 I think we're going to try to get started, and I recognize that people will continue to flow into the room as we proceed. But I thought I'd do just a quick run around and have each of you introduce just your name and institution so people that want to catch up with other people from other institutions afterwards will know who's who. And I think we have a really nice selection of the diplomatic community, the U.S. government, NGOs, academics, the religious sector, it's a pretty wide-ranging group, and it's always helpful to have alliances across institutional barriers, so we encourage that all the time. We're delighted to have Luis Eduardo Mendes with us today. He was a researcher with the Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris for about 15 years and now is a consultant for many of the organizations working on peace and conflict issues in Colombia, including the Fundación Pasi Reconciliación, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, as well as Nuevo Arcoiris, Las Dos Orias, and many others. He's been a constant source of support and information and analysis for the different peace processes and I think is one of the people who really has his finger on the pulse of what's happening both with the FARC and with the ELN, so we're very pleased to have the possibility of having a long conversation with him. Today's event is part of our Columbia Peace Forum series. We've been, since the peace talks started, we've been trying to keep the attention of Washington focused on what's happening in Colombia and at the table in Havana. And ordinarily we've had panels of people and we've had topics that we've tried to explore. This time we're taking a slightly different approach because Lucho has so much knowledge in so many different areas. We've asked him to talk about several different things, about the peace process in Havana, as well as the impending process with the ELN, as well as some of the themes at the table. And for those of you who have been following the peace process in Colombia, you know that they have now reached agreement on three of the six items, three of the five substantial items, agrarian reform, political participation, and illicit crops and narco-trafficking. They have entered into discussion on victims and the end of the conflict, the last two substantive items on the agenda. And there's a final agenda item that has to do with mechanisms for approving the whatever accords are reached and verifying and implementation of those accords. And that has yet to be really tackled at the table. But right now we're in a very interesting time. We finished the, or the negotiators in Havana, have finished the 27th round of talks that those ended on the 22nd of August. In the last session of talks, many new things and new mechanisms were established. There was a new sub-commission on, a technical sub-commission on ending the conflict that would be going forward at the same time as the table looked at the issue of victims. There was a visit of victims, which was really historic in that, in most peace processes, the victims are not sitting at the table with the people who are negotiating the end of the war. This is, I think, a really dramatic and significant event that potentially has changed many things and shifted many of the political calculuses about what's possible in Colombia. For those of you, I'm not going to go into a lot of detail, but for those who are interested in the detail, I would recommend that you read my latest blog. I keep a blog at vbuvie.wordpress.com, and I try to fill in a lot of the details. And I also try to link to the documents themselves. So when agreements come out at the table, you can usually get a copy of that document, the original document at my blog. So it's kind of a place to find things sometimes. Another development was the establishment and the launching of a historical commission on the conflict and its victims. It's not a truth commission. It's a process for establishing more general kinds of truths about the conflict as part of the process for the discussion about victims. So it's a very interesting innovation that we haven't really seen in other peace processes either. We've seen many truth commissions. They usually come after you sign a peace accord. This is a truth commission in the middle of a process of making a peace agreement. So it has a very different significance, I think, and Lucio may be talking about some of these themes. And then finally, there's been a sub-commission on gender established to review all of the agreements that are going to be made in Havana with an eye toward the differential focus on women and men and questions of gender. So that's something else that's a little bit innovative. It's not the first time it's been done in Sri Lanka, in Somalia. They've had gender sub-commissions. Oftentimes, the sub-commission does a good job, but then the implementation of the recommendations is usually pretty weak because there's nobody there to follow through. So it's not clear what it means yet, but these are all kind of new wrinkles that have come up just in the last month or two. The other major innovation, I think, was the Declaration of Principles on Victims that was signed in June between the parties. And it established really a framework for thinking about victims' rights to truth justice reconciliation and truth justice reparations and reconciliation. So this is new. And part of that was an agreement between the parties that the participation of victims of the process was essential, that that was giving them back not only symbolic reparations, but giving them a chance to exercise their rights and that they would be a part of the solution. This is the shift. I think the shift really came even before the victims went to the table. I think the decision of the table to open the process to the victims is really significant. So with that, that's kind of a general overview of the different. No, no, no, no, no, no. So number three should be Spanish, and number one should be English, number one, English. Can you assist? Gracias. Bueno, no voy a resumirlo todo en español, pero sí. I'm not going to make a summary of all of this. Espera un moment, Tico. Sí, ahora escucho. Sí, gracias. Muy amable. Gracias. Disculpa, Lucho. No, no, no. Solo quiero esta vez explicar. I'm sorry. Lucho, I was explaining what was going on. I was giving out a summary of all those issues. All right. Then I'm just going to introduce Lucho again. He's a sociologist. He has studied of all of the subjects of conflict and peace. Perhaps if we could introduce everyone and their institutions, if everyone would please use their microphones. If they don't use a microphone, we won't learn anything. That's just a hello, hello, hello. Él está viendo que es lo importante. Bill Taylor, acting executive vice president for the Institute of Peace. I'm Adam Isaacson with the Washington office on Latin America. Natalia Teja, research assistant of USIP. Agradecemos a los traductorios. We're thanking the interpreters who are Marta and Marta who are going to be doing the interpreting this afternoon. We're going to have a webcast as well of the event. You'll be able to hear it in English and in Spanish. But obviously, it'll be a few days before it goes into the webcast. So Lucho, please give us your comments. Thank you so much to Virginia for giving me the opportunity to be here to organize this event. Talking about the different initiatives in Colombia, Natalia as well. She's been so helpful throughout all these activities. Unfortunately, I do not speak English. And that's why I lose out on a lot of things. But I thank so much the work of the interpreters that are helping us out. I'd like to give you five very brief messages. And I'm going to try not to talk for more than 15 minutes for over five specific points. The first one is because right now I really feel we're at the point of resolving this conflict. And why do I feel that way after four different attempts with FARC seven, eight with ELN? And I guess I'm exaggerating. But secondly, where are we at the point of negotiations of all these efforts? And third, that's what's left at the negotiation table. So it is the ELN, which is the same as