 Okay, we may start now, thank you for being here for this session on energy and environment. During the different sessions of this WPC, the huge importance of energy and environment has been highlighted several times. In fact, in times of multiple crises, this workshop today will discuss the opportunities and challenges to achieve the goals of energy security, sustainability affordability, acceptability and resilience from the perspective of different geographic shareholders mapped out credible and realistic pathway through this most demanding period. So around the table, there is a wonderful panel to cover all the dimensions of the energy and environment challenges. And so I will give the floor to the different panelists for 10 minutes. After each presentation, I suggest to have some Q&A session, a short Q&A session focusing on the specific content of the presentation. And at the end, we will have time for a general debate between the panelists and the audience. So it's my privilege to start by presenting my views on the present situation of the energy sector. And clearly after COVID crisis in 2020, the energy sector has been faced in 2021 to an unprecedented crisis and to the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict for the last 18 months. So the growth of the energy price had a major impact on inflation worldwide. This slide presents the percentage of countries with an annual inflation greater than 6%. Most of the countries in the world have been faced to an economic shock similar to what we experienced during the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. Oil price increased rapidly at the beginning of the year from 80 to 120 dollars per barrel due to the uncertainties linked to the Ukrainian conflict. This growth was mitigated by the possible impact of the crisis on the world economy. For the last months, the price went back to the pre-crisis level, so the impact of oil on the inflation is rather limited. Gas electricity market, more specifically in Europe, has been faced to a first crisis in 2021 due to the market design followed by the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022. The prices of gas increased from 9 euros per megawatt hour in 2020 to 47 euros per megawatt hour in 2021. Then the uncertainty on the availability of Russian gas pushed up the price to 125 euros per megawatt hour in 2022 with peaks at 240 in August. In the US, the gas market was more volatile than during the previous years, but the gas price rarely exceeded 20 dollars per megawatt hour, and today the price in the US is five times lower than in Europe. The price of electricity followed the price of gas, 113 euros per megawatt hour in 2021, 297 in 2022 compared to the average price in 2020 at 35 euros per megawatt hour. The impact on the energy spending in Europe is huge. 1,200 billion euros in 2022 compared to 580 in 2021 and only 310 in 2020, which represents 8% of the European GDP in 2022 compared to 4% in 2021 and only 2.2% in 2020. Rapidly after the Russian invasion, the European countries and the EU Commission took measures. An embargo on Russian coal was decided on April 8 and later on June 6, and these measures have been taken also in most of the developed countries in the world. An ambitious energy plan has been decided in order to cope with the dependence of EU countries from Russian supplies. Most of the countries took measures in order to reduce the impact of the price increase on the final consumer or to promote energy sobriety. A decision was taken at EU level to set up a cap on the price of Russian oil and gas, and I remind that in June 2022 the US government launched a massive plan of 400 billion dollars in order to sustain US economy, the Inflation Reduction Act. As a result of these measures taken in Europe and in many other countries, the OECD imports of Russian oil dropped by 50%, 2.5 million baris per day. However, this drop has been largely compensated by Russian oil exports to non-OECD countries, especially China and India. In one year, Indian imports of Russian oil has been increased by a factor of 10. Russian export to EU by pipeline dropped from 10 BCM in March 2022 to 1.5 BCM in December, and at the same time Russian LNG export increased significantly. At the end of 2022, the share of Russia in the EU gas imports is only 10%. Immediately after the first embargo measures, the price of Russian oil dropped by 30% in order to find consumers. In fact, Russian was obliged to reduce the price in order to increase its export towards non-OECD countries. We should not forget the major event which happened just a year ago, the sabotage of the gas pipe North Rim 1 and 2. Despite, we are playing a major role on the gas supply of Germany. On the 26th of September 2022, several explosions destroyed the gas pipe of the Danish coast. It is the first time that such a vital infrastructure is attacked in a peace zone. Who is responsible of such sabotage? There is no clear evidence. However, the clear winner of this sabotage is the US. If such an infrastructure may be attacked during a peace time, what are the implications on all the vital infrastructure we rely on? Both energy telecommunication. The recent attack of the Baltic connector from Finland to Estonia may be another