 Chapter 6 Part 1 of Famous Sea Fights by John R. Hale. The Great Armada, 1588. Attend all ye who list to hear our glorious England's praise. I sing of the thrice, famous deeds she rocked in ancient days, when that great fleet, invincible against her borne vein, the richest spoils of Mexico, the bravest hearts of Spain. Thus, Macaulay begins his stirring ballad of the Armada. The lines have helped to perpetuate a popular error, one of the many connected with the story as it is generally told in our English histories. It somehow became the fashion at a very early date to speak of the defeat of the so-called invincible Armada of Spain, but the Spaniards never gave their fleet such a name. In the contemporary histories and in Spanish official documents it is more modestly and truthfully spoken of as the Gran Armada, the great armed force. And by the way, our very use of the word Armada is based on popular ignorance of the Spanish language, and on the impression produced in England by the attempt of Philip II to make himself master of the narrow seas and invade our islands. An Armada is not necessarily a fleet, it is an armed force, an army, either marching on land or embarked for service on the sea, in which case fleet and fighting men are included in the word. Philip II was king not of Spain only but also of Portugal and of the two Sicilies, ruler of other European lands, and Lord of the Indies, the sovereign of a widespread maritime empire in Asia, Africa, and America that had been won by hundreds of years of enterprise on the part of sailors and soldiers like Columbus, Vasco de Gama, Cortez, Pizarro, and Albuquerque. The tradition of Spanish victory on the sea was a proud one, and as we have seen Spain had borne a leading part in the latest of decisive naval victories when the Turkish power in the Mediterranean was shattered at Lepanto, King Philip might therefore reasonably look forward to success for his great fleet. And if it could once secure the mastery of the channel, the invasion of England might be regarded as no very perilous enterprise, for the Spanish infantry were the best soldiers of the day, and the Duke of Parma, who was to command the land operations, was one of the best and most experienced leaders in Europe. Looking back on the events of the wonderful year of the Armada, we must try to divest ourselves of the ideas of today, and see things as the men of the time saw them. Philip counted on divisions among the people of England. The event proved that he was mistaken, but he had reasonable grounds for the view he took. A hundred years later another fleet conveyed a foreign army across the narrow seas from the Netherlands to change effectively the course of English affairs. It found a divided people, and the invading army was welcomed by a party strong enough to effect a revolution that was a new starting point in English history. Nor must we suppose that the policy of Philip II was directed entirely by religious views. If kings were easily swayed by such motives there would have not been such difficulty organizing a league against the Turk. Professor Lawton, in his introduction to the State Papers relating to the defeat of the Armada, puts the matter so clearly that it is worthwhile quoting his words at some length. It is not strange that the action of the fleet was for long misunderstood, and that the failure of the Spaniards should have been represented, as it often is, even now, as due to a heaven-sent storm. Flavid deus et dissipati sunt was accepted as at once a true and pious explanation of the whole thing. It was, too, a flattering and economical belief. We were, it had been argued, a nation peculiarly dear to the Almighty, and he showed his favour by raising a storm to overwhelm our enemy when the odds against us were most terrible. From the religious point of view such a representation is childish, and from the historical it is false. False, because the Spanish fleet, after being hounded up channel, had sustained a crushing defeat from the English, a defeat in which they lost many ships and thousands of men before they fled to the North. Childish, as in affairs of state, Providence works by recognized means, and gives the victory not by disturbing the course of nature and nature's laws, but by giving the favourite nation wise and prudent commanders, skillful and able warriors, by teaching their hands to war and their fingers to fight. But, in fact, much of the nonsense that has been talked grew out of the attempt, not unsuccessfully made, to represent the war as religious, to describe it as a species of crusade instigated by the Pope, in order to bring heretical England once more into the fold of the true church. In reality nothing can be more inaccurate. It is indeed quite certain that religious bitterness was imported into the quarrel, but the war had its origins in two perfectly clear and wholly mundane cases. Professor Lawton then goes on to explain what these cases were. One, the attempts of Drake and Hawkins to break the Spanish trading posts, the Spaniards regarded Drake and Hawkins as smugglers and pirates, and in vain asked Elizabeth to disavow and make amends for their acts. Two, the countenance and assistance which had been given by the English to the King's rebellious subjects in the Low Countries. The King was glad enough to put forward religious reasons as the motives for his enterprise in the hope of thus enlisting new allies on his side, but, like so many other wars, the conflict between Spain and England, which began in 1585, arose largely from rivalry and trade. The Marquis of Santa Cruz, the same who had commanded the Allied Reserve at Lepanto, was then the most famous and the most trusted of King Philip's admirals. Santa Cruz urged upon him the advisability of attempting an invasion of England itself as the only effective means of cutting off the support given by Elizabeth to the revolt of the Netherlands and checking at their source the raids in the West Indies. In March 1586 he submitted to his master an elaborate plan for the operation. Santa Cruz's scheme was an ambitious project for concentrating the whole force of the Spanish Empire in an attack on England. Some five hundred ships, great and small, were assembled in the ports of the Spanish Peninsula and eighty-five thousand men embarked on them. Philip II thought the scheme too vast and, above all, too costly, he substituted it for another plan which was more economical. Santa Cruz was to assemble in the Atlantic ports of the Peninsula a fleet of more modest proportions, just strong enough to secure command of the Channel. This done he was to cover the transportation across the narrow seas of the Spanish Army that was already operating in the Netherlands under the Duke of Parma. The army of the Netherlands would be reinforced with all the fighting men that could be spared from the fleet. This was, in its essential points, the plan of campaign of the Grand Armada of 1588. It was intended that the attempt should be made in the summer of 1587. It was delayed for a twelve-month by the daring enterprise of Francis Drake, a memorable enterprise because in proposing it he laid down the true principle for the defence of England against invasion. His policy was that of Edward III at Sleuys, his principle that it was better to keep the enemy occupied on his own coasts rather than await him on those of England. On April 2nd 1587 Drake sailed for Spain with only thirty ships and surprised and burned the half-armed transports and storeships collected at Cadiz for fitting out the Armada. His dashing enterprise had made its departure for that year impossible. Before the preparations for the next summer's campaign were completed the Marquis of Santa Cruz died and Spain lost her best and most experienced admiral. King Philip put in his place a great noble, Guzmán, Duke of Medina Sedonia, who pleaded in vain to be excused, frankly declaring to his sovereign that he felt unfit for such high command as he had scant knowledge of war and no experience of the sea. It is supposed that the king persisted in the nomination because Medina Sedonia's hereditary rank would place him above the jealousies of the subordinate commanders and he hoped to supply for the Marquis an experience by sending veteran sailors and soldiers with him as his staff officers and divisional commanders. By the middle of May 1588 the Armada was at last ready to sail from the Tagus. In England there had been the wildest reports as to its numbers and strength. These exaggerations were repeated by the popular historians of the fighting in the Channel and have become almost a national tradition. The Spanish galleons were said to be floating monsters, more like castles than ships. The fleet was so numerous that it hid the sea and looked like a moving town. It seemed as if room would scarce be found on the ocean for so vast an armament. The glory of the English victory was great enough to need no exaggeration to enhance it, but in sober fact there was no such enormous disparity as is generally imagined between the opposing forces. Large and small there were 130 ships in the Armada. The detailed catalogue of them from the list sent by Medina Sedonia to Philip II has been reprinted by Captain Duro in his Armada Invencibile and by Professor Lawton in his state papers relating to the Armada. From these sources I take a summarized table giving the statistics of the Armada and then add some particulars as to various squadrons, ships and commanders. Armada of Portugal, ships, twelve, tons, seven thousand, seven hundred thirty seven, guns, three hundred forty seven, soldiers, three thousand three hundred thirty, sailors, one thousand two hundred ninety three, total men, four thousand six hundred twenty three. Armada of Biscay, ships, fourteen, tons, six thousand five hundred sixty seven, guns, two hundred thirty eight, soldiers, one thousand nine hundred thirty seven, sailors, eight hundred sixty three, total men, two thousand eight hundred. Armada of Castile, ships, sixteen, tons, eight thousand seven hundred fourteen, guns, three hundred eighty four, soldiers, two thousand four hundred fifty eight, sailors, one thousand seven hundred nineteen, total men, four thousand one hundred seventy one. Armada of Andalusia, ships, eleven, tons, eight thousand seven hundred sixty two, guns, two hundred forty, soldiers, two thousand three hundred twenty seven, sailors, seven hundred eighty, total men, three thousand one hundred five. Armada of Guipuscoa, ships, fourteen, tons, six thousand nine hundred ninety one, guns, two hundred forty seven, soldiers, one thousand nine hundred ninety two, sailors, six hundred sixteen, total men, two thousand six hundred eight. Armada of the Levant, ships, ten, tons, seven thousand seven hundred five, guns, two hundred eighty, soldiers, two thousand seven hundred eighty, sailors, seven hundred sixty seven, total men, three thousand five hundred twenty three, squadron of Urcas, hulks or store ships, ships, twenty three, tons, ten thousand two hundred seventy one, guns, three hundred eighty four, soldiers, three thousand one hundred twenty one, sailors, six hundred eight, total men, three thousand seven hundred twenty nine, pataces and zabras, small craft, ships, twenty two, tons, one thousand one hundred twenty one, guns, ninety one, soldiers, four hundred seventy nine, sailors, five hundred seventy four, total men, one thousand ninety three, Neapolitan Galeases, ships, four, guns, two hundred, soldiers, seven hundred seventy three, sailors, four hundred sixty eight, total men, one thousand three hundred forty one, galleys, ships, four, guns, twenty, sailors, three hundred sixty two, total men, three hundred sixty two, total ships, one hundred thirty, total tons, fifty seven thousand eight hundred sixty eight, total guns, two thousand four hundred thirty one, total soldiers, nineteen thousand two hundred ninety five, total sailors, eight thousand fifty, total men, twenty seven thousand three hundred sixty five, plus rowers in Galeases and Galleys, two thousand eighty eight, grand total, soldiers, sailors and rowers, twenty nine thousand four hundred fifty three. The first point to note about the Armada is that it was almost entirely a fleet of sailing ships. The new period of naval war had begun. There had been hundreds of galleys at Lepanto seventeen years earlier, but there were only four in the Armada, and none of these reached the channel. The long, low, ore-driven