 Senior Advisor here and the Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues. This is our fourth installment of Pony Debates the Issues. And again, I want to thank Steve Henry from OSD Nuclear Matters, who has been our sponsor for this stream of activities as part of our project on nuclear issues. It's been a great event. It's fed our blog in which Pony Debates the Issues during that time. And so it's been, this is the last event until we get into the September-October timeframe. It's a little bit later in the summer than I like to do one, but here we are nevertheless. Very timely issue. We're going to talk about North Korea, the proposition being that the United States should continue to pursue the policy of complete and verifiable disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. We have with us two subject matter experts from slightly different ends of the political continuum to debate this issue. One speaking in the affirmative, Bruce Klinger, former CIA, former Research Fellow. No, now a Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies. Was it Eurasia Group, but had been the chief of the CIA's career branch? I, too, had a background at the CIA, but that was longer ago than I like to remember. And Doug Bandow, who is written extensively on this issue now at the Cato Institute. I wouldn't say that the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute are on opposite sides of the political continuum because sometimes they agree, as is the want of any libertarian, and sometimes they disagree on this one. But I look forward to an extremely spirited debate. The first, next person I'd like to introduce is CSIS's own Jessica Yates, who will be moderating this debate. She'll speak quickly to the ground rules. Jessica. The topic is resolved that the United States should continue the policy of complete and verifiable disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. Because of the complexities with the North Korea issue, this was a particularly difficult topic to codify in a one-sentence resolution. But essentially what we are trying to capture were two points of departure. The first being sort of the severity of the threat, the degree to which nuclear North Korea is unacceptable. And second, what the role of the United States should be in the denuclearization process. The format is slightly modified from the previous events for those that attended the other ones. There'll be two seven-minute opening remarks beginning with the affirmative, and then a 12-minute moderator question and answer period in which I'll ask both of them one or two questions and then give them the other, their opponent the opportunity to respond, and then two three-minute closing rebuttals. And with that, we're ready? Well, thank you very much to get right into it. I might have hoped that the logic of maintaining the U.S. policy of a complete and verifiable disarmament or denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would have been so much of a self-evident truth that it was not necessary to debate the issue. After all, denuclearizing North Korea has been a consistent and bipartisan U.S. policy objective for decades. Despite fierce debates over the best means to achieve that goal, presidential administrations and congresses from both political parties have unswervingly pursued that objective. And having the best and the brightest from both parties in agreement on something, perhaps anything, would seem to be sufficient grounds for justifying the continuation of a policy. However, it has been said that an idea is not responsible for those who believe in it. So let's explore additional justifications. Now, as for debating the topic, Washington is, of course, known as a place for hotly arguing every possible issue, except perhaps how poorly the nationals baseball team is playing. But to be less facetious, there has been a growing discussion amongst Korean watchers about whether the U.S. should alter its policy and an accompanying rising fear in both South Korea and Japan that the Obama administration will abandon the existing policy. So as such, it makes this topic particularly relevant and timely. Therefore, I commend CSIS and the project on nuclear issues for initiating this debate, and I thank them for the opportunity to participate. I'll lay out of four main reasons why I think we should maintain the current policy. The first is to uphold and defend the principles of non-proliferation and the rule of law. Principles are important. As Edmund Burke said, all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. To abandon the policy of denuclearization for North Korea would be counter to existing U.N. resolutions, the policies of our allies, and would undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation treaty. It would send a dangerous signal of acquiescence to not only North Korea, but also to Iran and other nuclear aspirants. If we do not implement and defend laws and U.N. resolutions, they have no value. And if we do not have the courage and the tenacity to uphold agreements, in this case against proliferation, then all U.N. resolutions become empty promises, precluding international action on any issue, including aggression or genocide. There must be a heavy penalty for provocative actions that transgress the laws. If we aren't willing to uphold the principles, why should we expect other nations to abide by or enforce laws? As President Obama said, rules must be binding, violations must be punished, words must mean something. The second reason is to defend the United States. North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities, coupled with Pyongyang's repeated belligerent threat, poses an increasing threat to the United States. It's uncertain how successful North Korea has been in developing weapons, the degree to which they've weaponized or miniaturized its fissile material, or how long it'll take to perfect the Taepodong missiles. But Pyongyang's rapid-fire provocation since the beginning of the year and its rejection of both multilateral and bilateral negotiations clearly demonstrate that the regime is determined to develop a viable nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it via ICBM. We know North Korea has already twice tested a nuclear device and claims to have weaponized all of its plutonium. As for its long-range missile delivery capability, the April 5th Taepodong-2 launch, though depicted as a failure, successfully more than doubled the previous range of its missile threat. A national intelligence estimate by the U.S. intelligence community in 2001 assessed that a three-stage Taepodong-2, when fully developed, would have the range to deliver a nuclear warhead to all of the continental United States. Washington should continue to develop and deploy missile defense systems to defend itself against North Korea's continuing quest to develop the capability to threaten the U.S. with a nuclear warhead. But even as we take prudent means to defend against a threat, we should also continue efforts to eliminate the threat. A preemptive military attack or forcible regime change would be provocative, escalatory, and unpredictably dangerous. As such, continuing a denuclearization policy to remove the nuclear sword from the dictator's hand through an integrated approach of sanctions and diplomacy provides a more pragmatic and viable approach. Three, protecting our allies by strengthening peace and stability in Asia. North Korea's increasing nuclear missile capabilities clearly threaten our allies, South Korea and Japan. Pyongyang has already deployed 600 SCUD missiles and 250 Nodong missiles that can range all of South Korea and Japan. A lesson of history is that we cannot decouple ourselves from overseas threats to our allies and those that share our values. In 