warning call. Some key figures, Russian revenues from energy dropped significantly. The share of Russia on the EU gas supply was reduced from 40% to 10%. EU investment in renewable energy and heat pumps increased by 40%. The electric vehicle markets increased by 15%. And the EU CO2 emissions were reduced by 2.5%. So in a nutshell countries, the European countries are the guest losers of this major energy crisis we are faced at. This will have a significant impact on our economies and clearly the US are the winners. As far as Russia is concerned, the impact on its economy is rather limited on the short term. However, on the longer term, Russia will have difficulties to compensate its European outlets. For the last few weeks, the dramatic conflict between Israel and the Amas is bringing a new dimension to the world energy crisis. But for the time being, we didn't see an evidence of what could happen due to this new crisis. So this is the scene I wanted to describe. Before I leave the floor to the different panelists, are there some questions to ask or some comments? Just a brief question regarding Indian exports to Europe. Do we have numbers regarding how much Indian exports to Europe have increased? That would be interesting to see how much of the gap India and China actually feel that, you know, the void that was left by Russia. Yes, yes, yes, yes. Okay, great, thank you. But as far as oil is concerned, nobody knows exactly where the oil is going. But clearly, the imports of Russian oil over India has been increased by a factor of 10. That's another story. Yes, please. Thank you so much, Anna Borchak from Romania. Thank you so much for a great presentation. But you didn't mention nuclear, the energy from nuclear, which, you know, we know that France has such a great tradition. Romania has such a great tradition. And we are actually working very closely together at the EU level. And we all know that the energy from nuclear is one of the cleanest, affordable and more reliable sources of energy. So maybe in your presentation, you might want to consider to add that part as well. And maybe later on we can, during the debate, I could intervene in a more elaborative way. Thank you. Don't understand on my presentation that I underestimate the role of nuclear, but I was focusing on a world, an energy world in a deep crisis. And if I would have, unfortunately, if I would raise the flag of a problem of nuclear, it is the availability of nuclear in Europe, which in France, which have been reduced dramatically due maintenance issues due to the COVID and also due to technical problems. Fortunately, we are out of this situation. But in August 2022, for the first time in 30 years, France was a net importer of electricity. But clearly now I think there is an increasing consensus in France and in Europe in order to develop the nuclear energy, to base the energy transition on nuclear. And there is also within European countries an increasing consensus, but there are also some countries strongly opposed to nuclear energy. You know what I mean. Olivier, it was not a bad technique, it was new norms. The reason why nuclear power plants were closed in France was mainly for nomadic reasons, rather than bad technology. It's important to say. You may afterwards ask a question. So now I leave the floor to Nicolas Terras. Nicolas Terras is president of exploration production of Total Energy. You made a wonderful presentation yesterday. And thank you to be here for this session. And now I leave you the floor. Thank you Olivier. It's a pleasure for me to be here to share a few comments about the energy context and then about what is the strategy of a company like Total Energy in this context. So you know when thinking about the energy context, the first point I want to make is that the demand for energy is increasing today, not decreasing. It's increasing because of population increase, particularly in emerging countries in the global south, because of aspirations also to better living standards. So we have to meet this growing demand for energy. At the same time, of course, we have a collective responsibilities, companies, governments to address the climate change and there is a real imperative to achieve the climate neutrality for the planet. The third point I want to make is that people, they want energy, but they also want affordable energy. And it's a constant in France, in Europe, in the US, in Brazil, in Nigeria, when energy prices increase, people go to the street. So there is a need also to provide, to make energy available, but also to ensure that this energy is affordable. On all this, in a system where today fossil fuels represent for 80% of the global energy mix. So a growing demand for energy, a climate neutrality imperative, need to provide affordable energy, even with a massive investment required for the energy transition, on a starting point which is today 80% fossil fuels. So I think if you consider those four elements together, it gives an idea of the magnitude of the challenge that we are facing in our sector. Let me just focus a bit on the various energies. I will start with oil. Oil today is about 30% of the energy mix. The global oil production is about to make it simple, 100 million barrels per day. The