 Good evening. We are the last panel of a very long day, so we're going to try to keep you awake. I'm Laurent Cohen Tannugi. I have the honor and the pleasure of moderating this panel. I'm an international corporate lawyer based in Paris. And I would maybe start with a word of explanation about our topic tonight, which is the weaponization of law and globalization. So many people ask me, what is this about? So of course, you can object to this title that law has always been a weapon. When you go to court, you use law against your adversary in a litigation. Also, if you take the long view of history throughout centuries, law has been used by sovereign powers to legitimize or justify even the most horrible actions. So you would say, what's new? Well, what is new in my view, and I think probably some of all of our panelists, is that we seem to be moving from an area from the end of World War II in the past 70 years where law has been key to the building of an international world order that, based on the rule of law, and that has been thanks to both the United States and the European community and the European Union, we seem to be moving from that rule-based international order to a more chaotic system of international relations where law seems to be more and more used as a pretext for arbitrary or unilateral action. And so I guess our topic is, is that so? And if true, is that evolution troublesome for, is that a new threat, a new impediment to globalization? So to address these questions, we have a panel of distinguished members, most of them lawyers, but not all. And so I will introduce very briefly, since we have very little time and a lot to say, I will refer you to the brochure for the complete biography. But very briefly, ladies first, Antida Nohodom at the far left here, who I would describe as a rising star in public international law academia. Then Michael Muller, who had a brilliant career in the UN system, had a number of positions in the UN system. Ye Min Lee, who had a brilliant diplomatic career in Korea, particularly in the international economic and trade area, he negotiated both the EU, Korea, and US, Korea Free Trade Agreement. And then finally, Stu Eisenstadt, who you all know, who was a close advisor to President Carter, who had a great biography of him recently, and was also US ambassador to the EU. So I will maybe start by illustrating what I was just talking about, this troublesome shift from a rule-based order toward a more chaotic order with maybe an abuse of the legal system. In my area, which is international business law and international criminal law. And of course, many of you think about the issue of the extraterritorial application of national law, and particularly of US law when we think about the weaponization of law. I happen to think that extraterritoriality as such is not an issue. In fact, I think that in a globalized economy, the extraterritorial application of US and other any national law is actually the norm. And in fact, the European Union also applies its laws extraterritorially. The only difference is that the US has a more powerful enforcement tools. And so at least in the areas where there is an international consensus, like for example, the fight against international corruption, where there is an OECD convention, the fact that the United States tend to enforce its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, its national anti-corruption law more vigorously abroad, doesn't shock me. When there is, rather instead, a policy split, like in the recent Iranian sanctions of the US, then it is more of a concern because there's no international consensus. But what is more troublesome, and what is more recent and illustrative of the trend I was describing, which is the subject of our panel, is what I would call the geopoliticization of international business law and particular criminal law. And this geopoliticization, I think, is due to three phenomenon. First, the targeting of individuals, and particularly corporate executives, in addition to cooperation themselves. That was the trend that was started by the US enforcement authorities, but is now spreading as a result of the financial crisis. There's a criticism that the CEOs of all these banks that created so much trouble were never actually indicted or jailed, so there's a trend towards targeting the individual, exactly. The second trend, of course, in the global economy is the rise of emerging powers who do not have a rule of law tradition. I don't need to cite them. You know those I'm talking about. And then the third factor is, of course, the growing conflictuality of international relations. So if you put those three things together, you have a situation like the Huawei situation, where Huawei CFO is arrested in Vancouver by the US authorities, which provokes retaliation and then China detains two Canadian nationals who have nothing to do with this or anything else. A French banker is arrested in Russia. And maybe the Carlos Ghosn affair, even though it's not so much a political, but it's sort of corporate politics, in a system that is in a criminal law system that is at odds with most Western criminal justice systems. So all of those things, all of these evolution are quite troublesome and I think are becoming a threat to globalization. Another example would be the use of anti-corruption laws by notoriously corrupt countries who enact them and then use them as they please against either political opponents or against selectively against foreign investors. So we seem to be moving from a rule of law-based system to a system of arbitrariness and force. And so that is, I think, what we should be concerned about. So to deepen that analysis, I would like to give the floor first to Antida to maybe give us a little doctrinal approach to this phenomenon. And Antida, please, the floor is yours. Thank you, Colorand. I take this opportunity to thank Thierry Montbriel for this invitation to participate a new time at this very beautiful conference. So I'm going to introduce you. I'm going to do my presentation in French because we're lucky to have interpreters. Let's present the doctrinal framework of the use of law as a weapon with a theoretical and historical presentation of the concept of law-making. So this session will mainly deal with the economic aspects of the use of the law as a weapon. And since it is part of the study of globalization, but this strategic use of the law is produced in a much wider framework than this economic context. And it has, by the way, started in the military field before reaching the economic field. My proposal is to highlight the theoretical and historical framework of the theme of this session by a brief presentation of the concept of law-making, neologism coming from the contraction of the terms of law and warfare, in other words, war by law. So what does law do? The first use of this term was made by Major Charles Dunlap in 2001, a publication by Nécry, where he defined law-making as the use of the law and the legal process as a weapon in modern warfare, either to achieve a military objective or to deny an objective to the enemy. The definition, as it was proposed in 2001, was broadened to include the illicit manipulation of the legal system to achieve political or military strategic objectives. Today, there is no consensus