 So, formally we used to have reporting on crisis and catastrophes by journalists, but since everyone is having a smartphone, everyone can take videos or pictures, and what does that mean actually for perception for everyone else around the world, and what kind of conflicts will arise for helping institutions on the grounds. So Ruben Neugebauer and Sebastian Junemann from kdos.ev are going to talk about them. So enjoy this talk. Yes, good morning everyone. So good to see so many faces already. It's always hard when you have an early slot. I would like to start with saying that there's three of us. We're going to have a life connection to Faye Bauman from the Kurdish Red Half Moon. She is currently in northeast Syria where our projects are located. We hope that this life connection will work and that she can give us some impressions directly from the ground. Just from the beginning, KADUS itself as a humanitarian organization is and has to be religious and politically independent, but we as humans are clearly not. We understand and we define ourselves as left. So when we talk about this offensive by the Turkish, we do not claim to do this in an academic, neutral way, but actually in a political way. We do want to say that up front and have this as a disclaimer. So a little bit about us and what we're doing and the other organization they're working with. It's a helping organization kind of like ASB, which is the Abert as a Maritabund. They do saving missions, but they're also involved in rehabilitation and psychological welfare and care. It's a very, very large organization by now. Over the past five years, we've grown quite a lot. We have partnerships with them a lot and on a continuous basis. Especially at the moment, there's a, us, we're like a smaller organization in Berlin. We are kind of like have this crisis response maker space. Some of your faces I've seen around. We're trying to work on a diverse set of problems that we have in the humanitarian market, more this kind of classical kind of maker thing. But we're also doing field work and we've been doing it for five years, mainly in northeast Syria. We also were in Iraq, did a short trip to sea saviour and in northeast Syria, but this is where we mainly do our work. So since 2014, we've done work in that region. As a disclaimer up front also, Rajava was part of the title of the talk and it's quite difficult to use this term because the structures on the ground currently they would like to refer to this as northeast Syria as it is self-governed and we're trying to do that. But because the term Rajava has been used in the media so much, that's why we're using it. But we do want to mention this in the beginning. All right. So crisis and communication, it's, there's lots of stuff that you can follow life. There's like rockets that are being shot to the mass and we can see them coming back to the ground. We can see the PR department of the German train company. You can live stream German folk artists. You can also follow crises and conflicts live. And for a long time, we've asked ourselves, what does that actually mean for organizations on the ground? It's great if you have that many information, but it's a different thing when you don't just want to inform yourself, but you also want to work as an organization on the ground and you want to make decisions and you have to make decisions about where can I help? Where am I maybe potentially also in danger? That sort of stuff, that sort of information. What does this mean for organizations on the ground? We're kind of in the post factual era in the era of Twitter diplomacy. And today was, are not just, they mean they're, they're followed by social media and they're also being kind of fought on social media to a certain extent. So there's sources and diversity in sources in all of social media. It is on the one hand that we have so much more information that we used to have, mainly we also have it so much quicker, but on the other hand, this also means it becomes a lot more difficult to evaluate this information because disinformation and gossip and that sort of misinformation spreads just as fast. So for a long time, we kind of wanted to talk about what does that actually mean for us on the ground, this kind of changed media landscape. And we have one good example on the ground for this, yeah. So why is Northeast Syria such a good example? Well, it, it isn't a classical conflict in a sense. It's a civil war within Syria with multiple different players with militia with a state regime that internationally has been questionable. And what does propaganda, it's kind of like a plate, like a proxy war. And there is accompanying this, there's this, this conflict between the Turkish and the Kurdish. And all of that is merged in this region. And in the past five years, this was always quite highly dynamic also for us, because also inside the Kurdish community, there's quite a large amount of conflict. So there's, there's a lot of stuff that comes together in a conflict region that usually don't come, doesn't come up. But in this case, it's kind of interesting to look at. But even in the past five years, it was always quite dynamic. And even though the clown in the White House has been in office for quite some time, but over the past few months, the dynamic of the conflict has gotten so much more extreme that we really, really cannot rely on anything anymore. Erdogan, for a long time, has been threatening and wanting to do some things, claiming he started an offensive. But there was always some sort of level of stability that you could count on, basically, also because of this kind of status of a proxy war. But like reading this tweet, I was