FARC. And there is no open process yet. Fourth subject, the opposers to all of this process. And fifth, so the United States and the process itself. I'll go back to the first one. Why? Yes, now. The first attempt that was made before I go to that, let me talk about the conflict itself. Obviously, there is no consensus even in Colombia, much less the rest of the world. My vision of the conflict is that this is a political conflict. It has organizations that have struggled for power with violence as their tool. They maintain an ideological basis. In other words, they have convictions and ideals that perhaps is, if you look at it this way, is a struggle for power. And that's the process we're trying to resolve. It's an armed conflict that's gone on for over 50 years. The principles involved historically that are still at this leftist groups of FARC, ELN, they are different. They have their differences between them. They have maintained this situation, this attitude for 50 years of trying to transform Colombia and the situation. Now, what are the roots of the conflict? I think the two roots of the conflict are the following. First, that, unfortunately, in the countryside of Colombia has not worked properly. It's excluded. It's been elitist. And I believe that's something we have to try to express today. Today's much more serious than 50 years ago. The idea of the countryside in Colombia is a subject that, if you compare it to what was going on 50 years ago, it's even worse. And why do I say that? A million families, between 85 and 2005, of peasant families that were displaced. The rural violence, 500,000 peasant families today don't have or have any land or own any land, and 30,000 families that have very little land. That's the subject. That's what we're talking about as far as the countryside where 1.5% of the owners own the control of 38% of the territory. So it is a tremendous concentration that is terrible as far as the rural countryside. So when we talk about that issue, that's where all this conflict began. And that's the first or the beginning of the conflict except the basis. The second basis for this conflict were the guarantees of political authority. Colombia historically either killed because they're trying to be politicians or they steal elections out of through the fact that there is authority at a very unequal basis. And this situation is the other basis for the conflict, this inequality. But I think that the subject is, why do we think we're resolved in the conflict now? This is something that we've tried to do since 82 with Velesario Betancur. I think we've tried it with Betancur back in the 80s. And then we tried it again with President Gaviria in the 90s. And then again with President Pastrana who made tremendous efforts through the 2012. This is the fourth time we've tried to do this with the FARC. And I believe that this time we will have success, we will succeed with the FARC. Why now? Why couldn't we do it in the 80s or 90s or in the year 2000? Why is everything indicating now that we'd be able to resolve these issues? I have an explanation and I'll do this very respectfully. I think we're in the process of resolving this based on two circumstances, primarily. Number one, because the group of power, the elite in Columbia, those that have been the leaders in our country, that are the hegemony that exists in our country, that's divided, but President Santos now represents what he represents for the very first time after 50 years. He needs to resolve this armed conflict because the insurgents have not been defeated. They're weakened, but they have not been defeated. So the conflict for the very first time in 50 years has been basically now against the economy of our country. In Columbia, they're losing tremendous economic possibilities in the country based on the fact that there is an armed conflict in process. In other words, to maintain this armed conflict is very bad business. During 50 years, many Colombians had economic power that they were accumulating within the midst of all this conflict on the authoritative right wing. The mafia, as we call it, they were the ones that won tremendously throughout the conflict. They've gained political power, economic power, and they use it in Columbia. But the reality is that we really need modernization of the countryside in Columbia. As it exists today, we have 110 million acres in the country and on the continent of Columbia. 50,000 are productive right now. The rest are basically being just conserved so there is no production. And in the 55 million hectares, we have 44 millions that's grasslands, 6,000 in agriculture, and 5 in wood or forests that are used for wood. So we have 22 million heads of cattle. In other words, we don't have one cow per acre at this point. And that I believe that that is the most anti-productive situation that the whole continent would have cattle livestock in Columbia. For example, statistics know to why I don't know what they are, but I know Holland. And that's a whole different type. But in Holland, there is a production of 140 cows per acre in any one of the regular cattle farms. But this is just an example I'd like to give you. What is going on then in Columbia, in the countryside? Well, it is totally inefficient. And why do I say that? The fact is that a large portion of that land is within an economy that's totally inefficient. If you look at Juan Camilo Restrepo, who was the Minister of Agriculture for Santos in a debate in the Senate in October of 2010, his first debate with Representative Iván Cepeda said to the cattleman, he said, look, you can do whatever in the half of the territory that you have today. You could do it in 22 million acres. You could do it. The other we need for agriculture, for other dynamic needs of our country. So the first message that I'd like to give you is that we're going to resolve the issues. Yes, we are. President Santos is motivated to do so because a tremendous advantage right now that's pushing all these negotiations. And it requires also if we want to maintain the expansion of mining and oil, we can't do it at the level or the pace that we should be because armed conflict exists. So the reason why we're resolving the conflict as far as the side of the establishment is a tremendous advantage, economic push to resolve the issues. And I repeat, the reason is because the insurgents are not defeated. And I'll say that again. If you see the economic sabotage that occurs in the oil areas, it's incredible. This sabotage that constantly goes on in Colombia is absolutely amazing. And that's not something we've seen the last five or 10 years. This is something we've still seen within the last five months. As far as the gorillas are concerned, in the case of the FARC, what is their motivation for them to reach a peace? If you compare the FARC that exists now with the FARC of Kawan, it's totally different entities. This is a FARC, let's say, that's much more willing and able to come and talk in everything that they say in their discourse. And I have to mention that why would they want to reach agreement at this point? Well, because they've lost the illusion of succeeding. It was always a force that was growing as far as the control of the territory and its political negative presence that it had in the country. The impact that it had in Colombia. It grew as far as manpower from 64 through 2008. In 2008, when the commander, Manuel Manuel Ante died, the balance of power for the FARC at that point realized they weren't gonna win. They were going backwards from 2002 after Kawan is the fact that FARC was going down. They lost manpower, they lost territory. So if the FARC for the first time comes to a conclusion that if they look at things, there is no possibility for a military triumph. In the past, it always thought it was continuing to grow, that it would continue to grow. But all of a sudden, when the study is done on military aspects, you could reach the idea that FARC basically never had any possibility of winning militarily in Colombia. It was a symbolic triumph, perhaps, between the years 96 and 98. That was the time when perhaps they had 20, 25 serious events against the military in Colombia, but they