 This is a School of Security Studies sponsored seminar series and this is the third year running. The point of the series is to showcase the vibrance and diverse research that our early career scholars and our PhD students are doing across the school. So we've, you can find us on the worst news YouTube channel for previous seminars and, yeah, and watch this space we have much more coming up from after Ross's but let's roll back I'm super excited to have Dr. Ross peel here today. And Ross is a research and knowledge transfer manager in the Department of War Studies and the Center for Science and Security Studies here at King's College London. And Ross today is going to be talking about the very topical important discussion of the title of this presentation is a different kind of nuclear weapon. Russian abuse of Ukraine nuclear power plant so this is no doubt going to be a very great conversation we have. Ross today is a joined also by Professor Tracy German who is a professor in conflict and security at the Defense Studies Department here at KCL. Welcome you both so glad to have you as part of the series. Um, so for you the audience what happens now is I'm going to hand over the virtual floor to Ross he's going to present his working paper for about 20 minutes or so before Tracy offers some commentary discussion and then we open it up to you the audience for any feedback comments questions a broader Q&A you can either raise your zoom hand to ask the question live or you can pop it in the Q&A box, and I will ask it to Ross. So without further ado Ross I'm going to hand over the virtual floor to you. Thank you very much for that introduction and great to be here and really happy to be able to share some thoughts and ideas about what's been going on about the nuclear power plant situation in Ukraine as part of this wider conflict. So this is a caveat upfront by saying this is all against the background of the wider international concerns and the potential that we're facing at the current moment for the fears around the escalation of this into a into a nuclear conflict. We have to also remind ourselves all the time when we're working on this and I'm always kind of very conscious of it. That this is a real situation where a lot of people are struggling and in great suffering and losing their lives every day and so it's important that, whilst I'm focusing on one specific aspect of this conflict to keep in mind that there's a much broader situation going on. With that said, allow me to just briefly introduce myself a little more so I've been at King's now for about three and a half years in the Center for Science and Security Studies. Prior to my time at King's I was in the nuclear engineering technical sector in the in the power plant side of the house. And so my work on warfare international relations and so on is relatively new and before that I was 100% hard science technical engineering kind of person. So I'm hoping that as I bring the that sign of things to this discussion today that Tracy will be able to support us with more of her Russia expertise and will be able to come together into a to form something much more complete than I would alone be able to deliver. I'm doing a lot of current work on nuclear security and safeguards international risks of exporting small modular reactors what we call SMR naval submarine reactor safeguards and a whole range of other stuff as well. So what I'm going to be talking about during this is first of all what is the current situation in Ukraine with its nuclear power plants, the risks that are faced over there as a result of this and why people in the public as well as experts are concerned. I'm going to try to make some suggestions about why this has been happening in the first place. I want to touch on the use of disinformation by both sides in this conflict. And finally try to maybe start suggesting what could be done about this to to address it to stop it happening again. So just briefly, you'll see here first of all what we have in term in Ukraine in terms of nuclear facilities. Around half of Ukraine's electricity is provided by nuclear energy or was and this comes from 15 different reactors, which are at four sites and the most interesting ones for this discussion is Zaporizhia in the bottom right of this of this map that you see here where it has six reactors and this is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe as the as the media has been at pains to remind anyone who was reading the about this story. We also had some activity at Chernobyl, the former nuclear power plant site, but this was more of a kind of temporary occupation which which lasted only a few weeks. However, the situation at Zaporizhia is has been an occupation of the site which has continued since the 4th of March. Now, whilst the planet has been occupied is still been operating. So it's been operated by its Ukrainian staff under the supervision of Russian experts from the state nuclear company Rosatom. And it has been also under the control of Russian military forces who've been securing the facility and making sure that it operates in in line with their expectations, let's say. Now, over time there's been some concerns about what's been going on there primarily to do with the impacts on the personnel and the staff who work there kind of working in in the very stressful conditions, which is not great when you're supposed to be controlling a nuclear reactor and need to give you a full concentration to it. And we've also seen a lot of accusations of the use of this facility as a Russian military base from which it can launch missiles and so on without fear of retribution by Ukrainian forces. And more recently than that though we've seen an increase in shelling of the plant and both sides blame each other for this shelling on upon the nuclear facility with daily reports of new damage to the plant and new damage to the to for instance the power lines that supply it and its supply and through which it would normally transmit energy to Ukraine, but for most of the time now which receives power from other power plants in order to maintain safety functions. The recent development was at the start of September we had a visit from the International Atomic Energy Agency on their international support and assistance mission to Zaporizhia the Isams mission. And they conducted a few days of of inspections and so on for a variety of different reasons, and they've left two staff behind who will remain there permanently on rotation with others but the intention certainly is to have a permanent IAEA presence from the international community until this conflict is brought to some sort of conclusion one way or another. And to just put this geographically