on the meaning of law-making. The propagation of the term law-making is produced in the course of war against terrorism led by the United States, although it is no longer today limited to these events. In such a context, the law has evolved to describe and denounce various forms of international legal commitment. Often, but not exclusively, these uses are the cause of non-state actors, individuals, non-governmental organizations, international institutions or militant groups under state. It is for them to impose and manipulate legal norms, especially international, in order to limit traditional military operations but also to limit state reactions, for example, against terrorism, and to limit the use of force. In these last revolutions, the law-making label describes the strategic use of the information control by the states in order to achieve a particular objective, often military but also economic, in which the role of the new technologies in the propagation of this phenomenon. The law-making label describes the use of law as a means of propaganda, a way to mobilize public opinion, and the concept of the law-making label has been so widespread that it is now revealed, since it has even been invited to denounce political interference in the elaboration of the law, or the exercise of national justice in the framework of democratic states. So we will limit here the concept of the use of the law to strategic defense of destabilization of the enemy. Two historical examples of the law-making label. First, the use of the law-making label in the framework of American military actions in Iraq in 2003, which gave place to a legal battle on legitimation and de-limitation of this intervention, especially by the ONG, who wanted to show the illegality of this action in order to de-legitimate the power. Second example, the law-making label was used by the Islamic groups to condemn the violations of human rights operated by the United States, in Guantanamo, or by the Europeans, in order to restrict public information on radical Islam. What kind of teaching can we draw from these examples? First, the fact that the right to be used as a weapon against countries where the state of law is strong. And second teaching, it is more often used in relations or asymmetric wars in order to influence the perception of the public, abroad, to obtain a moral and political advantage on the enemy to compensate for military or economic disadvantages. This phenomenon illustrates a change in the art of war. Even if this phenomenon has always existed, and used the right as a weapon, we know that war does not necessarily win only with the success of the armies. We observe today an amplification and a diversification of the phenomenon that reaches the economic sphere and does not limit itself to the military sphere. Three manifestations of this change that you can see on the diapo. First, first manifestation, we see a political necessity to justify the right to military interventions with the public, national and international opinion. In a more general way, debates raising political issues are taken back and formulated in legal terms because the right is considered as a supposed, neutral and consensual language, which in reality is not the case. There is, in other words, a confusion between legality and legitimacy. Finally, the phenomenon also relies on the technological mutation of the digital in the civilian and military sphere that facilitates the diffusion of the legal argument used. So what are the techniques of the offer? There are three techniques, mainly the commitment to pursue in front of the tribunals of the international system and of the internal systems. We, for example, used the offer to describe the depot of plenty of defamation against the experts in the fight against terrorism in order to discourage them from making their expertise. The use of legal terminology is also abusive to manipulate the public opinion, international institutions to influence this public opinion and finally, perhaps, the extraterritorial door of the national law, which is a new technique of the offer and we see it in illustrations in the field of economic sanctions, in the use of universal skills or even more recently, in the case of the protection of personal data. So the question we can ask ourselves is whether it is a pathology that we should absolutely treat or an inherent evolution of the international society. The use of new technologies facilitates the mobilization of the public opinion and disinformation and in this sense, the offer is inherent to the international society. Even the globalization increases interdependence between the states and the transnational dimension of the activities that are led. And so the offer, using the extraterritoriality of the laws, plays on interdependence of the economy. Finally, the final question that I would ask is, is there really a pathology of the law? The use of the law can be pathological? So yes, and in this case, we can use the notion of law abuse, that is to say the fact for a person to commit a mistake by the exceeding of the limits of exercise of a law that is conferred to him, either by detourning it from its finality or in the aim of destroying it. Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights mentioned it. In conclusion, the offer may be a useful tool when it comes to communicating on the way of using the law in modern conflicts and appears as a substitute to traditional weapons. The offer also works because it is about the values of the victim state, the respect of the law state, then becomes the talent of the democratic states. So let us, however, renounce the principle of the law state, I do not believe it. I am a law professor, so I will preach it for my parish. It is necessary to fight the offer, in my opinion, by the offer, to use the law because there is always the most serious alternative to the war. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, Antida, for this doctrinal lighting on the concept of the offer. What I deduce is that there is good and bad in this concept. There are uses that are legitimate of the law for a particular fight and others that are less. And if we are optimistic, we can say that the fact of needing, in any case, to have a legal justification, is, in any case, at least for lawyers, a progress. I would like not to give the floor to Stu Eisenstadt to maybe illustrate some more, maybe at the political level, this notion. Andy Warhol said we should all have 15 minutes of fame. I'm only given 10. Why is there an upswing in lawfare? There's a positive reason. That is that major nation states know it would be catastrophic to engage in shooting wars in a nuclear age. So there's an attempt to achieve the same geopolitical objectives by non-lethal means, disinformation, cyber attacks, and by lawfare. Second, for non-state actors, the Taliban, ISIS, Hamas, the Polisario, and to a lesser extent the Palestinian Authority, in an age of terrorism, it is a way of rebalancing the argument against stronger foes, an inexpensive, asymmetric way to attack stronger rivals. Third, for rising powers like China, or for major nuclear powers like Russia, it's a way to enhance their influence with minimum effort on the part of the U.S. and NATO to respond, minimum provocation. For the U.S., in an age of