weren't basically putting Colombia in collapse. The idea was that the company, the actually army had collapsed, and that was the ideal, that if they hadn't had money from Plan Colombia, it would have been a tremendous defeat that was just on the horizon, but that's not true from the military point of view. Greya. Nonetheless, the FARC believed that they were making strides. They stopped believing this in 2008, and the FARC decided we must go to a negotiation table, and it was built with the idea of actually taking on the conflict. And this is how I moved to my second point. Where are we? We are making strides in the dialogue table that was defined two years ago on August 26. In other words, two years ago, day before yesterday, they signed the agenda that is now being utilized, and that is the agenda for the armed conflict. That is the minimum that must be resolved in order to move forward if we in fact want to resolve the conflict. First, the rural agenda. As I said, that is the root of the conflict. Second, the agenda of political participation, a second root of the conflict. The third on the agenda, drug trafficking. Drugs and drug trafficking became part of the conflict on top of these two other routes or pillars. One, countryside that is exclusive that does not give opportunities to many, and a political system that was prone to violence and corruption. So on those two pillars, drug trafficking came about, and drug trafficking has been the fuel for this conflict, but not the main basis nor the main motivation for it. In other words, FARC, even though they have been closely tied and worked hand in hand with drug traffickers, they never lost their idea of power, and they utilized drug trafficking in order to push their political agenda. So agenda points one, two, and three have partially been resolved in the past 17 or 18 months of the peace process. So I think that the dialogue has given us steps and concrete items that we can point to where we have been successful. We still have to work on points one, two, and three on the agenda, but both parts are being able to see work together because there's lots to do specifically regarding our countryside and political participation. And unfortunately, the Colombian democracy, which is not strong or robust, that is not true. It is a weak democracy. It is the weakest in the region. It is the most prone to fall in the region because it's full of violence, corruption, and fraud. So I believe that we are, we find ourselves in the midst of a peace process that is yielding some results, but we must respond to the victims here. This is the most difficult part, which is part four on the agenda because it is a very difficult situation. Over 50 years of conflict have left thousands of victims. If you want to understand this, I would recommend a report where Virginia participated. First, it was an historic memory and now it's institutional memory. It's called Basta Ja. It's a very comprehensive report. It's a long and big report that has lots of information that incorporates how all the parties involved in the conflict respond to basic elemental needs that have been established by humanity, truth, justice, and reparation, and making sure that it never happens again. And that is a very difficult subject matter to take on, but both parties have shown that their attitude has changed in order to reach a resolution. The case in Columbia is going to be amazing. When I'm talking about all the victims, I'm not just talking about, for example, deaths, but any type of victim, they have gone to Havana and they have shown their situation to both sides. And I don't think I've ever seen this before, but there's going to be 60 victims that will be going within the next few months and days to basically file their claims or tell their story. So where do we find ourselves? We find ourselves in a situation where we are making great strides and we are moving towards success. Of course, there's still very delicate subject matter that we must resolve, like what the formula for justice is going to be, what the formula for truth is going to be, and the base for this as far as truth is concerned is to try to make sure that we set forth a strong truth, making sure that nobody who has been committed to the process has shown anything but decorum. The government of Columbia has participated in this conflict and during the 50 years that they have been there, they have been criminal and illegal. They have behaved in that way. And not just isolated incidents, but it has been a systemized approach of the Colombian government to permit this to happen. So of course, the government has great responsibility and of course the paramilitaries, which we still haven't been able to move beyond, has also been part of this conflict. It has ties with the government and with the other armed conflicts. So we have to move forward. Next, ELN. What is ELN? ELN and FARC are part of 250 municipalities out of the 1,100 that we have in the country. So in 100 of 250, they are fully in power. These are organizations that have ties to the community that are able to organize the community. They have their own economy and of course they have systematic violence. And among that, what is ELN? ELN is an organized force that is present in at least 100 municipalities of the country. And among those municipalities where oil is a very important part of the economy. For example, ELN is found in Arauca, which is on the border with Venezuela, where basically the ELN has made sure that the government there has collapsed. The ELN is in charge in Arauca. And out of the 100 municipalities where they have a very strong presence, this is one of the ones where they have the strongest. And perhaps in about 30 or 40 of these 100 municipalities, they are a very important force. And what's going on with ELN? Why are there no peace talks with ELN? Because that's the case. There are peace talks with the FARC, but not with ELN. I believe, unfortunately, that it has been the strategy of the government to have a specific dynamic with the stronger guerrillas and to hope that they will be able to work with the smaller guerrilla later. In other words, they've never tried to do it in a simultaneous manner. It was never a goal to say, I'm going to undergo a simultaneous process. This is one peace process. It is not two peace processes. It's my opinion that it is only one peace process with two separate tables that must some way be synchronized because we're not going to have two different mechanisms of truth and reparations. They're not going to be one for FARC and one for ELN as compared to the government. It's going to end up being one process and one mechanism that will be utilized for truth, justice, and reparation. There's not going to be two types of referendum. You know that President Santos has said, whatever we build here, whatever we agree to at this table with FARC, we'll go to referenda. That is the proposal of the government. And the FARC has requested that it be a constitutional amendment. So we don't know if it's going to be referendum or if it's going to be a constitutional amendment. And what I think is that neither one is going to happen. We're not going to have a general referendum or we're going to have a constitutional vote, but we're going to have a constitutional referendum. So if it is one peace process, then we are missing ELN. We do know that they have been speaking discreetly with ELN and that they have two items that they have already been able to cover, which is victim participation and social participation. We know that ELN really wants to discuss mining and oil industry. This is something that does have lots of issues in Colombia because the political agenda for oil and mining has lots of issues at different levels, environmental, social, economic. There is also a great report there from the Colombian Department of Treasury that is on their website and you can find it if you want to. But in Colombia, when you talk about mining and the oil industry, you talk about violence and a weak government and that actually creates an explosive situation. So what I believe is that, I mean, I hope that this table will become more public between the government