warship that for two thousand years had done so much fighting in the Mediterranean proved useless in the long ways of the Atlantic. The only ore-chips that really took part in the campaign were the four Galeases, and in these the ore was only auxiliary to the spread of sail on their three full-rigged masts. The Galease has been described in the story of Lepanto. It was an intermediate or transition type of ship. It seems to have so impressed the English onlookers that the four Galeases are given quite an unmerited importance in some of the popular narratives of the war, but the day of sales had come, and the really effective strength of the Armada lay in the six galleons of the six Armadas, or squadrons of Portugal, the Spanish provinces, and the Levantine traders. The Galeon was a large sailing ship, but even as to the size of the Galeons the popular tradition of history is full of exaggeration. Built primarily for commerce, not for war, they carried fewer guns than the Galeases, though many of them were of heavier tonnage. In those days every large trader carried a certain number of guns for her protection, but such guns were mostly a small caliber in short range. The largest Galeons were in the Armada of the Levant. The flagship La Regasona, commanded by Martín de Bertandona, was the biggest ship in the whole fleet, a great vessel of 1,249 tons, but she only mounted 30 guns, mostly light pieces. Compare this with the armament of the Galeases, and one sees the difference between ships built for war and Galeons that were primarily traders. The largest of the four Galeases was only of 264 tons, the smallest 169, but each of the four mounted 50 guns. In all the six Armadas of Galeons there were only seven ships of over 1,000 tons, there were 14 more of over 800, and a considerable number of under 500 tons, but the Galeon looked larger than she really was. Such ships had high bulwarks and towering foreign stern castles, and they appear to have been overrigged with huge masts and heavy yards. A Galeon under full sail must have been a splendid sight. The bowels and stern and the tall castles tricked out with carving, gold, and color. Great lanterns were fixed on the poop. The sails were not dull stretches of canvas, but bright with color, for woven into or embroidered on them there were huge coats of arms or brilliantly colored crosses, and even pictures of the saints with gilded halos. From the mastheads fluttered penins 30 or 40 feet long, and flagstaffs displayed not only the broad standard of the lions and castles of Spain, but also the banners of nobles and knights who were serving on board. But the tall ship, with her proud display of gold and color, was more splendid than formidable, and the Elizabethan seamen soon realized the fact. Built originally for the more equitable weather of the trade wind region in the South Atlantic, she was not so well fitted for the wilder seas and changing winds of the North. She was, essentially, an unhandy ship. In bad weather she rolled heavily, and her heavy masts and spars and high upper works strained the whole structure, so that she was soon leaking badly. With the wind a-beam and blowing hard, her tall sides and towering castles were like sails that could not be reefed, a resisting surface that complicated all maneuvers. The guns that looked out from her portholes were mostly small cannon, many of them mere three and four-pounders, of short range and little effect. So small was the dependence the Spaniards placed on them that they carried only the scantiest supply of ammunition. The fighting method of the galleon was to bear close down upon her opponent, run her abroad, if possible, pour down heavy fire of musketry from the high bulwarks and castles, so as to bring a plunging shower of bullets on the enemy's decks, and then board, and let pike and sword do their work as they had done at Lepanto. These were, after all, the methods of the soldier, the tactics of the war-galley. It was the merit of Howard, Hawkins, Drake, and the other great captains who commanded against the Armada that they fought as seamen, using their more handy and better handled ships to choose their position and range, refusing to let the Spaniards close and bringing a more powerful, longer ranging, and better served artillery to bear with destructive effect on the easy targets supplied by the tall galleons. It is worth noting that while there were more soldiers than seamen in the Armada, there were more seamen than soldiers in the fleet that met in the narrow seas. The Armada had a commander whose only merit was personal courage. The admirals of the various squadrons were all men of long experience in war, both by land and sea. Martinez de Ricalde, the second in command and admiral of the Armada of Biscay, was a veteran seamen. Diego Flores de Valdes, the admiral of Castile, was an enterprising and skillful leader, and if his advice had been taken at the outset there might have been a disaster for England. Pedro de Valdes, the admiral of Andalusia, had sailed the northern seas, and Medina Sidonia was told he might rely on his local knowledge. Moncada, the admiral of the Galeases, was a first-rate fighting man, and Deleva, the general of the troops in Barte, who had taken command of the Rata Coronada, a great galleon of eight hundred tons in the Levant Armada, showed that he was sailor as well as soldier. The Duke of Parma, who commanded the army that was to be embarked from the Netherlands, was counted the best general of the day, and his thirty thousand Spanish regular infantry were the most formidable body of troops than in Europe. His orders from the King were to build or collect a flotilla of flat-bottom barges to ferry his army across the straits under the protection of the Armada, and for months thousands of shipwrights had been at work in fishing ports and creeks, canals and rivers along the coast between Galees and Ostend. The Dutch rebels held flushing in the mouth of the Skelte, and they had a small but efficient fleet ready to do good service as the ally of England, a fact often overlooked in our popular stories of the Armada. Parma had proposed that he should attempt to reduce flushing and obtain command of the Skelte, as a preliminary to the Enterprise against England. The Armada could then run for the Skelte, and make Antwerp its base of operations. But Philip was impatient of further delays. Though the best of the Spanish admirals were against him, the King insisted that the Armada need only run up channel and obtain temporary command of the straits to enable Parma to embark his army in the flotilla, even from an open beach. In the King's mind, the necessity of destroying the hostile sea power as a prelude to any scheme of invasion was disregarded or was not understood. On the thirtieth of May, in fine weather, the Armada had last sailed from Lisbon. The report sent back to Philip II by Medina Sidonia, as the fleet passed Cape Finish Stair and stood out into the Bay of Biscay, told that all was well. But a few days later a storm for the Atlantic swept the sea and partly dispersed the Armada. The store ships held on till they sighted silly islands, and then, finding they had parted from the fleet, turned back. Into the northern ports of Spain came scattered ships that had lost spars and sails, some of them leaking so badly that only hard labour at the pumps kept them afloat. Medina Sidonia, with the main body made for Caruna, where he ordered the stragglers to reassemble. On the nineteenth of June he wrote to the King, reporting his arrival. Then he sent letters betraying so much discouragement and irresolution that one wonders he was not promptly relieved of his command. He proposed that the whole enterprise should be abandoned and some means found for arranging terms of peace. He reported that the fleet had suffered badly in the storm, that there was much sickness on board, that large quantities of provisions had gone bad and must be replaced, and that the ships were short of water. Instead of dismissing him from the command, the King wrote to his Admiral, ordering and encouraging him to renew the attempt. The ships were refitted and provisioned and drafts of men collected to replace the invalided soldiers and sailors. Early in July the Armada was again ready for sea. The news that King Philip's great Armada had been beaten back by the wild bisque gales reached England when the whole country was in fever of preparation for resistance. A commission of noblemen and gentlemen had been appointed to set down such means as our fittest to put the forces of the realm in order to withstand any invasion. The lordly tenants of the counties were directed to be ready to call out the local levies, which formed a roughly armed and mostly untrained militia. Garrisons were organized in the seaports, formed of more reliable and better equipped men, and a small force was collected at Tilbury to opposed landing in the Thames estuary. Faggots and brushwood were piled on hilltops from Land's End to Burwick to send the news of the Spaniard's arrival through England by a chain of beacon fires. The best of the Queen's advisors, men like Lord Admiral Howard of Effingham and such experienced seamen as Hawking's, Drake and Fenner, realized and succeeded in persuading the council that it was on the sea, not on the land that England must be protected from invasion. Their letters in the Armada State Papers are full of practical lessons even for the present time. While insisting that the main effort must be concentrated on the fleet, they did not disregard the advisability of subsidiary preparations on land in case of accidents. But Howard insisted that a few well-trained men were worth fourfold their number of irregular levies, and wrote to the council, I pray your lordships to pardon me that I may put you in remembrance to move her majesty that she may have in a special care to draw ten or twelve thousand men about her own person that may not be men unpracticed. For this she may well assure herself that ten thousand men that be practised and trained together under a good governor and expert leaders shall do her majesty more service than any forty thousand which shall come from other parts of the realm. For, my lords, we have here six thousand men in the fleet, which we shall be able, out of our company, to land upon any great occasion, which being as they have been trained here under captains and men of experience, and each man knowing his charge and they their captains, I had rather have them to do any exploit than any sixteen thousand men out of any part of the realm. The fleet, from which Howard of Effingham was ready to land these trained men if necessary, was even more numerous than the Armada itself, though the average size of the ships was smaller. On the list there appear the names of no fewer than one hundred ninety-seven ships, ranging in size from the triumph of one thousand one hundred tons, Robisher's ship, down to the small coasting craft. The flagship, the Ark, or Ark Royal, was a vessel of eight hundred tons. Contemporary prints show that she had a high poop in four castle, but not on the exaggerated scale of the Spanish galleons, and that she had four masts and was pierced with three tiers of portholes for guns, besides gun ports in the stern. She had a crew of two hundred seventy mariners, thirty-four gunners, and one hundred twenty-six soldiers. Contrary to the system on which the Armada was manned, the seamen in every ship of the English fleet exceeded the soldiers in number. The Ark carried no less than forty-four guns, namely four cannon, sixty pounders, four demi-canon, thirty pounders, twelve culverines, long eighteen pounders, twelve demi-culverines, long nine pounders, six sacours, six pounders, and six smaller pieces, some of them mounted inboard for resisting borders at close quarters. This was an armament equaled by few of the Spanish ships, and the fact is that the English ships as a rule were better armed than the Spaniards. But few of Howard's fleet were of heavy tonnage. There were only two ships over one thousand tons, one of nine hundred, two of eight hundred, three of six hundred, five or six of five hundred, and all the rest less than four hundred tons, many of them less than one hundred. But though the English ships were smaller than the Spaniards, they were better at sailing and maneuvering, thoroughly handicraft, manned by sailors who knew how to make them do their best, and who were quite at home in the rough northern seas. The main body of the fleet under Howard of Effingham assembled at Plymouth, detached squadrons under Lord Henry Seymour and Sir W. Winter watched the Straits of Dover. Some of the captains thought Plymouth had been unwisely chosen as the station of the main fleet, pointing out that a south or southwest wind, which would be a fair wind for the Spaniards, would be a very foul one for the ships working out of the long inlet of Plymouth harbour. Chapter 6 Part 2 of famous sea fights by John R. Hale. