 Section 0 of Prolegomina to Any Future Metaphysics. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Prolegomina to Any Future Metaphysics by Emanuel Kent, translated by Paul Carus. The Publishers' Preface Kant's Prolegomina, although a small book, is indubitably the most important of his writings. It furnishes us with the key to his main work, The Critique of Pure Reason. In fact, it is an extract containing all the salient ideas of Kant's system. It approaches the subject in the simplest and most direct way, and is therefore best adapted as an introduction into his philosophy. For this reason, the Open Court Publishing Company has deemed it advisable to bring out a new edition of the work, keeping in view its broader use as a preliminary survey and explanation of Kant's philosophy in general. In order to make the book useful for its broader purpose, the editor has not only stated his own views concerning the problem underlying the Prolegomina, C-Page 167 et sec, but has also collected the most important materials, which had reference to Kant's philosophy, or to the reception which was accorded to it in various quarters, C-Page 241 et sec. The selections have not been made from a partisan standpoint, but have been chosen with a view to characterizing the attitude of different minds and to directing the student to the best literature on the subject. It is not without good reasons that the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason is regarded as the beginning of a new era in the history of philosophy, and so it seems that a comprehension of Kant's position, whether we accept or reject it, is indispensable to the student of philosophy. It is not his solution which makes the Sage of Königsberg the initiator of modern thought, but his formulation of the problem. The present translation is practically new, but it goes without saying that the editor utilized the labors of his predecessors, among whom Professor John P. Mahaffey and John H. Bernard deserve special credit. Richardson's translation of 1818 may be regarded as superseded and has not been consulted, but occasional reference has been made to that of Professor Ernest Belfort-Bucks. Considering the difficulties under which even these translators labored, we must recognize the fact that they did their work well, with painstaking diligence, great love of the subject, and good judgment. The editor of the present translation has the advantage of being to the main or born. Moreover, he is pretty well versed in Kant's style, and wherever he differs from his predecessors in the interpretation of a construction, he has deviated from them not without good reasons. Nevertheless, there are some passages which will still remain doubtful, though happily they are of little consequence. As a curiosum in Richardson's translation, Professor Mahaffey mentions that the words which simply means symmetric helices are rendered by snail-throlled up contrary to all sense, awarding that is itself contrary to all sense and makes the whole paragraph unintelligible. We may add an instance of another mistake that misses the mark. Kant employs in the appendix award that is no longer used in German. He speaks of the Sento der Metaphysik as having Neue Lappen and einen veranderten Zuschnet. Mr. Bach translates Sento by body, Lappen by outgrowth, and Zuschnet by figure. His mistake is perhaps not less excusable than Richardson's. It is certainly not less comical, and it also destroys the sense, which in the present case is a very striking simile. Sento is the Latin word derived from the Greek, meaning a garment of many patches sewed together, or as we might now say, a crazy quilt. In the hope that this book will prove useful, the open court publishing company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy. End of the publisher's preface. Section 1 of Prolegomina to any future metaphysics. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Prolegomina to any future metaphysics by Immanuel Kant, translated by Paul Carus. Introduction These Prolegomina are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of future teachers. And even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of already made science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself. There are scholarly men to whom the history of philosophy, both ancient and modern, is philosophy itself. For these, the present Prolegomina are not written. They must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work. It will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been done. Unfortunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion has not been said before. And truly, the same prophecy applies to all future time. For since the human reason has for many centuries speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways, it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages. My object is to persuade all those who think metaphysics worth studying that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment and neglecting all that has been done to propose first the preliminary question whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible. If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition? If not, how can it maintain its pretensions and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing that in this, which pretends to be wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle everyone inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk. After all, it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of the science when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced that the question should at last occur whether and how such a science is possible. Human reason so delights in constructions that it has several times built up a tower and then raised it to examine the nature of the foundation. It is never too late to become wise, but if the change comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform. The question whether a science be possible presupposes adopt as to its actuality, but such adopt offends the men whose whole positions consist of this supposed jewel, hence he who raises adopt must expect a position from all sides. Some in the proud consciousness of their positions, which are ancient and therefore considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands and look down on him with contempt. Others who never see anything except it be identical with what they have seen before will not understand him and everything will remain for a time as if nothing had happened to excite the concern or the hope for an impending change. Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of this Proligomina will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated, on which its possibility depends, be satisfied, and as this has never been done, that there is as yet no such thing as metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand, since the interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he must confess that a radical reform or rather a new birth of the science after an original plan are unavoidable, however men may struggle against it for a while. Since the essays of Locke and Leibniz or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on the species of knowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance, and had its smoldering fire been carefully nursed and developed. Hume started from a single but important concept in metaphysics, that of cause and effect, including its derivatives, force and action, etc. He challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth to this idea from herself, to answer him by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, something else also must necessarily be posited, for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori, and by means of concepts a combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. Hence he inferred that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain representations under the law of association, and mistook the subjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be purely fictitious, and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing, but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language, there is not and cannot be any such thing as metaphysics at all. However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at least founded upon investigation, and this investigation deserved the concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day, as well as determined efforts on their part to discover, if possible, a happier solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him, all of which would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science. But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood. It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, Raid, Oswald, Beati and lastly Priestly, missed the point of the problem. For while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal, and often with impudence, that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstructed his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened. The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, or even indispensable for our knowledge of nature. For this Hume had never doubted. But whether that concept could be sought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a wider application than merely to the object of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of