1999, former Secretary of Defense William Perry concluded, acquisition by the DPRK of nuclear weapons are long-range missiles and especially the combination of the two could undermine the relative stability in East Asia. Such weapons in the hands of the DPRK might weaken deterrence as well as increase the damage if deterrence failed. It could also spark an arms race in the region and would surely do grave damage to the global non-proliferation regimes covering nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. A U.S. retreat from attempts to denuclearize North Korea would not only leave our allies more vulnerable to the direct military danger but also to North Korean coercion. There would be an even more acute threat if we were to couple it with a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Asia because we either deemed the denuclearization objective too difficult to achieve or the neighborhood to be too dangerous. Isolationism isn't a viable policy. Pulling up the drawbridge and hiding behind the cloistered moat of the world's oceans didn't work in 1939 and designating the Korean Peninsula as laying beyond America's Asian defense perimeter didn't work in 1950. Moreover, cutting and running or saying, sorry boys, you're on your own is not an American tradition. After all, the symbol of America is the eagle, not the ostrich. To share it from a challenge would be too much like the reported words of one general on the eve of battle telling his troops, men, I want you to fight vigorously and then run. And as I'm a bit lame, I'm going to start running now. The fourth reason is don't preemptively accept defeat. Abandoning the policy of denuclearizing North Korea would affirm the pattern of not punishing North Korea for its belligerence and transgressions. It simply encourages worse behavior. As the PERI report again concluded, a policy of trading material compensation for security would only encourage the DPRK to further blackmail and would encourage proliferators worldwide to engage in similar blackmail. It would also set the precedent for the U.S. to provide concessions on other important issues with North Korea or Iran. If we cave on this, why should we think we'd be believed if we said we'll be tough on the next important issue, such as verification? Some might advocate focusing only on preventing proliferation since achieving denuclearization is deemed to be unattainable. But abandoning denuclearization is like saying it's just too hard to enforce the law, so let's accept and condone transgressions and violations. Similar to saying we just can't win in the war on drugs, so let's admit defeat and legalize all illegal drugs. Moreover, trying to merely maintain the status quo of keeping the nuclear genie in a Korean peninsula bottle is unsustainable in the long run. North Korea has privately threatened to proliferate plutonium or nuclear weapon technology. Containment, rather than eliminating the threat directly, is also a less effective strategy, similar to chasing cockroaches with a hammer. North Korea already proliferated nuclear technology to Syria. We know that in late 2008 it attempted to proliferate something in violation of UN Resolution 1718. The U.S. invoked the PSI in order to get India to prevent a flight from a North Korean flight from Burma to Iran. And the feckless chase of the North Korean ship, Kongnam, also showed the inherent constraints in trying to prevent North Korean proliferation rather than removing its source. Now, in conclusion, I focus my remarks on the denuclearization or the disarmament aspect of the debate title. In the interest of time, I've not covered the complete and verifiable component, but it's something, i.e., the need for effective verification. We could discuss that during question and answer, as well as discussing recommendations for achieving North Korean denuclearization. I'm aware that achieving North Korean denuclearization will not be easy, and there are no guaranteed successes for any policy recommendations. In fact, we may be trying to negotiate the non-negotiable and achieve the unachievable. There may be simply no set of inducements and penalties that ensures North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons. As such, it would be prudent, even now, for Washington to be discussing contingency plans, particularly with South Korea and Japan, should negotiations no longer seem to be a viable policy option. But this difficulty should not deter us from continuing to try. As Teddy Roosevelt said, in a moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing. The worst thing is to do nothing. Thank you very much. I'm glad to be here. I think Kato and Heritage occasionally agree. Many years ago, I was a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation, so I've had my contact with the Heritage Foundation over the years. The issue of North Korea is one that most policymakers, I think, would prefer not to have to deal with. Certainly, the Obama administration did not expect this to be on its plate nearly so early. Unfortunately, we live in a world in which we can't make those choices very easily. I think everyone in this audience understands why North Korea is a problem. It's a very unique mix of a murderous regime that's willing to allow hundreds of thousands, if not more of its own citizens, to starve to death. It's a regime that currently is in the midst of potentially unstable leadership transition. The dear leader, obviously, is not doing well. He suffered a stroke and there are reports now that he has pancreatic cancer and apparently is trying to pass the regime on to his 27-year-old son. I think a dubious prospect, given the current circumstances. It's a regime that's engaged in external provocation. We've had both the nuclear test recently, as well as multiple missile tests, denunciation of the six-party talks, the armistice accord, and tearing up the investment agreement with South Korea. And you mix that all together. We clearly have a rather nasty mix. There are no good answers here, and I think this is the crux of the debate, is that in a diplomacy, everyone would like to see it work. It's still worth pursuing, the difficulties that we face. Every step the DPRK takes backwards makes a diplomatic solution less likely. Every new threat, every new test suggests that the regime is more interested in buying time as opposed to coming to an agreement. The ultimate solution then looks further and further away. Sanctions are a great hope. Nevertheless, they only, if so far, had limited effect on a regime that's willing to allow mass starvation of its people. In fact, we have since particularly of China, Russia as well, but China is clearly the most important player here, accounting for an estimated 75% of trade with North Korea and the provider of aid and food aid and energy. You know, the ultimate impact of sanctions, even if enforced, are somewhat uncertain, but unless we get them enforced, they're not likely to bring us to a successful resolution. And the military option is a very bad one. It's hard to imagine a military exercise of military force that wouldn't trigger war. My guess is the regime in the North would view it as being the first step in regime change. It would find it utterly unacceptable to stand by and it could wreak havoc. The North, of course, would lose any conflict, but the consequences, particularly for South Korea, but also for American military forces and the North Koreans, would be horrific. So the question is what to do. Now, we all know the perfect. We'd all love to have regime change but there's no doubt about that. We share the same ends. It's a wonderful goal. The world would be a better place not to mention North Korea. And that's led to multiple assertions on the part of U.S. officials and others saying