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Famous Sea Fights by John R. Hale. Chapter 6. Part 2 In June, Howard had news that the Armada was not only at sea, but far on its voyage. Merchantman ran for shelter to Plymouth, and told how they had met at least two squadrons of large ships with great red crosses on their foresails off Land's End, and in the entrance of the Channel. One ship had been chased and fired on by a Spaniard. Then all trace of the enemy was lost. There was no news of him in the Channel, or on the Irish coasts. The weather had been bad, and it was rightly conjectured that the squadron sighted off Land's End were only detachments of the Armada scattered by the storm, and that the great fleet had put back to Spain, probably to Caruna. This was soon confirmed by reports from France. For a while there was an impression that the danger was over. Drake, Hawkins, and other captains urged that now was the time to take the English fleet to the Spanish coast and destroy the crippled and discouraged Armada in its harbors, but the Queen and her council hesitated to adopt so bold a policy, that only a few ships were sent out to watch for the enemy in the Bay of Disgay. These returned, driven before a strong south wind, and then fugitives from the Channel brought news that there was a crowd of ships off the lizard, and Howard, in a short note, reported that he had gone out to engage them. The Armada had come in earnest at last. After refitting at Caruna, Medina Sidonia had sailed on the twenty-second of July, with fine weather and a fair south wind. Progress was not rapid, for the great fleet's speed was that of its slowest ships. On the twenty-sixth, when the Armada was well out to sea off the headlands of Brittany, the morning was dull and cloudy, and towards noon the wind went round to the northward and increased to half a gale, raising a heavy sea. The course was changed to the eastward, and the ships were kept under shortened sail. The four galleys, unable to face a rising storm, ran for shelter toward the French coast, and never rejoined. They went southwards before the wind. One was wrecked near Bayonne, the other three reached Spain. All the next day the gale blew heavily. The Armada, scattered over a wide extent of the sea, beat slowly to windward, working away from the dangerous French coast. Many ships temporarily parted company. It looked as if there would be another failure, but on Thursday the twenty-eighth, to quote the Spanish Admiral's diary, the day dawned clear and bright, the wind and sea more quiet than the day before. Forty ships were counted to be missing. The Admiral sent out three penises to look for them. And the next day, Friday the twenty-ninth of July, had news that all but one of them were with Pedro de Valdez off the lizard. This was the crowd of ships reported that same day to Howard at Plymouth. The missing ship, the Santa Ana, the flagship of Biscay, rejoined later. In the evening Medina Sidonia saw the coast of England and notes that it was said to be the lizard. On the Saturday the Admiral writes that, upon the Armada was near with the land, so as we were seen therefrom, whereupon they made fire and smokes. The crew of a captured fishing boat later in the day told him they had seen the English fleet coming out of Plymouth, and in the evening Medina Sidonia's diary tells that many ships were seen, but because of the mist and rain we were unable to count them. A council of war had been held on board his flagship, the San Martín. The wind was south-west, the very wind to carry the Armada into Plymouth, and dead against the English fleet coming out. Dileva proposed that the opportunity should be taken to attack the English in Plymouth Sound. Once in the narrow waters the Spaniards could run them aboard and have the advantage of their superior numbers of fighting men in a hand-to-hand conflict on the decks. The soldier's advice was good, but the sailors were against him. They argued that the fleet must enter Plymouth Sound in line ahead at the risk of being destroyed in detail as the shoals of the entrance, those on which the breakwater of today stands, left only two narrow channels. Dileva's bold plan was rejected and it was decided that the Armada should proceed up the channel. Next day the fighting began. The wind had shifted to the north-west, a good enough wind for working up channel on the port-tac. English contemporary accounts say the Armada was formed in a half-moon, a center and two wings slightly thrown forward. Howard had, as yet, only brought part of his fleet out of Plymouth, but though greatly outnumbered by the Spaniards, he had his best ships and his most enterprising captains with him, and nothing daunted by the grand array of the Armada, he began a series of harassing attacks upon it. It was Sunday morning, 31st of July, according to the Spanish reckoning, the 21st according to the old style still used in England. It was a sunny day, with just enough wind to help the nimble, English and their guerrilla tactics. Howard's policy was to take full advantage of the three factors that were on his side in the solution of the problem, better seamanship in his crews, better gunnery, and handier ships. To close with and grapple in the fashion of earlier naval battles would have been to risk being crushed by superior numbers. His policy was to hang upon the flank or rear of the Armada, close in and try to cripple one or more of the ships by artillery fire, slip away if the enemy turned upon him, and come on again as they gave up the attempt to close, and he was ready all the time to swoop down upon and capture any ship that might be detached from her consorts. At the time, armchair critics on shore found fault with what they considered the half-hearted conduct of the Admiral, and the Queen's counsel inquired why it was that none of the Spanish ships had been boarded. Sir Walter Rale, who, as Professor Lawton notes, must have often talked with Howard and Drake and Hawkins while the business was fresh in their memories, thus explains and defends the Admiral's conduct. Certainly, he that will happily perform a fight at sea must believe that there is more belonging to a good man of war upon the waters than great daring, and must know that there is a great deal of difference between fighting loose or at large and grappling. To clap ships together without consideration belongs rather to a madman than a man of war, for by such an ignorant bravery was Peter Stroze lost to the Azores when he fought against the marquis of Santa Cruz. In like sort had the Lord Charles Howard, Admiral of England, been lost in the year 1588, if he had not been better advised than a great many malignant fools were, that found fault with his demeanor. The Spaniards had an army aboard them, and he had none. They had more ships than he had, and of higher building and charging, so that, had he entangled himself with those great and powerful vessels, he had already endangered this kingdom of England. For twenty men upon the defences are equal to a hundred that board and enter, whereas then, contrary wise, the Spaniards had a hundred for twenty of ours to defend themselves with all. But our Admiral knew his advantage and held it, which had he not done, he had not been worthy to have held his head. The shift of the wind to the northwest had given the English the weather gauge. They could run down before it on the enemy, and beat back against it in a way that was impossible for the clumsy galleons. Thus Howard and his captains could choose their own position and range during fighting. It began by a pinnace, appropriately named the defiance, firing a shot at the nearest Spaniards, a challenge to battle. Medina Sidonia held his course and took no notice of it. Howard's squadron now swept past his left, and then engaged the rear ships. The Admiral himself, in the Ark, steered for Deleva's tall galleon, the Ratacornada, perhaps taking her to be the flagship of the whole Armada. The two ships were soon in action, the English gunners firing at the Spaniards' great hull, and Deleva's men aiming at the masts and yards of the Ark in hope of bringing down her spars and sails, crippling then boarding her. The better gunnery was on the English side. They fired three shots to the Spaniards' one, and every shot told on the huge target, and shots in the hull meant much loss of life and limb in the crowded decks. As recalled with the rear division shortened sail and turned to the help of Deleva, the Ark and her consorts bore away, only to return again to the attack. Bringing their guns into action against recalled is huge galleon, the Santa Ana and Pedro Valdes' ship, the Rosario, Capitana or flagship of the Viscay and Armada. These two had become separated from the main body with the few of her ships that now formed a kind of rearguard. Robisher in the triumph and Hawkins in the victory were prominent in the attack. On the Spanish side several of the flagships joined in this rearguard fight. The admirals showed a chivalrous disposition to come to close quarters, and thus Howard was engaged with some of the largest and best commanded ships of the enemy. Okendo, the admiral of Wipuskoa, in his twelve-hundred-ton galleon, called, like that of Recalde, the Santa Ana, had soon to draw out of the fight with his ship on fire and badly damaged, not by the English cannon, but by a powder explosion on his main gun deck. One only wonders that such accidents were not frequent on both sides, for the power was ladled into the guns from open gunpowder kegs and matches were kept burning beside each gun. The fighting loose and large went on for about three hours. Recalde's ship was badly hulled and also had her rigging cut up and one of her masts damaged. Pedro Valdes' flagship, the Rosario, was twice in collision with a consort, with disastrous results. Her bow spirit was carried away, and her foremast went over the side, the strain on the rigging bringing down the main top mast with it. When the English drew off just before sundown, Valdes was busy cutting away the wreckage. Medina Sidonia shortened sail to enable the rearward ships to rejoin and then held his course up the channel. Valdes sent a request to him that his ship should be detailed to tow the disabled Rosario, which otherwise could not keep up with the fleet. It is generally stated that Medina Sidonia took no notice of the message and abandoned Valdes to his fate, but in his narrative the Duke reports to King Philip that he personally endeavored to assist the disabled Rosario and succeeded in removing the wounded from her, only failing to save her, owing to the icy and darkness of the weather. The English did not seem to have been troubled by the weather, and it cannot have been very bad, or the wounded could not have been taken by boats from Ocendol's ship. Evidently no great effort was made to sucker the Rosario, and the ships detailed for the work did not like to lie in isolation so near the English during the night. The impression in the Armada certainly was that the gallant Valdes had been shamefully abandoned by the Admiral. Before sunset a council of war had been held by Howard on board the Ark. It was decided to follow up the Armada through the short summer night. To Drake in the Revenge was assigned the task of keeping touch with them and guiding the pursuit by displaying a large stern lantern on his ship. After dark Howard lost sight of the lantern and then thought he had picked it up again, but at daylight he found that he must have steered by a light in the Armada, for as day broke he lay with only a few ships perilously near the main body of the enemy. Drake explained that in the darkness he had thought that some ships of the enemy were turning back, and had followed them. He had certainly failed in his important duty, and there was a suspicion that the veteran buccaneer was really maneuvering to make sure of a prize, for at sunrise his ship, the