really like, did he get hacked or was he has gone completely off the rocks? And that's why today we want to focus on how do you handle sources and source identification and how to rely on sources. And how can I respond to them when I'm on the ground? We want to start with giving a short overview. What actually took place when the invasion happened? In order to do that, we want to get Fih to be also here with us. Do I have to do something? Are you guys doing it? Oh. Hi, Fih. Maybe really quickly, Fih works for the Kurdish Red Half Moon. She does not like to introduce herself, but she does an amazing outstanding job. She coordinates lots of different projects. And she has a much better insight than us, who are there a lot, but do not have the same expertise that she does. Fih, maybe your part. Fih, wait a second. We don't have sound yet. Still no sound from the video. Hello? Oh. OK, so the sound is somewhat. So unfortunately, the sound from the video into the booth is really bad. OK, so she's talking about how she cannot. Sorry, guys. It's really hard because we're not getting a direct audio stream from what's going on on the video. So unfortunately, we simply cannot translate this at this time. Bear with us. We're going to be back with you when the people on stage are back to talking. And hopefully, they're going to give a bit of a summary of what we just had. Slash, we didn't hear, unfortunately. So sorry. OK, so additionally, there are still walls going on. I'm getting a better tune now. At the moment, there is not as many civilians involved and being affected by it. That's great. But currently, this is limited to military actors. Additionally, it is, however, the case that the state of security has worsened all over the region. There's ISIS cells that are trying to destabilize this region even further, as best as they can. And these cells, since the attacks by the Turkish government have grown, there's a lot more attacks going on everywhere now. Additionally, it is the case that the region that is now being taken over and occupied by the Turkish, it is assumed that it's forbidden that Kurdish is not being allowed to be spoken on the streets anymore. All public official buildings have been renamed. There's no more Kurdish language being used, only Turkish or Arabic. And it is quite clear that it's similar like Afrin. It's completely forbidden that Turkish is being spoken on the streets at Kurdish. I'm sorry, guys. The medical supply on the ground, even before the offensive eight years of civil war, it was quite dire, and taking care of refugees in the older camps, it was miserable, it was horrible, it was quite critical. Now with 300,000 more refugees, it has become even more extreme, and it's much more critical than it was before. Additionally, it's winter now. So that means that a lot of people catching diseases are getting sick, it's much colder, people are being put up in tents. It's the rainy season. We have a lot of newborns and pregnant women who are in much danger, obviously. We have a lot of, I mean this is a high stress environment, which leads to a lot of psychological problems clearly. And what we can basically not stabilize, like it's really hard to supply that kind of care. So the environment, basically everybody here has lost everything, and they can't go back. Drinking water and enough food is quite not good, like there's just too little for everyone. And on top of that, one of the main water pipes has been damaged by an airstrike from Turkey and is now part of the Turkish sector is still broken. So that means that about 700,000, probably more are without water or without enough water. At the moment, we're carrying in the water in big trucks, but the quality of that water is obviously a lot worse. We have the problem that currently it's quite stable that humanitarian goods are being shipped in and being waved through, but we're always depending on the good will of, for example, Iraqi border patrols. And we cannot rely on humanitarian goods coming in on time. And we cannot always pass it on on time on the ground to other regions, because the streets are still quite insecure and unsafe. Also the distribution to public hospitals and medical equipment is also very bad. And it's becoming worse. It's becoming worse. Also, of course, because of the war or because of the attack from Turkey, there's a lot of highly injured people who will have long-term consequences. And we can't take care of them properly right now. So we need prosthesis, physiotherapy, and so on. Also like psychological help. And right now, we cannot do that at all. There is support by international NGOs. The problem here is that many of those, because of the security situation, and because it has been so insecure, let's say it's completely impossible or almost completely impossible to risk, to prepare everything on the ground. And that makes it that support is arriving more slowly and not in enough quantity. Regarding the international community, there's nothing, I'd say. There are tiny, tiny projects, but that's all unofficial and very careful, I would say. So they don't get in political quandaries, I guess. So this was a little bit of an overview of how the situation is here. In addition, we have a lot of insecurities in the public and also with NGOs, of course, because so many actors here are suddenly active in this region. And this means that we have Turkey, we have the allies, we have the US who mainly take care of their oil fields and Russia and Syria who are moving around here and, same as Turkey, are completely impossible to predict. So you never know what is happening, what's going to happen, and what you can rely on. There have been multiple incidents