the concept. Where the former decided the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason. So far as it is concerned with pure thinking, a task which did not suit them, they found a more convenient method of being defiant without any insight, with the appeal to a common sense. It is indeed a great gift of God to possess right or, as they now call it, plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown practically by well considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle when no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal to common sense when insight and science fail and no sooner, this is one of the subtile discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial renter can safely enter the list with the most thorough thinker and hold his own. But as long as a particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge. For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed while the popular charlatan glories and confines in it? I should think that Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beatty, and in addition to a critical reason, such as the latter did not possess, which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, or, if speculations are under discussion, restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments. By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for steel engraving we require an engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable in their own way, the former in judgments which apply immediately to experience. The latter, when we judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so-called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has no right to judge at all. I openly confess the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions at which he arrived by regarding not the whole of this problem but a part which by itself can give us no information. If we start from a well-founded but undeveloped thought which another has bequeased to us, we may well hope by continued reflection to advance further than the acute man to whom we owe the first spark of light. I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections. I sought to ascertain their number and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts which I was now certain were not deduced from experience as Hume had apprehended but sprung from the pure understanding. This deduction which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor which had never even occurred to anyone else though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis of their objective validity was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics and the worst was that metaphysics such as it then existed could not assist me in the least because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible but as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular case but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason I could proceed safely though slowly to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles in its circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable method but I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent with my critique of the pure reason will fare as the problem itself fared when first proposed it will be misjudged because it is misunderstood and misunderstood because men choose to skim through the book and not to think through it a disagreeable task because the work is dry, obscure opposed to all ordinary notions and moreover long-winded I confess however I did not expect to hear from philosophers' complaints of want of popularity, entertainment and facility when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at stake which cannot be established otherwise than by the strictest rules of methodic precision popularity may follow but is inadmissible at the beginning yet as regards a certain obscurity arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan owing to which the principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of the complaint is just and I intend to remove it by the present prolegomina the first mentioned work which discusses the pure faculty of reason in its whole compass and bounds will remain the foundation for which the prolegomina as a preliminary exercise refer for our critique must first be established as a complete and perfected science before we can think of letting metaphysics appear on the scene or even have the most distant hope of attaining it we have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge produced as new and out of its former context and reducing it to system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles most readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the critique but these prolegomina may persuade him that it is a perfectly new science of which no one has ever even thought the very idea of which was unknown for which nothing is too accomplished can be of the smallest use except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts yet ever he did not suspect such a formal science but ran his ship ashore for safety's sake landing on skepticism there to let it lie unwrote whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot who by means of safe astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe and provided with a complete chart and compass may steer the ship safely with their helisteth if in a new science which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of our previously acquired knowledge which is precisely what has first to be called in question we should only fancy we saw everywhere what we had already known the expressions having a similar sound only that all would appear utterly made of morphosed senseless and unintelligible because we should have as a foundation our own notions made by long habit a second nature instead of the authors but the long windedness of the work so far as it depends on the subject and not the exposition its consequent unavoidable dryness and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the science though they may discredit the book few writers are gifted with the subtlety and at the time with the grace of David Hume or with the depth as well as the elegance of Moses Mendelssohn yet I flatter myself I might have made my own exposition popular had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and leave its completion to others instead of having my heart in the welfare of the science to which I had devoted myself so long in truth it required no little constancy and even self-denial to postpone the suites of an immediate success to the prospect of a slower but more lasting reputation making plans is often the occupation of an upland and boastful mind which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius by demanding what it cannot itself supply by censuring what it cannot improve and by proposing what it knows not where to find and yet something more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure reason than mere conjectures if this plan is to be other than the usual declamations of pious aspirations but pure reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest we can therefore do nothing without first determining the position of each part and its relation to the rest for as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason so in the structure of an organized body the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole it may then be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete down to the smallest elements of pure reason in the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or nothing but although a mere sketch preceding the critique of pure reason would be unintelligible, unreliable and useless it is all the more useful as a sequel for so we are able to grasp the whole to examine in detail the chief points of importance in the science and to improve in many respects our exposition as compared with the first execution of the work after the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is sketched out after an analytical method while the work itself had to be executed in a synthetical style in order that the science may present all its articulations as the structure of a peculiar cognitive faculty in their natural combination but should any reader find this plan which I publish as the prelogimena to any future metaphysics still obscure, let him consider that not everyone is bound to study metaphysics that many minds will succeed very well in the exact and even in deep sciences more closely allied to practical experience while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts in such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects but he who undertakes to judge or still more to construct a system of metaphysics must satisfy the demands here made either by adopting my solution or by thoroughly refuting it and substituting another to evade it is impossible in conclusion let it be remembered that this much abused obscurity frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their own indolence or dullness has its uses since all who in other sciences observe a judicious silence speak authoritatively in metaphysics and make bold decisions because their ignorance is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others yet it does contrast with sound critical principles which we made therefore commend in the words of Virgil Ignavum fucos pecus apre sepibus artent bees are defending