 Good evening, good morning, or good afternoon, depending on where you are. My name is Steve Seng. I am the director of the Sours China Institute and welcome to another of our weekly webinars on China. We have, as usual, a fantastic speaker, but before I introduce the speaker and the subject, let me just remind you that if you are new to our events, that you will be able to take part in the discussion through the Q&A box at the bottom of the screen. And if you are using the Facebook feed, you will also be able to raise questions and the questions will be related to me. When you raise the questions, if you would like to keep your anonymity, please just say so and I will not read out your name or your specific affiliation. But when you raise the questions, it would be very helpful to me if you would say who you are, whether you are, for example, a student at Sours or somewhere else or you are a researcher at a different location, it will simply give me a better scope to bring in more questions from a range of people as I move forward in selecting the questions for the speaker. And the speaker is Professor Jessica Chan-Vice, and she is a very distinguished colleague in the political science at Cornell University. She's also the political science editor at the Washington Post Monkey Cage Block and a non-resident senior associate at CSIS in the United States. Jessica received her PhD from the University of California, San Diego and had taught at Yale University before she relocated and settled at the Cornell University in Upstate New York. She has published in many leading journals and is the author of powerful patriots, nationalist protest in China's foreign relations which was published by Oxford University Press in 2014. And the subject of her presentations today is a well-safe for autocracy, question mark, the domestic politics of China's foreign policy. A subject that if I may say so is very close to my heart indeed. Over to you, Jessica. Well, thank you so much, Steve, for that very kind introduction and thank you all for being here. It's my pleasure to be here. I wish I could be with you in person, but it's wonderful to see folks from near and afar. So I'd like to talk today about my new book project on the domestic politics of Chinese foreign policy. There are pressing questions I think we face about what China wants and what will China's rise mean for the future of the international order. And I'd like to present to you today a framework that I've developed in conjunction with a colleague, Jeremy Wallace, just grounded in the domestic politics of authoritarian rule in China and its implications for how China approaches the international order and various different foreign policy domains. A version of this framework and its illustrations will be coming out in a new issue of international organization later this year. And the broader book project is under contract with Oxford University Press. So I very much look forward to your questions as I'm continuing to develop the manuscript. Of course, in keeping with some of my previous work, I'll talk today a little bit about how China has managed nationalism in its foreign policy and what is this meant for understanding the frequent disconnect between Chinese rhetoric and Chinese behavior. And then I'll conclude with some thoughts about what might lie ahead for US-China relations and the international order more broadly, as well as some policy implications. So first, what does China's rise mean for world politics? An increasingly prevalent view holds that the United States and China are on the precipice of a new Cold War or perhaps are already in a new Cold War. And in this view, China is a revisionist that seeks to overturn US hegemony and the existing international order defined as the institution's norms and practices that shape international relations and global governance. Others have been more optimistic that China could still be peacefully integrated into the system. And proponents of this view have argued that the US-led order, even as US hegemony fades, has been open enough to accommodate China's rise peacefully and China has incentives to remain within and contribute to that system, whether rationally or by a process of socialization over time. And a related argument has been that the chief problem in China's rise has been for free writing that China has not contributed enough. And so in this view, the policies of the past four decades of engagement have worked. Proponents of this view note that there has been no war in Asia. Can you imagine the counterfactual since the end of World War II? And in particular, China has not used force since its war with Vietnam. Yet still, in recent years, we have seen far greater variation that I think is missing from these canonical views of China's approach to the international system. Overall, of course, China's authoritarian character is at odds with key aspects of the existing order, particularly the emphasis on individual rights, on universal values, and on rules-based multilateralism. At the same time, China has profited immensely from its participation in the international order and remains in some ways a staunch defender of the Westphalian order on which it was built, and particularly the UN Charter. And at times, we've seen in the past few years, ironically, China seeming even perhaps more committed to preserving aspects of the existing order than the United States under the Trump administration, hence the irony of Xi Jinping appearing to defend globalization and free trade at Davos, or cooperation on the coronavirus at the World Health Assembly. Now, some of this variation, both in China's behavior and in the US approach to the international order has been documented in an important recent article by Ian Johnston, where he shows that, far from China being clearly the revisionist power, there's actually a lot of variation in how China interacts with different aspects of the international order, supportive of some, unsupportive of others, and partially supportive of still others. And he presents a descriptive analysis of this variation in a recent article. And what isn't, I think, fully captured in this, first is an explanation for this variation, as well as China's evolving behavior and approach to different issues, both in terms of its rhetoric, as well as in terms of its behavior. And that far from a Beijing consensus that some have put forward, underneath Xi Jinping's grand slogans of a China dream or shared future for humankind, there's significant issue by issue variation. It has been a conservative defender of some issues like the UN Charter, and as opposed others like the United States, the International Criminal Court, and of course, it has rejected the standing of the International Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea. And yet in one of the most important areas of global governance, climate change, we've seen an abrupt reversal from being an obstructionist and laggard power to one that's playing a much more leadership role in this space in just a few years. So how do we account for this variation? So I present a new theoretical framework to explain this variation, both across space and over time. And the starting premise of this domestic politics-based argument is that the Chinese Communist Party is, of course, first and foremost, a concern with its domestic survival with Xi Jinping at the helm. This is not China's only ambition, it's not the CCP's only ambition, but it's certainly the most important. They can't achieve very much else if not in power. And for decades, the CCP has been deathly afraid of peaceful evolution and democratic contagion. After all, most communist states around the world have collapsed and the CCP is very afraid of going the way of these others. So its overarching goal is regime survival, a world safe for autocracy as I have written in foreign affairs. Now survival is more than just repression, it's also about performance, it's about persuasion and it's about co-optation, providing not only bread but also circuses if you will to bolster its domestic support. So my theory identifies two different characteristics, centrality and contestation or heterogeneity as I've written in international organization that really shape the domestic politics of a given foreign policy issue. And it's variation along these two dimensions that shapes China's interests and its investments both domestically and internationally. And it's important to note that these are all malleable, these are not exogenously given but rather are shaped and contested both by the state and by various interests and actors inside society. So what are these two different concepts? Centrality first describes how closely the authoritarian government like China sees an issues affecting its survival prospects and in particular the core pillars of its legitimation strategy. Since the late 1970s, the CCP has relied on a combination of nationalism, economic performance and