 Hello, so we're back for another session of our reading of what is philosophy by Deleuze and Gattari. And we are concluding the introduction today. So philosophers, they write, have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of the concept as philosophical reality. And this is still true today. If you look on YouTube or published papers, et cetera, the reflection on the concept itself are rare, or they are merely confined to logic and analytics, but there is not a lot of focus on the embodied concept. And here, once again, it is important to note that the usual opposition that is made between Deleuze and Hegel is actually probably somewhat superficial. And actually they write here at the end of the introduction, Hegel powerfully defined the concept by the figures of its creation and the moments of its self-positivity. The figures become part of the concept because they constitute the aspect through which the concept is created by. And in consciousness through successive minds, whereas the moments from the other aspect according to which the concept posits itself and unites minds in the absolute of the self. In this way, Hegel showed that the concept has nothing whatever to do with a general or abstract idea. Any more than with non-created wisdom that does not depend on philosophy itself. So concepts are not mathematical options. So there is a becoming world of the concept and this supposes a historicity of the concept. There are moments and it supposes a form of subjectivity. This might appear to be somewhat contradictory or paradox. There are elements in the concept that are subjective and we'll come back. Now of course, then comes a little critique of Hegel in the sense that this movement, this dialectical movement of the self-reconstitutes universals and the personal embodiments of the concept become the right. They are treated as ghostly puppets. I'll see to what extent this is unfair and I think it's very important today to read and this is what I will be doing in this reading. Now we need to read the Loes and Gattahy with Hegel and this is my project that I call Creolelectis. It's a sort of reconciliation or perhaps a new form of half-hebon between Hegel and... But what is important in the sentence that I've read is that the concept posits itself, right? They write that the concept has this auto-poetic aspect. Then a little bit later, when we'll come back to that, they write the concept is knowledge but knowledge of itself. So this might appear a little bit strange because it might appear to give sort of an independent life to the concept while it was also said that concepts are embodied. So if the concept posits itself, it might need a worldly embodiment but its origin becomes somewhat complex, right? We cannot, at the level of the introduction, the reader can only guess what that might mean, this self-positing. And self-positing is not exactly creation. They write creation and self-positing mutually imply each other because what is truly created from the living being to the work of art thereby enjoys a self-positing of itself or an auto-poetic characteristic by which it is recognized. So auto-poesis is a concept created by Maturana and Varela in the 70s. There's probably a reference to that. It was an influential concept. It was meant to designate the property of life as opposed to non-living beings. That organisms are auto-poetic, that they are self-referential in their cognatious, if we are to use a term proposed by Skinoza which means the persistence, the will to persist in one's being. Of course it's problematic here if we speak of will, but nevertheless we'll have to address this question, the subjectivity of a concept. And often the laws and process philosophers are criticized for example today by speculative realists etc. Because the idea of a differential becoming of a non-antropocentric creative process, cosmic becoming, creative evolution according to Bergson, that would not explain emergence, our individuated being's emergence. And I think it's more complex than that but we will slowly come to that. So actually the paradox here is that the concept is in a way what de-universalizes abstraction but is that contradictory to ego? Not necessarily. Not necessarily if we equate the universal with a positive moment of the dialectic. If we consider that once the concept has met its negation it becomes more than universal, not only universal but also singular. And of course the problem is how can a concept survive its singularity? There might be a point where a concept is so singular that it collapses into something else, something that is not philosophy, right? So the extent to which concepts belong to the discourse of philosophy to the practice of philosophy must be understood not as an impoverishment of the concept but as an enrichment of philosophy. Philosophy is much more than an analytic discourse on the conditions of possibility of such and such practice. Philosophy is not a meta discourse on science, only philosophy has to do with the presence of cosmic reasons, its deployment in the world. That's a very grand idea of philosophy that only you if you're still here after 11 minutes and me and a few others care about, clearly most people don't care about this. But I think it's worth caring in. Next session will be about entering in part one of this book, Word is Philosophy. See you tomorrow.