that we cannot accept a nuclear North Korea. The risk, I would argue, is that we may let the perfect become the enemy of the good. Clearly, the regime is going to resist any kind of regime change and from their standpoint, as in perhaps rising role of the military within the system, denuclearization may very well be viewed as almost the same thing as regime change. I'm afraid that the likelihood of winning denuclearization with the current regime that is not only stopping further nuclear developments but getting North Korea to give up whatever weapons it has developed or vanishing. The benefits to the North are very clear possessing even a small nuclear force, defense. If it were Iraq, it gives it status otherwise who would pay attention to a small starving nation and blackmail trying to raise money and get various benefits from the West. And I would argue that the behavior of the North certainly would seem to suggest this is a red line in their behavior a willingness to dismantle an old reactor but bulking at intrusive verification procedures in terms of its past nuclear behavior. I think there is a hope that in a negotiated settlement with the North it's much more likely to be one of freezing the arsenal and preventing proliferation to stopping any further nuclear developments. Not a good option, notably. Very unpleasant but perhaps livable compared to the alternative. I think at the end of the day the good news, if there is good news about North Korea, is that Kim Jong-il is not suicidal. Kim Jong-il wants his virgins in this world, not the next. This is not a regime that's going to loose missiles against the United States. The Americans can work against Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. I suspect it can work against Kim Jong-il or whatever follows him in the tragic capital of Pyongyang. Far more dangerous is a North Korea with a growing arsenal with more and bigger missiles and with the prospect of proliferation. It opened a Pandora's box in East Asia in terms of potential proliferation elsewhere and would certainly raise the threat level and the instability in the region. So it strikes me that we may very well want a goal denuclearization because that would be what we prefer. Nevertheless, in practice what we might be better aiming for is to try to freeze developments with verification, eliminate on any ongoing nuclear program and accept the fact that North Korea is likely to remain a nuclear state with a relatively small nuclear arsenal. Not only is it a question of negotiating with North Korea but it's also a question of involving China. The regional powers have much more at stake than the United States here and they should be taking a much broader role. They are the ones most threatened by proliferation. They are most threatened by missile developments. They are most threatened by the prospect of instability and war. China today, I suspect, sees the issue as one that provides it indeed with certain benefits. The United States must come hand in hand to China and ask Beijing for help in dealing with North Korea. It sees this as an American issue and has many concerns in terms of a collapse of North Korea. The question of a United Korea allied with the United States, many other things. We hope to get serious Chinese cooperation in terms of diplomacy, sanctions, shutting down perhaps North Korean and Iranian air traffic and even conceivably covert action. We're going to have to have goals that are compatible with those with Beijing which Beijing is willing to support. Engaging Beijing in this way is going to be very difficult. Nevertheless, I think there is a possibility among other things pointing out to Beijing that the natural progression of events could very well be a North Korean with a growing nuclear arsenal followed conceivably by South Korea and Japan because the U.S. could say rather loudly we're not sure we want to stay in the middle of that if you're not willing to help out with the North Koreans who knows maybe we wouldn't stand in the way of the South Koreans and Japanese in which case the nightmare would be shared so maybe Beijing should do a little bit more to help. The U.S. I think could encourage that by indicating it would not take geopolitical advantage of any transformation because American troops would come home, they would not remain in a unified Korea and the U.S. would help in terms of any economic problems with refugees and economic chaos. At the end of the day what we want is the parties in the region to do more and we also want the most realistic solution. Now obviously this may be a dead end perhaps the PRC won't be willing to help. Nevertheless there is no good answer here. Again, my reaction is we're facing a world of what is possible as opposed to what is best. De-nuclearization is an obvious objective if we are able to achieve a freeze perhaps especially if there's change within the regime in coming years we could achieve full de-nuclearization at a future point but we don't want to let the perfect become the enemy of the good. Strikes me the path to de-nuclearization certainly without Chinese support appears to be blocked. War would be a cure worse than the disease. We have to look for other alternatives that probably means accepting a lesser goal even though the ultimate objective of de-nuclearization is the best one. Thank you. In your opening statements you listed a lot of reasons that the United States should want a nuclear free peninsula. You also identified a lot of reasons that admitting failure admitting failure is bad but you didn't list any reasons why we haven't in fact failed and in a national security environment in which there's a widening gap between requirements and the capacity to meet them there is actually a consequence to fruitless effort. So give us hope or what exact measures can the United States take to de-nuclearize North Korea. I think the most effective manner is a three part strategy. One is to strengthen defensive measures and that includes not only because as we've seen negotiations and international pressure have not prevented North Korea from pursuing nuclear tests in the long-range missile range. So the first step is defensive measures which includes not only missile defense but strengthening non-proliferation efforts reassuring our allies etc. The second is to implement punitive measures which not only upholds the principles and non-proliferation treaty etc. but also tries to bring North Korea back to the table. The punitive measures are three levels. One is what we can get through UN Security Council. The second is a parallel effort led by the United States using existing international and US law and calling upon other nations to apply their laws targeting not only North Korea but the other end of the proliferation pipeline as well as those that are complicit in North Korea's illegal activities and then three, a sub-Rosa effort as was underway during the Banco Delta Asia issue which is quiet negotiations or meetings between the US government and Chinese banks, companies and others as well. And then third is negotiations. Sanctions like engagement is not an ends in itself but is a means to achieve an ends and what we're trying to do is squeeze North Korea with one hand while holding open the door of negotiations to regain their behavior. We're trying to moderate their behavior. We're trying to change their behavior to come back to the negotiating table and laying out not only the downside to their violations and aberrant behavior but also the benefits that they could enjoy if they rejoin or begin to implement their commitments. What gives meaning to the laws if the people advocating them think that forceful regime change would be extremely dangerous? I didn't advocate forceful regime change. What else gives meaning to