stability to justify its continued single-party rule. First nationalism, securing the defense and territorial integrity of the nation has been critical to the CCP's justification of its continued rule not just to the founding of the PRC when Mao declared that ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation we have stood up but it's been a continual theme throughout the CCP's rule even in the reform era. And as particular as the last two Chinese regimes were ousted by nationalist movements as Susan Shirk has noted, CCP leaders are especially concerned about defending the nation's sovereignty against perceived foreign encroachment as well as returning China to the status and privileges of a great power. The second pillar, economic growth. In particular, the CCP has relied upon rapid economic growth in a litany of economic statistics, GDP in particular to claim its competence and to justify its rule in the post-Mao era. So under Deng Xiaoping and subsequent leaders, the CCP moved away from communist ideology as a barometer of good performance instead touting slogans like to get rich as glorious or black or white as long as it catches mice, it's a good cat. And the third pillar is public security or stability. And the ability to keep the CCP, the Chinese citizenry safe from, whether it's disease, disaster or crime or the fear of chaos. This has been a central pillar of the CCP's continued a claim to rule. And we can see that in the CCP's propaganda, drawing attention to the so-called chaos that it sees in democratically ruled societies around the globe and making China's relatively stable domestic governance in their view relatively more appealing. So what does this then mean for the Chinese government's foreign policy performance? So looking here, we see a lot of variation in whether an issue is domestically central or less central. And so the more central of foreign policy issue is to the government's domestic legitimacy, the much harder it is for the CCP to concede without suffering a potentially destabilizing domestic backlash. And the more likely it is to pursue unilateral policies regardless of the international costs. So this is of course typically applies to what China has defined or the CCP has defined as China's core interests, issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang territorial disputes. On these issues, China has been, the Chinese government has been hyperactive in making demands, insisting on its preferences even when these have led to international censure as we saw in the South China Sea for example when it rejected the ruling or the standing of the international tribunal. And international pressure in general that has aimed at the central pillars or those that seek to change the regime itself have been especially likely to backfire, heightening the CCP's sense of domestic insecurity as well as rallying domestic audiences around the CCP's leadership. But a lot of different international issues like most before the United Nations do not impinge directly on the central pillars of the CCP's legitimacy. And so on these issues, whether it's the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the IMF the Chinese government has been much more flexible about its approach. For example, moving closer to international practices including the announcement of a debt sustainability framework in response to criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative or rhetoric about the environmental and social practices that have accompanied its infrastructural investments. So a key implication of this idea of centrality is that the greater the domestic centrality of an issue the more likely the government in China is to rely on performance rather than repression because domestically repression is costlier as well as more likely to backfire. It's not that the government can't repress as I found in my first book the Chinese government prevented anti-American demonstrations after a US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter jet collided over the South China Sea. The Chinese government prevented anti-American protests from taking place but they still relied on this sort of symbolic performance of commemorating and celebrating the so-called martyred Chinese pilot who disappeared into the sea. And in addition, international pressure that appears sort of aimed at one of these issues that could undermine the CCP's legitimacy is more likely to backfire by rallying Chinese audiences around the regime as well as provoking a greater resolve to stand firm. So for example, you know, greater international pressure on the issue say of Taiwan could backfire if it in turn increases a domestic Chinese resolve to take a tough stance that it would not have otherwise or to take quick action rather than defer the issue for years to come. Now in turn, if you're thinking about this in terms of the international relations theory, this then the domestic centrality of an issue then affects the government's bargaining position at the international level in the spirit of a two level game. So this means that on central issues on issues that the Chinese government is willing to go alone go it alone and pay large potentially large costs they're more likely to have leverage than in the international space to demand international reforms on that issue or to go outside to build a like-minded coalition of states to advance China's issue interests in an alternative set of institutions. And so ultimately, whether or not, you know these investments by the Chinese have entailed greater cooperation or conflict with other states in the international order depends on of course the prevailing norms and practices as well as the willingness of other stakeholders to make concessions to China's domestic imperatives. So as Scott Casner, Margaret Pearson and Chad Rector put it in their recent book a rising powers outside options and their indispensability will jointly determine whether or not the rising power will invest in demand changes to or passively accept a particular set of norms and practices in global government. So what we have here with centrality is helping to determine where it is it that China will have these outside options. And then in turn, how does that then affect China's leverage or negotiating power within the system? Now it's important to note that these central pillars nationalism, growth and public security are often in tension with one another and it's managing these domestic pressures and if you will contradictions that the Chinese government faces a number of risks and trade-offs. And so it means that an issue on which the Chinese government places central importance doesn't necessarily mean that the Chinese government is unable to make concessions it just requires that there be an equally central alternative pillar that is counseling cooperation. So for example, Taylor Fravel in his first book shows that the Chinese Communist Party has been willing to make territorial compromises with neighboring states when it was interested in shoring up its domestic security and control over minority populations along the border. Similarly, China's changing stance on climate is another example of an issue that touches on two different domestic pillars, economic growth but also public stability as concerns about air pollution mounted in and became a crisis in China. Initially, the Chinese government viewed international efforts to limit carbon emissions as threatening domestic economic growth and China acted as a spoiler at Copenhagen. But once the scale of the catastrophe became domestically known and galvanized both mass as well as elite outrage and Chinese government shifted strategies investing and taking a leadership role in international efforts to limit carbon emissions. And so here it was that public health and stability came to the fore as Xi Jinping explicitly noted and stating that if environmental problems not handled well, they most often easily incite quote, mass incidents. The Chinese government's term for popular protest. So in international crises, the government often faces a trade-off. Similarly, in managing national mobilization like the protests that I have researched myself, sometimes the Chinese government benefits by allowing these grassroots protests whether it's on the streets or online to help the government show resolve and demonstrate that China won't be pushed around to international audiences. But these nationalist mobilizations also come at a cost to domestic stability. And so this is a dilemma that as I argued in powerful patriots that the international context can help adjudicate affecting the government's calculus in which direction, which pillar it leans on nationalism or on domestic stability. But the Chinese government is not monolithic. China is not monolithic. And so this second factor, contestation, describes the degree of domestic division or heterogeneity at both the mass and elite level often rooted in