Revenge, lay near the crippled Rosario, which had been deserted by her consorts. He summoned Valdes to surrender, and the Spaniard with his ship helpless and menaced by the main English fleet hauled down his flag. The huge galleon was towed into Weymouth, the first prize of the campaign. Howard had drawn off the enemy, helped to secure the Rosario, and rallied his own fleet, which had straggled during the night. This day, Monday, the 1st of August, or the 22nd of July, old-style, there was no fighting, the Armada working slowly up channel, followed by the English out of cannon range. Medina Sidonia formed a rearguard of forty galleons and three galeases. In all, forty-three of the best ships with the Armada took in front of the enemy, so that there should be no hindrance to our joining with the Duke of Parma, and the Duke with the rest of the Armada should go in the van, so that the whole fleet was divided into only two squadrons, Don Alonso del Deva taking the rear under his charge. At eleven a.m. Okendo's ship was reported to be sinking. Her crew and the king's money were taken out of her, and the Santa Ana, largest but one of King Philip's galleons, disappeared under the gray-green waves of the channel. In two days the Armada had lost two of its divisional flagships. Howard had been reinforced during the day from the western channel ports. After the free expenditure of powder and shot the previous day, his magazines were half-empty, and he husbanded his ammunition and followed up the Spaniards out of fighting range, riding to Portsmouth to have all ships there ready to join him. I mean so to course the enemy, he added, that they shall have no leisure to land. Seymour reported to the council from Dover that the Armada was well up the channel, and he feared they might seize the Isle of Wight. He asked for powder and shot for his squadron, whereof we have want in our fleet, and which I have diverse times, given knowledge thereof. All the English commanders felt this want of ammunition and supplies. The Queen's parsimony was endangering the country. On the Tuesday morning, second of August, 23rd of July, old-style, the Armada was off Portland. In the night the wind had gone round to the northeast, and as the sun rose, Howard's fleet was seen to be between the Spaniards and the land and to the leeward of them. Medina Sidonia was no sailor, but his veteran commanders saw the chance the shift of wind had given them. The Armada turned from its course up channel, and on the starboard tack stood toward the English fleet, hoping in Spanish phrase to catch the enemy between the sword and the wall. It was an anxious moment for Howard and his captains when the Armada came sweeping down on them, the Galeases in front pushing ahead with sail and ore, behind the long lines of galleons with the wind in the painted sails of their towering masts. It looked as if the Spaniards would soon be locked in close fight with the English squadron, with every advantage on the side of King Philip's floating castles. Led by the Ark, the English ships began to beat out to seaward with scant room for the maneuver. But just as the close fight seemed inevitable and the tall Regazona had almost run the Ark aboard, and while both ships were wrapped in a fog of powder smoke, the wind suddenly shifted again, backing to the northward. Howard was now working out well from the land, and every moment improved the position. There was a heavy cannonade on both sides, but as the range lengthened, the advantage was with the better gunners of the English ships, the Galeases, led by the great Florencia, tried with the help of their long oars to fall on the English rear. The galleons tacked and made one more attempt to come to handstroke, but, writes Sidonia, all to little effect. The enemy avoided our attack by the lightness of their vessels. Good seamanship told. Howard's ships were soon in a position to resume the fighting loose tactics of the first battle, and the Spaniards knew that at this game they were the losers. So the Armada bore away, resuming its course up the channel, and the cannonade died down into dropping long shots, and then ceased, for Howard had no ammunition to spare. On Wednesday the two fleets crept slowly up channel, the English some six miles astern of the Armada. Once they closed up, and a few shots were exchanged with the Galeases in Recalde's rearguard, but Howard did not want to fight. He was only putting on a bragged countenance, for he was woefully short of ammunition, and writing urgently for much needed supplies. The wind had fallen, and in the afternoon some of the Galeons were drifting along, healed over by the shifting guns and stores to enable the Carpenter slung over the sides to plug shot holes near the waterline. On Thursday the fleets were off the Isle of White, and it was almost a calm, with occasional flaws of wind to help them on their way. Welcome reinforcements from Portsmouth joined Howard, and he received some ammunition. Soon after sunrise there was a sharp fight. The Santa Ana and a Portuguese Galeon had fallen astern of the Armada, and Hawkins, in the victory, supported by several other ships, attacked them. He had done considerable damage to the Santa Ana, and already reckoned her a prize when the ever-ready Dileva, with the great Ratha and the Galeases, came to the rescue, and Hawkins reluctantly drew off. Howard, with the Ark and his nephew, Lord Thomas Howard, in the Golden Lion, had come up to cover the retirement of Hawkins. They became involved in a fight with the Spanish rearguard, and the Ark was damaged, according to one account, by a collision, but it seems more likely that her steering gear was temporarily put out of order by a chance shot. She fell behind her consorts and lowered boats to tow her out of action. For the moment the wind was helping the Spaniards, and, led by Medina Sidonia himself, several Galeons turned to attack the Ark. But the wind freshened and changed suddenly, and the English ships escaped from their dangerous position, and so the fight ended. On Friday it was almost a dead calm. It was a bright summer day, and from the hills of the Isle of Wight there was a wondrous spectacle of the two fleets drifting idly over miles of sea, with the sails flapping against the masts. On board the Ark, now repaired and again fit for action, there was a stately ceremony, the Admiral, in the Queen's name, conferring knighthood on Hawkins, Frobisher, and several other of the captains who had taken a leading part in the fighting. It was decided not to engage the enemy again, till the fleets had reached the Straits of Dover. Shortness of ammunition was the reason for this decision. Medina Sidonia was anxious on the same score. He sent off a pilot boat to the Duke of Parma, asking him to send a supply of four, six, and ten pound shot, because much of his ammunition had been wasted away in the several fights. The mention of such small weights shows with what light artillery most of the galleons were armed. He also asked Parma to send forty light-craft to join the Armada. To the end he might be able with them to close with the enemy, because our ships, being very heavy in comparison with the lightness of those of the enemy, it was impossible to come to hand-stroke with them. At sunset the wind freshened, and at daybreak on Saturday the English were seen following up closely, but there was no fighting. The Armada was sailing with the fair wind, and the rear close up and in very good order. At ten a.m. the French coast near Bologna was in sight. At four in the afternoon the Armada was off Calais, and at five orders were given to anchor in Calais roads, seven leagues from Dunkirk, or between Calais and grave lines. The Spaniards noticed that some thirty-six ships had joined Howard's fleet, which anchored about a league away. The new arrivals were Seymours and Winter squadrons from Dover and the Medina Sidonia now believed that he had all but accomplished his task. English writers say that the enemy were disappointed and discouraged when they anchored off Calais, but there is no proof of this in contemporary Spanish accounts. Medina Sidonia thought of the success that he had gotten in touch with the viceroy of the Netherlands, asking him to embark his army at once and declaring his readiness to convoy it across the channel. But Medina Sidonia was in a fool's paradise. His ignorance of war was the ultimate source of his satisfaction with the outlook. Better men, like Leva and Recalde, realized that until the enemy's fleet was not merely eluded, but effectively beaten, there could be no invasion of England. The French governor of Calais told the Admiral that a change in the weather might make his position very unpleasant, and Medina Sidonia urged Parma to act at once by telling him that he could not tarry without endangering the whole fleet. But Parma was neither ready nor anxious for any prompt action. The fleet of the Netherlands, some 50 sail, was blockading most of the places along the coast where he had prepared his flat-bottomed boats. He knew better than to embark the force he had in hand at Dunkirk till Howard's fleet was disposed of. But Howard was determined not to leave the armada undisturbed in its exposed anchorage. He had no sooner been joined by Seymour in winter than he hurriedly prepared eight small craft in his own fleet to be used as fire ships by turning over to them all the inflammable lumber that he could collect from the other vessels and removing their guns, ammunition, and stores. End of Chapter 6, Part 2 Recording by Sarah Williams Germantown, Maryland, June 2008 Chapter 6 of Famous Sea Fights by John R. Ayle This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org Famous Sea Fights by John R. Ayle Chapter 6, The Armada Part 3 Medina Sidonia had spent the Sunday writing pressing letters to the Prince of Parma and obtaining fresh water and other supplies from Calais. When the long summer twilight ended, the Armada was still writing at anchor the irregular lines of dark holes stretching through the hills with lanterns flickering at yard arm or poop and guard boats rowing about the outskirts of the floating city. At midnight there was a cry of alarm passed from ship to ship. The tide was running strong from the westward through the straits and sweeping along on its current came eight dark masses, each defined in the night by a red flicker of fire that rose higher and spread wider as the English fire ships came nearer and nearer. Three years before when Parma was besieging Antwerp the revolted Netherlanders had attacked the bridge he had thrown across the river below the city by sending drifting down upon it a ship laden with powder barrels with a burning fuse and powder trained to fire them and blocks of stone heaped over them to increase the force of the explosion. The awful destruction caused by this floating volcano made the Spaniards long after fearful of the attempt being repeated elsewhere and Medina Sedonia tells in his diary that when Howard's fire ships came drifting through the summer night off Gravelin he and his captains thought that they were likely to be my queen's day minas, contrivances of mines, like the terrible floating mine Antwerp. With this suspicion all idea of grappling them was abandoned as they drew nearer there was something like a panic in the armada. The admiral signaled to weigh anchor and make sail but few of the ships waited for the tedious operation of getting the heavy anchors up to the cat heads by slow hand labor on windless or capstan and most of the galleons the carpenter's broad axe hacked through the cables and left the anchors deep in channel mud sails were hurriedly shaken out and like a startled flock of sheep the crowd of ships hurried away to the eastward along the coast in wild disorder. Mancada the admiral of the galeases in the San Lorenzo collided with the galeons San Juan de Sequila and the great galeous dismasted and with shattered ores drifted on a back eddy of the tide towards gale bar the fire ships went aground here and there and burned harmlessly to the water's edge. Medina Sidonia seeing the danger was over fired a gun as a signal for the fleet to anchor but most of the ships had cut their cables and had no spare anchors available on deck and they drifted along the coast some of them as far as Dunkirk. The sunrise on the Monday morning showed the great fleet widely scattered only a few of the best ships being with the admiral Maccada's