International Energy Agency, a number of organizations are making forecasts of what is the future oil production and when is oil production demand actually going to decline. At Total Energies, we see more or less the oil production stabilizing over the decade and then starting to decline from 2030. To reach a level in 2050, you know, when we aim to be carbon neutral, somewhere between 40 and 60 million barrels per day, compared to 100 today. Because there will still be a demand for oil for a number of uses today, we don't see how they can be substituted. Now, the reality today is that the oil demand is not decreasing. So we are not yet on that decline curve. This year, the oil demand will be 102 million barrels per day, plus 2 million versus last year. So plus 2 million, to give you an idea, a company like Total Energies is producing 1.4 million barrels per day of oil globally. So plus 2 million in one year is 1.5 times the production of Total. Only about 20 to 30 very large projects to be started to supply that demand. So I think it's important to understand that, that all of us are expecting to see in fact a decline in the oil production, but today it's not yet the case. The demand, I talked about the demand, now the supply of oil. I mentioned it yesterday, but I think it's always important to remember that there is a natural decline of oil field production, which is much greater by the way than for gas. It's about 4% per year, so if you do nothing every year, out of your 100 million barrels per day, you lose 4 million. In face of a demand, you know that is increasing by 2 million. So that's why in our company we are saying we need investments in new oil and gas projects, so we can stop investing of course, but if we stop investing, there is very quickly a large imbalance between supply and demand. And very quickly prices are going to skyrocket and we are back to the issue of affordability of energy and acceptability of all this. Gas, so today gas is about a quarter of the global energy mix. We see gas as a great fuel for the transition, simply because there is still a huge potential to substitute coal for gas, or coal by gas, particularly for power generation. The share of coal in the energy mix is slightly higher than the share of gas by the way, coal is more than a quarter of the energy mix still today. So there is this substitution, we see demand for gas actually increasing over the coming years. On a key requirement for gas to be an acceptable transition fuel is of course to eliminate all the missing emissions from gas production, gas transportation and gas use to make sure that actually gas is a positive contributor to the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Electricity is of course the core of the new energy system because we know that electrification is going to play a super important role in the decarbonisation of the energy system. It's a key lever for the energy transition. It will mobilise certainly massive investments, continue to mobilise massive investments in the future, not only in electric power generation, particularly from renewables, but also in transportation and networks. On power systems will become more and more complex, at least the way we see it, with the massive arrival of renewable power generation and the impact it has on the management of power systems. And what we need to remember also is that electric power customers or users, they want firm power, they don't want intermittent power, which means that even if renewables will play a very important role in the future, they need to be complemented by flexible power generation sources, gas fire power generation or storage by the way. So that's what I wanted to say as a few ideas about the energy sector and now let me move to what is the strategy of total energy, what we're trying to achieve in this context, which is both a challenge and I would say exciting. Our strategy, we summarise it very simply by saying we want to produce more energy with less emissions. More energy, for the reason I mentioned, because there is a growing demand for energy by a growing population. And in total energies, we expect to continue increasing our energy production while diversifying, of course, our mix with more low-carbon energy. Less emissions at the same time, and we've taken a commitment to decrease our greenhouse gas emissions by 40% between 2015 and 2030, and I will say a few words about how we're going to achieve that. But my first message is that companies like Total Energy, and I think a number of our peers actually are pursuing similar strategies, is to be able to supply more energy to people with less emissions, which is a real challenge per se. So today we see our future activity and our strategy based on two pillars. First pillar is oil and gas. Second pillar is what we call integrated power. So to give you an idea, today we dedicate about two-thirds of our investment, our capital expenditure programme to the first pillar, oil and gas, so about $11 billion per year. And one-third of our capital expenditure to the second pillar, which is renewable power generation, low-carbon molecules. So two-thirds one-third, $11 billion for the first one, $5 billion per year for the second one, which in fact is a massive shift compared