 Rwyf da. Yn eich dros fel y dros, y рын wedi ein yn dweud ysgoel y mae Ynw Maddd yw'r ddylch yn ein gynghoriad, os ystafell. Mae'r rhan sy'n dros yn ysgoel yng Nghymru, ynghylch, ysgoel, ymfwrdd, y ysgawis, yw ysgawis, a'r ysgawis ar gyflwys yng Nghymru. Mae'i sgawis ar y llwyddiad 1, 1 o'r gynnwys yma. Mae'r hyn yn ysgawis yn ynghyrch Washington D.C. is a research associate in 2007 to examine low income working families immigration policy workforce in youth development and criminal justice. Juan grew up in Guanajuato in Mexico, in Chicago, Illinois. There's a bachelor's from Dupau, an NPA from Indiana, and he will soon be getting his doctorate from Stanford. Without further ado, let's welcome Juan Pendoza. Thanks for everyone at John Jay for putting together not just this event, but the book that we're here to talk about today, and the wide range of events going on all semester. I think it's really a model for how to keep these kinds of conversations going. So what I'm going to do is update us on what I've been working on since the book came out and relating it to things that I've been learning in my own studies, but also from other folks on the panel and working on these issues generally. I think outside justice, the book volume is a great place to start. It's a great entree into a lot of the issues that we're talking about today and then some. I think it's right up there alongside other volumes that have come out recently talking about the importance of these issues, which are relatively unprecedented. A deportation nation is a book that I'd highly recommend, governing immigration through crime, and a couple of volumes that are several years older, keeping out the other, and immigration and crime by Martinez and Valenzuela. So if you're looking to learn more, those are great resources alongside the book. So my talk today is removal roulette, how place matters for predicting deportation outcomes across the United States. I'll talk a little bit about some background, just a little bit and how I see this paper in the larger literature on immigration enforcement. I'll give you a sense of what deportation rates look like across the country, how they differ depending on how you look at it, which places you're looking at if you're interested in whether or not deportation rates are higher or lower based on key things that we want to keep an eye on, like the economy and other social forces. I'll focus on one central question that's at the heart of a paper that I'm writing, but I thought it would be especially relevant for today talking about policy and the effects of policy to either accelerate or dampen deportation policies at the local level. A little bit, just a little bit on data and methods and how I'm going about doing my paper, some results and then implications and I'll probably conveniently run out of time before I get to the limitation section. A little bit on background, there's been a lot more work on immigration enforcement and deportation, much of it has focused on the consequences of deportation and part of my work at the Urban Institute focused on the aftermath of deportation on children and families. There hasn't been as much trying to figure out what are the kinds of forces that are good predictors of where we would expect deportation problems to happen more likely than not. And that's what I'm focusing on. The reason I put up this slide is to give you a sense of deportation rates across the country and I'll explain what those specific numbers are in a few minutes. But for now what you should know is across the country the national average for deportation rates sits right around the 2.4, 2.5 that you see in that first bar. But if you look at places with large influxes of immigrants, that rate goes up. If you look at places that are on the border similarly that rate is higher. If you look at places in the south, also higher. But if you look at states like New York, California, Massachusetts and Illinois that adopted secure communities, which Michelle Waslin described earlier, later on in the process in other words they perhaps decided to delay implementation of the program. And once they implemented it perhaps they decided to only refer people for deportation for serious crimes. That's one of the theories out there. You do see lower deportation rates at least through the spring of this year which is the data that I'm using for this. So this gives us just a sense, very descriptive, which kinds of places do we see deportation rates higher. And this builds on the chapter that's in the volume where I speculate about which kinds of places might we see higher deportation rates or not. So I'm advancing the work there. Similarly places that had very high support for John McCain in the 2008 election, you see more than 50% support for John McCain. It's pretty similar although if you look at places that have really high support for the Republican Party as we'll see later there's higher deportation rates. We haven't mentioned the 287G program yet today. This is what I call a deportation acceleration program. It started mainly in 2006 and 2007. It's been for the most part replaced by secure communities but it's still an important predictor for very high deportation rates in those places that still have the program. And I'll talk about sanctuaries and anti-trafficking initiatives in a little while but just based on the descriptives it doesn't actually look like having a sanctuary designation or having an anti-human trafficking policy in place is doing much to lower the deportation rates. So those are descriptives but I wanted to sort of collect as much data along all of these indicators and then some to figure out after we account for all of these different factors what are the best predictors of deportation. So that's my question and to make it even more specific in this tug of war between policies and programs designed to accelerate deportation versus policies and