in the context of Russian forces, you'll see that the Zaporizhia power plant as indicated by this blue icon is now kind of right on the border and really has been for months this situation the front hasn't moved around the power plant although you can see that the there have been advances of Ukraine recently in the north around Kharkiv and also in the south around Kherson we're kind of anticipating that this front around the nuclear power plant may be a little slower to move, because of you know what might happen as Russian forces are put under pressure around that power plant we certainly don't want any, any dramatic and drastic action being taken there. So what are the risks. So I included an image at the front of this presentation of when I was kind of talking to the media and I've done a lot of talking to the media about risks on this and the way I characterize it is in this way that we're kind of. There's a lot of risk here there are the direct risks that could result from shelling on the plant which would cause damage to the point where nuclear material can be released and escape from the various layers of containment and steel and concrete that are put in place to prevent damage if those are penetrated by shells and missiles, or we're looking at indirect consequences because nuclear power plants, even when they're shut down. They don't immediately become inert and they need cooling water and certainly in the case of this plant it needs water to be passed through the reactor and through some pools that in which the old used fuel is stored because the used fuel remains very hot for a long time. What passes through takes the heat away and keeps everything nice and relatively cool. If we lose that access to that cooling water or the electricity to the pumps that supply it, either from offsite power plants or from diesel generators to produce that electricity on site. We're looking at a situation where the fuel will start to heat up and potentially cause things like melting of that fuel what we call the meltdown, or fires inside the reactor and so on, all of which, though leads to the same thing to this unacceptable radiological consequences, what is the term we use in the industry. And effectively this means a release of radiation that will cause public health consequences of the severe of a serious nature. And we're looking at the potential for spreading what we call a plume a cloud effectively of nuclear material being carried by the wind moving within Ukraine and potentially internationally in a lot of different directions be that towards Europe, Africa, the Middle East or even Russia. And the image I've shown, I've got at the bottom there is from a, it's from a media prediction of what might happen at Fukushima. Just about 11 years ago so this is not a representation of Ukraine obviously, but this is one of the ideas of what plume can look like when radioactive material is transported by wind over great distances. So why this is happening. This is a question that I've kind of been being asked a lot. And for anyone who wants to kind of understand why Russia is keen to control this plant or what they have to gain here there's not really one solid concrete answer unfortunately. So as I can, I think we can all appreciate trying to peer into the mind of Vladimir Putin, and see what his intentions are is a bit like trying to read a crystal ball. But I'll try and make some suggestions here and look forward to hearing what Tracy might say as an alternative explanations that I haven't thought of, or perhaps where I've overstated something. So looking at a range of things, something that's been talked about a lot is weaponization of energy in order to use that energy in order to achieve various things to to either power Russia and Ukraine or to deny access to energy to others. And this is in the context of a much wider debate around whether Russia is weaponizing energy against Western allies of Ukraine. So looking at potentially is this a distraction tactic in order to pull a media and buy the public attention away from the wider war, and focus us on to nuclear power plants and certainly the media has a very strong desire to look at nuclear power and nuclear power risks, rather than the situation with what's going on on the ground on a day to day basis. So is this potentially a political or propaganda victory that Russia is seeking to win here by showing that they can control this very important strategic target. Is it potentially to deprive Ukraine of energy, and this is going to be particularly important as we go into the winter months and in the context again of that wider energy shortage that that we're facing globally at the moment. Russia hoping Ukraine will capitulate in the face of energy shortages in that bitter winter coming up. Military use of secure facilities, so using the facility as a missile launch base and other military facility, against which they know a Ukrainian response is fairly unlikely. In order to push that energy into Russia or control Crimea. Are we looking at potentially the acquisition of nuclear material for various purposes, either the theft of the nuclear fuel for use as nuclear fuel in Russia in the same type of reactors or in a weapon. Is it possible that Russia is seeking to plant false flag evidence, quote, evidence of a Ukrainian nuclear weapons program something they've claimed exists in the past. And so they're looking to put something in that plant that will lend credence to that claim. Is it to be used as a new kind of nuclear weapon, is it intended that under certain circumstances and conditions they might choose to purposefully cause this this unacceptable radiological consequence. They have, they have taken control of this plant and want to use that as a way of legitimizing their presence, because if they can control the strategic assets and things does that kind of give them a some sort of de facto legitimization of Russian control. Or finally is this is this was this an accidental acquisition on the east bank of the Nipah River. They've managed to acquire this as a result of pushing the front lines to the river now they can't simply withdraw and leave this vulnerable strategic point on guarded. So a whole range of potential possibilities there and I'm suggesting things with no particular leanings towards one theory or the other on this slide I'm simply kind of laying out a whole range of possibilities. One thing I will say is that these may have changed dramatically over time. You know they were they were Russian forces were moving that way very quickly at the start of the war. And we're also pushing towards the South Ukraine nuclear power plant so moving up towards this facility if I go back a few few more moving up