their hives against drones those indolent creatures end of introduction prologamana to any future metaphysics by Emanuel Kant translated by Paul Carros prologamana preamble on the peculiarities of all metaphysical cognition one of the sources of metaphysics if it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science it will be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features which no other science has in common with it constituting as characteristics otherwise the boundaries of all sciences become confused and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its nature the characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference of object or of the sources of cognition or of the kind of cognition or perhaps of all three conjointly and this therefore depends the idea of a possible science and its territory first as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical its principles including not only its maxims but its basic notions must never be derived from experience it must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge with knowledge lying beyond experience it can therefore have for its basis neither external experience which is the source of physics proper nor internal which is the basis of empirical psychology it is therefore a priori knowledge coming from pure understanding and pure reason but so far metaphysics would not be distinguishable from pure mathematics it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition and for the meaning of this term are referred to the critique of the pure reason two method of transcendentalism chapter one section one where the distinction between these two employments of the reason is sufficiently explained so far concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition two concerning the kind of cognition which can alone be called metaphysical A. of the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments in general the peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical cognition must consist of nothing but the a priori judgments but whatever be their origin or their logical form there is a distinction in judgments as to their contents according to which they are either merely explicative adding nothing to the content of the cognition or expansive increasing the given cognition the former may be called analytical the latter synthetical judgments analytical judgments express nothing in their predicates but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject though not so distinctly or with the same full consciousness when I say all bodies are extended I have not amplified in the least my concept of body but have only analyzed it as extension was really thought to belong to that concept before the judgment was made though it was not expressed this judgment is therefore analytical on the contrary this judgment all bodies have weight contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of the body it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept and must therefore be called synthetical b. the common principle of all analytical judgments is the law of contradiction all analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of contradiction and are in their nature a priori cognitions whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not for the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject of which it cannot be denied without contradiction in the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of the subject in an analytical but negative judgment by the same law of contradiction such is the nature of the judgments all bodies are extended and no bodies are unextended i.e. simple for this very reason all analytical judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical as for example gold is a yellow metal for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal it is in fact a very concept and I need only analyze it without looking beyond it elsewhere c. Synthetical judgments require a different principle from the law of contradiction there are synthetical a posteriori judgments of empirical origin but there are also others which are proved to be certain a priori and which spring from pure understanding and reason yet they both agree in this that they cannot possibly spring from the principle of analysis with the law of contradiction alone they require a quite different principle though from whatever they may be deduced they must be subject to the law of contradiction which must never be violated even though everything cannot be deduced from it I shall first classify synthetical judgments one, empirical judgments are always synthetical for it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience as our concept suffices for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience that body is extended is a judgment established a priori and not an empirical judgment for before appealing to experience we already have all the conditions of the judgment in their concept from which we have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of contradiction and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the judgment which experience could not even teach it two, mathematical judgments are all synthetical this fact seems hiddado to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have analyzed human reason it even seems directly opposed to all their conjectures though incontestably certain and most important in this consequences for as it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed according to the law of contradiction as is demanded by all apotheic certainty meant for a synthetical proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction but only by presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows but never in itself first of all, we must observe that all proper mathematical judgments are a priori and not empirical because they carry with them necessity which cannot be obtained from experience but if this be not considered to me, very good I shall confine my assertion to pure mathematics the very notion of which implies that it contains pure a priori and not empirical cognitions it might at first be thought that the proposition 7 plus 5 equals 12 is a mere analytical judgment following from the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 according to the law of contradiction but on closer examination it appears that the concept of the sum of 7 plus 5 contains merely their union in a single number without it being at all thought what the particular number is that unites them the concept of 12 is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of 7 and 5 and analyze this possible sum as we may we shall not discover 12 in the concept we must go beyond these concepts by calling to our aid some concrete image i.e. either or five fingers or five points as senior has it in his arithmetic and we must add successively the units of the five given in some concrete image to the concept of 7 hence our concept is really amplified by the proposition 7 plus 5 equals 12 and we add to the first a second not thought in it Arithmetic judgments are therefore synthetic and more plainly according as we take larger numbers for in such cases it is clear that however closely we analyze our concepts without calling visual images to our aid we can never find a sum by such mere dissection all principles of geometry are now less analytical that a straight line is the shortest path between two points is a synthetic proposition for my concept of a straight contains nothing of quantity but only a quality the attribute of shortness is therefore altogether additional and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept here too visualization must come to aid us it alone makes the synthesis possible some other principles assumed by geometers are indeed actually analytical and depend on the law of contradiction but they only serve as identical prepositions as a method of concatenation and not as principles e.g. a equals a the whole is equal to itself or a plus b is larger than a the whole is greater than its parts and yet even these though they are recognized as valid from mere concepts are only admitted in mathematics because they can be represented in some visual form what usually makes us believe that the predicate of such apotheic judgments is already contained in our concept and that the judgment is therefore analytical is duplicity of the expression requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity implied in the thought of a given concept which necessity attaches to the concept but the question is not what we are requested to join in thought to the given concept but what we actually think together we eat and in it though obscurely and so it appears that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed yet not directly but indirectly by an added visualization 3. a remark on the general division of judgment into analytical and synthetical this division is indispensable as concerns the critique of human understanding and therefore deserves to be called classical though otherwise it is of little use but this is the reason why dogmatic philosophers who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in metaphysics itself and not apart from it in the pure laws of reason generally all together neglected this apparently obvious distinction thus the celebrated wolf and his acute follower Bumgarten came to seek the proof of the