and accidents with Russian tanks and civilians. At least five civilians have been killed, have died, in their situations, if not more. And all in all, the populace, or in the populace, there's a huge insecurity and stress and fear. That was my overview. Yeah, we're going to have a few images before we go on. Thank you, Faye, for this input. So let's switch. Faye hopefully will stay in the loop. And then we can loop back to a few questions. We have a few images here. We just want to flip through them. We thought to use those when the connection to Faye wouldn't have been possible. So these are the images we wanted to show in this case. This is how it looks on the ground there. We heard from Faye that how complex the situation is and what you have to keep in mind and how many actors and it is very hard to find out what is really happening on the ground. So if we have been talking about the post-fact era, we don't only talk about fake news. Those are possible. Those are happening as well. But we're not talking about things that are completely untrue. But if we talk about how hard it is to evaluate sources, we also are talking about sources where they didn't intend to mislead. So we have a few difficulties here. So it used to be like in the media, just in TV reports. But these days it has moved to other sources in social media. And on the one hand, this is awesome because we get the information very fast. And partially we get information that we wouldn't have gotten otherwise. And this gives us way more options to verify things when they happen. But on the other hand, it is hard because it gets way harder to properly analyze everything because misinformation also moves very quickly. And another effect is that the classic media are reducing their network of correspondence because they can't afford to have people informed correspondence everywhere on the ground. And so they could have done the thing to just Skype in an informed person like Faye. But many media don't do this. Instead they send a moderator from Germany. They send them there for a few days. And for us, this also part of this post-fact landscape where media that are not present in the region just fly there for a few days and then talk about the difficult hygiene situation in this camp, Al-Hol. Al-Hol is a camp which is very hard. There's many thousand people that belong to the IS. So it's a very tense situation. And actually, it is probably a hard hygienic situation. But the reporter doesn't have access to these situations and this information. So he just takes whatever is hopping in front of his camera and talks about the difficult hygienic situations because of this little water spot here that's just like we would see in a European camping site. So the situation which we have reports, but it's very hard to see, are they exaggerating a situation or is it actually that bad? And the whole thing is presented by his colleagues even as quality TV. And it enters the public consciousness under this label. So this is a classic problem that we have now. Talking about post-fact society, if we have a map that shows the international relations of states in relation to the Turkish invasion of Rojava. So green are the countries who support this attack. So then there have been a few countries who were neutral. But many countries who said that this would be against international laws and talked about sanctions, but still pro-war hashtags were happening. We're seeing way more than anti-war hashtags. And especially in Turkey, pro-war hashtags were absolutely way longer in the hot topics. So we're not talking about click farms and how this might happen today, but this information presents itself. And you can look at these hashtags and they don't have a lot to do with reality. But another thing that's post-fact is that when the command of the militia that is controlled by Turkey is when these people is asking the militia to not use the social media anymore to record things from the front and to show that, so to prevent the security incidents from being spread. And they're saying, OK, this is dangerous for the soldiers, but instead is that these images are showing so many violations of international laws and war crimes. Like this, for example, here is it about the murder of a Kurdish human rights activist, Hadri Khalaf. And it was very clear that, or it was relatively clear that this was an attack. She was being dragged from the car and then shot. And this went through the media, not through the media because the person was relatively unknown. But if you think about it, if you're interested in this, then every day you would see images like this where the militia attacked or went into this region and just posted their crimes to Twitter. And of course, they didn't follow this order and continued uploading images and videos from their battles. So it's interesting to talk about post-fact. So in the internet, you find so many images of the awesome German tanks that are being used in the Syrian front. But at the same time, the German government is saying, we don't have sources for this. We don't know what's happening there. And if you look at this neutrally, then we're thinking, what do we have? Then we think about what sources are being seen. So if the government is saying, we don't have our own sources, then they should have said, we don't want to have sources. Because if you think about what the German government has in resources to verify such a video and what are the technical probabilities, then it's a bit sad that there's no individual thing. So we know since Chemnitz that the German secret services are very bad at verifying videos. But of course, there's very, very many sources you can use