flagship had been left by the falling tide hard aground on gale bar the English attack the stranded galeous and penises and boats howered with some of the larger ships standing by to give the men comfort and continence some of the Spaniards escaped to the shore. The rest headed by Maccada made a brave stand against the borders who swarmed up her sides led by one Richard Thompson of Ramsgate. Maccada was killed in the ship taken. The English pillaged her but the Hulk was abandoned and seized later by the French governor of Calais. During this fight on the bar Medina Sidonia had reassembled about half his fleet which he formed in a great crescent off Gravelin. The wind was from the west and numbers of galleons were a way to leeward some of them were in dire peril of driving ashore Howard saw his advantage and the whole English fleet bore down on the Spanish crescent it was the nearest thing to a pitched battle armada campaign. The English came on with wind and tide helping them and with the confidence that was the outcome of their growing sense of superiority ventured to close quarters with the tall Spaniards while taking care never to give them a chance of grappling and boarding. As the fight went on the Spaniards worked slowly towards the northeast edging off the land for their deep draft in the fate of those galleists made them anxious about the Flanders shoals Howard and Hawkins led the English center Drake and Frobisher the right Seymour and Winner the left not a shot was fired till they were at musket range and then the English guns roared out a well sustained cannonade in which every shot told. It was the first of modern naval battles the fights decided by gunfire not by hand to hand conflict on the decks the Spaniards answered back with their lighter and more slowly served artillery and with a crack hole of musket-tree fire before noon the Spanish cannon were mostly silent for sure lack of ammunition and the galleons defended themselves only with musket and arquebas while striving in vain to close and grapple with their enemies wars and rigging were badly cut up shots between wind and water were letting the sea into the huge holes just as the English thought the San Juan de Sequilia had been put out of action and would be their prize the galleon healed over and went to the bottom soon the fight was only sustained by the rearward ships the rest trying to extricate themselves from the melee not for any lack of courage but because all their ammunition was gone their decks were encumbered with wreckage from aloft and the men were toiling at the pumps to keep them afloat the English at last drew off from their persistent attacks on the rearward ships only because after a hot cannonade of seven hours they were running short of ammunition so they used the advantage of position and better seamanship and seaworthiness to break off from the battle Howard hanging out the council flag from the ark as a signal to his leading captains to come on board and discuss the situation with him Medina Sidonia in his diary of the day says nothing of the sinking of the San Juan de Sequilia but he goes on to tell how the San Felipe and the San Mateo were seen drifting helplessly towards the shoals on the inland coast how efforts were made to take off their crew but these failed for the sea was so high that nothing could be done nor could the damage be repaired which the flagship had suffered from great shot whereas she was in danger of being lost this talk of rough seas shows that brave though he undoubtedly was in battle the duke had the landsmen exaggerated alarm at the choppy channel and regarded as a gale and a storm what a sailor would call fine weather with a bit of a breeze none of the English commanders thought that there was a high sea that summer afternoon in the night it blew somewhat harder from the northwest and as the early dawn came on it could be seen that the Armada was in a perilous position the galleons many of them with badly damaged bars and rigging many more without anchors that their cat heads ready to bring them up were being forced nearer and nearer to the low sandy shores that were marked only by the white foam of the breakers and the Leedsmen were giving warnings that the keels were already dangerously near to the shelving bottom along the outline fringe of the shoals the English ships with plenty of sea room looked on without closing in to attack little ammunition was left and Howard and his captains were not going to waste good powder and shot on ships that seemed doomed to hopeless destruction some of Medina Sidone as captains proposed that he should show the white flag and obtain the help of the English to tow the endangered vessels off the Leeshore but he refused to hear of such base surrender and told them he was prepared for death he tells in his journal of the day how a sudden change of wind saved the fleet the enemy held off seeing that our armada must be lost the pilots on board the flagship men of experience of that coast told the Duke at this time that it was not possible to save a single ship of the armada for that with the wind as it was in the northwest they must all needs go on the banks of Zeeland that God alone could prevent it being in this peril and without any remedy God was pleased to change the wind to the west southwest whereby the fleet stood towards the north without hurt to any ship the deliverance was not quite as complete as the Duke supposed far as stern the great San Mateo had grounded on the shoals between us dead and slice next day three English ships came to take her but the Spaniards not withstanding their helpless plight made a desperate fight for two hours before they surrendered Don Diego de Pimentel was in command with several nobles among his officers and volunteers these were spared for the sake of the ransom they might fetch but no quarter was given to the common crowd William Borlaz one of the captains wrote to Secretary Wallingsham I was the means that the best sort were saved and the rest were cast overboard and slayed at the entry these Elizabethan sea fighters were as cruel as they were brave other ships drifted to the shore or found their way into ports along the low coast to the northeastward but these were all taken by Prince Maurice of Nasa Admiral of the United Provinces who with some 30 sails cleaned up the wreckage or the armada though he had taken no part in the fighting only blockading Parma's flotilla as his share of the service meanwhile saved by the shift of the wind the body of the armada was speeding into the North Sea led by Medina Sidonia in the Leaky San Martin Howard in the English fleet held a parallel course shepherding the enemy without closing in to fire a single shot Howard was again to use the phrase of the time putting on a bragging continence for he was in no condition for serious fighting even against such crippled opponents the magazines of the English fleet were all but empty its cannon, demicanon, sacres, and faconettes doomed to useless silence food and water shortened supply and much sickness among the tired crews who were complaining that they were badly fed and that the beer was undrinkable in the evening Medina Sidonia held a council of war on board the San Martin soldiers and sailors veterans of many wars and the chief pilots of the fleet sat round his cabin table and there was anxious debate no one could say how long it would be before Parma's army was ready ammunition and provisions were short men falling sick ships badly damaged though only a dozen had been actually lost the wind was increasing from the south-south west that the best course was to run up the North Sea round the north of Scotland reach the open Atlantic and so return to Spain without further fighting some of the best of the officers men who had been throughout in the thick of the fighting protested against this course to which their admiral was evidently inclined Ricaldi Ocuendo and Leyva spoke for the brave minority most of the fleet was still safe and Ricaldi begged the Duke to lie off and on until the wind blew fair for the channel again and then risk another fight Leyva supported him and said that though his ship the Rata Coronada had been sorely battered was leaking like a sieve and had only 30 cartridges in her magazine he would rather take her into action again and sink fighting the Armada runaway northward like a pack of cowards but what seemed the easiest course prevailed Medina Sidonia saved as conscious as a soldier by summing up the resolution of the council as the decision to sail northward but turned back and fight if the wind and weather became favorable so in the following days the Armada sped northward before the south-west wind sometimes blew hard and raised to sea that increased the distress of the Spaniards Howard followed with the English fleet just keeping the Armada in sight if the Spanish admiral shortened sail to collect his rearward stragglers Howard followed his example making no attempt even to close and cut off the nearest ships he was still reluctantly compelled by empty magazines and half empty lockers to be content merrily to put on the bragg continents his shortness of supplies forced him at last to lose touch of the enemy off the Firth of Forth he abandoned the pursuit when the English ships returned to their post the captains were not at all sure what had become of the Armada some thought it might have gone to the harbors of Norway and Denmark to winter and refit there and renew the attempt next spring one sees in the letters of Secretary Walsington the uncertainty that prevailed among the Queen's Counselors and some disappointment that the victory was not more complete though this was the result of himself and his colleagues leaving Howard so ill supplied on the same day 8 August old style Walsington writes to Lord Burgley it is hard now to resolve his advice to give her majesty for disarming until it shall be known what has become of the Spanish fleet and to the Lord Chancellor I am sorry the Lord Admiral was forced to leave the prosecution of the enemy through the wants he sustained our half doings death breed dishonor and leave with the disease uncured meanwhile the Armada had held its course to the northward Scottish headland on 20 August 10th old style 12 days after the battle off Gravelin it was passing between the Orkneys and Chetlins heading for the Atlantic helped by a change of wind which now blew from the east filling the great sails but chilling the southern sailors and soldiers to the bone though it was summer the cold was like that of winter and the bitter weather grew even worse as the galleon sailed on into the North Atlantic the great ships straggled for miles over grey foam flecked seas under dull cloud packed skies that sent down showers of squeedy rain men huddled below in the crowded gun decks and in four and stern castles and there were days when only the pilots kept the deck while gangs of men took their turn at the never resting pumps there were semi starvation and fever in every ship the chaplains were busy given the last consolations of religion to dying men and every day read the burial service over a row of canvas shrouded dead and committed them to the deep the Armada no longer held together small groups formed haphazard squadrons keeping but many ships were isolated and plowed their way along over the dreary sea many, despite hard work at the pumps, settled lower and lower in the water each day and at last sank in the ocean their fate unknown and unrecorded till as the months went by and there were no news of them they were counted as hopelessly lost of others the fate is known in his sailing instructions Medina Sidonia had been warned that he should take great heed lest you fall upon the island of Ireland for fear of the harm that may happen to you on that coast whereas a 16th century sailor wrote the ocean sea raises such a bellow as can be hardly endured by the greatest ships there was heavy weather in the ocean sea that August and September but even so the galleons that steered well to the westward before shaping their course for Spain and kept plenty of sea room by never sighting the island of Ireland succeeded in getting home except where they were already so badly damaged and so leaky that they could not keep afloat but along the coasts of Scotland and Ireland there was a secession of disasters for those who clung to or were driven into the landward waters the first mishap occurred when the armada