principle of sufficient reason which is clearly synthetical in the principle of contradiction in Locke's essay however I find an indication of my division for in the fourth book chapter three nine sequel having discussed the various connections of representations in judgments and their sources one of which he makes identity and contradiction in analytical judgments and another the coexistence of representations in a subject he confesses that or a prior knowledge of the latter is very narrow and almost nothing but in his remarks on this species of cognition there is so little of what is definite and reduced to rules that we cannot wonder if no one not even he was led to make investigations concerning this sort of judgments for such general and yet definite principles are not easily learned from other men who have had them obscurely in their minds we must hit on them first by our own reflection then we find them elsewhere where we could not possibly have found them at first because the authors themselves did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations men who never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness discover everything after it has been once shown them in what was said long since though no one ever saw it there before four the general question of the Prologa Mina is metaphysics at all possible where a metaphysics which could maintain its place as a science really in existence could we say here is metaphysics there needs and it will convince you resistably to evoke up the office truth this question would be useless and there would only remain that other question which would rather be a test of our acuteness than a proof of the existence of the thing itself how is the science possible and how does reason come to attain it but human reason has not been so fortunate in this case there is no single book to which you can point due to Euclid and say this is metaphysics here you may find the noblest objects of this science the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence proved from principles of few reason we can be shown indeed many judgments demonstrably certain and never questioned but these are all analytical and rather concerned the materials and the scaffolding for metaphysics than the extension of knowledge which is our proper object in studying it even supposing you produce synthetical judgment such as the law of sufficient reason which you have never proved as you ought to from pure reason a priori though we gladly concede this truth you lapse when they come to be employed for your principle objects into such doubtful assertions that in all ages one metaphysics has contradicted another either in its assertions or their proofs and thus has itself destroyed its own claim to lasting assent nay, the very attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early appearance of skepticism a mental attitude in which reason treats itself with such violence that it could never have a reason save from complete despair of even satisfying your most important aspirations for long before men began to inquire into nature methodically they consulted abstract reason which had to some extent been exercised by means of ordinary experience for reason is ever present why laws of nature must usually be discovered with labor so metaphysics floated to the surface like foam which dissolved the moment it was scooped of but immediately there appeared a new supply on the surface to be ever eagerly gathered up by some while others instead of seeking in depth the cause of the phenomenon thought they showed their wisdom by ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors the essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical cognition among all other a priori cognitions is that it cannot at all proceed from concepts but only by means of the construction of concepts as therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding visualization contains these judgments neither can nor ought to arise analytically by dissecting the concept but are all synthetical I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant observation He whom being prompted a task worthy of a philosopher to cast his eye over the whole field of a priori cognitions in which human understanding claims such mighty possessions heedlessly severed from it a whole and indeed its most valuable province with pure mathematics for he thought its nature or so to speak the state constitution of this empire dependent on totally different principles namely on the law of contradiction alone and although he did not divide judgments in this manner formerly and universally as I have done here what he said was equivalent to this that mathematics contains only analytical but metaphysics synthetical a priori judgments in this however he was greatly mistaken and the mistake had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception but for this he would have extended his question concerning the origin of or synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of causality and included in it the possibility of mathematics a priori also for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical and then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience a thing which he was far too accurate to do the good company into which metaphysics would thus have been brought would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics which was not and could not have been Hume's intention thus that acute man would have been led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style metaphysical judgments properly so-called are all synthetical we must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments properly so-called many of the former are analytical but they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments which are the whole end of science and which are always synthetical for if there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics as for example that of substance the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also pertain to metaphysics as for example substance is that which only exists as subject and by means of several such analytical judgments we seek to approach the definition of the concept but as the analysis of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics does not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other even empirical concepts not pertaining to metaphysics such as air is an elastic fluid the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known degree of cold it follows that the concept indeed but not the analytical judgment is properly metaphysical the science has something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions which must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common with other rational knowledge thus the judgment that all the substance in things is permanent is a synthetical and properly metaphysical judgment if the a priori principles which constitute the materials of metaphysics have first been collected according to fixed principles then their analysis will be of great value it might be taught as a particular part as a philosophia definitiva containing nothing but analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics and could be treated separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper for indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value except in metaphysics i.e. as regards to synthetical judgments which are to be generated by these previously analyzed concepts the conclusion drawn in this section then is that metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical propositions a priori and these alone constitute its end for which it indeed requires various dissections of its concepts with of its analytical judgments but there in the procedures is not different from that in every other kind of knowledge in which we merely seek to render all concepts distinct by analysis but the generation of a priori cognition by concrete images as well as by concepts in final synthetical propositions a priori in philosophical condition constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics we are therefore as well of dogmatism which teaches us nothing as of skepticism which does not even promise us anything not even the quiet state of a contented ignorance disquiet by the importance of knowledge so much needed and lastly renders suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess or which offers itself under the title of pure reason there remains but one critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends is metaphysics at all possible but this question must be answered not by skeptical objections to the asseverations of some actual system of metaphysics for we do not as yet admit such a thing to exist on the conception as yet only problematical of a science of this sort in the critic of pure reason I have treated this question synthetically by making inquiries into pure reason itself and endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the laws of its pure use according to principles the task is difficult and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system based on no data except reason itself and which therefore seeks without resting upon any fact to unfold knowledge from its original germs Prolegamen, however, are designed for preparatory exercises they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if possible to actualize science that to