and the ELN, hopefully within the next two weeks, and it's possible that mining and oil will be on that table as well. But the biggest challenge is to be able to improve the process with the ELN so that we can reach the two dynamics with FARC and with the ELN and have them converge. Perhaps we can discuss this more in the question and answer session. Fourth point, who is opposed to this process? Those who oppose this process are those who feel that their interests are adversely affected. Who feels this, those who don't want to modernize the countryside, those who don't want equality in the countryside, those who don't want a different policy but feel like a fish in water because they are perfectly comfortable around violence and corruption. And in Colombia, that has one name, which is Uribismo, those who follow Uribe. Those who follow ex-president Alvaro Uribe, who is now a senator, say that as a government they have a fifth presence in the Senate. We just had a voting process recently where they have lots of numbers. In Colombia, we have over 7 million people who voted for the Uribeismo candidate. Somebody told me, how can we have 7 million people in Colombia who represent what President Uribe believes? What does President Uribe believe? Well, that violent policy jumping over legality, as you know, there is a huge scandal about Oscar Iván Zuluaga and he was the Uribeista candidate for presidency with previous information, with intercepted calls and intercepted emails. Basically, lots of illegal activity. And that world, those group of people are the ones who oppose these negotiations and they don't do it openly. They don't say we don't want to modernize the countryside, we don't want to make great strides in the countryside, but rather they say it in a euphemistic way. In other words, they say they oppose impunity. They oppose humiliating the military, for example. I'm not gonna get into details here, but I can tell you that there are those who oppose this process and not only those who work within the confines of democracy. I think Uribeismo is a strength, is a force that is partially legal and partially illegal. Basically, it has one foot in democracy and one foot in illegality. And that is the framework that we're working within in Colombia. And my last point, and I apologize for taking so long, is the United States. The United States has been a great actor in this conflict. In other words, they've had a stable relationship with the Colombian government and they have the weight that you know that United States has around the world and in the continent. It's an incredibly enormous and important player on the field and I believe that, fortunately, the world and the United States are viewing the negotiations with respect. They are supporting the negotiations. They are awaiting to see what is happening and they have a very good policy to see what's happening in Colombia and thinking about legalities and justice and human rights is a very important presence of the United States and our country. Let me say that some of the concerns, however, on the process, perhaps there are two that we'll be able to talk to in the next 90 seconds. First of all, the extradition of the heads of the gorilla, all of the park gorilla heads and I guess the experts that are here in the room might be able to correct me but I believe that all of them have been on the list for extradition to the United States. Now, I think in Colombia, we have to resolve this issue. We have to have a constitutional referendum and placing in that, that these individuals that are signing the piece cannot be extradited and that's one of the reasons and one of the autonomous parts of our sovereignty that we can't give up. This is a subject that has to be viewed and this is given a lot of importance here and the second would be that the United States has currently in its hands and I say this respectfully, Chief Simon Trinidad who's in jail here in the United States and Mr. Sherman perhaps has more details about this. I think that that man has been a rebel. I think there was a trial, there was the justice of the United States that was applied but perhaps in the next few months, there should be a way to help this process would be as far as requested and I agree with him that that guy could have a very important role in this process. He could be a message that the efforts are going on, perhaps he could participate through Skype or something, I don't even know how but perhaps it's something that would be a symbol of the attitude to try to look for a path to the end of this. But as I said in Colombia, I was gonna talk a lot but I wanted to mention at least this five points to generate a dialogue with you and to thank you so much for the opportunity to be here. Thank you so much, Lucio. I think only on the last point I was gonna say that this morning I saw in the news that they were asking to put Simon Trinidad in the technical commission. I didn't know that for the end of conflict. You've been traveling so you hadn't heard that but I think it was very interesting because maybe the US now is looking at what might be interesting to be debated. In other words, we'll see. But anyway, thank you for this wonderful panorama of all your ideas and subjects. I'm not gonna get involved too much. I'm sure many of you have your own ideas and questions that you want to ask about specific issues. So I'm going to open the floor to Q&A. Please use your microphones. Anyone that has a comment or a question, please identify yourself. I'm Adam Askson from Asunto Latino Americanos in Washington. Hi, Lucio, I'd like to hear what you interpret as to what's going on in the armed forces of Columbia currently. We were aware of the fact that has not always, an institution has not always supported peace processes but there's been active officials that have gone to talk to FARC in Havana. So it's difficult to know but how do you view the internal debate of the military forces in Columbia? I think if we can get three or four questions and then I will answer them. And I think maybe about the Chusadas, which is something that's going on with the hacking and to somehow find out what are all the things that are happening, these scandals that have been going on. And I also have a question. The commission to clarify the conflict and the victims, why to have other investigations? In other words, I think it's very important and it's interesting that they've gone through a construction of historic memory with those that are doing that at the Central National Center for Historic Memory. But now there's an effort to write, perhaps a more pluralistic history to incorporate the extremes of these issues and it's trying to identify the consensus, the dissent, the path for the future. I would be very interested to hear your opinion about this process as a process. What I would like is your opinion of the 28 points that just came out from Dos Orillas that mentioned this black holes of these three substantive points that we've agreed on. How can we talk about that and what would be a good time to mention all those issues? I need to have a microphone, please. No, microphone, microphone. Jose Wach, Communications on the World Bank. I think it's interesting what you just mentioned that the elite have an idea that the arm conflict is a bad business but the ones that are opposed are specifically those that represent the elite or the elite in the country who would obviously gain from the good, isn't there a contradiction because they would gain by the fact that there was an end to the arm conflict? What are we talking about, two different issues? Media Mosodio, I'm Colombian and I've been living 15 years here in the United States. What is your perception of how civil society is looking at the conflict in the country and the possible solution to this conflict? Does the Colombian society really accept the fact that there is gonna be an agreement and will they internalize that agreement because I believe that civil society is a very important part of an issue that's been such an important factor in the lives in Colombia. Okay, there's several issues then I can start answering. I'm going to respond to the questions, the conflict and