the laws? Enforcing them. What we've seen so far is the UN has targeted three North Korean companies. The US has targeted two. Apparently today there's going to be perhaps an expansion of that list. In meeting with US officials we've also seen a resumption of the multifaceted effort that was done in 2005, which was very effective in that trying to cut off the regime from its funding. So it's several levels. What's public and also what's private. So by constraining North Korea's finances, trying to moderate their behavior, that's not bringing about a regime change. Two questions. The first is they're pretty insulated from international pressure, economic pressure. What other strings can we pull that you think would be meaningful? The second question is, if this is a regime that responds to diplomatic pressure, it seems to be based on the assumption that it calculates perceived gains versus perceived loss, why wouldn't that same rationality moderate North Korea as they do the Revenue State? They are largely insulated from the international financial network and that is why in 2005 the multifaceted effort was effective. As a senior Obama administration official recently said, they recognized that the Banco Delta Asia effort, and that's, as I said, not just the 22 million that they froze, but it was all of the subrosa effect as well, was very effective and it was a mistake for the Bush Administration to have fallen off of that policy, and that's from the current administration. So obviously, as Mr. Bandas said, we have to get China on board and we may be more able to get China to do quiet efforts constraining financial interaction between North Korea and the outside world as well as restricting food and fuel, but quietly as opposed to expecting them to publicly announce formal sanctions against North Korea. My second question was about their rationality, if they can respond to pressure. Well, people have said that sanctions don't work, but we have seen in the world that it has. Sanctions in conjunction with diplomacy work to get Libya to abandon its nuclear weapons program. We've also seen that some have said North Korea does nothing when it's pressured. Well, the corollary is they usually do also do nothing unless they're pressured. So it's a conjunction of pressure and maintaining the door open for negotiations. I guess my question was why doesn't that logic moderate the regime as a nuclear weapon state? Why wouldn't that make their nuclearization less unacceptable? Well, I think North Korea having a nuclear North Korea given its past actions and given its current belligerent threats against the United States, against South Korea, against Japan makes a nuclear North Korea inherently destabilizing for Northeast Asia. So I think rather than simply capping and admitting that we no longer have denuclearization as an end goal, simply trying to cap the problem, I don't think is sufficient. I think we have to try to eliminate the threat not only to our allies, but the long-range threat or the long-term threat to the United States. I think Bruce is right in terms of a two-prong strategy. I think that in essence one has to offer both a vision of a positive future if they engage the international community and are willing to step back from their current course, as well as punitive options to limit them, constrain them, particularly to try to dry up their funding to the extent that we can. I think that Banco Delta, an Asian example of the bank shows if China is involved there can be an enormous impact on North Korean behavior. I think the challenge is, number one, there has to be an obvious set of positives. Chinese have made this very clear that if we want their cooperation they have to perceive there is something beneficial being offered. It may be worth rethinking rather than a tit for tat it's kind of a process to essentially lay out for North Korea here is everything you can get, but it requires serious change in verification and this is what we want for it as opposed to kind of dribbling a little bit here and a little bit there. I think the challenge is, again, I'm not terribly hopeful. The problem is we see several years of negotiating pattern. I think there's an increasing feeling that the North is primarily interested in stringing things out so it can become a nuclear weapons state. That's not for certain, of course. I think we have to test them and that requires continuing negotiations, but I think what complicates it is the current leadership problem in Pyongyang. Where we have a very much physically weakened Kim Jong-il potentially with a deadly disease, I mean the five-year survival rate for pancreatic cancer is 5%. I don't know, these are simply reports unconfirmed. Nevertheless there's a lot of fear that the military has taken a more important role. The National Defense Commission seems to have taken over certain powers. You know, he's appointed his brother in law to the commission. In fact, Kim Jong-un, his youngest son, who's supposed to take over, is also at a mid-level position there. So the question is, if you have a leadership if not in crisis, at least in potential transition with enhanced military role, I am not at all confident that diplomacy is going to get us there. I think it will require substantially more pressure. Only the Chinese I think can apply that. I'd like to have the U.S. applying more to the extent we can, but China is the critical one here, unless we can enlist them. I think we're going to have trouble making this approach have much chance of success. State should cede responsibility for the process to regional players. U.S. assurances to South Korea and Japan provide their existential security. So part of, I mean it's a large, significant reason that we have such a stake in the conflict. If we start transferring responsibility to those regional players, what does it say about those commitments, or what should happen to those commitments? It strikes me that security commitments should reflect security environment. South Korea in 1953 is a very different South Korea than today. It's not at all clear to me why, at least on conventional terms, a South Korea with 30 to 40 times the GDP of the north twice the population, a vast technological lead, as well as a relationship with China that suggests China would not be involved in any war if the North Koreans attacked. Why South Korea should not, in fact, take over responsibility for its defense. I think, you know, the world in 1953 and 63 and even 73 looked very different than the world today. I'd make the same argument for Japan. I understand regional concerns over Japan taking on a larger role. But it strikes me that in a world in which we have a $2 trillion deficit this year, we face $10 trillion worth of deficits over the next decade. It's very hard to explain why the U.S. should be in a position where countries, certainly on a conventional scale, that can defend themselves. So that, I think, is, in a sense, separate from this current debate is something that we should be proceeding upon over a longer term. It's not a thing to do immediately, but it's certainly something that I would argue is in America's interest. It is far better for the United States to have powerful allies in the region who are the first responders if there's a crisis in the region, rather than expecting Washington to be the final guarantor of Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, you know, Sydney, if Japan took responsibility for its own defense it would have nuclear weapons within probably under a year, South Korea a few more months, what would the region look like, what would North Korean capabilities look like in five years? Well, I think it's not clear that there's an imminent threat of either of those countries going nuclear. I think, in