propound it they must therefore rest upon something already known trustworthy from which we can set out with confidence and ascend to sources as yet unknown the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which always bring from the same sources the method of Prolegamina especially of those designed as a preparation for future metaphysics is consequently analytical but it happens fortunately although we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions, pure mathematics and pure physics are actual and given for both contained propositions which are thoroughly recognized as apotheictly certain partly by mere reason partly by general consent arising from experience and yet as independent of experience we have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori and need not ask whether it is possible for it is actual but how it is possible in order that we made it use from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest the general problem how is cognition from pure reason possible 5. we have above learned the significant distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments the possibility of analytical propositions was easily comprehended being entirely founded on the law of contradiction the possibility of synthetical a priori judgments of those which are gathered from experience also require no particular explanation for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions there remains therefore only synthetical propositions a priori of which the possibility must be sought or investigated because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction but here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible for there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubtedly as our present method is analytical we shall start from the fact that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exist what we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility and ask how such cognition is possible in order that we may from the principles of this possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use its sphere and its limits the proper problem upon which all depends be the scholastic precision is therefore how our synthetic propositions a priori possible for the sake of the popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently as an inquiry into purely rational cognition which I could do for once without a detriment to the desired comprehension because as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources let's move after the foregoing remarks keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition we do not mean analytical but synthetical cognition metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem its very existence depends upon it lets anyone make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility let him overwhelm us with conclusions if he has not previously proved this question satisfactorily I have a right to say this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom you speak through pure reason and claim as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only dissecting given concepts but also by asserting connections which do not rest upon the law of contradiction and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all experience how do you arrive at this how do you justify your pretentions and appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumour so for us quaducon coosantees mihi seek incredulous od to all that which thou provost me thus I refuse to give credence the answer to this question though indispensable is difficult the principal reason that it was not made long ago is that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody there is yet another reason which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent profound and painstaking reflection than the most diffused work on metaphysics which on its first appearance promised immortality to its author an even intelligent reader he carefully reflects what this problem requires must at first be struck with its difficulty and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible did there not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori this actually happened to David Hume though he did not conceive the question in its entire universality as is done here and as must be done should the answer be decisive for all metaphysics how is it possible? says that acuteman that when a concept is given me I can go beyond it and connect with it another which is not contained in it in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former nothing but experience can furnish us with such connections thus he concluded from the difficulty which it took to be an impossibility an all-advanted necessity or what is the same thing all cognition assumed to be a priori is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of this problem he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research and will rather be surprised at the facility with which considering the nature of the subject the solution has been attained yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality using the term in the mathematical sense for that which is sufficient for all cases and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form as the reader finds it here all metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question how are synthetic cognitions a priori possible for the answer contains which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name of pure reason but if they do not possess these credentials they can expect nothing else of reasonable public who have been deceived so often than to be dismissed without further ado if they on the other hand desire to carry on their business not as a science but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man they cannot in justice be prevented they will then speak the modest language of a rational belief they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture far less to know anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience but only to assume not for a speculative use they must abandon but for practical purposes only the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the willing life in this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians for the latter profess to be a speculative philosophers and since when judgments a priori are under discussion poor probabilities cannot be admitted for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures but their assertions must be either science or art worth nothing at all it may be said that the entire transcendental philosophy which necessarily precedes all metaphysics is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded in systematical order and completeness and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy for what goes by its name is properly a part of metaphysics whereas the former sciences intended first to constitute the possibility of the latter and must therefore proceed all metaphysics and it is not surprising that when a whole science deprived of all help from other sciences and consequently in itself quite new is required to answer a single question satisfactorily we should find the answer troublesome and difficult may even shrouded in obscurity as we now proceed to the solution according to the analytical method in which we assume that such cognitions from few reasons actually exist we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition which alone is under consideration here pure mathematics and pure natural science physics for these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualisable form and consequently if there should occur in them a cognition a priori can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concreto that is its actuality from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytical method this facilitates our work greatly for here the universal considerations are not only applied to facts but even a start from them while a synthetic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts but in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of the same as we are seeking which to metaphysics as a science we must comprehend that which occasions it is near natural though in spite of its truth not unsuspected cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that science the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of the possibility is commonly called metaphysics in a word we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions one, how is pure mathematics possible two, how is pure natural science possible three, how is metaphysics in general possible four, how is metaphysics as a science possible it may be seen that the solution of these problems though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the critic has yet something peculiar which for itself alone deserves attention this is the search for the causes of given sciences in reason itself so that its faculty of knowing something a priori may be its own deeds be investigated and measured by this procedure the sciences gain if not with regard to their contents yet as to their proper use and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin they give at the same time an occasion better to explain their own nature end of section 2 recording by Fahna Jahangiri section 3 of prologamina to any future metaphysics this is a Librebox recording all