terrorism, it's a way of striking back at terrorists and of flexing economic muscle backed up by the dollar, and putting unparalleled economic pressure, as we've seen in this administration, in better terms of trade or better international agreements, even if it means totally and objectively abandoning international norms and best trade practices. With that as a backdrop, let me give you some very frank and specific examples. For non-state actors, the Taliban and ISIS, whether it's in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq, use human shields as a way of protecting themselves against the full brunt of Western response, knowing that the West, the U.S., NATO, tries to abide by the law of armed conflict and to reduce the degree to which military intervention harms civilians. So they embed themselves in civilian neighborhoods. Hamas shoots its rockets at southern Israel from densely populated civilian neighborhoods. In addition, if we go from there to Morocco, the country we're in, the conflict over the Western Sahara has been made a part of lawfare by the Polisario backed by Algeria. Trying to deny Morocco the opportunity to exploit the natural resources both in Morocco and offshore with fisheries by using legal attacks. This has gone to the UN, it's gone to the European Union, it's gone to the European Court of Justice. And in general, the UN has sided with Morocco and said that as a self-administered territory, as long as Morocco uses the resources and revenues from its exploitation of these resources for the people in the Western Sahara, it's appropriate. And yet, just this very year, 2019, the European Court of Justice, reversing itself from 2018, said no, it was illegal. This was ignored by the European Parliament and the European Commission. That cleared the way for a EU Morocco fisheries agreement. But again, it's an example. And just last year, a South African court in 2018 upheld South Africa seizing a cargo ship full of phosphates made by OCP, mined by OCP, and kept it there until great political pressure was put in releasing it. The Palestinian issue as a non-state actor is more complicated. I have negotiated during the Clinton administration when I was responsible for the peace process's economic dimension more than a half dozen times with Chairman Arafat. I spent a great deal of time, both in Israel and in the territories. And to its credit, the Palestinian Authority does not resort to the kind of violence that Hamas, ISIS, and the Taliban do. And indeed, they cooperate with Israel on security issues. But they have turned to lawfare from their perspective as a way of gaining a two-state solution. They can't get it a negotiating table. But from Israel's perspective, it is nothing short of the use of lawfare for what is called BDS. Boycott, divestment, and sanction. This began in 2001 at the Durban Conference on racism in which NGOs were activated by the Palestinians to isolate Israel, to call it an apartheid state. And in 2005, the BDS movement formally started with across-the-board efforts in the UN, in U.S. courts, in every forum possible, in Belgium, in the Netherlands, to sanction Israeli officials, bar them from coming in, sanction Israeli companies. I could give an hour speech just on this alone. Use of the International Criminal Court. It is an effort from Israel's perspective a delegitimizing Israel as a Jewish state rather than simply accomplishing a negotiating deal sitting down and making the tough compromises they're not prepared to make. Now let's move from that to China. I was present with President Carter in the cabinet room when Don Chao Ping made his historic first visit. We normalized, not Nixon, we normalized relations with the People's Republic. And again, I've spent a good deal of time in China as well. The change in China is profound because from Don Chao Ping's time in 1978, 79, up to President Xi, all Chinese leaders tried and with great success to mobilize their internal resources to take hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. President Xi felt that was not enough. He wanted China to become a global power and they have done so by using lawfare. I'll give you some concrete, very specific examples. The misuse of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas and the extension of the economic zone. They have taken three coral reefs. They built them out into militarized islands with jet fighters and the like and then claimed 200 mile jurisdiction as if this was a part of the coastline of China. The Philippines took them to the world court. The Philippines won, China ignored it. I was on the Defense Policy Board and the Obama Administration and we urged and Obama did and Trump has continued not to allow China to treat the South China Sea as if it was a great lake in the US and to have warships go by those islands. But this is a major way of doing it and China has extended this concept of lawfare to aviation law. For example, with the Chicago Convention on International Air Travel. They have taken this concept of militarizing the islands they claim as theirs as an extension of their coastline and have gone up and said you can't go over these islands by using US planes without our permission or Western planes and they've done it without our space and with cyber space as well. Their Belt and Road Initiative is a very, very creative way of extending their influence globally. 750,000 Chinese workers in Africa alone building infrastructure, warm water ports for their built up Navy and their carriers. Just in the last week, the National Basketball Association was threatened with a cutoff of the transmission of their games because one general manager for one of the teams tweeted sympathy for Hong Kong and ESPN and major airlines are being told to redraw their maps of China to include Taiwan as well. Russia is another example of the extension of lawfare. Putin has very cleverly maximized his influence by doing so. And this fits very much with what Anne said. So what has he done? He's taken over parts of Georgia by handing out fake Russian passports and saying he had to go in to protect the Russian. He has taken over an annexed Crimea and used little green men in Eastern Ukraine who he says are not Russian military. And he has abrogated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which after the Cold War, Ukraine transferred all of its nuclear weapons to Russia in return for an international agreement which the U.K., the U.S. and others signed on to that the sovereignty of Ukraine would be protected. Well, it hasn't been. And what has been the lawfare excuse by Russia responding to simple of the popular will of those in the Crimea, of the Russians in Eastern Ukraine? We're simply abiding by it and we're not doing it anyway. It's only the militias responding to popular will. I'll close on one positive note. One going back many years to Jimmy Carter and one today. The U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan in a positive way are using a new lawfare concept. And that is when they take ISIS out of a territory, they immediately begin to employ the rule of law, set up conflict resolution efforts, and it's an operation called COIN. It's a very creative and positive use of lawfare. And last, my own President Jimmy Carter has served Clinton and Obama as well. He put human rights at