past Mikhailov and up to this this South Ukraine nuclear power plant that was a front that we saw emerging before the war kind of the Russian advanced ground to a halt. So all of these different possibilities out there and we're not really sure which one it is. Now disinformation is a key point for me and we've seen in this conflict, both sides blaming the other for the shelling that is taking place at the plant. So, Ukraine has been repeatedly made the claims that Russia perpetrating the shelling for various reasons than the same Russia has claimed that it's Ukrainian nationalists or terrorist groups who are perpetrating the shelling. And both are blaming the other and claiming that well what why would we show the plant we have things to lose Russia is saying we would show up we would be shelling our own soldiers. Although this this claim for me has limited weight given how much the reports of how much Russian conscripts are struggling even then within their own country at the moment. Whether or not the Russia would be willing to sacrifice a few of its own soldiers is a point I'm speculating about in order to uphold this narrative. And Ukraine is equally saying well why would we shell our own plants with our own people inside of it it makes no sense. Now, this is muddied because in this conflict we've seen demonstrably false claims from from both sides. And the Russian ones I think are well known to most people the Ukrainian ones perhaps not so well known but we saw one recently where Ukrainian strategic command was put on Twitter was putting out a supposed screen grab from a Russian general saying that he would rather destroy the plant and blow it up and let it fall back into Ukrainian hands and this was demonstrated to be false later on. So no one has the real high ground here. One of the wider issues of course we have as well as the possibility that Russia has to use the phrase painted itself into a corner it can't now back down from this invasion and from its occupation of the plant without losing face because it's gone in there with it with a certain mission and a certain set of objectives that is claimed and now to kind of leave would be to to admit that it's either failed or to try and create a narrative to say those objectives have been achieved, which will be quite difficult. And what we've seen in the wake of that isam's visit as well in the and the report that came from it was a lot of pressure from Russia on the IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency to to to print in its report the claims Russia has made and Russia is saying you know we have told you that the the shelling has come from Ukraine so why aren't you putting that into your report. And the IAEA is always is very very keen to avoid getting putting into its reports anything that it doesn't substantiate itself and anything that could be politically motivated and it always is very very careful to remain a completely neutral unbiased organization that reports purely on the basis of of observable fact. So in terms of the latest situation on the ground, and this is a rapidly evolving situation so it's very hard to kind of come to a conclusion on this or provide a much detailed book. The latest situation we're seeing is that the plants have been until recently in cold shutdown, which is, they've been shut down and brought to a state where the risks of a nuclear release are lowered. It doesn't mean they are cold room temperature but more than like they're at 93 degrees I think is the correct temperature. So this increases their safety situation but it also means that they can't generate any of their own electricity supply their own safety functions and so they're dependent fully on getting power from off site and on there on the emergency backup diesel generators in order to provide their own energy. There have been suggestions that unfortunately because the power lines have after a period of being let off for a few days let's say they're now being shelled again. And they are now endangered again so we're seeing the plants starting to consider do we need to start back up in order to provide put us put ourselves in a potentially more risky situation but in order to have another safety backup, which will help us be be safer in another way. The annexation of several regions of Russia, following these sham referenda is a great concern, because now Russia is saying effectively to the people at the plant, well this is ours now you're all going to have to reapply for your own jobs. And something we've seen coming from this most most recently is the capture and detainment of the directors of the plant so the director a couple of weeks ago was kidnapped for a few days and released a few days later. Details of what happened to him in that time I haven't been able to find but he has since stepped down from his position as director. And just in the last 24 hours we've seen the deputy director of the plant has been kidnapped as well. I've seen suggestions this is in order to interrogate them in order to gain information on how they can force the plant staff in order to to leave and hand over control but that's only a suggestion I've seen by someone that's not got any evidence that I've seen to back it up. And so the main points that I want to talk about though in terms of research going forward really is what can the international community do. And this is at two levels what can we do about Zaparizia and the situation now, and this ranges from providing additional support to the IAEA and condemning any actions that might be taken by others that would raise the threat. So actions by primarily Ukrainian and Russian forces that would raise the threat of what is going on there, the IAEA certainly wants to lower the temperature around the plant. And encouraging compliance with international law. So for instance, specifically the, the paragraphs of the Geneva Convention amendments, which say you should not attack facilities that contain what they call dangerous forces and by which they mean nuclear power plants and dams that hold back large bodies of water because damaging these facilities would have widespread impacts that are not limited to just military consequences. And, and encourage further verification, so support the IAEA and its mission to go out there and report on on the ground truth of what is happening. And more widely than that to find out really what's going on what is the origin of this shelling and put beyond doubt who is responsible for this if whichever side it may be. In short term as well we need to think about how to prevent recurrence, and this involves reviewing from an international relations and other perspectives how we got here, what led to this conflict and what led