geographic, economic, institutional as well as ideological differences. Because even in an authoritarian system like China's power is fragmented and contested, central and local leaders face different incentives, different levels of information. And oftentimes central decisions and slogans need to be interpreted and implemented by multiple levels and agents of the state. And often we find powerful industries and businesses are far from faithful agents of the state even if ultimately they are subject to the government's predation as well as ultimately control or reining in their activities. And so the more contested and international issue is domestically, the more likely we are to see difficulties with implementation and enforcement of China's international commitments. So I'll take the example again of climate. Local officials in China have often resisted central directives to shut down polluting firms as economic development has remained of primary significance in cadre's promotion evaluations. And Chinese officials and industries have also become quite adept at gaming the system, providing as if compliance with environmental regulations and incentives. And so when state leaders set out a general direction but leave many of the specifics to be hashed out, concentrated domestic interests can often dominate both the design as well as the implementation of various policies. So for example, recent research on the Belt and Road Initiative suggests and as Yun Yun Ang put it, that his Belt and Road Initiative is really provided an encompassing but vague slogan that has made it easy for domestic interest groups to use a national policy as cover to pursue their own agenda. So let's put these two together. What do centrality and contestation get us? Well, first of all, they don't map neatly onto one another. Some highly central issues are also highly contested. Many issues in fact, ranging from climate trade, climate change to trade, exchange rates, internet governance. These are all issues on which there are winners and losers of any particular policy. And oftentimes a lot of domestic agitation over what policy ought to look like. But other highly central issues like Taiwan are not characterized by a great deal of contestation. And this of course is in part a feature of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda efforts as well as their willingness to kind of patrol the boundaries of domestic discourse and debate. And looking now to the bottom portion of this table, of course some issues remain sort of characterized by low centrality, not particularly pertinent to the Chinese government's domestic legitimacy, such as most issues before the United Nations. But some of these issues nonetheless implicate a number of different domestic interests that are characterized by a higher degree of contestation. So for example, the Iran nuclear deal, Ian Johnston notes that China played an important role in the Iran nuclear deal. For example, helping to design a key reactor to reduce Iran's future plutonium output. But at the same time, China also failed to halt the export of particular missile technologies due to the well-connected interests of a particular arms exporter. Now, one thing that's missing from any kind of static table like this is the significant movement as domestic actors try to manipulate the apparent centrality of a particular issue. So for example, subnational actors and industries may try to link their demands to a central pillar of the CCP's domestic legitimacy in order to increase the likelihood of what you might call side payments or loopholes that protect them from international commitments. So in a bidding war for central government attention, subnational actors that are able successfully to sort of magnify the centrality of their interests are then more likely to succeed than those whose demands are still seen as relatively peripheral or parochial. So here I draw upon the work of Margaret Pearson who argued that during China's negotiations over admission to an accession to the WTO, an array of different industries and ministries as well as provincial governments lobbied for continued protection and some were more successful than others. So the telecommunications industry, for example, and its affiliated ministry, the Ministry of Information Industries, succeeded by linking their demands to the national interest, as Margaret Pearson notes, they claim that foreign internet providers would use access to China's internet markets to steal economic information, disseminate propaganda and use the internet to support dissidents or undermine the party. And these arguments tapped into deep worries about loss of Chinese sovereignty and widespread fear of social unrest made such arguments especially potent. So here we can see an example of how it is that subnational actors try to magnify the centrality of their demands in order to get particularistic accommodations for protection. But we also see the Chinese government playing a significant role in molding or shaping the apparent centrality as well as the degree of domestic contestation over a particular issue. So for example, the Chinese government framed resistance in Hong Kong and the US-China trade war as part of a national struggle reminiscent of the Opium War the Korean War and other historical disputes in which China eventually prevailed. And so in doing so, the Chinese government did a couple of things. One, it sought to build public support for the costs of a protracted dispute. It sought to raise the domestic cost of international concessions and it tried to signal its intent to stand firm against foreign pressure, increasing the centrality but also diminishing the space for contestation over this issue, right? Rather than making this an issue about the winners and losers of a trade war this was now about a national struggle against foreign pressure to keep China down. And preliminary sort of initial evidence from surveys conducted by scholars Wei Yishua and Jubu Liang find that indeed these framing efforts have been effective. So that survey respondents when asked about the ongoing trade war were much more supportive of the government's response when it was framed as part of a geopolitical struggle with the United States rather than when its economic costs were mentioned. Now I wanna talk about the issues in the upper left quadrant. These high centrality, low contestation issues that mostly I think encapsulate China's so-called core interests. And a key question here is the role of nationalism because if there is as I've just noted a lot of malleability and movement in how different issues are constructed across time and space how constrained really is the Chinese government by the nationalist sentiments that it has nurtured. And so the argument here that I make is that nationalism is a malleable constraint. It's not a direct driver in Chinese decision-making. So I first wanna talk about why it is that nationalism is malleable. First it's malleable because it's not an exogenous holy independent force. I'm a guy like to garden when it's not quite so snowy outside. So I'll use a metaphor of landscaping. It's both cultivated and selectively pruned back by the state and its agents whether that's through history textbooks, patriotic propaganda or the media. And over time the gardener can cultivate can renovate or even extend the landscape. But this is hard work once especially a particular strand of nationalism has grown extensive roots in society and become established. But it's important to note that the government isn't the only one involved in national Smith making. Of course, there are many actors and individuals in civil society, fervent believers, but nonetheless the Chinese government still steers the bounds of domestic discourse to align with its domestic international objectives. And so this national storytelling affects what historian Rana Mitter calls the circuits of memory, which historical episodes are showcased for domestic consumption, which contemporary external disputes are highlighted as critical and defined as part of the nation's core interests. So if nationalism is malleable or endogenous to the Chinese government's own domestic propaganda and foreign policy strategies, is it how constraining is it really? Here, I argue it's a constraining factor because nationalism provides contingent support. So it's one of the chief pillars of the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and as such it can bolster or also threaten regime security if toppled. And in particular, weak performance on issues that have been defined as central to the defense and advancement of the nation's interests can ultimately hollow out, chip away or topple the CCP's claim to rule. So in this way nationalism shapes the government's calculus but doesn't really directly tie its hands. In particular, nationalism defines which foreign policy issues are central and which are peripheral to the government's domestic legitimacy. So