military forces in Colombia. Let's start with that. As far as the military forces, the military, the army in Colombia has had to carry the weight of this confrontation and not always did they do it in a way that was conducted probably no military, no army, obviously ever acts in a completely coherent manner during conflict, obviously there's passions, there is a confrontation situation, but as far as the Colombian military is concerned, the army, they handle themselves for many years and continue to do so not within the framework of the legal issues. In other words, I'm not talking about all of the institutions or all the military, obviously military forces are huge and it's been growing tremendously during Uribe's presidency, it's a large force that's become more and more professional as the years have gone by. But if we look at the situation today, I think it's a much more professional army, much more organized and perhaps more respectful of individuals understanding their role. So the question that was asked by Adam, I think today's army is one, the institution as it stands today has moved forward. You know them so well on site, perhaps you agree with me that if you go talk to officers, for example, from the army in Colombia, they're much more professional individuals, understanding issues, they've gone through different times when the military went through the Cold War in the 70s, 80s, and 90s and that's their train of thought because that was their school of education back then, their military officials that I can think of that maybe seven, 10 years ago, someone would say, well, the thing is that there is a total group of individuals that thinks that the NGOs are enemies, that this was a Cold War mentality and it was as much smaller world, but it did exist. So today I don't think that that is the situation and that idea that the NGOs and communists are the enemy. Now, we have a Communist Party in Colombia. There are 5,000 members to that political party. They don't have a senator. Why? Because of the dirty war that goes on for many reasons, but we do have a Communist Party. And I don't believe that anyone today from any institution looks at it as a negative or something that should be censured, but 10, 20, 30, 40 years ago, that was the case. The military considered the Communist enemies and they had to be eliminated and that's what they tried to do with all of their mafias, et cetera, and basically they did away with the Union patroteca which was a Communist. Today, this is something that is called genocide in front of the International Criminal Court and that was done through the military. But perhaps to answer your question today, I think that they are professional, they've been acting very respectfully and the people that don't believe that don't go up the ladder in the military ranks. I believe that that's ideological variant is controlled now in the military forces. Now, I don't say that or I don't mean that, this means that there are people that don't think that the peace process is against the country and it's their ideology, but that's a minority now within the forces. I think the challenge is the problem of corruption. The problems today are ideological. There is all kinds of situations that we see in the country, avarice and greed that exists. If you look at situations in the economy, you'll see that that exists. Those are the difficulties. So I think the process exists today. They are respecting and supporting the process and it shows what you said before. Last week, for example, there was a commission from public forces and military police, et cetera, and as well as Navy went to work at the table talking about disarmament and the issues that are military issues. So I do believe, but where the greatest difficulty occur, I think it's the military officials that are retired because that's where it all still remains. If you talk about the generals, the colonels, the majors today, they don't have as many problems. The problems exist where the debts for the issues that happen is in the world of those that are retired. There's 12,000 that have been processed, 3,000 that are in jail, and that's something that a lot of people want to discuss. They want to know what's going on. They want to talk about it. So I think that's where the problem exists. Likewise, this is a fairly large group of people. There are lots that did it with support and some that don't. So that's my idea or my perception of the military situation. The historic commission created not too long ago between the government. The FARC at the table has decided to create a commission. I believe they're calling it historic victims commission or something to the effect that is made up of 12 individuals that are all academicians on 11 men, one woman, they should have more women participating in that commission. But it has been an agreement on both parts. Some both parts have invited these individuals. And they have two individuals that are going to be talking within the last few months. The, there are 22 or 23 of August, the reconters are going to be there. And they're the ones that are following the mandate and to construct the understanding of what was the origin of the conflict as how it did evolve was the actors in the conflict. And how do we reach that conclusion? It was something that basically was demanded by the FARC. FARC was the one that mentioned the fact from the very beginning that they considered it very important that there would be an independent commission from both parts or parties would present evaluations. And I think it's done with a sense of legitimizing the situation and this is on behalf of the FARC. In other words, they want to show that they did not award machine that their motivation has not been terror. If there's been any debate in Colombia saying that the FARC has been a player that constantly is causing terrorist acts and hurting the country, it's true. They have done so. It's true that they've done a lot of damage to Colombia society, but at the same time, they've also done a lot of things. They've struggled for power. They've had a discourse for a grand reform. They've had a lot of issues that they've worked on. And I think I don't like, believe that they want to get legitimacy. I think secondly, the FARC wants to show that they're not the only actor in the conflict. Sometimes in Colombia, you hear the discourse that, how come FARC, how are they gonna respond to these issues? And FARC usually comes back with, yes, we are going to respond. I think that the Colombians in the authority, the military, the politicians, all of the businessmen all have to respond as well. It's a conflict that has a lot of players. They're all participated in this conflict. I believe that this is what FARC would like now for someone else to say, to say, what about paramilitarism in Colombia? What's that subject all about? The paramilitaries had the support of the state. If you look at the standards and norms in Colombia, when you talk about the 60s, they'd say that the military could train civilians and arm them. And that's the origin of paramilitaries. That's why it's called paramilitary forces. That was something that was maintained in the country for many decades. So those are the subjects that I think we have to talk about. This is what the commission has to deal with. They're going to eventually do a very complex report on all these issues. All of the different emphasis that are interesting because you have to understand the conflict and its origins. The commission is going to be able to place some points for people to think about that I think are gonna be very important. Third, in every agreement that we have already made, there's still things that are pending. Natalia mentioned that there is a report where there's 28 points that are still pending. So we have to go back to that. We have sort of agreed on point one. Do you know that at this process, it is global reform? In other words, nothing is a court, nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to. That's the way that it has been discussed. So we can rediscuss anything and unless it is all agreed to, there is nothing agreed to. So as far as the rural area, there's still topics