to a nuclear power plant being made considered a reasonable target. And then we can improve international law and, and potentially take other measures that will prevent a recurrence of this given that not everybody holds international law in the same regard. And then also to think about nuclear security. So, it's not reasonable in my opinion, and I may not really in the opinion of anybody in the nuclear sector I talked about to say, well it's now up to you to figure out how to respond to a hostile conflict as it would be unreasonable to expect them to hold that off if the National Army can't defend a country. But to think about what what is the correct appropriate response if you are attacked, is it to shut down the plant and hand it over. Is that the correct thing to do, as much as difficult as that might be and and it certainly would be for Ukraine. It's not about the spent fuel given that you can't you must you might be able to shut down the reactor there will still be a large amount of nuclear fuel on that site that needs safety functions, ensuring over it to keep it cool and prevent damage and danger. And is the solution, as some have argued, the movement to mobile transportable or floating nuclear power plants which will be able to effectively lift up the anchor, as it were, and and sail away in the case of conflict. It's not a solution where these things can retreat but does it also place them at greater risk of easy hijack and theft, or taking over by foreign forces. And moving towards a point where we're learning safety and security lessons from this so making sure that we're getting security and safety risks as low as is reasonably practicable. And so the requirements can ensure that the other area of reasonable so going beyond reasonable and ensuring against these threats that are beyond the reasonable request of a nuclear power plant or nuclear power plant operator to manage. So, a few words in conclusion, though, is really we need to be from my point of view is thinking about how we can balance the need for a just green energy transition. We're trying to spread the benefits of people peaceful nuclear technology against the threat landscape of out there because if we're moving from a position where the threat landscape is no longer terrorists and organized crime gangs, but includes foreign military invasions. How can we, and how can we ensure that we are operating to provide safety and security at nuclear power plants such that nuclear energy can play a vital role in that just green energy transition. And that is very difficult given that even within my lifetime we've seen the Cold War end, in quotes, and we've gone through huge train changes in international relations and issues and tensions. But a nuclear power plant is designed to operate for 40 to 60 plus years. So how can you design today a system that is able to address all of the uncertain threats of the future. How can we justify continued use of nuclear energy in this new threat environment, and I certainly hope so because I'm a big proponent of nuclear energy, but we have to be objective, which is hard given the ambitions of many countries. So weighing the risks and benefits in an uncertain future is incredibly difficult, and the decision on energy policies of course a matter for an individual states. And all of this again I would place in that context of, well we've, as Western Europe and beyond we've designed it depended for many years on Russian fossil fuels to supply our energy needs. We so we need to avoid trying to have a fossil fuel fixed to this we need to stop thinking about well solution to this is to go back to fossil fuels and instead treat this threat as an opportunity to make a positive transition towards more green energy in a way that is safe and secure for all. And I'll stop there so thank you very much for your attention. Thanks, Ross. A couple of thoughts from me there and actually I'm going to start with your final points there about the safety of nuclear power and nuclear power plants, moving forwards as as part of our kind of green energy transition. Because when you look at Russia's actions in Ukraine but also what they're thinking has been with regards to warfare in the 21st century and this sense of attacking critical national infrastructure, nuclear power plants have obviously formed a key part of our critical national infrastructure and are therefore key targets and, and that then brings me on to, you know, my point you were talking there about the why, why Russia is targeted, why it's seeking to control it. And I think I agreed with all of your points on that round circle, but I wrote down this kind of essentially the broad overarching aim is to undermine the will to resist of both Ukraine, the Ukrainian government the Ukrainian people but also I think more critically those outside of Ukraine. So, supporters in the West and elsewhere because nuclear power plant, holding that to ransom essentially has such big implications doesn't that threat of attacking your slide with the risks the direct and indirect risks I think brought that home very, very clearly. That one of the reasons I think Russia has focused on this is very much about the fact that there are no borders, if something happens, as we saw obviously with Chernobyl in in the 1980s. So, yeah, I would absolutely agree with all of your points and just leading up to that broader overarching, well, undermining the will to resist. You also talked about towards the end there about law of armed conflict international humanitarian law and how what Russia's doing violates it. And I think that's a key point moving forwards, because the last thing that we want to see as a repetition of this. In future. And the fact that there would be no discrimination between competence and non competence if something were to happen, and some kind of either strike or accident which led to some kind of release in this path on is going to be very, very indiscriminate isn't it. And not proportional in terms of the law of armed conflict. This is going to have a very, very significant impact. And it's, it's, it's a very, it's a really interesting aspect. Not just of this conflict but of war in general. And how these installations should be being protected. And or not, because they are, you know, they can be used as is in this case to such great effect. And I thought you made the case, particularly the coming winter of depriving Ukraine of energy moving forwards I think it's seeking Moscow really seeking to take it a longer term. And I'm less convinced that the one point I'm less convinced that is that it's, they found themselves accidentally in charge of this one. Most of you know that actions I think have thought behind them in terms of