it shapes the domestic costs the government faces in navigating a real or hypothetical crisis or foreign policy challenge and in particular mobilized nationalism whether it's online or in the streets tends to increase the costs of compromise and it shapes the domestic decision-making environment again on the margins. It's not a direct driver but it shapes the government's foreign policy calculus. And then it also affects what issues the government is able to credibly invoke the specter of popular mobilization whether that street protests or consumer boycotts to signal to international audiences. And increasingly in an interconnected age despite censorship popular nationalism often provides the initial spark for international confrontation as Chinese netizens go global in their efforts to defend China as the NBA controversy showed. And even if nationalism doesn't play a direct role the government's expectations of where it is likely to face popular criticism will shape the government's calculus as it considers the risks and potential rewards that it stands to gain in taking particular decisions. And so nationalist narratives begin to provide that rhetorical framework that shapes which form policy critiques become powerful which ones are only glancing interests. So it affects the latent sensitivity of the government across different issue areas. So in survey work that I've done I find that Chinese attitudes are generally hawkish. A majority of respondents have endorsed greater reliance on military strength supported in greater spending on national defense. Others Andrew Chubb find there's very strong approval of sending troops to reclaim disputed islands in the East and South China Sea as well as viewing the US military presence in Asia as threatening. Interestingly hawkish views were more common amongst younger Chinese respondents that were reached by a set of surveys done out of Beijing but across the country in 2015. And Chinese elites were also more hawkish than their sort of mass public counterparts as well as netizens that I surveyed. So there are of course always questions about how reliable are the survey responses in China. Nonetheless, what I think and of course what Chinese citizens are willing to say whether that's in a survey or online is an important part of the kind of mobilized public opinion, the attentive public, if you will that the Chinese government has to deal with. Of course, what Chinese people really think is also very important, but what they're willing to say then becomes part of the political calculus. So then what question, a particularly important question is in a particular dispute how and to what extent can the Chinese government untie its hands or navigate flexibly even as the public might be upset? Well, here I think national sentiments do affect how successfully the Chinese government can appeal for restraint as well as how the government might behave when it cannot. And so a colleague and I found using a variety of survey experiments evidence of what political scientists call audience costs where respondents disapprove more after China made a threat in a dispute with them back down than if the government didn't make the threat in the first place. Then respondents in our surveys cited national honor as one of their main concerns in criticizing the governments in action. And similarly, research by Ian Johnston and Kai Kwak find that appeals to the costs of war China's peaceful identity and even the offer of UN mediation have been shown to increase public approval of restraint. Still, as I noted, China has not gone to war since 1979. So there must be other tactics that the government has been able to use to manage these public opinion costs. And so here I've just put up a screenshot of a recent paper that I published with Alan DeFoe in the International Studies Quarterly where we point to the possibility of bluster, symbolic military moves and rhetorical statements that are tough but vague, vague enough to escape this kind of binding constraint imposed by audiences who are upset about apparent inconsistency in the government's failure to follow through. And so this is one tactic that can be used, but there are still, I think, limits to how much the government can manage these domestic costs of restraint. So in a follow-up study, we looked at the real-time effect of U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to pick up the effect of all this Chinese bluster with the actual effect of these real-time patrols. And we found an increase in Chinese public disapproval, suggesting that the government does face pressure in such an instance to behave and respond rather than exercise restraint at the moment. So even though the Chinese government largely exercised a military strain, it did so at some domestic cost, suggesting that over the long-term, these kinds of actions can provoke greater resolve amongst the Chinese public to do more in the future. So I realize that we're drawing close to the end of our time together. So I wanna wrap up here with some conclusions for both China in the international order as well as some policy implications. So first, the takeaway here is that the Chinese government has really behaved strategically with the domestic politics of its approach to various issue areas determined ultimately by the politics of its domestic rule. And so if China is simultaneously a revisionist in some areas of a former or a free rider and even a defender of the status quo in other areas, perhaps a better term to use is one of disgruntled stakeholder to describe a rising China. And so what I've argued here is that the CCP has ultimately sought first to secure its survival and its legitimacy, a world that is safe for autocracy, but also one that isn't necessarily at odds with a world safe for democracy. Now, increasingly, China's efforts to create a world safe for autocracy is having international spillover effects. And as criticism of the CCP and hopes for regime change have grown abroad, so has the CCP's willingness to show off its resolve and claim a superior system. And so an open question is whether the CCP leadership newly both frightened by the early days of the coronavirus but emboldened by its relative success in combating COVID-19, will it more actively try to tip the scales around the world away from democracy and toward Chinese style autocracy? Now, to date, China's behavior in this area has largely been pragmatic and it's been agnostic about the regime type of the host countries that it has worked with. The strings that China attaches to its aid and investments have really been to the one China principle, not to how autocratic or democratic the other government is. And its economic coercion, whether that's boycotts or sanctions has really been targeted at companies and governments that have supported causes or the CCP deems threatening to its core interests, not necessarily, you know, overall this sort of ideological democracy versus autocracy question. And so to me, this continues to look more heavily weighted toward nationalist realpolitik on Beijing's part rather than a universalizing ideological mission. And of course this could change and one of the things that I'm concerned about is that an overly ideological approach on the part of whether it's the United States or it's a liberal democracies in Europe is that the more ideological the approach taken toward China the more likely it will inflame Chinese regime insecurities and perhaps encourage the CCP to play an even more offensive strategy in trying to defend itself at home. Now, in terms of the international implications for policy, I think the framework here suggests that different kinds of international pressure are more or less likely to succeed. The more central an issue is, the more likely it is to backfire unless a countervailing of equally central incentive for the Chinese government to shift policy can be found. The more contestation there is domestically on some of these central issues, the more international audience or international policymakers may be able to identify a domestically powerful constituency that can be played off of another and in particular allowing certain constituencies to be bought off with side payments. And this is how it was that the Chinese government after facing a lot of international pressure several years ago on the value of the R&B was able to overcome a bit of opposition from entrenched interests and industries. And that's a particularly important in the context of a lot of domestic contestation to recognize that Chinese rhetoric, not just material policies, but also symbolic rhetoric often plays to multiple audiences rather than always being consistent or predictive of Chinese behavior. Now, finally, ultimately this kind of a strategy is not about getting China to do something that is not in its interest, but rather to do something that is in the interests of some powerful constituencies while minimizing the opposition of