pending. What are the topics pending? What about foreign presence in the rural areas? As you know, this is a global issue. Foreigners are buying land all over the place and there are some national security interests. What do we do as far as foreign presence in the rural Colombian lands? That is something that is pending. Also, free trade agreements and how it impacts on Colombian territory. So the FARC has its proposals for that and so does the government. And also among the rural confines is a law that currently is in existence in Colombian law. What occurs in Colombian countryside is it does in other societies. The big ones get rid of the medium ones, the medium ones get rid of the smaller ones, the smaller ones get rid of the super smaller ones. In other words, and then from an economic point of view, this is how competition works. The problem is that in Colombian land, this has been done with violence. Land concentration, all those items that work with violence. So in 1994, under Colombian law, we established the protection of the small campesino, which is a small countryside reserve. I recommend that you look into this topic. And what the idea says basically that within a territory, a community may organize itself and present a way to protect their land. In other words, each individual maintains their land, but the zone becomes a shared area for protection. So they share in their development and this is supported by the government. And the government gives it this name of peasant area reserve or campesino area reserve. And what does this mean? That this organized area of land manages their development, they manage their land, and any change must be made by everybody in a green. In other words, it is collective. Collective within the zone. So if I live in a zone of 500 hectares where 100,000 people live, and I am a person who works in forestry and I wanna buy 20 hectares of the 10,000 that they have, I would have to discuss it with their managers. I couldn't discuss it individually with each landowner of it. I would have to discuss it with the managers of the zone. And that's the idea that they work as a group. And this was in support by, this was supported by the IDB. They have given resources for these zones and these zones exist. There are six land reserve areas. The organized farmers or campesinos in that group have 85 going through the process. In other words, there are 85 communities in Columbia that want to be part of this reserve zone status. Right now there's only six of them because it is a legal status that is granted by the government. The FARC has said, I agree with the reserved lands. And that's why we have these 86 trying to become part of these reserved land. If you take these numbers out of the 86 who want to have land reservations, it's 250,000 families that are hoping to have 8.5 million protected hectares that they either already own or hope to own. In other words, the 85 processes are 250,000 families that in some cases have very little land or no land at all and are aspiring to 8.5 million hectares in total. That's there. And the FARC says we support that. That's something else that needs to be discussed. But it is already found in Colombian policy. And what the FARC is telling the government is, I just want you to follow through with your own laws. Why don't you give the land to those people who need it? Why do you give people who already have land more land? And why don't you just return the land to all the people who have lost their land? And that's the discourse. That is one of the situations for the rule. And we also have conditions in the political arena. And I'm not gonna go through all of them because you can definitely look at them. But there are possibilities of conciliation in both areas, in all the areas. There are possibilities of the meeting of the minds and moving forward. Now, as far as your question, very well expressed. The problems that we've had with drug trafficking, we have the coca production, but not as an illegal economy. The illegal economy that we've had for coca has been for the last 40 years. We went through a marijuana cycle, et cetera. But that entire area has created a social class. And part of that social class has aligned themselves with the cattle ranchers in order to become a criminal group. In other words, this is how paramilitaries are created with huge political power, with huge economic power. And this was reflected when we saw this when Alva Uribe became president in 2002. During our entire life as a republic, we've always had a small elite class as you know, the current president is a grandson of an ex-president. I don't know if this has happened in the United States. I don't know if you've ever had a president whose grandfather was a president. Oh, okay, just recently. But in Colombia, that's the way it's always been. President Pastrana was a son of a president. President Santos, grandson of a president. And the next president could be, that way, Hermara Maragalleras could be our 2018 president, grandson of a president. Simon Gaviria, who is actually a public officer right now, could be a president in 12 years and he's a son of a president. So let's just say that the Colombian elite is a small one and it worked hand in hand with business and politics up until 2010. But in 2010, there was a great divide in those elites and now we have two elites that are confronting each other. The elite of President Santos, one that wants to modernize, wants to culminate with the armed conflict and another elite that is leadered by Uribe, who is opposed to that, who feels negatively or adversely affected by that because they feel that this process goes against their main interests. So we now find ourselves with two elites and these elites are confronting each other at this very moment in time. And lastly, Colombian civil society. Look, regarding Colombian civil society, I believe that we've had a dramatic situation in Colombia. In other words, the armed conflict dimension in Colombia has not been small. We've had six million people that have been displaced and I can name lots of things and all this happened right behind urban society. In other words, it's something that has fundamentally affected the Colombian countryside, at least part of the Colombian countryside. And this was done without urban society saying a word. There's more or less 50 million of us. The 70% of us live in 125 cities. So if you take 125 cities, 75% of the Colombian population lives there. And in that other 25% is where we saw all this drama. Of course, I mean, they also killed labor union leaders and different types of people. But basically it is found in the 250 municipalities where gorillas are still present. So if Colombian urban society were indifferent to this process, then why couldn't they say now that the solution is something where they are fully aware is something where they are fully engaged and emotional about it. If they were indifferent to it before, there's no reason to be completely engaged now. So I think that if you were to discuss it with the average Colombian, they don't truly understand this conflict. In Colombia, their understanding of this conflict is very basic, just good guys and bad guys. So I think that we must be able to work hand in hand with society. With most of the society that supports the process, I think that the society truly owes the rural area a lot. But that's not what is happening right now. Somebody was saying that in Havana, everything is fine. In Havana, we have a table where talks work. But in the country, nothing is going on. In other words, the support for this process is something that should be led by the government and they should involve the population. But I think that we're lacking there. And in fact, you see that in the support that Uribezmo has. I am speaking about this from a personal point of view. My neighbors on the second floor are teachers. Very respected teachers. And they are full Uribez supporters. So Uribezmo is very strong in the country. It's amazing. So I believe that this is a great challenge to involve Colombian society. Okay, so another round of questions. And I actually have several. First, regarding your comment on indifference, how