was rounding the north of Scotland the grand griffin the flagship of Juan Lopez de Medina admiral of the orcas or store ships drove on the rocks of Fair Isle the solitary cliff bound island in the channel between the Orkneys and Shetlands here such few as escaped the waves lived for some six weeks in great hunger and cold then a fishing boat took them to Amstradder and Fifeshire where they surrendered to the Baileys Lopez de Medina was among this handful of survivors Melville the Presbyterian minister of Amstradder describes him as a very reverent man of big stature and grave and stout continents grey-haired and very humble like as he asked for quarter for himself and his comrades in misfortune other distressed ships fled from the Atlantic storms for shelter inside the Hebrides the three entered the sound of mall where one was wrecked near Wackeline and the second off Salon the third the great Galleus Florencia went down in Tobremory Bay the local fishermen still tell the traditional story of her arrival and shipwreck she lies in deep water half buried in the sand of the bottom and enterprising divers are now busy with modern scientific appliances trying to recover the pieces of eight in her war chest and the silver plate which according to a dispatch of Walzinghams for the grandee of Spain who commanded her but it was on the shores of the island of Ireland that the most tragic disasters of the Armada took place its wreck strewed the north and west coasts Fitzwilliam the deputy or the viceroy and Dublin and Bingham the governor of Connac had taken precautions to prevent the Spaniards finding shelter, water and ports by reinforcing the western garrison Bingham feared that the Irish might be friendly to the Spaniards and industriously spread among the coast population tales that if they landed the foreigners would massacre the old and carry the young away into slavery the people of the ports who had long traded with Spain knew better but some of the rude fisherfolk of the west coast where a shipwrecked cruise fell into the hands of Bingham's men no mercy was shown them he marched 400 prisoners into Galway and his troops massacred them in cold blood and then he reported that having made a clean dispatch of them both within the town and in the country abroad he rested Sunday all day giving praise and thanks to God for Her Majesty's most great action and our deliverance from such dangerous enemies one of the Urcas came into Traley Bay in an almost sinking condition with her crew reduced 23 men ill and half starved and unable to work the ship Sir Edward Denney the governor of Traley Castle was absent the Spaniards surrendered to Lady Denney and her garrison the men begged for their lives and some said they had friends in Waterford who would pay ransom for them but the lady had them all put to the sword because there was no safekeeping for them in all some 25 galleons were dashed pieces under the giant cliff walls of the Irish coast or on outlying skirries and rocky headlands and in a few cases the Irish coast people helped the survivors but too often they were as cruel as the English and killed and plundered them Sir George Karoo wrote to the Queen rejoicing that there was now blood between the Irish and the King of Spain the government troops marched along the coasts hunting for Spaniards the Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam accompanied one of these parties and told how in Sligo Bay he saw miles of wreckage timber enough to build five of the greatest ships that I ever saw besides mighty great boats, cables and other cordage and some such mass for bigness and length as I never saw any two could make the like Fitzwilliam fairly revealed in the destruction of the Spaniards he wrote to Secretary Walzingham since it hath pleased God by his hand upon the rocks to drown the greater and better part of them I will with his favor and his soldier for dispatching of those rags which yet remain at last he got tired of this miserable kind of soldiering and proclaimed mercy for all Spaniards in Ireland who surrendered before 15 January 1589 numbers of ragged and starving men surrendered others had already been smuggled over to Scotland still an independent country where they were well treated and given transport to Spain the gallant Alonso de Leyva after escaping from the wreck of his good ship the Radic Coronado in Blacksod Bay was stirring from Scotland in one of the Galeas that had rescued him and his comrades when the ship was driven by a storm against the wild cliffs of Dunleys Castle near the giant's causeway the Galeas was shattered to matchwood and Leyva perished with Alon board save five who swam ashore in the last days of September the surviving ships of the Amada came straggling into the northern ports of Spain with starving fever-stricken crews Medina Sidonia had kept some fifty sailed together till 18 September he had resigned all active duties of command to his lieutenants Flores and Fabidia for he was ill and broken in spirit his head whitened and he looked like an old man as he sat all day in the great cabin of the San Martin with his head in his hands a biscuit Gale scattered the remnants of the Armada and on 21 September the San Martin appeared alone off Sant Anger the wind had fallen her sails hung loose from the yards a long swell that followed the Gale was driving the ship towards the rocks outside the port some boats went out and towed her in most of the crew was sick nearly 200 had been buried at sea Ricaldi and El Quinto brought their ships home but landed broken with the hardships of the terrible voyage and only survived it a few weeks every ship that arrived told of many buried at sea and landed scores of dying and fever and scurvy stricken men so that all the northern ports were like great hospitals when the last Galean had struggled into harbour 55 great ships were still missing the best of the leaders were dead not more than a third of the sailors and soldiers survived it was a disaster from which Spain as a naval power never really recovered to come the Spanish infantry still upheld their claim to be invincible in the battlefield but the tall Galean had ceased to be the mistress of the seas the campaign of the Armada is remarkable not only for inaugurating the modern period of naval war the era of the sail and the gun but also because though it ended in disaster for one side and success for the other there were from the first to last the stories of engagements in the narrow seas no battle fought to a finish in all the fighting the English showed that they had grasped the essential idea of the new warfare and proved themselves better sailors and better gunners but the number of the ships they took or destroyed was insignificant Howard was so crippled by the parsimonious mismanagement on the part of his government that he had to be content with his actions instead of decisive results but there was worse mismanagement on the Spanish side and this led first to failure then to disaster the story of the Armada is full of useful lessons but for England this message for all time is that her true defense against invasion lies not in armies but upon the sea the Elizabethan captains and their veterans landed in Kent or Essex the half trained levies gathered by the beacon fires could do little to stop their onward march so they took care to make the narrow seas an impassable barrier to the enemy by harassing the covering fleet and making it hopeless for Parma even to think of sending his transports to sea the lesson is worth remembering even now End of Chapter 6 Chapter 7 of Famous Sea Fights by John R. Hale this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Famous Sea Fights by John R. Hale Chapter 7 The Battle of the Gun Fleet 1666 a great power was largely due to the unsuccessful attempt to coerce the Dutch people out of this struggle arose the Republic of the United Provinces and Holland one from the sea and almost an amphibious state became in a few years a great naval power a hardy race of sailors was trained in the fisheries of the North Sea settlements were established in the Far East and fleets of Dutch East India men broke the Spanish monopoly of the United States it was to obtain a depot and watering place for the East India men that the Dutch founded Cape Town with far reaching results on the future development of South Africa a Dutch fleet had assisted in defending the Armada but the rise of this naval power on the eastern shores of the narrow seas made rivalry with England on the waters inevitable in the 17th century there was a series of hard fought naval wars under the two first Stuart Kings of England there were quarrels with the Dutch that nearly led to war the Dutch colonists and traders in the Far Eastern Seas had used high-handed measures to prevent English competition nearer home there were disputes as to the right claimed by the King's ship to make any foreign ship lower her flag and salute the English ensign but it was not till the days of the Commonwealth when the first war broke out it was a conflict between two republics its immediate cause was Cromwell's Navigation Act which deprived the Dutch of a considerable part of their carrying trade the first fight took place before the formal declaration of war and it was always the result of a Dutch captain refusing the customary salute to a Commonwealth ship in this as in later conflicts with Holland while England was still able to live on its own products the Dutch were in the position in which we are now for the command of the sea was vital to their daily life their whole wealth depended on their great fishing fleets in the North Sea their Indian men which brought the produce of the East to Northern Europe through the Straits of Dover and the carrying trade in which they were the carriers of the goods of all Central Europe which the Rhine and their canals brought into their ports the mere prolongation of a naval war meant endless loss to the merchants and ship owners of Holland the development of ocean-born commerce had led to great improvements in shipbuilding in the three quarters of a century since the days of the Armada and the fleets that met in the Channel and the North Sea during Cromwell's Dutch War were far more powerful than those of Medina Sidonia and Howard the nucleus of the English fleet had been formed by the permanent establishment created by Charles I but the ships for which he had levied the ship money were used against him in the Civil War for the seafaring population and the people of the ports mostly sided with the Parliament the operations against Rupert in the Mediterranean the war with the Algerians and the expeditions to the West Indies had helped to form, for the Commonwealth a body of experienced officers and seamen and in Blake Cromwell had at least one admiral of the first rank on both sides sometimes numbered as many as a hundred sail the guns mounted in broadside tears had come to be recognized as the weapons that must decide a sea-fight and in this first Dutch war we see on both sides attempts to use tactical formations that would give the best scope to gun-power though a battle was always likely to develop into an irregular melee in which the boldest exchanged broadsides and the shirkers hung back there were attempts to fight in regular lines the ships giving each other mutual support want of traditional experience marked differences in the speed and maneuvering power of ships and the rudimentary character of the signalling made it difficult to keep the line but it was early recognized as an ideal to be aimed at the old ore-driven galleys with their heavy batteries in the bows and all the guns pointing ahead went into battle as at Lepanto in line abreast the broadside battleship would thus have her guns pointed at her consorts the line abreast was used only to bear down on the enemy the fighting formation was the line ahead this was adopted at first as a fleet running down from windward closed upon its enemy unless they were actually running away the other side would be sailing in line ahead with the wind a-beam it was soon realized that in this formation an admiral had his fleet under better control and gradually the normal formation for fleets became line ahead and hostile fleets either fought running on parallel courses on the same tack or passed and re-passed each other on opposite tacks but this was the result of a long evolution and the typical formal battles fought out by rule in the