fact, I would use that very much as the negotiating posture with China. China needs to understand that, in fact, the nightmare is likely to be shared. China could not expect a growing nuclear arsenal in North Korea without this spreading. And if China does not want nuclear weapons in Japan, China needs to do much more in terms of resolving this crisis. Currently, China has the best of all worlds. China can use this for its own advantage, gain influence in Washington, have a buffer state, you know, and have the U.S. restrain American friends in the region who could build countervailing weapons. I think that there's a long-term issue that it may not, you know, someday we may have to deal with anyway. Will Tokyo forever believe that Washington could build nuclear weapons in Tokyo? I'm not sure. It depends a lot on how the region grows. It depends on growth and changes within China itself. At the very least, both Tokyo and South Korea could do much more in conventional terms, even if we wanted to maintain a nuclear guarantee. And that would be the last thing that I would pull off. I think that that nuclear guarantee could stay even as they have conventional superiority on their own borders. I would argue American forces in South Korea are essentially nuclear hostages. In the United States, other than American forces on the South Korean Peninsula, they aren't needed for the convention of the defense of South Korea. I don't see any reason why they shouldn't come home. Your comment about withdrawing the commitment to Japan scaring China into pressuring, increasing pressure on North Korea does not change the fact that Japan would still develop a nuclear weapon. That just eliminates one of the demand side factors being North Korea, but they're still threatened by China. Those commitments were not formally withdrawn, but started laying the groundwork for withdrawing them, and inevitably Japan would most likely be preparing at least covertly a nuclear weapons program. I really want to know what the region would look like if both of those countries, particularly if Japan had nuclear weapons. Or just say if you knew that that premise was true, that Japan would have nuclear weapons, would you still advocate transferring responsibility to is it worth it? Yes, I'd transfer conventional responsibility. As I indicated, you can separate the two. You can maintain a nuclear umbrella over countries, but say on conventional terms, you need to have the forces to defend yourself. It's inexcusable for South Korea not to have the conventional arms to defend itself. It's easily capable of doing, so there's no reason why the US should be expected to provide that. The US has other things on its mind. I think over the longer term, the US has to make some very clear decisions about how involved it wants to be in the middle of potential nuclear disputes, depending on how the region goes. At the end of the day, are we more or less secure if we promise to get involved in a nuclear war between China and fill in the blank? Well, deterrents, commitments like that have three impacts, one of which is deterrents. You hope the Chinese would never be foolish enough to test it. On the other hand, it has to be believed, and the Chinese have already indicated at least when it comes to Taipei they're not so convinced that we'd be prepared to take that risk. But if you have a commitment like that, deterrents fail as it means you are involved, and then suddenly you are in a horrible situation of contemplating a nuclear exchange with China or with Japan, and the third is it tends to change the behavior of your allies. We've certainly seen that with Taiwan. Under President Chen Shui-bian, who engaged in much more provocative behavior, I mean, DPP officials were very explicit saying we believe you'll defend us. We don't believe any of this silliness about that if we're irresponsible, you wouldn't want to do so. We think you're committed to us, and there's a role in the war between Georgia and Russia. The Georgian president believed he could be backed up by the United States, so you play more provocative behavior. You believe you have the hegemon behind you. So the United States has to make some long-term decisions. Are we prepared forever to have those kinds of guarantees? Again, I think that's a debate we have to have that's very serious. I think that we can make the threat to the Chinese and we don't have to follow through on it if we choose not to. But if we want to move the debate forward and get China energized, they need to have a prospect along with us. Right now, I think the perception in Beijing is they don't share the nightmare. As long as they don't think they share the nightmare, we're not going to get the kind of cooperation that we desperately need to have effective sanctions. But as long as we have that nuclear guarantee, it's our nightmare. We have territory on the border. How can we separate it conventionally in the nuclear and conventional element when we will trade Washington for Tokyo? No, I would argue that if you want to have a nuclear guarantee in other countries saying they better not use nuclear weapons. But on conventional terms, I would argue that South Korea clearly is capable of defending itself. And we should expect allies to do so. The argument South Korea can't defend itself on conventional terms is a bit like the U.S. begging its NATO allies to protect it from Mexico. I mean, South Korea has had plenty of time and it clearly has the capabilities to do a lot more. Same thing with Japan. Recognizing other countries in the region prefer that not as an option. It's far better to have well-armed, effective allies to defend themselves as opposed to have underperforming allies dependent upon the United States for defense in a region that could very well be rather unstable and dangerous. But our incentive to denuclearize North Korea is certainly tied to our nuclear assurance to South Korea. We have a policy of non-proliferation that goes well beyond that. There's very good reason for us not to want nukes in North Korea for proliferation purposes. And even if we didn't have troops in the region, we wouldn't want an unstable East Asia. We'd much prefer a stable, prosperous, peaceful East Asia. So we don't want nukes in North Korea for very good reasons, and it may. I guess that would be my last question. How ought the United States curb nuclear proliferation in a world where we're withdrawing extended deterrence and we can't enforce the nonproliferation regime? Or if we shouldn't, if we should just let the floodgates down, what should the United States do now with respect to its central deterrent to prepare for that world? Well, I think what we, well, missile defense makes a lot of sense. It's very good to have some defense against incoming missiles. We certainly want to maintain a sophisticated nuclear deterrent that can protect us against large states like Russia or eventually China as well as smaller powers. I think the nonproliferation has to be pursued in certain ways on an ad hoc basis. We were not going to stop India and Pakistan from getting nuclear weapons. We applied sanctions that had no impact other than to get them both angry at us. Were we going to bomb them? The answer is no. The Bush administration made a decision at the nuclear agreement with India. It was denounced in the nonproliferation community. Probably made geopolitical sense. We made an accommodation. We've never worried very much about the French and the British having nuclear weapons. We worry an awful lot more for very good reasons about the Iranians and the North Koreans. I think we take a process by, or an example by example, a process where we try to use anything that we can, whether it be diplomacy, sanctions, pressure, coordination with allies, and then we