the center of his foreign policy. He applied it to the military dictators in Latin America, cut off their arms, activated the democratic movements there, got thousands of political prisoners released, and did the same thing with the Soviet Union. So there are many examples of positive uses as well that I hope perhaps in the remaining time we can use. Thank you very much. So without further ado, I'll give the floor to Ambassador Lee for other instances of lawfare. We've learned a new concept tonight and we didn't know how broad it was. Please. Thank you, Chair. I wish to speak this afternoon on the serious threat to the rule-based international order from the international trade perspective based on the insight I have gained from my more than 35 years working experience as a trade diplomat. I would like to highlight two elements which are currently threatening the rule-based international trade order. First, unilateralism by abuse of national security exception, and second, paralyzing the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO by abuse of this consensus rule. The crown jewel of Lugai land agreements was the establishment of effective dispute settlement mechanism in international trade, prohibiting unilateral sanctions by its members. When the Lugai land of multilateral trade negotiations were finalized after nearly eight years of difficult negotiations signed here in Marrakesh, setting up the WTO in 1995, all members undertook not to resort to unilateral action and all the sanctions therefore must go through the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. In these years, however, the unilateral actions of the most important members of the WTO have reappeared with these members insisting that they base their action on the international trade rules for example, the United States has imposed additional tariffs on imported steel and aluminum in March 2017 and is currently exploring the possibility of imposing one on the auto and auto parts whose importance and impact on the world economy are far behind comparison with steel and aluminum. U.S. defends this action based on Section 232 of Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorizes the president to take action when his national security is in danger by the import. It justifies his action citing the national security exception of the WTO. As it is not logical nor reasonable to claim that imported steel and aluminum were eventually imported cars from allies including European Union, Korea or Japan, it is regarded as an abuse of national security exception of the WTO. The European Union and other members have brought this case to the WTO which established a panel to examine its consistency with the relevant WTO rules. What is more serious than worrisome is that some members have begun to use the national security exception provision of the WTO while they are criticizing the United States invoking national security to justify the retaliation against the dispute not related to trade is a good example. In this sense, it is very encouraging to see that in a ruling over Ukrainian transit issue with Russia, WTO panel in April confirmed the WTO's right to review national security claims rejecting the traditional argument of the powerful countries that national security is not subject to review but self-judging. Ladies and gentlemen, in the international trading system, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO serves as an independent institution tasked with upholding the rule of law and deterring unilateralism. It is critical therefore for our international community to work together to guarantee the proper functioning of WTO dispute settlement mechanism. So it is with a sense of disappointment to witness its collapse due to one member's veto of the appointment for new members of WTO appellate body. Coming this September, just one member out of seven will remain on the body. Since the WTO appellate body needs at least three members to deliberate, the WTO dispute settlement system will come to a grinding halt by that time. The WTO dispute settlement system with this appellate body has been key to the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. Without the proper system of enforcement, the multilateral rules can no longer work effectively. The US complains that there is no effective check on appellate body decisions. The impact of overreaching appellate body decisions create a traditional stair decisis which has emerged from WTO case law. As a result, panels depart from previous decisions of appellate body only in rare instances. The appellate body is also criticized for issuing advisory opinions on matters not raised by the parties or not related to the dispute at hand. International trade expert, including myself, sympathize with these US concerns, particularly because the decisions of the panels or appellate body should not result in de facto amendment of the agreement without the consent of its members. In this sense, I can see the broad support for the reform proposal made by the European Union at the end of last year, together with the other members to address the concerns expressed by the United States and at the same time to preserve the overall successful dispute resolution system of the WTO, but it is not certain if a way out of current that law could be found. I think the reappearance of unilateralism, the members are abusing the national security exception and paralyzing WTO dispute system are two important examples of the weaponization of the law in the international trade. In order to overcome this serious threat to the rule-based international trading system, like-minded countries need to more actively cooperate and unite to uphold the principle of rule of law abiding by the already leached agreements. Before I conclude, I would like to state that though I have highlighted US trade policy in my presentation, I understand and agree with the current US trade policies on many points, if not all. And I highly appreciate US contribution in spreading the value of rule of law all over the world and convenes that they will continue to do so in the future. Thank you. Thank you. So it seems like wherever you look, whether international business or international politics or trade, the rule of law based system is under threat. And so what do the United Nations have to say on that? I'm no longer the United Nations. Well, still. I'm very tired. Thank you. Thank you to my fellow panel members for so eloquently highlighting some of the specific issues of the issue at hand. I'm going to, with your permission, take a little bit more of a bird's eye view and situate what we're talking about in a broader context in which we live. And weaponization of law is not a new phenomenon. It's been going on ever since humanity started establishing rules and norms for how we govern ourselves. We use law for good and for bad. We use it to ensure the orderly conduct of our lives but also to rule, and as we've just heard, to subjugate, to gain political, economic, and personal advantage, et cetera. And we use it to also counter the negative aspects that we've talked about. It is this constant balancing act across history at all levels of our societies between good and evil that has culminated over the past 70 years or so in the absolutely unprecedented and extraordinary levels