close-hauled line ahead belonged to the 18th century the first Dutch war ended with Blake's victory off the Kentish Nock the second war in the days of Charles II is best remembered in England in connection with a national disgrace the Dutch raid on Chatham and the blockade of the Thames this disaster was the result of a piece of almost incomprehensible folly on the part of the king and his advisors but it came shortly after a great naval victory the story of which is by most forgotten it is worth telling again if only to show that the disaster in the Thames was not the fault of the British Navy and that even under Charles II there were glorious days for our fleet it is also interesting as a typical naval battle of the 17th century hostilities began in 1664 without a formal declaration of war the conflict opening with aggressions and reprisals in the colonial sphere of action English fleets seized Dutch trading ships on the African coast and Dutch islands in the West Indies in North America the Dutch settlement of New Amsterdam at the mouth of the Hudson was occupied, annexed and renamed New York in honor of his highness the Duke of York the brother of the king England drifted into the war as the result of conflicts in the colonies and was in a state of dangerous unreadiness for the struggle on the sea God knows how little fit we are for it wrote peeps who as secretary of the navy knew the whole position there was the utmost difficulty in obtaining men for the ships that were being got ready for the sea the press gangs brought in poor creatures whom the captain described as a useless rabble there were hundreds of desertions happily the Dutch preparations were also backwards and England had thus some breathing time in June the two fleets under the Duke of York each numbering nearly a hundred sail were in the North Sea and on the third they met in battle some thirty-five miles south-east of Lowestof Optam was driven back to the Texel with the loss of several ships the Duke of York had behaved with courage and spirit during the fight and was covered with splashes of the blood of officers killed beside him on the quarter-deck where he himself was slightly wounded but he showed slackness and a resolution in the pursuit and failed to reap the full results of his victory during the rest of the summer there were more or less successful enterprises against the Dutch trade but the plague in London in the ports and dockyards and even in the fleet itself seriously interfered with the prosecution of the war as usual at that time the winter months were practically a time of truce in the spring of 1666 both parties were ready for another North Sea campaign the Dutch had fitted out more than eighty ships under Admiral to ride to and the English fleet was put under the command of Monk Duke of Albemarle with Prince Rupert the fiery cavalry leader of the Civil War as his right-hand man both were soldiers who had had some sea experience it was still the time when it was an ordinary event for a courtier to command a battleship with a sailor to translate his orders into sea language and look after the navigation for him Pepes tells how he heard Monk's wife the Duchess of Albemarle perhaps echoing what her husband had said in private cried mightily out against the having of gentlemen captains with feathers and ribbons and wished the King would send her husband to sea with the plain old sea captains that he served with formerly Monk and Rupert went to join the fleet that was assembling at the Nohr on 23rd April it was not ready for sea till near the end of May on 1st June when part of the fleet was detached under Rupert to watch the Straits of Dover Monk met the writer who was in superior force off the Essex coast and began a battle that lasted for four days the news of the first days fighting set London rejoicing but soon there came disappointing reports of failure the four days battle had ended in defeat outnumbered as he was Monk had made a splendid fight on the first two days hoping from hour to hour for Rupert's arrival on the third day the Sunday he had to retire towards the Thames covering his retreat with a rear guard of sixteen of his best ships several of these touched on the Galapur sand and Ascu's ship the Prince ran hard aground on the bank Ascu struck his flag and the Dutch burned his ship abandoning an effort to carry her off because at last Rupert's squadron was in sight on the fourth day a confused melee of hard fighting off the Thames mouth ended in Monk retiring into the river he had lost twenty ships and some three thousand men but he had fought so well that the Dutch bought their victory dearly and after attempting for a few days to blockade the Thames had to return to Holland to refit and make good their losses amid the general discouragement at the failure of the fleet there was an outburst of mutual accusations of misconduct among the captains and even some bitter attacks on Monk the general at sea Fault was found with the dividing of the fleet on a false report with Monk's haste to attack the Dutch when he was short of ships and finally with his retreat before the enemy into the Thames Monk however did not bear himself like a beaten man in the midst of the long battle as at the worst an indecisive engagement and said he had given the Dutch as many hard knocks as he had taken and now knew how to defeat them he had sufficient influence at court to be able to retain his command and so could look forward to trying his fortune again before long the work of refitting the fleet was taken in hand at any cost the danger of a blockade of the Thames must be averted so the merchants of the city combined to help with money and even some of the rich men of the court loosed their purse strings a fine three-decker launched at Chatham was named the Loyal London in complement to the exertions of the city and work was pushed on so rapidly that she was soon ready for commission many of the ships had been short-handed in the four days battle the press gangs were now set vigorously to work and though there was a constant drain of desertions to contend with the numbers on board the ships at Chatham and in the lower Thames rose day by day at the end of June a new impetus was given to the preparations by the reappearance of Derighter's fleet he had repaired damages more quickly than his opponents and had put to sea to blockade the Thames it was on 29th June that the fishermen of Margate took a great crowd of strange sail off the North Forland it was the Dutch fleet of over a hundred ships great and small and commanded by Derighter, van Tromp and Jan Evertsen some of the ships stood in close to Margate the militia of the county was called out and the alarm spread along the southern coast for the rumor ran that the Dutch had come to cover a French invasion but no Frenchmen came the volunteers themselves did not send even a boat's crew ashore they were quite satisfied with stopping all the trade of London by their mere presence off the Thames and they had the chance too of picking up homecoming ships that had not been duly warned so, favoured by fine summer weather the Dutch admirals cruised backwards and forwards in leisurely fashion between the North Forland and the outer end of the gunfleet sand they watched with their light craft all the channels that traverse the tangle of sand-banks and shallows in the estuary of the river but their main fleet was generally somewhere off the Essex coast for on that side of the estuary lay the channels then best known and most used the Swin and the Black Deep the fleet which was thus for some three weeks held possession of the very gateway to the Thames numbered seventy three line of battleships and some twenty light craft fitted to be used as fireships by great exertions Monk and Rupert had got together in the lower Thames eighty seven fighting ships and a squadron of fireships some fifteen more frigates might have been added to the fleet but it was thought better to leave them unmanned and use their crews for strengthening those of the larger ships the fleet assembled at the Nor had full compliments this time were eager to meet the enemy and numbers of young gallants from the court had volunteered for service as super-numeraries the Royal London fresh from the builder's hands at Chatham Yard with her crew of eight hundred men was said to be the best ship in the world large or small peeps noted that it was the talk of competent men that this was much the best fleet for force of guns, greatness and number of ships that England did see England had certainly need of a good fleet for she never met on the sea a more capable and determined enemy than the Dutch in fact the Republic of the United Provinces was perhaps the only state that ever contended on anything like equal terms against England for the command of the sea when at last Monk and Rupert were ready to sail they had to wait for a favourable wind and tide so they could leave their pilots solved a somewhat delicate problem this problem was something like that which a general on land has to solve when it is a question of moving a large force through defiles of which the other end is watched by the enemy's main army but it had special complications that the soldier would not have to take into account Monk's fleet sailing in line ahead the only order in which it could traverse the narrow channels about nine miles from van to rear there were then no accurate charts of the Thames Estuary such as we now possess and the pilots of the time believed the possible ways out for large ships to be fewer and more restricted than we know them to be at present they advised Monk to take his fleet out from the north through the warp and the west swin which former continuous fairly deep channel on the Essex side of the Estuary at the edge of the Mapland Sands at the other end of the Maplands a long narrow sand bank known as the Middle Ground with only a few feet of water over it at low tide divides the channel into two parallel branches the East Swin and the Middle Deep at the end of the Middle Ground these two channels and a third known as the Barrow Deep unite to form the Broad King's Channel also known as the East Swin where there is plenty of sea room and presently this again expands into the open sea in those old days of sailing ships a fleet working its way out of the narrower channels inside the Middle Deep in presence of an enemy would court destruction if the whole of its fighting strength could not be brought out into the wide waters of the King's Channel on a single tide if only part of it got out before the tide turned the van might be destroyed during the long hours waiting for the rearward ships to get out and join in on 19th July Monk brought his ships out to the Middle Ground beside which they remained anchored in a long line till the 21st waiting for a favourable wind and a full tide the ebb flows fast through the narrows from west to east and weighing shortly before high water on the 22nd the fleet spread all sail to a fair wind as well Charles with Monk and Rupert on her quarter-deck the long procession of heavy battleships worked out into King's Channel soon helped by a racing ebb those who saw the sight said that no finer spectacle had ever been witnessed on the seas and certainly England had never till then challenged battle with a more powerful fleet officers and men were in high spirits and confident of victory Rupert as eager as when in the days he led his wild charges of Cavaliers Monk impatient with prudent councils urged by timid pilots and using sharp, strong language to encourage them to take risks which he as a landsman did not appreciate not a ship touched ground some Dutch ships were sighted on the lookout off the edge of the gun-fleet but they drew off when Captain Elliot in the revenge led a squadron of nine ships of the line to attack them the writer, who had been waiting with his main fleet off the nays stood out to sea having no intention of beginning a battle till there were long hours of daylight before him as the sun went down the English fleet anchored in the seaward opening of the King's Channel with the royal Charles near the boy that marked the outer edge of the gun-fleet sands and on both sides men turned in with the expectation of hard-fighting next morning at daybreak the English fleet weighed anchor the Dutch fleet was seen some miles to seaward and more to the south sailing in three divisions in line ahead Evertsun was in command of the