others. Now, of course, this kind of a strategy will only work when there is a relatively strong domestic constituency that is aligned with external interests. On some other issues like, for example, cyber governance, you know, Molly Roberts shows in her research that censorship acts like a regressive tax. So elites have the means to circumvent the Great Firewall, while less wealthy or less educated citizens don't. They up to half the internet population isn't even aware of the Great Firewall's existence. So in such a case where the powerful aren't suffering and the less powerful have little ability to mobilize to demand change, that's not an issue in which you're likely to be able to use these domestic divisions to galvanize kind of an alignment for reform. So taking stock ultimately, you know, what does this mean for the future of international order? We're likely to see the most friction on highly central, low contestation issues. But it's important to note that China's domestic social purpose doesn't require the wholesale destruction of the existing internet. Jessica, we have lost your voice. Jessica, we are not hearing you. International order, hold on, okay. You're back, you were frozen earlier. I was frozen earlier, but okay. Yes. Sorry. And you were talking about the implications. That domestic Chinese policy don't require it to be really aggressive externally. So it doesn't require the wholesale destruction of the existing international order, but I do think it favors a more conservative version that emphasizes Westphalian norms of sovereignty and non-interference. So, you know, within the United Nations, China has sought to alter international obligations on human rights to emphasize the primacy of state sovereignty oversight of civil society and development above all. But there are many areas, for example, the national security law for Hong Kong when the intimidation of overseas Chinese where we see Chinese actions threatening the principle of non-interference. So if China wants to return to defending a more Westphalian system of mutual coexistence amongst sovereign states, it will need to curtail these extrusions of what we may call sharp power into other societies. But ultimately, I think the more that the Chinese Communist Party relies upon this more chauvinistic form of nationalism, the less successful it will ultimately be in its efforts to claim global leadership and attract international support. And already its efforts to proclaim superiority in combating the coronavirus have fueled a lot of suspicion and alarm. Now, of course, I think that other countries are also at risk of pursuing an equally nationalistic strategy. And so in the New York Times, I warned against the United States trying to quote out China, China. And then in particular, a strategy really based on tit for tat reciprocity, risks ceding the initiative to Beijing and ultimately risking a race to the bottom, sacrificing the very kind of openness and liberalism that US policy has aimed to protect. So with that, I think I'll conclude and really appreciate your attention and look forward to all the many questions I see coming in. Well, thank you very much, Jessica, for your very, very thoughtful and indeed thought provoking presentations. It's a tribute to you that we already have 19 questions in the Q&A box, and I will try to go through as many of them as I can. But as usual, before I go to the question from the Q&A box, can I start off by asking you to focus in particular in the Xi Jinping era, particularly after Xi Jinping became the dominant leader in China at the 19-party Congress of 2017? Because in your presentation, you talked about contestations and that there were significant disagreements on certain policy matters within the Chinese government. My question to you is while that would apply, if we look at the reform period generally, but if we only look at the period since the 19-party Congress when Xi Jinping becomes the dominant leader in China, what are the areas of contestations that we still see under Xi Jinping and who are the leaders within the Chinese leadership who contested on those specific foreign policy issues against the express wishes and policy guidelines of Xi Jinping? Thanks, it's an excellent question. And in some ways, the more recent we get, the harder it is to detect this internal contestation. And I don't mean to say that there are established factions that are driving policy far from it. I think that under Xi Jinping, we've seen a real effort to root out and crack down on any potential sources of real challenge. Nonetheless, I think that desire to preempt or respond to and diffuse any particular threats to Xi Jinping's authority does have a policy component. It's not just about eliminating people, but it's also about getting ahead of and preventing potential sources of consternation or concern. And so we saw, I think, some of this take place in the early phase of China's so-called war against the coronavirus. And we saw calls for greater freedom of speech. We saw certain elites, Rindu Qiang all the way to intellectuals like Shujun and Shujangren criticize in very harsh terms the performance of the CCP and particularly the kind of the silencing, the early silencing of local doctors and others. And so that is an example of, even though there is, of course, a great effort to instill ideological unity and deference to the top party leadership and Xi Jinping in particular, there still exist a great divergence of views. Now, that's not a particularly a foreign policy issue. I think on the issue of, say, Taiwan, for example, there are still within, nobody is contesting in China whether or not Taiwan is part of China. That is not within the bounds of discourse. But the question of how quickly should the mainland move to achieve the shared goal of so-called reunification, that is an issue on which there is disagreement. What is this a time at which conditions are ripe for reunification to proceed more quickly? Or is China simply still not strong enough militarily not to do so in a way that would be consistent with Chinese interests? And so you saw even here, briefly, some conversations, public comments by military or military affiliated figures discussing how China should think about this objective of reunification in particular, whether or not to use military force in the short run. Now, I'm not saying that those views ended up necessarily putting pressure on Xi Jinping, but they may be reflective of ongoing discussions taking place inside of the CCP at higher levels. But I don't have any particular insight into who exactly is contesting on what issues, at this level of specificity. I do think that particularly on economic issues where there are much more readily identifiable interests, material interests, as well as when you think about, for example, the sprawling of BRI where there are many, many different actors involved in implementing as well as agitating for changes in policy. There is much easier to discern different actors where even if they are not playing a key role in rolling out the slogans, nonetheless in the implementation phases do have a key role to play in how policy turns out. Okay, well, thank you very much for that. The first question I pick is from William Knight in London. China certainly seems to be aiming to become an active member of international institutions. Is the objective predominantly to most such organizations into adopting China's own governance standards and thinking or is it being too cynical? Well, I think that it's not an either or. And I don't, I'm not trying to be idealistic here. In fact, I think it's very important to be realistic about what it is that China is trying to do. But we have to also recognize in part of the sort of, I think part of the payoff of the framework is recognizing that China doesn't have one single set of governance standards. In fact, it has many different issues. And so its behavior towards certain international organizations will look different than others. And so in some areas, such as, you know, thinking about human rights, universal values, yes, there's definitely an attempt to, you know, move those norms and standards away from the sort of, the sort of post-Cold War liberal interventionist mold toward one that is, you know, much more a deferential to the host states, and particularly the government's interests and wishes. But on other issues, you know, whether it's, you know, the IMF or, you know, the World Health Organization, what does it mean for, you know, what are China's own governance standards there? I think there's a lot more sort of give and take as to, you know, whether or not China is in some way sympathetic with some standards. But of course when you have the difference there, the gap there, I think is a lot smaller. And so this is, it's different from, you know, trying to recreate, I think, other institutions in China's own image. Again, the intensity of China's preferences, I think