to inform yourself. There's normal news channels. And they have the advantage that they are at least a little bit have an editorial. So they filter a little bit what is real, what is not real. But on the other hand, they're certainly a bit slower. Then there's agencies on the ground that talk about this. They look at these things and then have news, especially about these regions. So these are good channels. But there's also the classic social media, like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and so on. And in this case, it's also super-interest. Telegram has been playing an important part. I don't want to talk about how good or bad Telegram is. But many of the militia have been using Telegram and Telegram channels to communicate with their followers. And so here it is, you try to find a way into that. But these militias, they sometimes have on their other channels, they link to their Telegram channels. So this was very exciting. You have to look like, what are the sources right now that work and are the fastest? So you not only find the classical sources. Another hurdle that we had was that this is a conflict where so many different languages are being spoken. So if I'm looking at the social media, then it might be that there's people who talk in Turkish. And these talk of a different information than the information that is available in English or Arabic. So it's very important to have, in the back of your head, there's many different languages that are relevant. And in this conflict, other is the language of the conflict parties. So Turkish, Arabic, Kurdish, then a lot of English and also in German, because there's a huge diaspora to Germany from this region. Right. So it's not just languages, but also this concept of echo chambers that separates people in filter bubbles. And we're not quite sure how close off are these filter bubbles. But with these echo chambers, I think it's quite clear that if I'm only interested in a certain information, then I'm not going to look into other aspects. And there's been lots of talks on this topic. And another example is this hashtag, it is a pro war hashtag. And here's something, I don't know if you've seen this, so this echo chamber concept, a soccer player of St. Pauli, a leftist soccer club of Germany, he shared and said, we're standing on the same side as our heroes and our army. And so even our prayers are with you. And so a person living and working in a completely separate environment that's pro-Kurdish and anti-war, but still he didn't get the relevant information or, oh, and by the way, at St. Pauli, they fired them. They kicked them off the team. So that's great. So this example really raised the question, so did he not know? Can he do this because his whole environment, his surroundings are pro-war? And so the question is, what information do people even read? What reaches people? And so here we looked at our ambulances. So after the attacks, we've supported ambulances. And so we shared that on Twitter. And you see that here. And most of the time we try not to work with images because we care about image rights. And we don't want to like shock people. But the same message, using a shocking imagery gets a lot more views. And so also us as a source, we have to think about how we spread information and how we work with that. All right. So once more, we'd like to talk to Faye again because one of our ambulances has been attacked as well. We weren't the first medical institution that was attacked in this war. Of course, medical institutions in wartime are protected by international law, by the Geneva Convention and such. But this really has been this process of normalization. So without any response from the media, these attacks have passed. And we've done a press release, talked about international relief organization being attacked. But really, we didn't get a lot of response to that. So Faye, how's the situation there for you? You've lived through this. And so what have the reactions been? What have you seen? Yes, so what happened was we had an attack on a trauma stabilization point near Bas Al Ain. So outside the security zone, and ambulances were damaged, but no workers, luckily. Then we had medical teams from the self-administration were kidnapped and executed. And what Seb just mentioned, the jointly run ambulances were attacked under fire. And we had the situation in Bas Al Ain that we still had teams in the city working in the hospital that kept on working there and treating people who were injured badly. And we didn't have any chance to evacuate those people. So medical personnel and patients were locked in the city for three days. And so we talked to most nations that are involved and asked about help to establish a humanitarian security convoy. But nothing happened. And in the end, we just rode into the city with 30 ambulances and got our teams and those heavily injured patients out of the hospital. And this worked. But of course, this was really dangerous because it was clear that us as a humanitarian relief organization aren't recognized as such and could have been attacked during this evacuation. So we tried to really get the word out on all possible channels, all available channels on social media, but also through interviews. But again, the reaction was nil. So at least none did I know of. And so the situation was devastating in the city, but no one intervened. And I think as long as the Geneva Convention isn't respected from military actors, from states even. Yeah, I think ambulances and humanitarian aid organizations just aren't going to be safe. The Geneva Convention states that it's forbidden to shoot at ambulances or humanitarian aid institutions, but in