of peace, rights, and well-being that we have achieved for humanity. The human race has never been better off than it is today. And law, quite obviously, has been and is an indispensable foundation and driver for those advances. Our discussion today is part of a much needed global urgent examination of how we preserve those gains and, more importantly, how we ensure that our succeeding generations will live and can live on a sustainable planet that is able to provide them with their life and health in peace and indignity. I'm neither a lawyer or an academic, I'm a practitioner on the international stage for the past four decades. And it's as such that I'd like to reflect a bit on where we are now and on where and how we should go next. Underlying the framing of our debate today on the weaponization of law and globalization is a pervasive concern that fundamental tenets of the international and indeed national order are fraying. And it's true, the implicit self-evidence with which we up till just a few years ago treated the rule of law as the natural order within a state and the liberal rule-based system between state today almost seems naive. The fundamental questions about the way our world is governed have been thrown wide open once again. And today we are faced with a massive trust deficit, growing inequality, people ask whether democracy is still viable, powerful actors on the world stage propagate the end of multilateralism, and new fascination for authoritarianism has penetrated our discourse. Laws, rules, norms, and standards are systematically being misused or ignored entirely. And the world is increasingly polarized. Political debate today is reminiscent of what Hannah Arendt wrote about the 1920s and 30s, that any statement of fact becomes a question of motive. And the debates are decided by allegiance, not by arguments. Populists the world over have pushed us into a us versus them scenario, the people against the establishment, the locals versus the immigrants, and similar false dichotomies. Structural economic polarization is rampant and growing. A handful of men own more than the bottom half of humanity, while entire regions and countries are failing to catch up to the waves of progress left behind in the rough belts of the world, a totally unsustainable situation. And when people see a select few, seemingly living by a different set of rules, avoiding taxes, manipulating loopholes, legal loopholes, this naturally further feeds a strong sense of injustice. Deepening polarization in our political debate and rampant inequality in our economic affairs have created a dangerous seedbed for discontent. It stretches the fabric of society to the breaking point and it undermines trust in the rules and institutions that govern our societies. We're also witnessing a dramatic diffusion of power. The central role of the nation state, as we know it, is decreasing as we speak. For example, mayors of big urban centers, private businesses, NGOs, rich and powerful individuals, today exert influence on the global stage and a global scale. At this stage, this new polycentric or multi-stakeholder system is more fluid and unstable than the balance of power that preceded it. That may change. In addition to all this, of course, are the major existential changes and threats facing us in an increasingly aggressive manner every day. The effects of climate change, the rapid evolution of technology, present and future migration patterns, the increasing prevalence of health emergencies, growing inequality, corruption, terrorism, et cetera. And I would add another important existential change. For the past several years and until today or until very recently, we have used the past to navigate and manage our present. Today, we are increasingly faced with the reality that it is the future that determines our present. We are living a major transformation of our world and a major transition in the tools that we have to manage it. Clearly, in this context, the multilateral model and the laws that underpin it that have served us so well over the past seven decades are no longer up to the task of dealing with the problems that have just enumerated. And at this time of dysfunction and transition in global and local power relations and governance structures, there looms the additional risk of the world splitting in two as we spoke of this morning with the two largest economies creating two separate and competing worlds each with their own dominant currency, trade and financial rules, their own internet and artificial intelligence capacities, their own zero-sum geopolitical and military strategies and with their own and at times very distinct interpretation of the law. These realities are further strained on the international legal framework which is increasingly out of step with developments on the ground. Just think of how far behind the global norms and rules are relative to the breathtaking and rapid advances in autonomous weapons, cyber warfare, and the arms race in artificial intelligence. We have been discussing and the world over we're discussing globalization and some cases in very negative terms as far as I'm concerned globalization is really not a four letter word. Whether you like it or not, it is an operational and very potent reality that frames every human activity on our planet. But what we need to do is now to elaborate a new multilateral approach that is more networked, more inclusive and more collaborative. One that fully embraces our increasing interdependence and delivers governance structures that are flexible, people-centered and that help us ensure that we leave no one behind. One that is based on the clear collective understanding that if we don't, our very existence is at stake. And all of this law had, has and will have a determining role in how things unfold. We have to find and we will have to find new ways of establishing the rules for the successful management of our future. Ways that are adapted to the speed at which developments are unfolding, particularly on the big-ticket items I mentioned earlier, especially climate and technology. We no longer have the luxury of time to sit and elaborate treaties over many years. And we have to include multiple actors. I think that the days of governments as the sole actor in these areas is fast coming to an end. One source of inspiration for the way to do this are the Paris Climate Agreement and the 2030 Development Agenda with its 17 SDGs, our global roadmap for fixing what ails the world, which were negotiated and agreed in an inclusive and voluntary approach that are not legally binding. A rules-based multilateral governance model is, I think, the only way forward. If some of us, as is happening today, including some of the big players, persistent thinking that they can manage their and our problems on their own, we will collectively not make it. And this also means upholding and preserving the ability of my old employer, the United Nations, and I hasten to say, a very reformed United Nations, which remains the only genuinely global and genuinely neutral table around which all actors can come together on unequal footing. It means engaging with and supporting the multilateral breakthroughs that did happen in recent years. Above all, what I just mentioned, the Sustainable Development Goals, which are