programs designed to slow it down or dampen deportation which one wins out at the local level? What seems to matter more? In other words you could think about this who's winning, folks who are very interested in deporting more people or other people who are interested in protecting immigrants rights and dampening deportation. That's the tug of war that I'm referring to here. What am I looking at? I'm looking at deportation rates. These are a number of people deported through secure communities at the local level and I account for how long secure communities has been in place and also for the number of immigrants in that county. And that's my unit of analysis. This is all at the county level. You don't need to look at that too closely. I just basically explain that in words. I also look at something that I call deportation relief or a discretion ratio because not everyone that ends up behind bars that is deportable or removable ends up getting deported. And some places do a much more concerted effort to deport as many people who are eligible for deportation than others. So I wanted to capture both of these outcomes, the rate of deportation and then deportation relief. They're related and there is some overlap, but I think that they're distinct enough that we can talk about it in Q&A if we want. What am I accounting for at the county level again? In every county across the nation I have data on local immigration detention policies, whether they're meant to accelerate or dampen deportation. So that's sanctuary counties, anti-trafficking task forces, 287G deportation acceleration program. I also have an indicator for counties that decided to adopt secure communities late in the game. I have 2008 election data for the presidential election at the county level so I can account for changes in Republican partisanship specifically. Demography is very important as we've learned from prior research. So I know the immigrant influx at the county level. Has there been a dramatic influx of immigrants at the county level across the nation? I know the Hispanic population, segregation indices, diversity indices and also geographic indicators like border counties, southern counties and then urban percent of the population that's urban. I also account for changes in the economy so the unemployment rate in the economy during the recession which ends up being very important. I also have an indicator for drug arrests and I think about this as a proxy for how large of an infrastructure a county has to enforce the war on drugs. Drug arrest rates. And then law enforcement capacity, how many officers are on the street, how many officers are there in jail, processing people in deportation and also federal deportation capacity before secure communities happened. I'm going to skip a lot of really annoying tables and just get straight to the implications. Context of expulsion and deportation varies widely. It isn't the case that deportation rates in Indiana versus Nebraska versus New York versus California or counties in those states are relatively the same. There's wide variation. But deportation outcomes are somewhat predictable. This isn't a mystery if you really account for all the things that I've been talking about. You can make some general predictions and I do in the models that I've put together. And what did I find? Deportation acceleration outweighs relief from deportation in almost all instances with one exception. If you're in a county that waited until 2013 to adopt secure communities or after January of 2012 to adopt secure communities, generally speaking those places so far have reported lower deportation rates. But it's not outweighed by the 287G deportation acceleration program in many places. Another thing that you should know is where there are places where there are dramatic influxes of immigrants, especially in places like the South and the Southwest and the Midwest. There we see localities that report much higher deportation rates. They're responding to an influx. Usually these are places with not that many immigrants to begin with so the influx is even more dramatic in those locations. You should also know that deportation is much less predictable in places with few immigrants and this speaks to the work of Jorge Chavez which is in the outside justice volume and hopefully we'll hear something about the role of institutional capacity and institutional infrastructure to deal with integration of immigrants. Where you don't have that history, where you don't have that capacity, where you don't have institutions, which is how I'm interpreting this, you have much higher deportation rates and less predictable deportation rates. Deportation mechanisms appear to operate at the booking stage. Once you're booked the determinants of deportation have already been set so it's going to be the economy, it's going to be partisanship, it's going to be demography. All of these social forces that I've been talking about that are relatively impersonal so it's not someone going into the system and deliberately picking and choosing who gets supported. Once you're booked depending on where you're at if that place has a really high unemployment rate or is very Republican or doesn't have a history with dealing with immigrants, guess what? Your fate for the most part has been sealed regardless of individual decisions. I'm going to skip a little bit here. The best predictors of deportation outcomes are border counties, late adoption of secure communities which dampens deportation rates, whether or not you have a diverse local population at the county level and Republican partisanship. These are the best predictors along some of the other ones that I've mentioned. What doesn't predict deportation rates? Law enforcement capacity. That does not seem to help us in figuring out which places are deporting people. It's really these other social economic and political forces that matter. Thank you very much.