our case, this rule wasn't followed. And as long as whoever doesn't follow this rule to provide humanitarian aid safely just isn't possible. So in the background, we've seen some pictures of these attacks on medical institutions. Yeah, we need to keep a look on the time. And so we're going to talk about how to interpret sources on the ground, how we do that. So we have international teams on the ground. And what problems we have with every person being a possible source on social media. And so one thing I think of is frontline developments. So as we've seen, we've conquered the city. This message was spread very quickly. But then Kurdish forces said, no, no, no, the city hasn't been taken over. And so for us, this raises the question, how can we trust this source? Where are the front lines? Where are the fights being fought if we have ambulances going into the city? And back then in Mosul, it was the same. IS said, we've conquered some city blocks. And this could be fake news. And in a calm environment in Germany, I could really evaluate this. But if I'm on the ground, then it's really hard. And so even if it's fake or not, could decide over life and death. And so in northern Syria, there's so many actors right now. Fun fact, two days ago, Russian and US forces had a fight over there. And it's really a melting pot. It's so important for a lot of people to know where can I go safely? Where is it safe? And so these checkpoints usually have been pretty easy to spot. But now these militias go through these checkpoints and fly their flag. And so afterwards, we don't even know if they're still there. And so it really takes a long time to decide whether a piece of information is true or false. So for example, here we have a few flags of the Syrian army. But then they drove away again. And so it looks like they're there, but they're not anymore. And then we have this Highway M4 sort of this lifeline of the region. And it's the same deal here. So Turkish-backed militias saying, we've taken over this highway. And then they have this photo to verify this claim. And then we have Kurdish forces saying, a little while after, no, they haven't taken this highway. And so me on the ground or as somebody driving an ambulance, now I would have to say, even though this is usually a pretty secure highway, I can't go there right now because I just can't be sure. And so I need to take a detour where there might be traps, where there might be bombs, where there might be attacks. And so this sort of freedom of information, which we're also happy about, can really become a huge problem. And so Faye had a good example for that. Faye, you're still here? Yes. So an example from Kamishnu. Please talk about how that was for you. So I, myself, don't use social media at all. But it was quite disturbing. I was in Kamishluk when the attack started and the attack started in the northwestern part. I knew that, but then I received messages from friends that saw on social media that drones were attacking or airstrikes were occurring near our location. And then I looked outside the window and listened and there was nothing happening. And so I talked to my colleagues on the ground and I've asked them, have there been any attacks here whatsoever? And they said no. And so all this information came in in the morning. And then in the evening, the attacks have occurred. But at the time when I got the information, there haven't been any attacks yet. And so this raises the question of how we deal with online sources. How can we create a report? How can we verify or falsify this information? So we still have people on the ground and we have this privilege where we can make a decision of whether or not we go. A lot of people do not, especially locals, obviously do not have that choice. Our question is usually, can we go? And if so, how? And we obviously do not rely on ourselves, but also other networks. There's Inso is this international security organization. They are located with a lot of employees. And what they do is we're going to explain what we do in our short term as well. They do source analysis. They are reachable. They will evaluate sources. This is a source that's not available to locals, but this is only available to humanitarian international aid organizations. There's obviously a free market. You can obviously understand the sum that you have to pay to get that sort of information. We obviously could not just rely on a network doing that for us, so we have our own little version of this. So this is us in Berlin. 24-7, we are monitoring the situation on the ground. So we got a lot of matter donated. Thanks so much to the audience. So online, what we're doing is monitoring all the different reports, monitoring the Twitter accounts that are reporting. We're using obviously other home pages that are out there. And additionally to that, we try to, through the professional information gather, we try to get our own version of this and supply that to the people on the ground. All right, so basically the way that we do this is on the one hand, we have open source intelligence, so the stuff that we get from the internet. The other thing is that you have obviously like professional knowledge of this area, and then we have context on the ground. And in order to actually evaluate a situation, you need all three of these. So we have this tank video, for example. Our expertise tells us that this is a leopard tank. We can identify that quite quickly. We are not like weapon nerdies, but we can like identify things, obviously based on our previous work. And it's good in it. And we obviously understand the logo up on the left corner quite easily, and based upon that, you can usually