Librebox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit Librebox.org recording by Buhir Nar prologamina to any future metaphysics by Emanuel Kant translated by Paul Keras section 3 first part of the transcendental problem how is pure mathematics possible section 6 here is a great and established branch of knowledge encompassing even now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in the future yet it carries with it thoroughly apodactical certainty that is absolute necessity which therefore rests upon no empirical grounds consequently it is a pure product of reason and moreover is thoroughly synthetical here the question arises how then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of this nature entirely a priori does not this faculty which produces mathematics as it neither is nor can be based upon experience presuppose some ground of cognition a priori which lies deeply hidden but which might reveal itself by these its effects if their first beginnings were not but diligently ferreted out section 7 but we find that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form on chao and indeed a priori therefore in a visual form which is not empirical but pure without this mathematics cannot take a single step hence its judgments are always visual which is to say intuitive whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from mere concepts and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual figure can never derive them from it this observation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest condition of its possibility which is that some non-sensuous visualization called pure intuition or crina on chaoong must form its basis in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed in concreto and yet a priori if we can find out this pure intuition and its possibility we may then easily explain how synthetical propositions a priori are possible in pure mathematics and consequently how this science itself is possible empirical intuition which is to say sense perception enables us without difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame of an object of intuition or sense perception by new predicates which intuition that is sense perception itself presents synthetically in experience pure intuition which is to say the visualization of forms in our imagination from which everything sensual that is every thought of material qualities is excluded does so likewise with this difference that in the latter case the synthetical judgment is a priori certain and apodictical and the former only a posteriori and empirically certain because this latter contains only that which occurs in contingent empirical intuition but the former that which must necessarily be discovered in pure intuition here intuition being an intuition a priori is before all experience that is to say before any perception of particular objects inseparably conjoined with its concept section 8 but with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than to lessen for the question now is how is it possible to intuit in a visual form anything a priori an intuition which is to say a visual sense perception is such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of the object hence it seems impossible to intuit from the outset a priori because intuition would in that event take place without either a former or present object to prefer to and by consequence could not be intuition concepts indeed are such that we can easily form some of them a priori which is to say such as contain nothing but the thought of an object in general and we need not find ourselves in an immediate relation to the object take for instance the concepts and the quantity of cause etc but even these require in order to make them understood a certain concrete use that is an application to some sense experience on Xiaoweng by which an object of them is given us but how can the intuition of the object its visualization proceed the object itself section 9 if our intuition that is our sense experience we're perforce of such a nature as to present things as they are in themselves there would not be any intuition a priori but intuition would be always empirical for I can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is present and given to me it is indeed even then incomprehensible how they visualizing on Xiaoweng of a present thing should make me know this thing as it is in itself as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation but even granting this possibility a visualizing of that sort would not take place a priori that is before the object were presented to me for without this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and the object can be imagined unless it depend upon a direct inspiration therefore in one way only can my intuition on Xiaoweng anticipate the actuality of the object and be a cognition a priori which is to say if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility and to dating in my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which I am affected by objects for that objects of sense can only be intuited according to this form of sensibility I can know a priori hence it follows that propositions which concern this form of sensuous intuition only are possible and valid for objects of the senses as also conversely the intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses section 10 accordingly it is only the form of the sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us to our senses not as they are in themselves and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions a priori be granted as possible or if in case they actually occur their possibility is to be comprehended and determined beforehand now the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodatic and necessary are space and time for mathematics must first have all its concepts and intuition and pure mathematics and pure intuition that is it must construct them if it proceeded in any other way it would be impossible to make any headway for mathematics proceeds not analytically by dissection of concepts but synthetically and if pure intuition be wanting there is nothing in which the matter for synthetical judgments a priori can be given geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space arithmetic accomplishes its concept of numbers by the success of addition of units in time and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the representation of time both representations however are only intuitions for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations motion everything empirical or belonging to sensation space and time still remain which are therefore pure intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical hence they can never be omitted but at the same time by their being pure intuitions a priori they prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility must proceed all empirical intuition or perception of actual objects and conformably to which objects can be known a priori but only as they appear to us section 11 the problem of the present section is therefore solved pure mathematics a synthetical cognition a priori is only possible by referring to no other objects than those of the senses at the basis of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition of space and of time which is a priori this is possible because the latter intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility which precedes the actual appearance of the objects indebted in fact makes them possible yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the matter of the phenomenon that is the sense element in it for this constitutes that which is empirical but its form namely space and time should any man venture to doubt that intuitions adhering not to things in themselves but to their relation to our sensibility I should be glad to know how it can be possible to know the constitution of things a priori namely before we have any acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us such however is the case with space and time but this is quite comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal conditions of our sensibility while the objects count merely as phenomena for then the form of the phenomenon that is your intuition can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves that is a priori section 12 in order to add something by way of illustration and confirmation we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers all proofs of the complete congruence of two given figures where the one can in every respect be substituted for the other come ultimately to this that they be made to coincide which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon immediate intuition and this intuition must be pure or given a priori otherwise the proposition cannot rank as epitaectically certain but would have empirical certainty only in that case it can only be said that it is always found to be so and holds good only as far as our perception reaches that everywhere space which in its entirety is itself no longer the boundary of another space has three dimensions and that space cannot in any way have more is based on the proposition that no more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point but this proposition cannot by any means be shown from concepts but rests immediately on intuition and indeed on a pure and a priori intuition because it is epitaectically certain