key vehicles for promoting the rule of law on a global as much as a local scale. The 2030 Agenda is critical in guiding our strategic response. We cannot successfully deal with the multiplicity of challenges we face either regionally, sequentially, or in isolation. That is true for climate change, it's true for combating inequality, and it's certainly also true in our collective struggle to uphold the rule of law. That will only become more important in a world that is rapidly becoming multipolar, even though it may remain bipolar for a few more years, which is yet another reason why the only viable way forward is multilateral. Not a multilateralism of the past, but one that recognizes a transformation of recent years, a multilateralism that is intergovernmental, but that implicates and empowers other actors on the international stage, from civil society to business, et cetera, and networked inclusive multilateralism. We have the knowledge, we have the expertise, we have the human and financial resources to do so, and all we need is a little bit more will. Thank you very much. Or replacing our topic in the broader background of the transitions we're going through and for this vibrant advocacy of reform multilateralism in which law would remain the cornerstone. So I think I'd like to take question from the audience right away because the time is short and we've covered a lot of ground, so let's start here. Mike. Thank you. My name is Pei Emerson, entrepreneur in education and communication, coming from Sweden. I just have lots of interest to Stuart Eisenstadt about how the law can be used. And I want to put the question to you about United States, because we have a number of issues in Europe when it comes to corruption and money laundering in European companies. And even if those companies only have 0.1% activity in the US, it's being handled by US authorities. US authorities outsource the work to law firms and then European firms have to pay millions or billions of US dollars. I don't think they should, of course they should pay when they've done mistakes, but what I can't understand is why we haven't got the system within European community to handle this. Why should it be US jurisdiction that controls the world in this area? Thank you. Maybe we're gonna take two or three questions and then we'll respond. Yes, the lady out there. No, no, here, I think there was a question. We'll take three questions. Please be brief. My question is to Mr. Aistat. Daniel Khatib from Eisenfair Institute at the American University of Beirut. You spoke about the Palestinian and their use of lawfare. What other option do they have when the Israeli slowly eat up their land and build settlement and there is no international pressure to compel Israel for the two-state solution? What other option do the Palestinians have? And I also want to tell you that while Barak was negotiating with Arafat, he was bragging that he built settlements more than any other prime minister. Thank you. Thank you. Third question here and then we'll respond. Hi, I'm Daniel Shek. I'm a former Israeli diplomat. I would love to hear someone expand a little bit about a notion that was mentioned at the beginning of the universal jurisdiction. There is, of course, the one sort which is within the international bodies that have been created and regulated through agreements like the ICC, but there are also individual states which have acquired different levels of universal jurisdiction, which creates a somewhat uncertain and unclear and fluid legal landscape, especially in Europe. So I wonder if somebody would like to say what they think this is worth and is it still a useful tool when there are recognized international bodies that have to deal with it? Okay, thank you. We'll take that maybe. If we start with the last question. Antida, do you want to answer this, Professor? Universal jurisdiction, I think for some of us, it's a low for a problem because effectively you have individual states who use the universal jurisdiction to fight against a specific individual for Pinochet, for example, who have action against Tony Blair as well, from Belgium and so on, and for Brangen and so on. I don't think so. I think that universal jurisdiction, it's not a low for argument because it's based on universal convention. So it's an obligation for the state who are party to this convention to respect their obligation. And if this convention, this intentional convention, mentioned the universal jurisdiction, they have to respect this convention obligation. So I don't think it's low for. It's a legitimate use of low. And you have this obligation if you are a party of this convention. So I'm not sure it's... Local, you have the right. Yeah, local, local. But most of the time you have an obligation based on international convention. Even if you act as an individual state, according to your national law, you have an international obligation. You can have an international obligation to use universal jurisdiction. That's why for me it's not low for because it doesn't use to destabilize the other party. It's only a conventional obligation. Yeah, I think the problem is to draw the limit between the legitimate and the illegitimate use of law between the legal and the illegal use of law. Stuart's Palestinian Lawfare and Extra-Territory Act of Yes, Law. I'll answer all three. On the last point, it is a use of lawfare. It's an inappropriate use of lawfare. The Dutch, the British, the Belgians use it as a way of asserting jurisdiction over actors who aren't their citizens and who they say have committed war crimes, including a private corporation that I happen to represent in the Netherlands who had a leased business with construction equipment that was used in the West Bank and he was arrested and he spent three or four years trying to avoid it. Now, with respect to the Palestinians and the first question on the financial situation, I understand exactly your point on the Palestinians. Let me point out, if I may, and I've been engaged in these negotiations for a very long time in many administrations. At Camp David II under Clinton, Prime Minister Barak offered 95% of the West Bank. East Jerusalem is a capital of a new Palestinian state. 50,000 refugees coming back permanently to Israel. Arafat, who I had negotiated with just two weeks before and who told me, don't have President Clinton, invite me to Camp David because I'm not willing to make the compromises he wants. They couldn't give up the law of their so-called right of return. A several years later, Prime Minister Omer at 96% of the West Bank, East Jerusalem was a capital, 50,000 refugees, Abbas turned it down. And by the way, Arafat created the second at the Fata when he turned this down. There's no question but that we have a government in Israel that is not predisposed to say the least to these kinds of negotiations. But if the Palestinians had had a Martin Luther King, if they had had someone who was willing in a nonviolent way to say everything is on the table, we are willing to accept as Oslo, they did, a Jewish state, we want our state and we're willing to negotiate. As we did not do in Camp David II and Omer's time, we would have a completely different situation. It would turn the tables and there wouldn't be a need. They use lawfare because they're not willing in