holding on to this particular asset and I, I'm less convinced by the, the accidental holding of it. But otherwise, yeah, absolutely, I would fundamentally agree with, with all of your points there. Yeah, the, the points about accidental I think is also undermined by, I remember in late February early March watching this very narrow spike travel up towards South Ukraine nuclear power plants and there was some theories that they were going to then sweep southwards down towards Odessa and and I was kind of thinking they seemed to me to be be lining straight for this second nuclear power plant so. And then when that kind of halted and got caught off I was, you know deeply relieved but it still hasn't obviously prevented a complete takeover of Zaporizia. And yes I agree that I don't think they've been left accidentally holding this one I think it's, I think it's correct what you say I'm just trying to present I guess all of the options. Absolutely. And I think, when we look at, you know, what Russian military scholars have been writing about warfare in the 21st century for the last, the last decade or so. The lessons that they've learned from watching others and their own action is that you, it's not necessarily about seizing and holding territory, it's about trying to destroy estates or an actor's economic potential, it's about going for regime change it's about being able to to coerce to pressurize without necessarily having to hold a wide territory and I think the nuclear power plant in this case offers some of those options. Yeah, I would agree. I'm going to ask probably a really naive question because I'm not an expert in this topic at all but you know just as a, as a, you know as someone who's watching the news and who's interested and also has some interest and, and some expertise and in war and warfare I just. And for me another example of how, how we understand and organize ourselves in global politics just does not seem fit for purpose. Again, right. The idea of kind of the states like Tracy was saying, you know, it's, it's not about, well it is in this case there is territory right but it's so much more and this nuclear power plant is such a great example of this right example of this in which powerful people are powerful forces undermine global politics, not through acquisition of territory per se but through economics through environmental, through all of these migration, all of these different things that defy our very nation state kind of borders and I just wonder for you Ross I mean you've reflected upon some things about what the international community can do but I just feel like we're in the spine we're like strengthen these laws but these laws again are underpinned by this understanding autonomous nation state actor right and I just, I wonder if you've reflected in your own research, can, can we be a bit more creative or imaginary or visionary of how we can think about our global order that actually can, you know, address or respond to these. There's no emerging security issues anymore they've been enduring right they've been around for a while so I just wonder if you have you reflect upon that or can you reflect upon that at all. Yeah, I'll provide a. So this, this is, as I kind of tried to suggest at the beginning a little or all a little new to me this idea of thinking in terms of our theories and scholarship and and international law and all the rest of it and I'm still kind of working hard to get to grips with all of this so I'm. I'm prefacing all with that to kind of say that if I say something naive or a bit off then that's why. But I was having a conversation yesterday with a colleague of mine Emily Sturzel who's going to be giving one of the presentations in this series later about international law actually. And, and she and I, mainly she are working on a, an outline for a conference moment where we're kind of saying. In Western Europe, and this conference is particularly about Germany become overly enamored of constructivism and post structuralism and all these things and we operate on the basis of an international order where everybody comes together and has all these organizations with rules and laws and all the rest of it and we see realism almost as a kind of thing of yesterday and the past where you know we don't do that anymore we've had war over here and we didn't like it so we've decided that war can't happen again in Europe. And have we become so deeply ingrained with that that we've lost sight of the fact that for other states, not that far away realism is still absolutely the, you know, the currency of choice or what have you. If the world is still viewed in that way by others then it doesn't matter how we view it if others with whom we have to coexist view it very differently. So, I think the needs to be kind of as exactly as you say all those laws and things don't necessarily matter to others in the way they matter to us. And so, I don't necessarily have a solution or proposition or an idea of something we can do instead. But I think at least we need to recognize that others just don't care about these things the same way that perhaps we might do. I think and Tracy would probably weigh in on this as well too but there's, I mean, it's also understanding what motivates Putin right that would enable you know why he is escalating things or making particular decisions and and and appreciating that is not something that's, you know dismissive or he should just follow rule of order but you know or brutal law but you know there's a, there's like a hurt empire a claim for a reimagining of you know the Soviet Union and, and I mean Tracy it'd be great for you to weigh in on that too but I think you know my own gender expertise and I'm just thinking I'm like this, there's such a need to not lose face and to appear powerful right and are forced to be reckoned with and then, unless I see it from you know a gender lens unless he's given some sort of way out right or a way to save face from the, from the West per se, you know we're in this perpetual bind of escalation but it'd be great. You know Tracy for you to weigh in about you know, it does the imagining of empire play into this or you know or what do you think is motivating Putin. I think this sense of status definitely weighs heavy and has done for you know, many, many years and most of the time that Putin has been in power at this sense that Russia had not been has not been treated as a great power, which you know Putin and those around him perceived the country to be to be that particularly the United States treated it with disrespect. And the sense of growing US unilateralism, particularly in the early 2000s, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty, for example. The