van the writer of the centre van Tromp of the rear there were more than a hundred sail Monk stood towards them before a light breeze challenging battle in the fashion of the time with much sounding of trumpets and beating of drums but the writer kept his distance working to the southward outside the tangle of shallows in the Thames Estuary all day the fleets drifted slowly keeping out of gun-shot range towards evening the wind fell to a sullen calm with a cloudy sky and Monk and the writer both anchored outside the long sand after sunset there came a summer storm vivid flashes of lightning heavy thunder-peels and wild tempestuous gusts of wind the anchors held but Monk lost one of his best ships the Jersey she was struck by lightning which brought down a mass of spurs and rigging on her decks and so crippled her that she had to leave the fleet at dawn the Dutch fleet had disappeared the writer had weighed anchor during the storm and ran out to sea and expected that he had gone back to his old cruising-ground off the nays and when the wind fell and the weather cleared up in the afternoon of the twenty-fourth he weighed and sailed for the end of the gun-fleet to look for the enemy in that neighbourhood he found no trace of him and anchored again off the gun-fleet that evening getting under way at two in the morning of the twenty-fifth the writer's light craft had kept him informed of Monk's movements the Dutch admiral had to settle when it was first offered because he hoped to manoeuvre for the weather gauge but the failing wind before the storm had made it hopeless to attempt to work to windward of the English at a council of whore held on board the writer's flagship on the evening of the twenty-fourth it was decided to accept battle next day even if the Dutch had to fight to Leeward when the sun rose the two fleets were in sight eight leagues off the nays later in his old position to Seaward and southward of Monk the English general at sea had ninety-two battleships and seventeen fire-ships at his disposal following the custom of the time the English was, like the Dutch fleet organised in three divisions the van, distinguished by white ensigns was commanded by Sir Thomas Allen the centre or red division flew the red ensign now the flag of our merchant marine and was under the personal command of Monk and Rupert the rear, under Sir Jeremy Smith flew the blue ensign battles at sea were now beginning to be fought under formal rules which soon developed into a system of pendentic rigidity it was a point of honour that van should encounter van centre-centre and rear-rear the Dutch were moving slowly under shortened sail in line ahead to the south-east of the English Monk formed his fleet in line abreast on the port-tac the orders were that as they closed with the enemy the ships were to bear up on to a course parallel to that of the Dutch and engage in line ahead division to division and broadside to broadside training cruises and fleet manoeuvres were still things of a far-off future and the ships of Monk's three divisions were all unequal in speed and handiness Rupert was not executed with the machine-like regularity of a modern fleet the van and centre came into action fairly together but the rearward ships struggled into position and trump was able to give some of the first comers a severe hammering before their consorts came into action and relieved them of some of the brunt of his fire the first shots had been fired between nine and ten a.m. till after two in the afternoon of their engagement a steady well-sustained cannonade with no attempt at manoeuvring on either side the fleets drifting slowly before the light wind wrapped in powder smoke in the midst of which both sides made attempts to use their fire-ships against each other the only success was secured by the Dutch who set the resolution ablaze she drifted out of the line and burned to the water's edge after her crew had abandoned her in both fleets for want of anything but the most rudimentary system of signalling admirals had little control of a fight once it was begun Monk in the Royal Charles had to content himself with marking out Derighter's flagship the seven provinces as his immediate opponent and fighting a prolonged duel with her he walked his quarter-deck chewing tobacco a habit he had acquired as a precaution against infection during the London Plague he spoke at the outset with undeserved contempt of his opponent now he said you shall see this fellow come and give me two broadsides and then run but Derighter's broadsides thundered for hour after hour however the dogged persistency of the Dutch was met with persistent courage as steady as their own London listened anxiously to the far-off rumbling of the cannonade on the North Sea waters Mr. Peeps went to Whitehall and found the court gone to Chapel it being St. James Day then he tells how quote by and by while we are at Chapel and we waiting Chapel being done come people out of the park telling us that the guns are heard plainly and so everybody to the park and by and by the chapel done the king and Duke into the bowling-green and upon the leads wither I went and there the guns were plain to be heard though it was pretty to hear how confident some would be in the loudness of the guns which it was as much as ever I could do to hear them all the eastern counties must have heard the cannon thunder droning and rumbling like a far-off summer storm through the anxious hours of that July day as the afternoon went on even Dutch insurance found it hard to stand up against the steadily sustained cannonade of monk center and van divisions and Derighter and Evertsun began to make sail and work further out to sea as if anxious to break off the fight Monk Rupert and Allen with the white and red divisions followed them up closely making however no attempt to board but keeping up the fire of their batteries and waiting for a chance to capture any crippled ship that might fall astern for of the enemy with us taken so the main bodies of both fleets worked out into the North Sea on parallel courses making no great way for the wind was failing the rear divisions Trump's and Jeremy Smith's ship did not follow the general movement for Trump had never quite lost the advantage he had gained in the open stage of the battle he kept his ships under shortened sail and hammered away dodgedly at the blue division this was the moment when Monk might well have either reinforced Smith or turned with all his force on Trump and overwhelmed and destroyed his squadron it was made up of twenty-five line of battleships and six frigates and its loss would have been a heavy blow to Holland but on sea as on land there was still little of the spirit of ordered combination just as Rupert at Marston Moore had destroyed the opposing wing of the round heads with a fierce charge of his cavaliers and then pursued without a thought of using his advantage to fall upon the outnumbered and exposed center of the enemy so now Monk and Rupert pressed upon Doreiter and Evertsun though Trump was at their mercy and Smith was in serious peril thus the engagement broke into two separate battles as the summer evening drew on darkness ended the fight and in the night the wind fell almost to a calm sunrise on the twenty-six showed the fleets drifting in disorder on a smooth sea with their heavy sails hanging loose from the yards only filled now and then by disappointing flaws of wind the crews were busy repairing damages and transferring the wounded to the lighter craft all day the only shots fired were discharged by a couple of brass toy cannon mounted on a pleasure yacht which Rupert had brought with him taking advantage of a mere ruffle of wind so light that it could not move the big ships the cavalier prince ran his yacht under the stern of the huge flagship of Doreiter and fired into him the Dutchman had no guns bearing dead aft and the prince was able to worry him for a while till there came one of those stronger gusts of wind that filled the sails of the seven provinces and she swung around showing a broadside that could well blow the yacht out of the water but before a gun could be fired the yacht with all sails spread was racing back to the English fleet and Rupert returned to the Royal Charles as pleased as a schoolboy with his frolic during the night of the twenty-six the winds rose and Doreiter steered for the shelt followed up by monks two divisions the Dutch admiral covered his retreat with his best ships and a running fight began at dawn even before the sun rose the sounds of a heavy cannonade had come through the darkness telling that Trump and Smith had again in their detached battle early in the day monk abandoned the chase of the Dutch and steered towards the sound of the cannonade soon the fleet came in distant sight of the battle Trump with the Zeeland squadron was making a dogged retreat working to the southeast close hold on the wind from the northeast monk tacked and made more than one attempt to place himself across the course of the Dutchman hoping to catch them between his fleet and Smith's blue division as between Hammer and Anvil but Trump slid between his enemies and was before long in full sail for Holland with the three English divisions combined in a stern chase monk said that if Smith had pressed Trump closer earlier in the day his retreat would have certainly been cut off Smith and his friends protested that if the general at sea had laid his fleet on a better course Trump would have been taken the honors of this last move in the game were with the Dutchman a substantial victory had been gained though there were few trophies to show for it the enemy had been met and forced by sheer hard knocks to abandon his station off the mouth of the Thames and take refuge in his own ports monk was on the Dutch coast picking up returning merchant men as prizes blockading the outgoing trade and keeping the great fishing fleet doing its idleness with the help of information supplied by a Dutch trader monk reaped further advantage from his victory and inflicted heavy additional loss on the enemy on 8th August the fleet sailed into the roadstead behind the long island of Turchelling one of the chain of islands at the mouth of the Zuiderzee and burned at their anchors 160 Dutch merchant men that had taken shelter there several great East India men next day landing parties burned and plundered the ranges of warehouses on the island and destroyed the town of Turchelling the loss to the Dutch traders was estimated at over a million sterling the victorious battle off the Thames in July 1666 is practically forgotten so far as the popular tradition of our naval successes goes it is not even a name by which it might live in the memory of our people but it practically broke the power of Holland and brought the war to an end what men do remember and what has banished from their minds the living tradition of the great North Sea battle is the ugly fact that in the following year the writer sailed unopposed into the Thames and captured and burned in the Medway dismantled ships that had fought victoriously against him in the North Sea battle the royal Charles being among his prizes the fleets had as usual at the time been laid up for the winter the money available for fitting them out in the following spring was diverted to other purposes and squandered by king and the court Charles counted on having no need to commission a great fleet in the summer he knew the Dutch were feeling the strain of the war and the destruction of their trade and would soon have to patch up a peace and he opened preliminary negotiations such negotiations must be prudently backed by an effective force on the war footing the king had practically disarmed as soon as there was a prospect of peace but the Dutch had fitted out the fleet in views of possible contingencies and to wit and a writer could not resist the temptation of revenging the defeat of 1666 and the sack of Turchelling by a raid on the Thames and Medway it was the dishonesty and incapacity of the king parasite court that laid England open to the shameful disaster that dimmed for all time the glory of Monk and Rupert's victory but even after the writers exploits at Charum the Dutch had no hope of continuing the war and within a few weeks of the disaster peace was signed at Breda the story of the Dutch raid is a lasting lesson on the necessity of an island power never for a moment relaxing the damned guard of the sea End of chapter 7