that we can require a line to be drawn to infinity in indefinite or that a series of changes for example spaces traversed by motion shall be infinitely continued presupposes a representation of space and time which can only attach to intuition namely so far as it in itself is bounded by nothing for from concepts it could never be inferred consequently the basis of mathematics actually are pure intuitions which make it synthetical and epitaectically valid propositions possible hence our transcendental deduction of the notions of space and time explains at the same time the possibility of pure mathematics without some such deduction its truth may be granted but its existence could by no means be understood and we must assume that everything which can be given to our senses to the external senses in space to the internal one in time is intuited by us as it appears to us not as it is in itself section 13 those who cannot yet read themselves of the notion that space and time are actual qualities in hearing and things in themselves may exercise their acumen on the following paradox when they have in vain attempted its solution and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments they will suspect that the degradation of space and of time to mere forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded if two things are quite equal in all respects as much as can be ascertained by all means possible quantitatively and qualitatively must follow that the one can in all cases and under all circumstances replace the other and this substitution would not occasion the least perceptible difference this in fact is true of plain figures in geometry but some spherical figures exhibit notwithstanding a complete internal agreement such a contrast in their external relation that the one figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other for instance two spherical triangles on opposite hemispheres of the equator as their common base may be quite equal but as regards sides and angles so that nothing is to be found in either if it be described for itself alone and completed that would not equally be applicable to both and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other being situated upon the opposite hemisphere here then is an internal difference between the two triangles which difference our understanding cannot describe as internal and which only manifests itself by external relations in space but I shall adduce examples taken from common life that are more obvious still what can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear than their images in a mirror and yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its archetype for if this is a right hand that in the glass is a left one and the image or reflection of the right ear is a left one which can never serve as a substitute for the other there are in this case no internal differences which our understanding could determine by thinking alone yet the differences are internal as the senses teach for notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one they are not congruent the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other what is the solution these objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves and as the pure understanding would cognize them the sensuous intuitions that is appearances the possibility of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else namely to our sensibility space is the form of the external intuition of this sensibility and the internal determination of every space is only possible by the determination of its external relation to the whole space of which it is a part in other words by its relation to the external sense that is to say the part is only possible through the whole which is never the case with things in themselves as objects of the mere understanding but with appearances only hence the difference between similar and equal things which are not yet congruent for instance to symmetric helices cannot be made intelligible by any concept but only by the relation to the right and the left hand which immediately refers to intuition remark one pure mathematics and especially pure geometry can only have objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense but in regard to the latter the principle holds good that our sense representation is not a representation of things in themselves but of the way in which they appear to us hence it follows that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination and that therefore they cannot be referred with assurance to actual objects but rather that they are necessarily valid of space and consequently of all that may be found in space because space is nothing else than the form of all external appearances and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can be given sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what geometry prescribes to them it would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to represent objects as they are in themselves for then it would not by any means follow from the conception of space which with all its property serves to the geometry as an a priori foundation together with what is then inferred must be so in nature the space of the geometry would be considered a mere fiction and it would not be credited with objective validity because we cannot see how things must of necessity agree with an image of them which we make spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them but if this image or rather this formal intuition is the essential property of sensibility by means of which alone objects are given to us and if this sensibility represents not things in themselves but their appearances we shall easily comprehend and at the same time indisputably prove that all external objects of our world of sense must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the propositions of geometry because sensibility by means of its form of external intuition namely by space the same with which the geometry is occupied makes those objects at all possible as mere appearances it will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy that there was a time when even mathematicians who at the same time were philosophers began to doubt not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space but of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept itself and of all its corollaries to nature they should much concern whether a line in nature might not consist of physical points and consequently true space in the object might consist of simple discrete parts while the space which the geometry has in his mind being continuous cannot be such they did not recognize that this mental space renders possible the physical space that is the extension of matter that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in themselves but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation and that all objects in space are mere appearances that is not things in themselves but representations of our sensuous intuition but such is the case for the space of the geometry is exactly the form of sensuous intuition which we find a priori in us and contains the ground of the possibility of all external appearances according to their form and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree with the propositions of the geometry which he draws not from any fictitious concept but from the subjective basis of all external phenomena which is sensibility itself in this and no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow metaphysics which is surprised at them geometrical propositions because it has not traced them to the sources of their concepts remark 2 whatever is given us as object must be given us in intuition all our intuition however takes place by means of the senses only the understanding into its nothing but only reflects and as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves but only their appearances which are mere representations of the sensibility we conclude that all bodies together with the space in which they are must be considered nothing but mere representations in us and exist nowhere but in our thoughts you will say is not this manifest idealism idealism consists in the assertion that there are none but thinking beings all other things which we think are perceived in intuition being nothing but representations in the thinking beings to which no object external to them corresponds in fact whereas I say that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves knowing only their appearances that is the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us that is thanks which though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us in which we call bodies a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us but not therefore less actual can this be termed idealism it is the very contrary long before locks time but assuredly since him it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things that many of their predicates may be said to belong not to the things in themselves but to their appearances and to have no proper existence outside our representation heat color taste for instance are of this kind now if I go farther and for weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also which are called primary such as extension place and in general space with all that which belongs to it impenetrability or materiality space et cetera no one