any intention of seceding from the Union or of being less active to support the general welfare. Would they not therefore acquiesce in our taking our time to deliberate, deliberate whether the measure be not perilous not only for us but the adopting states? Permit me, sir, to say that a great majority of the people even in the adopting states are averse to this government. I believe I would be right to say that they have been egregiously misled. Pennsylvania has perhaps been tricked into it. If the other states who have adopted it have not been tricked still they were too much hurried into its adoption. There were very respectable minorities in several of them and if reports be true a clear majority of the people are averse to it. If we also accede and it should prove grievous that peace and prosperity of our country which we all love will be destroyed the government has not the affection of the people at present. Should it be oppressive? Their affections will be totally estranged from it and sir you know that a government without their affections can neither be durable nor happy. I speak as one poor individual but when I speak I speak the language of thousands. But sir I mean not to breathe the spirit nor utter the language of secession. I have trespassed so long on your patience I am really concerned that I have something yet to say. The honorable member has said we shall be properly represented. Remember sir that the number of our representatives is but ten or of six as a majority. Will those men be possessed of sufficient information? A particular knowledge of particular districts will not suffice. They must be well acquainted with agriculture, commerce and a great variety of other matters throughout the continent. They must know not only the actual state of nations in Europe and America the situations of their farmers, cottages and mechanics but also the relative situations and intercourse of those nations. Virginia is as large as England. Our proportion of representatives is but ten men. In England they have five hundred and fifty-eight. The House of Commons in England numerous as they are we are told are bribed and have bartered away the rights of their constituents. What then shall become of us? Will these few protect our rights? Will they be incorruptible? You say that they will be better men than the English commoners. I say they will be infinitely worse men because they are to be chosen blindfolded. Their election, Prince, the term as applied to their importment is inaccurate. And Prince, will be an involuntary nomination and not a choice. I have, I fear, fatigued the committee. Yet I have not said the one hundred thousandth part of what I have on my mind and wish to impart. On this occasion I conceived myself bound to attend strictly to the interests of the state and I thought her dearest rights at stake. Having lived so long, been so much honoured, my efforts, though small, are due to my country. I have found my mind hurried on from subject to subject on this very great occasion. We have been all out of order from the gentleman open to day to myself. I did not come prepared to speak on so multifarious a subject, in so general a manner. I trust you will indulge me another time. Before you abandon the present system, I hope you will consider, not only its defects, most maturely, but likewise, those of that which you are to substitute for it. May you be fully apprised of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience, but by some abler advocate than I. End. Anti-Federalist Papers. Section 54. Patrick Henry addressing the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Thursday June 5th, 1788.