the greater part of the population is indifferent. What possibility do you have, or have you seen a change with the presence of victims in Havana and the publicity on conflict with historic memory and all that? Is that affecting the population? Are they being more, is there more awareness? And how would we've raised this awareness, if not? And that brings me to my second question. What challenges do you see to this process? What can be the greater barriers that would become obstacles to advancing? And regarding the different roles, the different levels of society play, how do you see the churches participating? Like what do you see regarding the pastors or Episcopal churches? And also, what does society think about the victims? Have they been empathetic towards it, or what can you tell us regarding the victims? Tim, I hand it from the World Bank. I wanted to know what your position was on the FARC political participation, basically in two aspects. First, all the information that we get is that most of, from the different reports that we send out, or the different questionnaires that we send out, is that most Colombians are not interested in the peace process. So how would they participate in the referendum? And second, if they do, in fact, in the referendum, how are we going to, how are you going to make sure that they are safe? Thank you. James Husser. Thank you, James Husser, U.S. Congress. For the politicians here in Congress, they would like to see us, to give a space of legitimacy to the FARC, or the ELN, is basically to give them amnesty, to give amnesty to terrorists. So my question is simply, how would you answer to that? Anyone else? My name is Andrew Albertson, and I work at Creative Associates. My question is, the question is regarding the challenges that threats to the process. I also hope you can answer to those issues as well when we talk about how to actually implement these issues the first year, the second year after the agreements. So my question is somewhat similar. If I live in a municipality, say, in the countryside of Columbia, after the agreements are signed, if I live there, what is it that I'm going to see? What is going to change? Are there any municipal processes that are going to change? Is there new investments going to be made into rural development? And what will it look like for the citizens that live in those areas? Thank you. I think that will be enough. Thank you. All right. When we talk about the victims, let's say that the government as well as FARC and ELN can say at this point that their attitude is that they're going to respond regarding their issues. The government, the FARC, the ELN have an attitude today that they're going to respond to the issues. In other words, they're now trying to avoid the situation. They're not trying to set up any barriers. And of course, we have to look at that as the events happen. Are you going to be telling the truth? Are you going to explain and respond to the issues? I think that this is a very important and very positive attitude. The delegation that reached the negotiating table agreed that they're going to talk about all the issues throughout the months, and eventually they're going to have to reach agreement. What about the issue of truth and justice and reparation? How is that all going to work? We already have rules. We have institutions. We have all kinds of processes that are working. Columbia lives in an area simultaneously of conflict and post-conflict. We've been in post-conflict for how long? Many, for a long time. While we're in the midst of a conflict. So each one of those issues, we have points that refer to it. So the question is how will they be handled when the conflict ends? How will they be handled in a very definitive manner after the end of the conflict? The armed conflict. I think it's going to be very important that the debate that's going on in Havana as well is in Columbia. Obviously all of this is discussed in Parliament, in the media, society. If you listen to any program in Columbia that's constantly being mentioned. So I believe the process is moving along. I think we have to look for formulas to be able to carry this out. I think as far as justice is concerned, there is a definition, a constitutional definition. We have done reforms to the Constitution. That was last year, where we basically introduced the fact that traditional justice is part of Colombian constitution. In other words, all of the mechanisms for the transitional justice are now constitutional. We have defined the priority of cases, how to select the cases. We have already defined then some of the steps that are going to be taken to implement all these issues. So who's going to be able to investigate and judge violence that's gone on for over 50 years? FARC says, let's not talk about 64. Let's talk about 44, from 44 on. Who is going to be able to do that and judge what's happened? That would not be very realistic. So we've already defined that what we're going to do is we're going to have methods for selection and prioritization for everything that's happened. We're going to construct the universe and we're going to judge the issues that happen and we're going to define how it's going to be done and how it's going to be handled. And this is when I'm referring to justice. Now, what's being discussed in Havana are going to be basically just the borders, just the ideas that are going to be part of the laws in the Republic that is going to have that constitutional framework. But let's say that the situation is that we have to face the errors that were committed. We're facing the mistakes and look at the horrors of what happened and look at it again. I think there is something that has to be done and worked. I think there is a dynamic to the victims that perhaps are much more visible and organized. They were the victims that went to Havana. The most organized, the most more visible ones, the ones that went to Havana. And by visible, I mean that there are politicians. We have a drama, obviously. You can look at the fact that there's 264 congressmen. The Congress has 102 senators and 162 or 164 representatives. Do you know how many victims are there within those 264? There would be about 40 individuals in those numbers. Their parents have died, their brothers, their cousins who was kidnapped, etc. You can imagine then the drama that exists in our country when in Congress we have 40 victims. And there is the dimension, the tremendous dimension of the subject. As I said before, I think the idea is the truth. And that's what we have to base everything. There's a process and a dynamic that has to come based on the truth. As far as, what are we going to do with these individuals from FARC and ELN? Well, they're going to be integrated into Colombian politics with all that they do. What we're trying to do with these two groups, which are armed political forces, is to integrate them into Colombian politics now, forces that are political, but without weapons. And that's what we're trying to do. And there's people that don't like that. They don't want that. And they can be opposed to that. But what we have to do is to integrate them to Colombian politics as they are gentlemen with political ideas. Of course, they have a debt. They have responsibilities. The businessmen, the politicians, everyone has a responsibility. And if everyone is going to have to put their face to these things, we're at the moment of truth. And what we're going to be doing now, in my opinion, is we're going to say that if anyone owes something, raise your hand and say, I owe such and such. And based on that, what are we going to do? There will be mechanisms available then for transitional justice. There can't be a process with FARC and ELN that doesn't end without them having some kind of participation in politics in Colombia. It can't happen, because, obviously, they want to participate in the policies and the politics of Colombia, but with weapons. So who can go to it? Who can't? What are the conditions we're going to set? That is the debate. To see people in the chiefs of FARC and ELN in Congress in Colombia is nothing new, because we've already seen, in the past, we've seen for many