in the least can induce the reason of its being inadmissible as little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself but only as modifications of the sense of sight should on that account be called an idealist so little can my system be named idealistic merely because I find that more nay all the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance the existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed as in genuine idealism but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid all idealism undoubtedly I should say that the representations of space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our sensibility has to objects that I have said but that it is quite similar to the object an assertion in which I can find as little meaning as if I said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the property of vermilion which in me excites the sensation remark 3 hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible world would be turned into a mere sham at first all philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled by marking the sensibility merely a confused mode of representation according to which we still know things as they are but without being able to reduce everything in this representation to a clear consciousness whereas proof is offered by us that sensibility consists not in this logical distinction of clearness and obscurity but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself for sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are but only the mode in which they affect our senses and consequently by sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are given to the understanding for reflection after this necessary corrective an objection rises from an unpardonable and almost intentional misconception as if my doctrine turn all things of the world of sense into mere illusion when an appearance is given us we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter the appearance depends upon the senses but the judgment upon the understanding and the only question is whether in the determination of the object there is truth or not but the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the representations which are referred to objects for they are the same in both cases but by their connection according to those rules which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of an object and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together an experience or not and it is not the fault of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth that is if the intuition by which an object is given us is considered a concept of the thing or of its existence also which the understanding can only think the senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now progressive now retrogressive and here and is neither falsehood nor truth because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but appearance we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion but as a false judgment may easily arise when the understanding is not on its guard against the subjective mode of representation being considered objective we say they appear to move backward it is not the senses however which must be charged with the illusion but the understanding whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment on appearances thus even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our representations whenever we connect our intuitions of space whatever they may contain in space and in time according to the rules of the coherence of all cognition and experience illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or careful it is merely a question of the use of sensuous representations in the understanding and not of their origin in the same way if I consider all the representations of the senses together with their form space and time to be nothing but appearances and space and time to be a mirror form of the sensibility which is not yet within objects out of it and if I make use of these representations in reference to possible experience only there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion for all that they can correctly cohere according to rules of truth and experience for all that they can correctly cohere according to rules of truth and experience thus all the propositions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all objects of the senses consequently all possible experience whether I consider space as a mirror form of the sensibility or as something cleaving could the things themselves in the former case however I comprehend how I can know a priori these propositions concerning all the objects of external intuition otherwise everything else as regards all possible experience remains just as if I had not departed from the vulgar view but if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my notions of space and time I cannot refrain from doing if I proclaim them qualities inherent in things in themselves for what should prevent me from letting them hold good of the same things even though my senses would be different and unsuited to them then a grave error may arise due to illusion for thus I would proclaim to be universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the intuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense namely for all possible experience I would refer this condition to things in themselves and do not limit it to the conditions of experience my doctrine of the ideality of space and of time therefore far from reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion is the only means of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions that which mathematics propounds a priori to actual objects and of preventing its being regarded as mere illusion for without this observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and time which we borrow from no experience and which yet lie in our representation a priori are not mere fantasms of our brain to which objects do not correspond at least not adequately and consequently whether we have been able to show its unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just because they are mere appearances secondly though these my principles make appearances of the representations of the senses they are so far from turning the truth of experience into mere illusion that they are rather the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived leading to the childish endeavor of catching up bubbles because appearances which are mere representations were taken for thanks in themselves here originated the remarkable event of the antimony of reason which I shall mention by and by and which is destroyed by the single observation that appearance as long as it is employed in experience produces truth but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience and consequently becomes transcended produces nothing but illusion in as much therefore as I leave to things as we obtain them by the senses of our actuality and only limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this that they represent in no respect not even in the pure intuitions of space and of time anything more than mere parents of those things but never their constitution in themselves this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me my protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear as even to seem superfluous where they're not incompetent judges who while they would have an old name for every deviation from their perverse though common opinion and never judge of the spirit of philosophical nomenclature but cling to the letter only are ready to put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions and thereby deform and distort them I have myself given this my theory the name of transcendental idealism but that cannot authorize anyone to confound it either with the empirical idealism of Descartes indeed his was only an insoluble problem owing to which he thought everyone at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world because it can never be proved satisfactorily or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Barkley against which and other similar fantasms are critique contains the proper antidote my idealism concerns not the existence of things the doubting of which however constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense since it never came into my head to doubt it but it concerns the sensuous representation of things to which space and time especially belong of these namely space and time consequently of all appearances in general I have only shown that they are neither things but mere modes of representation nor determinations belonging to things in themselves but the word transcendental which with me means a reference of our cognition that is not to things but only to the cognitive faculty was meant to obviate this misconception yet rather than give further occasion to it by this word I now retracted and desire this idealism of mine to be called critical but if it be really an objectionable idealism to convert actual things not appearances into mere representations by what names shall we call him who conversely changes me representations to things it may I think be called dreaming idealism in contradistinction to the former which may be called visionary both of which are to be refuted by my transcendental or better critical idealism end of section 3 recording by Buchernar