we, again, have to go back to the domestic centrality of a particular issue set. And on issues that are quite central, that ones that threaten the very survival of the CCP, in particular the emphasis on universal values and individual political rights, that's an issue on which the CCP feels intensely and is working hard to change. Whereas other ones where there's more domestic contestation inside China, where it's not as central to the CCP's legitimacy or where there's even a shared interest, then, you know, I don't think that we need to think about it as to dominate these institutions and, you know, replace existing norms with China's own. Next question comes from Bill Haydn's of the Chatham House in London. Can you suggest any example of the Chinese Communist Party demoting an issue from higher to lower centrality? Is it possible for it to downplay an issue by managing public opinion? So somebody asked actually here about, you know, China's border dispute with India. And I think that's an interesting example of an issue where of course sort of its latent centrality is quite high. Anything that has to do with territorial sovereignty is quite high. But I think tactically the Chinese government has made a decision not to, you know, hype the issue in public discourse. It's, you know, not reported, you know, much of the Indian activity along the border. And so that's an example and that's, you know, consistent with how China's behaved in, you know, some of its territorial disputes or various times tried to downplay certain issues. So when, for example, you know, Vietnam, there were, you know, mass anti-China protests, you know, over contending claims in the South China Sea, you know, China did not allow, you know, reciprocal anti-Vietnamese protests and relative to the dispute with the Philippines, you know, Vietnamese, you know, that dispute was given much lower profile in the Chinese media. So even on issues that there is kind of a high degree of latent centrality, we do see, I think, the Chinese government demoting some of these issues and for various reasons. And so, you know, drawing upon the work that I, you know, did for my first book, sometimes, you know, economic ties, especially throughout, you know, for example, the 1990s, you know, China was much more interested in, you know, fostering kind of a conducive, you know, external international environment and, you know, downplayed certain territorial disputes and kind of kept a lid on grassroots mobilization. So we do see, I think, my liability even in this area. Next question comes from Alana Tang. You mentioned that China has not used force since the Vietnam incident of 1979. And yet, just recently, there are border incidents between China and India, where forces were actually used. China similarly has established new foreign military bases, clearly expending and expulsing its hot power more dramatically. How do you so-called reconcile this with your claim? So to be clear, you know, my claim was that the Chinese government has been able to resist, you know, many of the most hawkish voices that it faces, you know, from online netizens or hawkish, you know, military-affiliated scholars or retired general, not that the Chinese government has not been willing to use, you know, military or, you know, paramilitary force. So these are different claims. And it is important to note that China has largely, with the exception of the recent, you know, border clashes in the Himalayas, largely kept, you know, the defense of its territorial claims below the threshold of sort of outright open military force. It is, you know, it's often termed sort of gray zone coercion, where it is clearly, you know, efforts by the state to advance its interests and shore up its military presence or civilian presence, you know, it's like a paramilitary presence. But nonetheless has done so in a way that it tries to and has largely successfully avoided, you know, provoking an all-out military confrontation. And so I say that largely to underscore the importance of looking at how it is that the Chinese government has managed and in some ways accommodated or pacified appeased, I guess you would say appeased these domestic Lihaka or nationalistic voices. Often through a few different means, one is what through what I've called bluster, right? Which is a lot of tough, emotionally resonant rhetoric, but that nonetheless leaves the government with substantial leeway, not to de-escalate, but to, you know, postpone any final reckoning as well as, you know, direct attention to the sort of longer term ways in which the Chinese government is planning to, you know, defend Chinese interests while resisting kind of the short-term pressure to take rash action. Next question from Freddie Bainbridge. How would you locate Xinjiang within China's foreign and domestic policy framework? Foreign because of its importance to the BLI or domestic because of its domestic developments, daybuilding and the ongoing crackdown of the weaker minorities in the region? Where would you put it? So like most issues, there isn't a clean line between domestic and foreign, many domestic issues have an international component. And even if, you know, the Chinese government would see Xinjiang as a purely domestic issue, nonetheless, it has, as you know, a connection to China's international objectives, whether that's in terms of security or our economic ties. Now, ultimately, I think the Chinese government sees this largely through the lens of domestic stability. I don't see very much evidence that international kind of considerations or, you know, whether it's sanctions or supply chain concerns, I don't see very much evidence that, you know, foreign censure criticism, that blowback is having a whole lot of impact on ultimately the CCP's, in my view, misguided, but nonetheless what they see is their effort to shore up control in this region. Okay, next questions come from Dan Wang. What do you think over or is China's own perceptions towards China's road in the international system? It's in particular underlines that it's not just about the rhetorics of what Chinese leaders have to say, but how China actually perceives its own role. Well, there is, of course, no singular China. And so I think this question ultimately has to be, you know, what is Xi Jinping's view of China's role? Because I think there are indeed a lot of different views on what role, you know, China ought to play. Some aspire to, you know, a Chinese kind of international hegemony. Others, I think, are much more willing to see China playing a shared leadership role in a system that is, of course, much more receptive and respectful of, you know, the CCP's continued leadership at home and in the international system. And others, you know, would like to see China be, you know, a much more liberal state itself and much more rules, much more bound by rules and much more open and less dominated by the party state. So it is, I think, you know, any definitive even answer that I could give you now, I think is also subject to change. And what you've seen, I think, although there is this spectrum of opinion, I do think that right now the equilibrium as, you know, potentially changing as it is really does, and it's reflected, I think, in kind of the rhetoric, really, because there's, you know, you see on the one hand an increased willingness by leaders like Xi Jinping to talk about the example China can provide for the world, but nonetheless to continue to reassure outsiders that China does not seek to export or its model or force others to copy it. There is a continued emphasis on, at the international level on this, you know, diversity of different systems. And that is, I think, important because it is, could change and would be a leading sign, I think, of a Chinese decision to dispense with that kind of restraint and to embrace a much more kind of universalizing mission. And so ultimately, I think that there is, although there is this different spectrum of opinion, I think that there is still a willingness to accept at the international level a shared leadership role. I don't think that there is a sense in which it is practical in any kind of near or medium term for China to, you know, supplant US kind of leadership, although of course under over the last four years that became, you know, much more realistic given the enormous vacuum that was left. But nonetheless, I think this more multipolar system, again, that's a word that a phrase that has been, you know, part of Chinese rhetoric for a very long time. I think that is coming a lot closer to being kind of a reality where, you know, in the region, you know, China exercises outside weight and globally, you know, it is a much more shared leadership role. Next question from Adam Said Oxford Brooks University. On the high centrality issue of Taiwan, would it be possible for the international community to move Beijing's positions at all? I think it would be very difficult for the outside