have to make decisions on if it's going to fail. Are we prepared to use military force? If not, are we prepared to live with it? Does that mean extended deterrence from the United States? Does that mean allowing an ally to move forward on their own program? I think that's something where it's hard to have a general rule. I wish nonproliferation, I think, is a good thing even though it's a bit hypocritical. The major powers have tasted sin and don't want anybody else to have the same problem. Nevertheless, I think in the world we have today, it's very hard to imagine how we can enforce uniform nonproliferation. We're going to have to make judgments. I think we should try to stop it. We have to be realistic in terms of some places we're not going to be able to. Did you hear a response? I would say a couple points. The idea that deterrence worked against the Soviet Union and China but that a bigger danger is North Korea is growing arsenal to me, that would seem to be internally consistent, inconsistent if it was okay to rely on a balance of terror with the Soviet Union and China, it would seem then a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal wouldn't be a problem. I disagree. I think we need to not only cap it but try to eliminate it. I agree that China is critical and if it's possible to have a come to Jesus meeting with an atheistic leadership I think we ought to have it. But I think in doing so I would not advocate threatening to unleash South Korea and Japan nuclear programs or calling upon China to engage in covert action to overthrow the regime in North Korea. I think it would be better to point out to China that their current softball approach to North Korea has not worked sort of a Dr. Phil moment of how did that work out for you soft peddling the response in April to the missile launch so fearful of creating instability that they're unwilling to do anything against North Korea has only encouraged North Korea to do more. So I think we have to make clear to China that North Korea's antics are largely a result or partly a result of China allowing them or giving them a green light and covering their backs so that North Korea never really had to worry about anything. So I think we have to point out to North, to China that North Korea's continuing behavior could continue to escalate problems. We're on a bit of a runaway train right now with the U.S. and North Korea engaging in sort of one-upsmanship in belligerence. I think for the U.S. it's clearly a proper response to respond to violations, but I think we do have to try to convince China that its current policy is not maintaining the stability in the region. We're going to open up to audience Q&A to I don't have to answer this. That's because I ask you and then to now audience questions and you both respond to those. We agree that whatever we do we're going to have to have China's cooperation with us. What is it that China wants from us that we can give them to achieve our goals that Bruce, that you're advocating? I don't think it's so much a negotiation with China or we'll offer you this if you act responsibly on North Korea. I don't think we trade Taiwan for North Korea. I don't think we offer a trade deal in response. I think we have to make clear though that if they want to be seen as a responsible stakeholder they can't be that by being an obstructionist at the end and undermining international efforts to maintain international law, UN resolutions and non-proliferation treaties. And also point out to them that if they value stability so much that North Korea's current behavior is undermining that strategic strategic objective of China. So rather than offering them something to buy them to buy their acting responsibly, I think it's more a case of pointing out the benefits of trying to reign in North Korea and also the severe costs of if North Korea continues down its current path. I think it's not so much paying them for the behavior but convincing them they would not come out of the disadvantage. Convincing them that it's worth the risk and the price of doing more. Convincing that the status quo is worse. I think that requires number one, the assurance on refugees and economic collapse in the North. They're not interested in having 10 million refugees show up across the border. They have enough problems with ethnic issues these days. Even though it's a growing economy, nevertheless it's a relatively poor country. I think that could require assurances from the U.S. and South Korea certainly, potentially Japan which a number of ethnic Koreans went there in the 60s, the families are still there to share in the cost, for example. I think geopolitical disadvantage in terms of American troop placement and a reunited Korea also worries them. The current situation is advantageous. They have an ally on their border, they have a buffer and it gives them a certain amount of cloud to negotiating position. I think they need to be convinced that this isn't going there. They will not be to material geopolitical disadvantage. Some Chinese don't particularly worry about American troops on their border because they recognize that we can overcome distance others still do but I think that's again an assurance to that effect. It's not buying them off but it's simply saying we're a good citizen and we all want people to be good citizens but typically people respond to other incentives more effectively. If you act that way then you're not going to be a disadvantage because of this. I think making the argument which is an important one of recognizing the leadership if you want to convince the world, you want to convince East Asia of a peaceful rise there's no better way to do so than to help us solve this problem of North Korea which is both a humanitarian catastrophe as well as a geopolitically unstable situation. That is a very good way to convince the world and your neighbors that in fact you're a responsible player. I also think we need to convince them that the current situation is not to their advantage. The current situation could have an implosion. We don't know what's going to happen if there's factional infighting. We don't know what's going to happen in the North. They could be stuck with this burden anyway. I also think that's the advantage of saying don't assume that proliferation stops in Pyongyang. If you don't do anything to stop it there we don't know where it might end up and you're probably not going to be happy so I think one has to give a larger package of convincing them. They won't respond to diktop. It's going to have to be convincing that it's in their interest, not just as good citizens as geopolitical players to take the action we want. I actually have two questions. So far the conversation has been focused too much on the security of the states and also how the states should defend its allies. But according to a documentary on North Korea done by a Hong Kong media company the reason why North Korea regards the United States as an enemy is to believe that the United States is responsible for the division on the Korean peninsula. In other words it's the United States that caused the separation of South Korea from North Korea. Therefore my question is should we give more importance to South and North relations and U.S. involvement in relation to U.S. security and international security? And my second question is about the concept of nonproliferation. I think for a country that does not have nuclear weapons the fact that Korea, Russia, China and America have nuclear weapons while the other countries are not allowed to have nuclear weapons actually it's simply unjustifiable. I wonder in this context how should we provide incentive for these countries to not nuclearize themselves. Thank you. North Korea may blame the U.S. but in relation to