sense that the US was going about its business doing you know what it wanted to do on the international stage without consulting others. And from Putin's perspective this sense that you know, we as a great power, i.e. Russia we should be consulted we should have a voice on all of these things. You talked about empire there and I think there's two issues with that I think Russia as a former imperial power is unusual because it's borders remain contiguous with, you know, those those territories that used to be part of Soviet empire and then obviously the Russian empire before but but also this sense that Russia as a great power should have spheres of influence where its interests are prioritized over those of others, and you know that sphere of influence according to those, you know, in the Kremlin, the Russian security elites is essentially that the post Soviet space and I think that is, you know, when we look at Russian foreign policy behavior over, you know, the last decade or more actually, we can see that kind of these, these status anxieties this desire to be recognized as a great power, but also deep anger that it's not being treated as one. I've got some questions for you Ross. So, someone has just an anonymous person has said do you think that the situation will push the EU towards using nuclear energy. And do you think that seeing how quickly events are unraveling this moving to nuclear energy is the only solution to utterly complete a green transition for more sustainable future. Second question, how much do you think this change would be possible if the EU, given how important the disagreements between countries are on this kind of energy is. Okay. Let me just reopen that so I can see the first question again. So I, I've seen quite a few countries expressing interest in nuclear energy as a result of this and the renewed interest in it. So when you look across the EU you see hugely different views on nuclear energy, hugely different histories of nuclear energy based on, you know, many years ranging from, for instance, Austria, which is completely opposed and has regularly put in place legal challenges to the use of nuclear energy in other countries where it sees this as opposed to EU law. So for instance when we had a competition in the UK where we were kind of talking about government support towards new nuclear power plants Austria opposed that in the courts. And I think it only kind of got resolved in a in a Brexit situation effectively. Similarly Germany has has sought to exit from nuclear power and wasn't keen on nuclear power even before Fukushima but when Fukushima came along it was a good trigger to to really be able to get out of it. Other places like the UK for instance we've been more kind of allowing things to gently slip away. And there's a great book on the history of nuclear in the UK where one of the chapter titles is years of hope and disappointment and I think that sums up the way things have gone in the UK quite well. However, to the question the change now we're seeing is that a lot of countries are starting to to really go in for this. The UK was already on a path towards new nuclear and has really leapt upon that now and I'm expecting by the end of this year actually some big announcements from from government and Rolls Royce about new stuff going off. Germany is engaged in some kind of debate about whether or not to prolong the life of its existing nuclear power plants and there are voices saying we should bring back online the old ones that were shut down early for no good reason. And various other places as well. In terms of is this the solution for Europe, I think what we really probably will need isn't is an all options solution. I think a personal preference would be to see as little fossil fuel as part of that as possible. I think there's still in a lot of quarters a desire to see it as as a war between nuclear nuclear and you know nuclear and fossils and then renewables these three sides. And what really needs to happen is we need to embrace the, the kind of coming together of renewable energy and nuclear power to kind of complement each other, in order to really be be beneficial. Is that possible within the EU, given these disagreements, I think it is possible and I think it is starting to happen that different countries will have different, different views on that. I think it's the best and possibly only way towards probably only way towards a green transition toward and an ecologically just green transition. Great. Okay, next question is from Henry, Henrietta Wilson, and she says hello. Thank you everyone for really interesting useful session. Ross just wants you to say something about Ukraine's disinformation anything that you're aware of and are there particular themes of this disinformation and ways it might be being challenged. I knew somebody asked me this. So I've, it's difficult because I've been kind of following this issue in a, I don't have any funding to do this but I'm really interested so I'm keeping an eye on it on the side kind of way for the last six months or so. And therefore I don't have a kind of document to draw on with all these examples sadly otherwise I would have, you know potentially had something more documented. I cited that one particular example of something being attributed to a to a Russian general saying that he would, it was kind of a if we can't have it nobody can attitude towards the power plant. And there have been other things I've seen as well claims about kind of Russia doing this Russia doing that. That have been very difficult to substantiate to the point where it is slightly suspicious, let's say. I would say that there haven't been a lot of other things coming back the other way from the Russian side where they've been a lot of claims that have been very difficult to substantiate and I would say many of the Russian claims seem frankly implausible, if I may. What else have we seen from from the Ukrainian side. I don't have any for any proper examples for you Henry I'm afraid at this point but perhaps we can pick up this conversation later, and I'll try to pull a few things out. Did that answer the question in full. I think it probably did. Oh, we have. Yes, you just said thank you so that's fine with that. And the last point was is it being challenged and I did not see that it's being challenged I haven't seen kind of anyone challenging this I mean it's it's possibly being challenged by Russia. I haven't been kind of following Russia's side of this very as diligently so I'm not so sure if that has or not but I suspect it probably has and that claim about the Russian general actually was debunked by by Western sources. I'm not the one who are kind of coming along and saying