to where we were five years ago, where the second pillar was close to zero. So for the first pillar, oil and gas, of course to achieve our more energy, less emissions strategy, we are focusing on oil and gas projects, which are both low-cost and low-emissions. Low-cost because we want our projects to be resilient through the cycles, and I don't need to tell you that Olivier mentioned about the oil price variation over the recent period, but we are in a very volatile market. So all our new projects, we set for ourselves criteria, they need to have a technical cost below $20 per barrel to be resilient at $50 per barrel. And low-emissions, because it's a way to achieve our target to decrease by 40% our greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. So what does it mean low-emissions? It means that when we look at the emission intensity of our production, so the quantity of CO2 that we emit for one barrel or one barrel equivalent produced, today the figure is 20. And by the end of the decade, our target is to reach 13, 13 kilograms of CO2 equivalent per barrel. So to do this, we work both on our existing production base and on our new projects. Existing production base, we are basically our emissions are coming from our own energy consumption, which is the majority of our emissions, and they are coming from flaring. So we are gradually eradicating, in fact, flaring, and routine flaring will be eradicated from all our facilities in a couple of years, even if our target was 2030. And then we are deploying new technology to stop completely flaring, including the safety flaring that we usually have in our facilities. We have systems of closed flare where basically today we can produce oil and gas with zero flaring. Energy consumption, we are spending this year and next year $1 billion to improve the energy efficiency in our facilities. So we are doing like any industrial company willing to reduce its energy consumption. We are installing combined cycle power generation units on our offshore production facilities instead of traditional gas turbines. We are electrifying our facilities, or a number of projects with renewable power generation. So we are taking care of our own emissions, you know, and of course hoping that the energy users or customers will follow the same approach. One principle that we set for ourselves is that all our new projects, oil and gas projects, must have a greenhouse gas intensity below the average of our portfolios, the average of our production. So by doing that, that's the way we can reduce gradually the emissions from our production. Low emissions for us is also aiming at zero methane emissions, because as I mentioned, we see gas as a great transition fuel, but provided we can eradicate methane emissions. So we decreased our methane emissions by half over the last decade. Our target is to further reduce by 50%, another 50% by 2025, and be near zero methane emissions in 2030. So I'm going to accelerate a bit, talk about the second pillar of our strategy, which is integrated power as I mentioned. Electricity was about 5% of our overall production last year, and we target to bring this to 20% by 2030. Some people may say 20% isn't a lot, but to go from 5% to 20% we need to invest every year $4 billion in our integrated power business, which is probably actually one of the largest investments by a single company in Europe in renewable. In 2030, today we invest $4 billion, this year we invest $4 billion in electricity power generation, mostly from renewables. So we've got this massive investment program, we're planning to generate over 100 terawatt hour of renewable electricity by 2030, but then when we say integrated power, our objective at the end of the day is not only to generate more renewable power, but is also to provide firm power to customers, which is what is required in fact. So our strategy really is to integrate this renewable power generation with flexible power generation from combined cycle gas turbines, with storage from batteries to manage intermentancy from renewables in order to be able to deliver this firm clean power to our customers. And of course we're trying to build an integrated power business, which is also a profitable business because we're a company and we have shareholders. And so we put a lot of energy and focus on producing better, developing projects better at a lower cost and selling better. For projects, I think we recognize that there are a lot of utilities around the world which have much more experience in the electricity power business than we have. Still, we have a large offshore experience for instance. So we try to focus on areas where we can be competitive such as offshore wind. And of course I will finish with that because Olivier is telling me that I passed my time already. But we also try to develop more and more multi-energy projects. A good example of this is what we are doing in Iraq where we have a four-component project where we develop the production from an existing oil field to generate money. And part of this money is used to gather and process a lot of natural gas that is currently being flared in Iraq to supply power generation in the country. And at the same time, we develop a 1 gigawatts solar plant in the same