community to move how it is that China sees an issue as being central or peripheral. I think that there are of course policy actions that outside actors take will resonate inside China and could affect, you know, the actions that Beijing takes. So when you ask, is it possible to move Beijing's position on this? No, not on the fundamentals, but tactically, of course, actions matter. And so I think that, you know, for example, there is a, I think a lively discussion in the United States over whether or not, you know, a position. You are frozen. You are frozen, Jessica. You are frozen, Jessica. Jessica, can you hear me? Sorry, you were frozen earlier. Yes, I see that now. Sorry. Yes. Well, don't worry about it. I think we got the gist of your answer there anyway. The next question comes from our Facebook feed. It's a rather long question. So if you could bear with me while I read that out. And it comes from PJ Lim, a source alumni. A certain Chinese foreign policy, such as territorial claims in South China Sea, alongside the confrontational public rhetoric employed in the Wolf Warrior diplomacy, tends to alienate both foreign governments and foreign public opinion. Why then does the CCP leadership continue to follow such a course of action? I think, I mean, there are more details, but if you could address that. I think it's a very good question. I think that it reveals that right now, I think a couple of things. One, internationally, that China would rather be feared than loved, there's not been a lot of course correction in terms of the so-called Wolf Warrior diplomacy. And secondly, that domestically, there are a lot of factors continuing to perpetuate a desire to shore up domestic security and the image that the CCP has vis-a-vis alternative forms of governance. And that this continued effort to kind of chide others for their failings is a couple of things that is aimed at reassuring Chinese audiences that there's nothing better out there, better stick with the CCP. And secondly, that there is in this CCP that's been dominated by Xi Jinping, a desire to play this more combative role in gaining the sort of public opinion, guiding and shaping public opinion, the sort of struggle. And so lower level diplomats in China, take their cues from this. And so, again, it is a very offensive way to achieve a defensive objective of making the Chinese system of governance look relatively again. Next question I pick comes from Graham Hutchings, who is an associate at the Oxford China Center and also an honorary professor at University of Nottingham. Does your framework assume that the interests and behavior of the CCP and its leaders are co-terminist with those of the Chinese people or the Chinese nation? Can you distinguish between the two analytically or conceptually or in terms of the English remarks, national welfare? A great question and absolutely not. In fact, part of the framework rests upon the idea that all of these ideas and the presentation of Chinese interests are domestically contested. But there is also the unfortunate reality that many voices that would contest the CCP's portrayal of certain interests, national interests, are silenced or marginalized. And so it then becomes, in some ways, the extent of observed contestation reflects the CCP's use of repression propaganda and persuasion. So it does not make that assumption, but it also recognizes that some of the most diversiferous forms of contestation are literally being silenced in, for example, in Xinjiang. OK. Next question comes from Kinling Lo. What do you think are the most immediate domestic issues that China is dealing with, which will be reflected in China's fallen policies in the very near future? There's so many. I mean, I don't think there's, you know, there was almost too many to count. I mean, I think pretty much everything that China does domestically has an international dimension on these days. There is certainly, you know, it is not just domestic effects international, but the international effects domestic. And so, for example, the idea of dual circulation and I think the CCP's recognition that the international trend toward some form of decoupling or national resilience in key strategic industries has led the Chinese government to similarly take measures to strengthen domestic innovation and reduce potentially catastrophic reliance inputs to China's growth in industry. So, you know, but then, you know, on the other hand, you know, I think there are a lot of, we look from the domestic outward, for example, at China's recent pledge on carbon neutrality. I think climate ultimately is an issue that China sees as stemming from its domestic interest not only in having, you know, clean air to breathe, but also, you know, a commanding position in the next generation, you know, renewable technologies in that marketplace. So that's an area in which I think it's important to start with domestic. Next question from Lucy Dide, who is a civil servant for the British government. Will increased international pressure help improve the human rights situation in Xinjiang or will it backfire? No, unfortunately, I think that this is an area in which it is more likely to backfire, but there are different ways in which one might try to get creative about trying to alleviate the suffering of those inside China, such as, you know, improving opportunities for those impressed inside China to seek asylum or refuge outside. Of course, that's, we're seeing that unfold in both the UK and under the Biden administration here. So there, I think there's a, it has to depends on whether or not the policies seem to be ones that, you know, are really directed against, you know, a very targeted set of policies or are, you know, bluntly seem at delegitimizing, you know, the entire CCP apparatus or are more specific. Unfortunately, I think the sad reality is that, you know, the more specific the sanctions, you know, it's not like they're, those become more effective as a result. So it's a really, it's a really tough place to be, unfortunately. Can I actually follow up on that, Jessica, because it happens that today in the UK, we have an opinions, legal opinion being offered by a very senior lawyer in London who says that there is a very strong case for what happens in Xinjiang to be considered as meeting the UN's definition of genocide. And if, if that is something that will be accepted more generally as a view, what is the implication of how we are engaging or how we should be engaging with China if we accept quite simply that taking on human rights in a place where it could potentially be a genocide situation and back off because it will simply backfire on the country that is responsible for such activities. I wish I had an easy solution here. I think it's a very, very tricky case because it is unlikely, you know, given, you know, China's position that, you know, a legal avenue will bear fruit. So this is really about the court of public opinion, international opinion as well as Chinese public opinion and whether or not, you know, a greater confrontation in the sense of whether it's an Olympic boycott or other measures to punish China collectively for what the CCP, the heinous things that the CCP is doing in Xinjiang, whether or not they are found to be, you know, meeting a legal definition of genocide. Nonetheless, a collective effort to punish China I think has the real potential of backfiring. But on the other hand, it's possible, you know, that it could, if the CCP, you know, I think it also depends on what's the offering, right? Which is, I think right now, unfortunately, I don't think China sees and the CCP does not see a lot of interest in China taking a greater leadership role in the international stage. So I think there's probably a fair amount of skepticism that even moderating Chinese behavior would kind of gain kind of international support and lead to a bunch of good things from China's perspective. So it's possible that if embedded in a larger framework that it could work, but I'm afraid that it might not. Next question I pick comes from India. It comes from Bahim Shubha, who is at the Hathorah Rabbat University in India. How do you see the PRC appointing United Frontal Work Department veterans serving in the minority areas as chief diplomats in South Asians and African countries? Do you see their experience in minority areas as being helpful to China's interaction with countries in South Asia and Africa? That's a very good question. And I think it ultimately is one that I'd want to explore empirically rather than make assumptions about what these, because I could only speculate. I wouldn't have anything really informed to say on that. Right, next question I pick comes from Italy. Is a academic in Italy who prefers to stay anonymous. I was wondering whether you would lengthen the maleability of Chinese nationalism, I say constrained to the recognized ability of the regimes to adapt. Could you clarify that? I know I didn't quite. I