reconstruct the location. There's multiple different ways of doing this. You can triangulate this, but you can also try to ask locals if they can identify buildings that are showing up in the videos in order to identify where stuff happens. If you do reverse image search and put it into Google, it also is usually quite helpful. I do that a lot. A lot of time find fakes based on that, because you can take pictures from somewhere else we're taking in order to dramatize something else. And you're actually seeing something from the Lebanon War 30 years ago. So with this method, I can quite quickly verify a large amount. So based on this tank, I knew that they were being used on the ground. But then obviously, you also have to know your own limitations of things that you cannot say. You're a lot of times very tempted to make assumptions. I'll get to that later on, that you really have to think about what do we know and what do we really not know. And ideally, we try to do this based on these three pillars. We see our expertise and context on the ground. You either have those because you write a lot of books and you drank a lot of sugar teas on the ground, or you don't have them. So what you can always do is you can always get a good understanding of what the internet has to offer. But you can really get somebody who is a humanitarian helper to become this super expert on the Middle East. So there's all these different languages that we've talked about that are a bit of a problem. We have the problem that we do not speak all of them. By now, however, online translations are quite good and a quite good help to get closer. It's obviously additionally good to have people in the background that actually speak the language. We have our analysis that also speaks Arabic. That's like the first way of getting to the content. But the first translation draft online is actually quite good for research. So on your Twitter account, you can basically set all these different languages that are going to be taken into consideration when you're searching on Twitter. And if you want to gather lots of different information and diverse information, it's quite helpful to set this. Like having your own research account and only getting the information that you really want is quite helpful in this regard. And that you only follow the sources that are on the ground. There's different sources. Obviously, there's institutions. There's organizations at think tanks. There's participants of private people who are former employees of humanitarian organizations or academics and stuff like that who actually have quite good information. You really have to, however, look at what is their interest in reporting and spreading information. Journalists are obviously always a good source. News agencies, but also NGOs. But also with NGOs, you also have to look at what is their own personal interest in this. And then there's obviously a lot of different local sources that you can use. There's, again, private parts and parties, militia, initiatives, and functionaries. So the problem with all of this is that there's a lot of fast sources, and they're obviously good sources, and especially for information that we usually wouldn't get, like the militia video that we looked at before. But on the other hand, we have the problem that with those sources, it's sometimes hard to really see the pinpoint where do they stand. So we have all this information, and how do we handle this? So the first thing that we do is we map that. So obviously, every action of war is bad. But for us, in particular, it's always extremely bad when it happens close to where we are located. So I have my information, but then I don't know if the information is true. So there's this letter that Trump sent to Erdogan, and I was convinced that this was a hoax. Unfortunately, it turned out to be true. So there was all this stuff that was like, don't be a tough guy. Don't be a fool. I'll call you later. I was quite convinced that all of this was a clear rubbish and was some sort of internet joke. But then I had to, and so then I googled. I searched for the image. I did all sort of quite reputable sources that were sharing this. So it was clear that this was the truth. So always go based on two sources, minimum. Watch out for them coming from different spectrums, so that it's not two sources from the same group of people, but that is, on the one hand, a militia tweeting, and then also a journalist who's tweeting it. So that increases probability of things to be factually true. So I always also have to ask myself where does the source get the information from? Is all of that one little source? And they copied off of one another? Is this a source that's known? Does everyone know, believe the source? And then obviously also check with the other side of things. As a line, we talked about that there was news that the city was taken over. But we had our team that was 30 kilometers south of that. And there's like free field that's quite quickly crossed with a tank. So we were obviously quite worried about our team. But when we checked with the counter side of this, the Kurds were tweeting images and videos from the area that was supposedly taken over. So the interest of a source is also something that you need to look at when you look at a source. So there's obviously like they like to quickly produce words of success and like that. They had a successful mission. So it's interesting like this leper tank. What do we know and what do we not know? The interesting thing about this one we know is that not only do we know that the tanks are being used, they're being used by Islamic extremists. But also because Turkey has a contract with