this doesn't make sense and and all that kind of thing so yeah. Yeah. Oh, you have another question that popped in by Ronald says thanks for an excellent presentation. If the power plant goes out of control what happens next there another Chernobyl type disaster. I laugh very awkwardly and nervously at that made worse because of concrete. It can't be built second question will it be equivalent to another kind of nuclear weapon and 10 mt tactical weapons strategic warhead. What is the effect in military terms. Okay, great question. Thank you. So, let's go out of control and we are looking at. Let's say worst case the worst case is kind of that combination of direct and indirect means I mentioned before so seeing in parallel military strike that breaks open the one or more of the reactors in combination with no ability to to cool it. And in the worst worst case and we're looking at something like something like what happened at Fukushima where the biggest issue was not only is this thing exposed to the air, but because of the huge disruptions to all the logistical communication transport everything around then you couldn't get anybody in to do anything about it very easily. So if you are in that situation then you're looking at potentially that that plume of radioactive material, which might be, you know, ranging in size from an intensity from very little all the way up to fairly catastrophic and I know there's fairly qualitative terms. So, that's the worst possibility really is that release of radioactive material that travels on the wind, potentially to great distances and then is deposited down onto the ground. In that case we'll be looking at advising people to remain indoors and avoid going out and that kind of thing but you could see consequences as we saw at great distance as we did in Chernobyl, post Chernobyl where even in the UK we saw stuff falling on radioactive material falling on the grass, the sheep eating the grass and then those sheep no longer being able to be to be used in the food chain and that kind of thing. More close to Ukraine obviously then you're going to see much more severe effects because these things are always worse close to the source, so you might see essentially evacuations of people and that kind of thing. With evacuations I must caution because it's been shown repeatedly that actually the impact on Fukushima survivors who were evacuated was far worse for them in terms of psychological impact. It would have been had they remained in place and just accepted a very very low dose of radiation so evacuation is certainly not the immediate solution. Remain indoors for 6000 years. No, so until this sort of thing until it effectively comes down after the atmosphere and is rained down onto the ground at which point it's much harder to breathe in and to be and to get it on your skin and that kind of thing. But Fukushima for instance people were evacuated and then they spent quite a lot of time scraping up the ground scraping up all the layers and that kind of thing off the surface. So this is, you know, I'm kind of cutting across multiple timelines and solutions here but I can talk about this more if time allows. I just want I don't want to spend ages on it in case there's other stuff that comes in but I will come back to this if we want to this time at the end. And question will it be equivalent to what kind of nuclear weapon. Very difficult to say anything from very small up to, you know, not not severe because the explosion part of it doesn't occur. We're not talking about a nuclear explosion where you're seeing huge fireball of devastation rain out from the middle. And it's more about the the fallout portion of your nuclear explosion so the sprinkling of nuclear material in low concentrations over a wide area and the potential impacts of that. And I can't put a equivalent mega tonnage if you like on it. I don't know the intensity and even modeling, you know, the amount of fallout that will come from a from a different size nuclear weapon is very dependent on a lot of factors. You got another question that came in Ross, I think it's really interested, you know, in the implications of. So Stuart asked Russia's activity surrounding the plant seems dangerous calculate it rather than accidental and fits the bill of hybrid warfare when considered with other activity. Our Western analysts understanding Moscow's ambition and intense surrounding the seizure of the plant noting Russia's propensity for risk and the psychological damage this could cause NATO members. Wow. Okay. Right. Yeah, I know right. It's it's that whole thing again of. Can you peer into the mind of Putin. So our Western analysts understating London Moscow's ambitions and intent. Well, I'll say again when I'm kind of mentioning accidental I mentioned that very much as a as a possibility as an option, amongst many others as a theory of what what could be the motivation here and so on. So, and I'm not necessarily putting that forward as as the answer, it was more of a possibility. So our Western analysts understating Moscow's ambitions and intent. I think potentially in public, they are. I think that we're kind of, I've not seen much public statements on the why and the what are they hoping to achieve and this kind of thing. It might be purposeful in order to avoid creating public panic, because people are very afraid and you know, to some extent rightly of nuclear power and and the potential impact that could result from something like this. In private I suspect they are probably more more concerned about this. But I, for instance, when I've done media stuff on this have to be very careful when I'm asked about, is this going to happen is this going to blow up or we all going to be be harmed and that kind of thing. I'm just I'm sorry I'm just reflecting on your question for a moment to give me a second. This other point about Russia's propensity for risk is very very interesting and I think it was something I kind of maybe hinted at in my talk without stating outright is I from the reading I've done and, you know, which isn't wide or detailed because I don't have a great experience in Russia, but it does seem to kind of indicate that in Putin's mind there's there's a thing called Russia, which is, you know, perfect and must be preserved and protected at all costs. And there are these other things that live in it called Russians which are very much acceptable as sacrificial lambs in order to protect the wider Russia. And I think sometimes we don't necessarily appreciate that because we look at it from our own perspectives whereby we don't necessarily view the citizens of our own countries in in the West, more often in that way, as people who are should happy to give their lives