was wondering whether you would lengthen the maleability of Chinese nationalism, I say constrained to the recognized ability of the regimes to adapt. I do think that as I said that the nationalism is a strategic choice and investment that the Chinese government has made. And it is one that should the CCP wish to signal a more reassuring attitude. They could change what is taught in schools, what is taught in history books. I think it is interesting. I was in full transparency, I have a review essay coming out in Foreign Affairs on Ronald Reagan's new book where the CCP has increasingly portrayed China as present at the creation of the post-war international order. Of course that's not quite accurate because it was Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong who was there at Cairo. But nonetheless, this change and how the CCP portrays China's role in the post-war history is an important, I think, sign that the CCP would like to play a more constructive role or be seen as a legitimate co-founder of the existing international order. And so far, of course, that's not how they are being treated. And I think that that actually potentially creates an opportunity for those powers, liberal democracies that want China to change its behavior and push back against its most problematic exercises of international influence, I think particularly the intrusion into the affairs of liberal democracy, the sovereign affairs, including the sort of export of censorship and intimidation of diasporic communities. Those are areas that, as I said, I think during my talk that are inconsistent with China's commitments to upholding non-interference. And so if China wishes to play more constructive role in defending what it has now portrayed as its role in co-founding the existing international order, then foreign capitals and governments may be able to use that desire to press for these changes in China's behavior. Next question also on nationalism comes from Philip Mead. If Chinese youth are becoming more hawkish, how will the CCP be able to manage nationalism in future? It seems to Philip that the rhetoric coming out of China in terms of the wolf warriors, the saber-rattling of sub-China sea, Senkaku, freedom of navigation, et cetera, is reinforcing extreme nationalist sentiment. Isn't the Communist Party rewriting a tiger that it cannot get off? It's an important question. And I think we need to be really attentive to the different strands of nationalism that the CCP is nurturing and whether or not that's a militaristic strand or whether it's a more intolerant strand of kind of chauvinistic nationalism that sees China as governance and society is superior to others. And that's what I see it really leaning on right now. That's what that wolf warrior diplomacy is. It's this intolerant sort of arrogant approach to viewing the troubles that other societies are experiencing. I would be, so that's worrisome, but it's also different from the kind of nationalism that says everybody should be ruled by China and Vietnam is next. And I don't think that that's the kind of nationalism that we are seeing. It's not a territorially expansionist nationalism, but it is a very chauvinistic nationalism, one that despite the CCP's rhetoric about the beauty of diversity of civilizations is really quite condescending toward others. Next questions comes from Melvin Jones. How far is the increasing nationalistic rhetoric of the Communist Party leadership related to a slowing down of China's economic growth? I think there's an important connection there as the CCP has been able less and less to rely on extremely rapid economic growth. They've had to change the sort of justifying rhetoric for the CCP's legitimacy, even away from fast growth to higher quality growth as well as increasingly relying on nationalism while still of course emphasizing the importance of the economy. And, alas, I think that national rejuvenation, achieving nationalist objectives has come to play a relatively greater role in the centrality kind of the picture. Which of these different pillars does the CCP lean on? I think nationalism has begun to play a bigger role. Next questions comes from a PhD student at the Ankara University in Turkey, group heritage, Gungo. China has laid out its plans to implement a social credit system throughout the country. Do you think the social credit systems will affect the contestations and centrality framework you have? I think that if the, I don't think that the social credit system is as much as all that it has been cracked up to be. Nonetheless, if it succeeds in providing the CCP with ever more insight into the opinions and behaviors of its citizens, then it may further reduce the possibility of contestation. But I would like to see more evidence of it before we proclaim that everybody in China lives, under this kind of highly integrated, well-honed machine that sees everything and knows everything. Okay, next questions comes from Kaod Diderich. How are international criticisms of China portrayed in the Chinese media? Do these portrayals inference how citizens interact with local politicians in China? So by and large, foreign, the Chinese media tends to emphasize both the problems of political governance overseas, again, to reduce the appeal of alternative political systems. You are fousoned again, Jessica. You are still fousoned, Jessica. Particularly liberal democracy. You were fousoned a bit, Jessica. Sorry about that. Can't get a break today. One of those things. So in general, I'm not sure what you last heard me say, but in general, the Chinese media have portrayed foreign political systems in a negative light and jumped at every opportunity to point out the hypocrisy in- I'm afraid you are fousoned again, Jessica. You are still fousoned. Foreign criticisms. Okay, here we are. Sorry, you were fousoned again. Oh, no. You know, since we only got two minutes left, I think I'll move on to the next question, which is also about media, but I suspect you can give a fairly short answer to that. And this comes from Lara Shira, a student at Cambridge University. She would like to ask you your opinion on the portrayal of China in the Western media. Do you think it is fair or do you see it as being biased? That's a really good and important question. There are, there is an abundance of really good reporting about China. Whether it is biased or not, I think that there is, on some issues, there are some inaccuracies or have been inaccuracies, particularly in the coverage of, we just talked about the social credit system, for example, where there is a tendency to report or have reporting framed in a particular way. Those are headlines could be all leaning in one direction. And we don't see quite so much diversity of views sometimes, even if within a given article, there may be diversity of views. The headline leans in a particular direction. So I do think that there is, not sure whether this amounts to bias, but I do think that there is a fair amount of herd mentality, where a particular interpretation gains speed or traction. And I think Ian Johnston has done a lot of work on memes in foreign, not just reporting, but also popular public discourse and think tanks and others, where sometimes a particular conventional view isn't subject to quite as much empirical scrutiny. And I think that the base, the evidentiary basis, if you will, for some of the arguments is not given as much rigorous consideration. So similar to the debt trap narrative, for example, I think there are some academics, particularly Deborah Brodegem and Meg Rithmeyer have a new piece in the Atlantic, again, trying to push back against this narrative, which was really rested on one port in Sri Lanka. It's particularly, I think, difficult when those narratives are taken up by particular governments and then shape policy because the underlying reality sometimes, the facts are lost when the narratives take hold. And so I don't know that I would go so far as to say the media are biased, but I do think that it's imperative for readers as well as producers of knowledge in the media to read everything with a little bit more, recognize that when everything is pointing in one direction and we don't hear from, there are no questions asked or uncertainties allowed for that that might be a red flag that we might want to take into consideration. Okay, well, thank you very much, Jessica. I'm afraid that we have run out of time and I must apologize to those of you who have raised questions that I have not been able to fit into Jessica. And I also need to apologize to you for the breaking up of part of the webinar. We will look into that and hope to see if there's anything you can do about this to avoid the same problem we current. With that, just let me thank you again, Jessica, Professor Chen Weiss for your fantastic presentation and very engaging conversations and discussions with our students and friends. Thank you and goodbye. Thanks, it's been a pleasure.