decades politicians that were linked to mafias and to criminals in Colombia. And that's what the Supreme Court of Justice said. And they basically sent 100 of them to jail because of those links that they had with these groups. So we have to integrate the issues, and I'm not an expert at that, but we need to integrate this leftist that have committed violence into a very precarious democracy. And we also have to do it with the right wing, which is perhaps more powerful and bigger that are also armed, and they're still part of the politics of Colombia. We have to integrate these two extremes. We have to put them under rules so they can live together. So the process in Colombia is to civilize ourselves, stop killing ourselves. We've been killing ourselves throughout history. So at this point, we have to follow the commandments and shall not kill, shall not steal. We have to do that in Colombia. And it's a very basic process which we have not done to just follow the commandments. But it's not that some should and the rest shouldn't. No, throughout the whole spectrum of politics, nobody is following the commandments. So what's going to happen after all of this? Well, we have to construct an agreement. It's going to be difficult, but to implement it is going to be even bigger. There's going to be a tremendous challenge to achieve all this. But what happens if we get close to an agreement that what we're going to see is those that want to sabotage the whole effort? What we're going to see and hopefully the society and the state will be able to control those that try to sabotage the whole system. It's one thing to be opposed to a process. Obviously, that's the legitimate right of any citizen to be opposed to say, I don't agree. I don't go along with what you're doing. What you're doing is wrong. And you can say that in parliament. You can say that on the streets or through the media in anywhere. You can say that. That's the right of a citizen. What is not the right is to call sabotage because that's a whole different issue. That's to act in an illegal manner. As Uribe did when they contracted people to do wiretapping, to intercept mail, to know where the chiefs, the coordinates of where they were located, the FARC leaders, et cetera. That's called sabotage. So we've seen that in the past in Colombia. People that have placed bombs and then they say it was the FARC that did it. People that do other things. We've seen sabotage in the process. So if we reach an agreement, if we control those that want to sabotage the system, in every process in Colombia, we've seen this happen. So what's going to happen? We need to implement the agreement. And that means that people in the 250 municipalities where the conflict has occurred have to see changes in their lives. Something has to occur that's different. So what has to be different? What has to be different is that the individuals of 500 million that don't own any land have to be able to land. And we can't do that in one or two years, but we have to at least say the 500,000 Colombian families that don't own any land today will. And we're going to start, we need to take the land in Colombia and reshare it with many, many families because we have 500 million peasants that don't own any. And another 500 million that don't, that have very little or another million that their land was stolen and they're now in the cities and they're not going to go back. But those are the statistics. What else has to change? There's a city in Colombia. I don't even know Virginia or Adam, perhaps those of you that travel Colombia, that's called Puerto Boyacá. It's a city of 70,000 inhabitants near a river and it is like three hours from Bogotá near the Río Magdalena, the Magdalena, which is basically the birthplace of the paramilitaries. It's the Puerto Boyacá capital, the anti-communist capital of Colombia. It's the sign that you see if you've ever been there. So what is not going on in Puerto Boyacá? What's not going on? There is a communist newspaper called Vos and Puerto Boyacá used to be fully communist 40 years ago. Most of the city council was made up of communists but then they were eliminated from the municipality for many reasons, like many of them basically got kidnapped. But what isn't going on in Puerto Boyacá that must change in Colombia? That I am going to move to Puerto Boyacá. I live in Bogotá and what has to happen in Colombia is that if I wanted to, I should be able to move to Puerto Boyacá, become a teacher in Puerto Boyacá and every Friday issue the Vos communist newspaper and sit in the city square and read this newspaper with nothing happening to me. Because if I do that right now, if I go as a teacher to Puerto Boyacá and I start reading the Vos newspaper in town square, I might not be around in three months. That is what is going on right now in 250 municipalities of the country. There is no guarantee for freedom of speech or for freedom of expression. In other words, what we need to see in Colombia is constitutional safety. Insurgents that have been killed because of patriotic marches and homicides of cattle ranchers, etc. That is what has to change in Colombia. We have to follow the commandment thou shalt not kill. And nobody, neither the left nor the right should kill because in Colombia, the armed left kills and the right armed kill, which is in arms kills. And the government in the middle does nothing and sort of condones one side but not the other. So the implementation part is going to be difficult and this is going to take a whole decade and it's already been said by the peace commissioner whatever we reach as an agreement must be implemented within the next 10 years. And to close, the core of all of this is a cultural exercise of civilization. In other words, Colombian society cannot continue its indifference and criminal practices that are so well organized and so organized and so structural, structuralized. And this means that we must somehow broaden our democracy from an uncertain democracy to a more stable democracy. There is a democratic effort and at the core of this effort there are reforms and without these reforms we are unable to say that we are broadening our democracy. We must reform our rural situation our political situation our way our lifestyle, way of living together and equality. President Santos has said, what is my message? This is what the president said, peace, education and equality. And that's a very good message. That is something we need to work towards. And I believe as I said at the very beginning I believe that this is going to be a successful process. We are missing the table with ELN but we are moving towards that. We have to move ahead with the FARC peace dialogues. We still need truth and reparations and we also need to incorporate Colombian society. It must not be something where people just watch it on TV. This must be discussed in schools. It must be discussed at the dinner table. And there are some huge responsibilities here for several actors. And that is what must be an open discussion. And I think it's time to close now. So I would like to thank everyone for being here. Thank the United States for all their help, for the Institute of Peace for the Colombian office that has worked there for several years. Even Congress, as I said, the United States is a great actor in this process and you can help us a lot and thank you very much. Thank you very much, Lucho. I believe that we could continue discussing many different topics but I would like to thank you for being here with us today for sharing your ideas. I would like to thank all of you for your excellent questions and thank you very much for getting all of you together here today. I really appreciate all her help and participation in this event. And I also wanted to say that on September 24, Carlos Vives will be here at the Institute. So if you're interested, please keep in touch. We are going to have a USAID a USAID class here with Carlos Vives. He has been invited by USAID and we're going to have a shared event regarding culture's role in the peace implementation process with other panelists as well. So please save the date and keep in touch with us for the information. Thank you very much.