in order to protect the nation state in all circumstances, and that it's our right as experts or leaders or technocrats or whatever you want to call people in charge let's say or people who have power. You know, we don't view them as having the right to decide that for us that we should go out and give our lives for something. So, yeah, Russia's propensity for risk I think in this is something that is perhaps not as well considered as it should be. I've said repeatedly that I don't think they are going to purposefully damage this thing to the point where it causes a massive release of radiation. And that is partly motivated by the fact that I don't think they would want to take that risk of that cloud drifting instead of in a in a Europe direction in a Russia direction, but it's it's I'm always very careful to China, put any numbers on that or to to state how likely I think that is because it's very impossible is well not impossible it's very very difficult to say and I think any calculation of it would probably be wrong. I'll stop there. I mean these are certainly likely and really important conversations and yeah I mean me not being a Russian expert or a Putin expert at all like there's some decisions. It appears that he's made or been responsible for that has made me step back and yeah you do have to I think key to all of this and like you said it's also an impossible task is trying to really understand the motivations. And again, Tracy in the last like minute would ask you to reflect upon I guess Stuart's question there too. Yeah, I, I was, I think, probably Putin, the Russian security elites have very much probably correctly assessed Western appetites or not for any kind of risk. So, I think Ross, I mean both during his presentation but also in answer to the last question really brought home the dangers surrounding this particular power plant but nuclear power plants in war on on battlefields in general. And my senses that yeah I'd agree with you, this is probably calculated from the Kremlin. I'm not a fan of the term hybrid warfare I think this is warfare. This is a state using all all means at its disposal to achieve what it wants to achieve. And, you know, the sense of I go back to this, you know, seeking to threaten and intimidate not just the Ukrainians seeking to undermine their will to resist not just them but all of those around that are supporting Ukraine. And I think this what's happening at the power plant kind of fits that model. But it's incredibly on cherry discussion. Yeah, on that bleak note I mean. Yeah, I, I don't even know I'm left speechless too. I think the news unfold in and particular and yeah Ross, you're right there's this the reflection of real politic. But I think us who are interested in international relations more broadly and war, more specifically and broadly. I think we need to use a multiple theories and perspectives at it as a tool kit to understand because I'm, I don't think it's ever just one theory right and one totalizing theory or perspective and, you know, Putin and Western forces are illuminating very clear right you can see different strategies. Yeah Tracy agree with you about the hyper warfare this is just multiple tools that you know Russian particular is using. And you see other states other state actors using multiple tools as well for to increase their sphere of influence, and to be heard. So in the world, world stage right and it's, it's, you know, it's, it's not new that you know people or states who feel like they've had a marginal status will resort to violence extreme forms of violence often to finally be heard to be finally listened to and so this also makes I think us as scholars and practitioners to reflect upon again is our, our systems and structures of world order fit for purpose right and, you know, if the if the points or the hope is to avoid escalation of violence and war, is it fit for purpose so these are just broader questions for us to, you know reflect upon us as scholars and those interested in, in global politics, more broadly. I want to thank you Tracy and Ross for Ross for presenting something so brilliant and important and timely and raising these sobering questions and for you Tracy for weighing in on your expertise and further sober analysis of, you know, where we go from here to how we might get out of the situation these are I guess ongoing important questions and debates to have and thank you audience for listening and for engaging in asking those difficult questions. Yeah, I'm left this seminar again is why I love sharing it as I'm always left. I'm feeling a little bit edgy Ross and Tracy if I'm honest after this seminar but you know intellectually stimulated and engaged and this is, this is the whole point of the series so I thank you so much for being a part of it. We let the audience go and everyone goes on their cheery Wednesday afternoon Ross I'm just going to leave final words for you if you have anything final you'd like to say. Okay, thank you very much. And yeah no one ever comes to talk to me if they wanted to hear anything cheery unfortunately is the store I've set up myself as the nuclear power plants in war guy. But the last thing I'll say I guess is that what happens next with with this is going to be critical and one of the risks that we are looking at at the moment in terms of research is the IAEA the International Atomic Energy Agency's role is to verify that all nuclear materials in the world in civil use remain in civil use and are diverted weapons purposes, and they've kind of to this point stated that they will not do any work on that of that nature looking at occupied facilities where the material is out of the control of the state now. So there's a question going to be raised I think quite soon unless the situation changes of what is the greater risk to not verify that material and risk it falling into the wrong hands out of international oversight, or to legitimize Russian control over this power plant through carrying out those inspections. So this is something that has come up only in the last 24 hours really as something that we've been asked about. So, I guess I'll just leave that as the final thought of what is really the kind of the cutting edge of what's going on with with the research at Kings in this area. Thank you very much and look forward to you know amplifying your research as it's produced in a material form as well too so thanks again Ross for sharing support work again thanks Tracy for coming and offering some really important expert reflections and again you the audience for asking those really important questions. So everyone have an afternoon. The best we can aim for this point. Well thank you very much everyone thank you thank you Tracy.