the end to make the final decision that they're not going to have a million and a half refugees coming back to Haifa and to Tel Aviv. With respect to the financial situation, the answer is in one word, the dollar. I mean the dollar is the king. You can't do business without the dollar. The euro is not a comparison. Now having said that, I have to conclude because I'm not a defender of all the things we've done. With the war on terror, until the US Supreme Court said we couldn't do it, we had extra judicial after 9-11 assassinations and abductions. We created in Guantanamo a situation in which to avoid US law, we use torture in order to extract confessions. Trying to come into a whole saying, well they're not a US court, the Supreme Court turned that down. We have a president and my colleague from South Korea who actually served together in the Brussels nailed it right on the trade issue. But let me go beyond that. How can we have, Michael, an international rule of order when we have a president who is withdrawn from agreements reached by his predecessors which never been done before? The Paris Accord, the JCPOA nuclear agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership for 12 countries. All of these, the INF Treaty with Russia. All of these things have been unilaterally withdrawn from. I mean, you talk about governance, my goodness. How can we urge any kind of rule of law on other countries when we abrogate agreements that previous presidents had reached in good faith? I'll close with one example. Jimmy Carter negotiated the Sol-2 nuclear agreement. It was never ratified by the Senate for reasons which I mentioned in my book but it's not relevant here. Reagan took over, polar opposite ideology. He and the Soviets abided by Sol-2 as if it had been ratified till the last day it was due to expire. Because he respected what his predecessor had done. Before taking three questions on this side of the room I'd like just to answer your question a little more specifically because why aren't the European, why isn't the European doing the job? Because until very recently, Europeans did nothing on anti-corruption. In France, briars were tax deductible until the OECD convention went into force in 2000. It's only two years ago that we've got a law that the UK also acted. So it's just starting and it's a good thing. But until now they left the floor open to the US which has been the anti-corruption policeman of the world. The things are changing but that's mainly the reason. So there's one question here, two questions, second question here. Go ahead. Sure. My question is for Madame Antida. And President Bush, after the attacks on September 11th, when he dealt with Iraq and Afghanistan, the state of Wai'u, can we consider that as law firm? Thank you. Sure. He still loves. Yeah. Hello, Nadia Moti, University of Muhammad V, professor. I'm not a lawyer but I'm very curious to know, how can the law prevail? If the law is here to protect minorities, to protect certain issues worldwide and your lawyers cannot do something to do what we call the firewalls for computers, how can the law prevails and make something like good for the humanity? Thank you. Okay, a third question on either side there. Thank you so much. My name is Joseph Mila, I'm an academic from France. My question is to follow the issue that was raised at the previous panel concerning the weaponization of dollar. We heard from the gentleman from Russia that the dollar as a currency is considered as a common international public good. And at the same time, the doctrine of the Trump administration was to state when it comes to the sanctions against Iran that the dollar was a national currency. So nobody is allowed or authorized to use the dollar in order to go, not to abide by the sanctions that have been put by the administration. My question is very simple and it comes to the legal side of it. I mean, do you consider from the legal point of view, it's, if this is not a law fair, what could it be? But from the legal point of view, is it legal to consider that your currency, which is the universal currency? As I might say, or the word currency, is at the same time a national currency and that you could put your law and make your law prevail on not the international legislation. I don't know if there is an legislation, but it is geo-paradising the whole trade system. Thank you so much. Okay, so Antida, I think maybe the, certainly the first question, maybe the second question was to you. On the state of Waiou, I don't think it's a law fair once again because I would like a more strict definition of the law fair, because the state of Waiou is not a legal argument. It's a political qualification that aims to stigmatize states and to eventually justify the adoption of sanctions. But there is no legal argument in the qualification of the state of Waiou. For me, the law fair is really the use of the right and legal arms, legal instruments to destabilize the opposing party. Michael, do you want to answer the second question maybe about protection for or whoever, anybody else? No? Or Antida? I don't know. I don't know how to answer the question. I don't know how to answer the question. Question? Do you want to go ahead and answer? A number of people, first of all, when you asked about lawyers, I mean, if the world has to depend on lawyers to solve our problems, we're certainly in that great shape. But let me talk about the dollar because it's obviously an erratic issue and a number of people have asked about it. I see Mr. Trichet here who's done so much European Central Bank to create a viable euro. And I was an ambassador to the EU and the Clinton administration when the euro was just about to get started. So, we have done things during the Clinton administration that were multilateral and did not abuse our power. For example, we created and it still exists a global system for dealing with anti-money laundering. We had a common agreement know your customer, all of these things were agreed to. We listed a number of countries including Israel and Russia and they did not meet those standards. Second, if you want a great example of the dollar versus the euro, look at what's happened since the U.S. unilaterally pulled out of the JCPOA. The European Union and rightly so wanted to keep Iran in that agreement. They tried to come up with alternative financing mechanisms so that there could be trade with Iran and Iran would get some of the benefits of the JCPOA in return for having given up two-thirds of their centrifuges their heavy water system 24-7 IAEA inspection and the like and it didn't work and it didn't work because any multinational company even a Europe-based company has to do business with the United States it's the biggest market and if the U.S. and I wish we hadn't done it pulled out and said we're going to sanction you if you do business with Iran Europe was powerless to counteract that even though it's a 500 million people market larger than ours we have 325 million chances it's made under Mr. Trichet and under his successor who saved it Draghi it's not a global currency it's not an alternative currency and so there's no country and no company in the world if given the choice between doing business with Iran and doing business with the U.S. it's a no-brainer and that's why this agreement is falling