the Korean peninsula North Korea tried to rectify that by invading South Korea at great loss of life and I don't think anyone at least in the South appreciated that. I think and as for whether the U.S. should encourage greater North-South dialogue I mean that is an issue for the Koreas to be engaged in. The present government in Seoul has reached out to North Korea and they've said that they will not only continue engagement they will significantly raise their living standards if North Korea simply abides by the documents that they've already signed. The U.S. doesn't stand in the way of North-South dialogue we're in favor of it. The U.S. is in favor of eventual reunification that's a matter for the Koreans to work out amongst themselves. North Korea has rejected not only multilateral nuclear negotiations they've rejected repeated attempts by the Obama administration to initiate bilateral dialogue and they've rejected repeated attempts by the South Korean government to engage in bilateral dialogue. So North-South dialogue is not going well but it's because of North Korea's fault. As for non-proliferation treaty calls for the eventual disarmament of all nations I think that's a very long-term goal I think as long as there are other nations I think it's going to be a very long time before the U.S. and Russia and China give up theirs but obviously that's the effort behind the assault treaties the start treaties and then President Obama's recent Prague speech so again it's a long-term goal but I think you also have to take into account the possession but sort of the nature of the country with it I think everyone is more concerned about a Soviet Union or a communist China or a North Korea or Iran with nuclear weapons than a democracy such as Great Britain and France. I mean to blame the United States for the division of Korea would seem to leave out the Soviet Union which was rather relevant at that time and of course the division of Korea meant that 48 million South Koreans today live in freedom or up north so I don't think the U.S. has much to apologize for in terms of the division of the peninsula. The U.S. has been blamed by South Korean students as well and my reaction was I mean there's a lot of complaint one can make about the occupation process that we're really missing the fundamental point if you look at the two Koreas today those students would not be alive protesting if they were in the North if they lived in a society where they could protest that would suggest there is some benefit at least of that division North-South relations should be a matter for the Koreas the U.S. should indicate has no plans to stand in the way of any negotiations, reunification, federation, co-federation whatever countries you'll want to come up with that clearly is something for the Koreas the U.S. wishes the Koreans well just wish the Germans well this is something for them as opposed to the U.S. are outside powers to determine you know the question of non-proliferation I mean again I mean the problem is it's an utterly hypocritical policy but one that strikes me as being very valuable which is a world of fewer nuclear weapons in general is a better more stable world so we'd prefer not to have them spread even though any country out there can say why you and not us then it's a question trying to create an incentive structure working with other countries finding other benefits making the case why expansion of nuclear weapons is not in the interest of those countries a number of things again I don't think there's one answer I think it requires a fairly sophisticated policy and it's going to we have to accept the fact we won't be successful everywhere but it's certainly worth the effort I just realized that after all that talk about the rebuttals right we can do that after the Q&A okay a brief okay so we'll take two more questions and then rebuttals Clark Cully NNSA how confident are you that North Korea would never proliferate weapons or weapons technology given the recent case with Syria and to what extent should we be willing to enforce an embargo or other such punitive measures to prevent a North Korea that decides to proliferate I'd have no confidence that they would not attempt to proliferate we've seen it they proliferated in violation of their commitments to pass nuclear reactor technology to Syria we saw the US invoke proliferation security initiative which only applies to WMD or missiles in getting India to prevent the overflight in August or September of 2008 again a violation of existing UN resolutions North Korea had privately told South Korean officials they may proliferate nuclear technology or fissile material and then in the past North Korean officials have told US officials they were threatening to build, test and proliferate nuclear weapons so I think the past action is there and the threats the pledge to do so has been there so I think they have done it and they will continue to try to do so I have very little confidence in any pledge that North Korea makes of course this isn't a unique problem we've had that problem with Pakistan that was sending plain loads of nuclear materials around with the government claiming to have no knowledge as well I think the question is do we believe that we can draw red lines and indicate that proliferation is the fastest bellae I think all the evidence is the North Koreans are doing this primarily for the money if they see other options to earn money that are not nearly as dangerous or risky I think that we can probably use that system as well as a threat behind it but clearly this is another reason why North Korea without nuclear weapons is a better place than one with it but I think to the extent we can stop the growth of the program we are far better often trying to stop proliferation as well this here again it would be helpful to have China stop the proliferation and stop the overflights etc I've got it right Steven Schwartz with the James Thornton Center for Non-Proliferation Studies writing in the bulletin of the atomic scientists recently Ted Postel and David Wright made a very strong case that by analyzing the latest typodong launches from North Korea that the technology that they are using for the long range missiles originated in Russia and specifically in Russian submarine launch ballistic missiles and they further argued that that technology is such that it cannot be indigenously manufactured in North Korea which means that given that the flow apparently has been cut off that North Korea is limited into how many of these missiles it can build I guess two part question A are you familiar with that and do you agree with it and B if you do agree with it how does that change our perspective about the threat posed by North Korea at least because of its ability to mount a nuclear warhead on a long range ballistic missile and use it to threaten us or anybody else the article in the bulletin of atomic scientists in addition to that point they also mentioned that they assessed that the typodong 2 launch in April was a significant advance over North Korea's previous launches and that the missile would have the capability to reach the continental U.S. with a payload of one ton or more and provide it for use as a ballistic missile as for whether the missile is from Soviet slash Russian origin or indigenous I don't have enough of a technical background on that but I think the consensus from most experts before that was that the North Korean missile capability was largely indigenous based on expanding from original languages of scud missiles so they've gone from the scud to extended range scud there's a whole family of scuds they extended that to the no-dong they've acquired perhaps SSN-6 from Russia and maybe turn that into a Musudon missile IRBM typodong I think it's what four