Germany and what is that contract with Germany actually say is it allowed for Turkey to pass on those tanks to someone else? So there was quite a few sources to we're watching this specific thing. So there's Kurdish armies reporting that the tanks were being used by the militia. And the built newspaper in Germany clearly smelled their scandal. And they found a public speaker that said that, of course, we are being supplied with these tanks. So we looked at these sources and we kind of have the tendency to then take this as serious because this really fits our concept. You can criticize government. But the annoying thing about this situation was that both sides in this instance have an interest in this news to be released. So the one side to be quite cool, hey, we have all these tanks at the Kurds in order to basically draw attention to wrong ongoing and doing. And so they wanted to frame themselves. Like the ones that were invading wanted to frame themselves as proper army with tanks. However, from the same organization, somebody else said something like, that is actually not true. These images were taken completely out of context and were part of the Turkish army and not part of the militia riding the offensive into the northeastern region. So it's really important to always go on these three pillars. And you can kind of that way, you can get closer to the truth. Another thing we really don't want to forget is this image. It is very important for our organization. We don't have the time to talk a lot about source analysis and how to do it right now. But one thing that is happening is everyone is over-emotionalized, not only of our people who are there, but also after five years, the whole region is emotionally charged so much. So it's all very unsharp, unclear. And so if we are analyzing sources, we have to keep that in mind. Also, you have to ask yourself, is someone biased? And that's the one thing. And the other thing is that if you are in the middle of a battle, figuratively, if you are really battle, then a lot of information is coming in. So it's very important to do simple analysis. And if you're in a stressful situation, you sometimes forget this, to classify information. The information is coming in. I have to think about what information is safe for information where another source and what is here safe from an unknown source. So this should be obvious. But you quickly forget this if you don't keep it in mind. And you have to remind yourself to really do this. And the last item is good for the nerds in the community here is OBSAC, operational security. Here we is. This is something we don't have. We can only talk about this briefly. We can't go too deep. So a few years in Syria, there was the selfie of death. And IS units took a selfie, put it into the internet, forgot to remove the geodata, and then a few hours later the rocket arrived. So these are also questions you have to deal with. In this short time, what we can do is just talk about these topics very briefly. We don't want to spoil big truths here. It's just about the question. We just want to put the question into the room here. So the next few days, we will be present here at Congress and are very happy to hear your input. But we are in the open infrastructure orbit. So visit our stand. And we would be very happy for your input and to listen to you and your thoughts. And that's it from us. Thank you. Thanks for listening to Catastrophe and Communications on the example of Rojava. By Ruben Neugebauer and Sebastian Jinnemann, we have been Mayor Levenius and Daniel, and we had lots of fun translating this. Thank you so much for listening. Thank you very much, Seb. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Sebastian and Ruben, I'm sorry. If you have any questions, please put them in the microphone. My signal is Angel. All right, so if you want to give us feedback, you can do so under the hashtag C3T. So first question from the audience. Are there any sort of news on why they attacked ambulances? No, there was no official statement. A lot of times it's quite logical who it was, because you can only these kind of attacks can only be done by drones. So this is quite easy to reconstruct, and you can kind of pinpoint who it was, but they will never admit to what they did. So question number two, how do civilians on the ground that are helping being brought there and how much help and what kind of help is needed? Well, the main ones that we need are quite specific, so medical personnel clearly. There is an existing medical healthcare system. To go to a war zone clearly always sounds like an adventure, but it does take quite a lot of time to prepare for this, and this decision to go there is a tough one. And you always have to ask yourself, are you adding or are you actually just causing more trouble than adding value? So if you only have skills that are basically already there on the ground, also you might have to reconsider whether or not you're right. You can obviously also donate money. That is super important, especially because the situation on the ground is quite complex. And international organizations and UN money and money from the foreign ministry can be distributed there with quite large difficulties because you do not want to provoke the crazy person in the Bosporus. It's quite difficult for us to get money, like official government money. So for carers, this is quite hard, and we're based on donations, and that's obviously also quite important. Again, we will send medical personal doctors, and they have the experience to help with, together with the locals on the ground, to add value. OK, so then please give a warm hand of applause to Ruben Fee and Zeb.