apart oh my god we had a situation it wasn't perfect it was not a perfect agreement there were sunset problems we could have built on that now in retaliation Iran is restarting its centrifuges it's talking about going back to its heavy water plant it's enriching uranium up to a dangerous level when it was at a very low level it's a catastrophe in terms of any kind of international governance it's undergirded by the strength of the dollar by the strength of the dollar and so Trump can get away with it because no company again is going to choose to do business with Iran and hope that the EU's alternative finance mechanism works it won't it's a shame but that's the reality of it just to answer the technical question there's often a misconception that the sole ground for jurisdiction is the use of the dollar or the US financial system but most of the time there are other grounds for jurisdiction if you take the famous BNP case if you have a US banking license whether you use the dollar or the euro you're subject to US jurisdiction that's the legal answer so it's not all about the dollar there are other of course as I said there's a big split of foreign policy between Europe and the United States which makes the sanction very unacceptable but in areas where there's a common ground the legal ground are not only about the use of the dollar but people often forget that so just the economic power of the US against South Korea was used by this administration to get a better deal for agriculture it was used against Mexico and against Canada our two great neighbors to get a better deal on NAFTA it's been used against China to our detriment as well but to get a better deal and there'll be some deal the best deal ever it won't be but okay so the power of the US economy has to be used very delicately but when it's used with a bludgeon and it's used now it does produce some results but with terrible after effects and aftershocks there will be years in recreating going back to a rule of space I think Jean-Pierre Trichet a question or comment thank you very much indeed I only wanted to echo what you just said both of you I think when I ask the major European multinationals they want to have transaction with Iran in dollars they could do that in other currency and of course the euro exists and as a matter of global transactions the rapport de force if I may is not dramatic I mean it's 45% for the dollar 34% for the euro something like that the problem is as you said they have interest other interest in the US and if they don't respect the legislation and the sanctions then they are punished not because they are utilizing the dollar but because they have a lot of course of trade or interest or FDI in the United States and that explains in my observation why immediately the major European multinationals said no forget about it about us and so the special purpose vehicle was not utilized at least by them which was some kind of of nice border utilizing the euro but again the main problem is that legislation in the US it seems to me is perceived by the multinational is really overwhelmingly threatening I mean the use of secondary sanctions I'll give you a perfect example of how two administrations can differ so when I was under secretary of state in the Clinton administration I negotiated with the European Union on the Iran Libya sanctions act on secondary sanctions that is to say not against US companies alone but against European companies who were doing business with Iran or under Helmsburton doing business with Cuba it was perfectly legal under European law and not under ours and we tried to enforce it with secondary sanctions but I negotiated waivers in both cases with the European companies so we didn't have to actually use those sanctions and we got in return like a commitment in terms of investment in Cuba okay you can invest but do more to promote democracy and reach out to democratic groups okay you can invest in Iran but don't do dual use products so I mean there are ways to handle these secondary sanctions in sensible ways but when we have a situation as we have today where there are no limits then you really get a very very significant problem in the whole global governance system can you take one or two last questions Jean-Claude Ruffin? On just I was for many years a French banker in the United States and then I became an American banker in Europe so I've come across many of the situations that you were talking about and in the case of BNP one thing that people don't always understand BNP was warned by the Department of Financial Services in New York not the Fed, not the administration of the Department of Financial Services which is under the governor of the state of New York Andrew Cuomo was warned that they were doing transactions that were not confirmed to U.S. legislation it was done out of Paribas BNP Paribas in Switzerland so they went to Switzerland and told them don't do this transaction they are not confirmed to what they did they continue doing this transaction and effectively that was a payment that was for Sudan using two banks BNP and another bank that were not American banks and to make sure that they didn't go through they thought they wouldn't go through the financial system in the U.S. they used the BNP branch in New York to clear the transaction as you know if you make a dollar payment every dollar payment clears by 8 p.m. New York Times in New York through the Fed system so this transaction were in the U.S. financial system regardless of the way they were structured they ended up being in the U.S. financial system and clear to the Fed and that's why the Fed imposed and the financial sanction was 9 billion dollars as you know one third went to the Department of Justice one third went to the Department of Financial Services and one third went to the Fed so this is really an important point let me just make an important understanding whatever one thinks about the JCPOA the nuclear deal with Iran and again it's imperfect it's much better than the alternative but whatever one thinks about it it is unmistakable that the reason Iran came back to the negotiating table and agreed to the JCPOA was not because of our unilateral sanctions it was because we got our allies in Europe to join with us who were also concerned about Iran's nuclear and what did they do Europe gave up 16% of all of its energy it stopped importing all the oil from Iran it agreed on the SWIFT system in Brussels that they wouldn't clear transactions they agreed with us to sanction the central bank of Iran Mr. Truce central bank of Iran if we had done that alone it wouldn't have worked so here we pull out of an agreement that the European Union sweated bullets to help us get and now they're trying desperately to hang on to it and don't have the financial wherewithal to do it it's really a tragedy and it's not a way to treat your allies who sacrificed for us President Trump just said when we were talking about unilateral actions when we decided we were getting out of Syria and Turkey comes in and he said about the Kurds who lost 20,000 men fighting with us against ISIS where were they in Normandy Yes Well, we were given instructions from Claude Debat I think our haute du dîner is punctual as was said by Thierry Montbryal this morning so I thank you all for your questions Thank you