no-dong strapped together as a first stage and perhaps this SSN-6 variant as a second stage I think the general consensus amongst most other experts is that it's largely indigenous but obviously with sort of a to and from interaction with others I mean we know with the flow of knowledge and technology was originally from North Korea to Iran and then Iran as they built their capability now they were the ones that were able to successfully launch a satellite, put a satellite in orbit and North Korea didn't so I think now it's probably more indigenous than perhaps they concluded but that's based sort of a amalgamation of a lot of other experts' views I was not aware of that article it doesn't strike me that the number of missiles is terribly relevant in terms of the United States and that the North will never have the capacity to overwhelm the U.S. or to deal with the U.S. without being wiped out in any kind of reply strike more missiles and more effective and more accurate missiles strikes me as being more important in terms of East Asia because you're dealing with countries there that are relatively disarmed compared to North Korea as opposed to the United States then the more missiles strikes me there probably matters very much in terms of the dynamic of other countries closing our bottles beginning with Bruce one thing I'd like both of you to address if you can is the areas of agreement and disagreement that you see I mean at least what you said today I guess beyond the defense because that's kind of easy I think we inherently agree on the need to maintain the denuclearization policy while first capping and then eliminating North Korean missile capabilities and nuclear capabilities I think perhaps it goes a bit beyond the parameters of the debate where it's supposed to be pro and con I think inherently we agree on the parameters of that I think perhaps the differences are whether to formally abandon the denuclearization policy or not I think we cannot abandon it I think that sends a dangerous signal not only to North Korea and Iran but also to our allies I think there are clear differences between us on I think we can or should delink ourselves from defending those nations that share our values such as South Korea and Japan I think we cannot leave them to their own defenses I think we have an obligation I think not only to our friends and allies but I think it is inherently in our best interests to defend those who share our values I think I also disagree with the idea that North Korea will never attack the U.S. so therefore it's not a problem for us I think the idea is not so much that we fear a single missile will come and obliterate Los Angeles it's that the threat is there and that as a Chinese general apparently said during the Taiwan Straits crisis in the mid 90s was will you trade Los Angeles for Taipei and North Korea may similarly say we've got nuclear weapons we are deterred from you attacking us if we act belligerently and threatening towards South Korea would you really trade Los Angeles for Seoul therefore we can act more provocatively more threateningly towards Seoul and you can't do anything about it so it's I think also not only a direct military threat and we can't discount a nuclear warhead that can reach the continental U.S. but it's also a coercion against that limits our ability to defend ourselves as well as our allies also I think on the approach to China I would not ask them to initiate regime change I think that sets in change a string of dominoes that we don't know where it could go and also I don't think China would ever do that I think that's sort of an overall summary I think we definitely agree in terms of what we think the best outcome would be in terms of denuclearization of the peninsula we also clearly agree that China's support and assistance would be very helpful in any effort to try to denuclearize the peninsula what I'd like to focus on is the question of is it somehow a denuclearization holy rift that one can't abandon Bruce mentioned that principles and rule of law I have to say the United States doesn't care one-wit about principles and international law the president goes to Russia and talks about the importance of territorial integrity the country that has invaded the most countries in the last decade is the United States one can argue that all of those are justified but we should not act as if you can attack Serbia invade Iraq and then preach to the world about the importance of territorial integrity we've already violated the non-proliferation principle with our agreement with India that I think this is a question of we have to make decisions in what's realistic, what's possible I know what the perfect is what the best would be but I may have to settle for second best and I think I might do what the US government has routinely done which is toss those principles aside kindly forgotten them when it preaches to Russia why are you attacking Georgia don't you understand you don't do that these days when Russia could look and say excuse me wasn't there this country a little bit to the south that you just invaded a couple of years ago so I don't think that's a very good reason in terms of defending the US there's no doubt it would be better not to have any missiles and any nuclear weapons but again I think we live in the world of the possible deterrence is very important yes I prefer not to have other countries able to deter America but we've lived in that world for a half century and that is not going to change it's likely to expand indeed even in India there have been discussions about the size of the nuclear arsenal and whether they should have one that can reach intercontinental range and America comes up not in terms of a strike against America but ensuring that never be used against them so we're into a new world where we cannot assume that we can forever act untrammeled and unhindered about the globe a best option of course is not to have that but this is where I would argue we're far better off with the North Korea of the small arsenal than the North Korea with the growing arsenal and proliferation concerns here again I think we may have to settle for second best the question of protecting potential allies I would argue that the principal responsibility for the United States is defending the United States it's not at all clear that defending allies is necessary for defending the United States indeed we have to be very wary that alliances can be transmission belts of war as opposed to fire breaks for war and in this world especially with the rise of a power like China we're going to have to make decisions in the future to what extent we are prepared to put American cities on the line to defend allies that are fully capable of defending themselves finally preemptively accepting defeat my reaction is no we shouldn't preemptively accept defeat but we also have to live in the world of the possible we have to recognize what the likely outcome is going to be we have to be very careful that we don't overreach and make it impossible to achieve a relatively good end that may not be the perfect end I'm afraid that's what we risk in this case given the current regime in North Korea given international circumstances I am skeptical we can get what we want then I think we have to be prepared to settle for something second best that I would argue is a major improvement over the current situation even though not the perfect outcome that I would prefer I would like to thank both of our speakers and the departure from our last day we actually have clocks to reflect the fact that they stay closer to a lot of times than anyone else has in previous debates thank you very much for participating and thanks to our moderator Jessica Yates and thank you all for coming thank you very much