area in the south of Iraq to supply power to local people. And we believe that this kind of, and there is a fourth component which is basically to build a large seawater treatment plant to be able to replace groundwater being used for injection into the oil field in the south of Iraq by treated seawater and so to alleviate the hydric stress. And we believe this type of multi-energy project today is a good solution for a responsible energy supply and it's also a good solution for the acceptability of what we are doing. I'm going to stop there. Thank you for this very interesting presentation. Are there some questions on this presentation? Yeah, please. You push your button. Yeah, just one quick question on this Iraq thing that you mentioned about natural gas flaring is converting into electricity. Any plans by Total or your partners there basically to monetize even deeper and more comprehensively to convert that into LNG for export? No, we've not. In fact, the project is ready to supply electricity for the local requirements because the local needs are huge. I need to know that today Iraq, there is a lot of gas being flared in Iraq, but at the same time the country is importing gas from Iran, in fact. So you know the idea is pretty simple is to supply gas for the local power generation plants which are existing already and to substitute import by local production. So no plan for LNG simply because the demand is there. A new plan to capture all that gas which is being flared so that it can be monetized maybe for the benefit of the local population or the local economy? Sorry, I was not clear. The plan is to collect all this gas that is currently being flared to process it to commercial specs and to supply it to gas-fired power plants, but locally. Thank you very much on this talk. Jeremy Finn from Blue Water Intelligence. I have a question regarding a peak. In any energy system the system needs to be balanced. You mentioned that you are developing battery capabilities to handle the peak in a low-carbon way. First of all, what is the capability of your batteries at the moment because it's not simple technology at large scale? And are you considering other energy sources and typically countries look at, I mean intermittent energies are not the solution for peak. So typically countries look at either nuclear or hydropower to nuclear for capability, hydropower for storage, dams in particular. So are you looking at these? I believe nuclear no because it's written in your annual report but who knows? It may change and how about hydropower are you considering these? So three questions, battery capability, nuclear yes or no? And are you looking at hydropower? Thank you very much. So battery capabilities, you know we assess it for each project depending on what is the market, what is the demand structure, what is the pricing structure, what is the customer requirement, whether we sell on a deregulated market, you know merchant way or whether we have a PPA with an industrial customer to which we need to provide firm power. But typically for a large portion of renewable projects today we associate them with battery. And you are asking what is the size of your storage? It depends but for a one gigawatt, typically for a one gigawatt renewable project, we have a storage capacity ranging anywhere between 300 to 600 gigawatt hours. So it's pretty large in fact. So that's for batteries. Yes, you're right, battery is not the only solution to manage intermittency. There is pump storage, hydro, other ways to do it and we are looking at this definitely, we are looking at always actually to manage intermittency. Nuclear, no we are not investing in nuclear which doesn't mean that we don't believe nuclear is a good solution. I think nuclear is a role to play in a decarbonized energy mix and we certainly recognize that. But it's not our competency, we have our two pillars, we have no experience, nuclear is complicated. And then we tend to think also for, you know, we are looking also at the long term liabilities. And we think like for private company like Total Managing, the long term liabilities associated with nuclear is not easy. Thank you, yeah, you have the floor. Renaud Girard from Le Figaro, should I speak French because everybody understands French or no? It's not translated so I will speak English. I would like to know the impact of a small geopolitical event that happened in February 22 with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on Total Business. What was the shift of your business? Can you tell us the shift of business between January 21st and January 1st of January 2024? And how much it cost to the company this small geopolitical event and how could you face it? Did you have like reserve? Did the government help you? Did the European Union help you? How did you face this lack of this change of business? So on this, Renaud, first the impact on our business, I think we communicated fairly openly and clearly on what business principles we decided to apply after the invasion of Ukraine. First thing that we abide with sanctions, no matter what is the impact on our activities and who are doing so. Second what we did immediately was to stop purchase of oil and petroleum products from Russia. Then we started a gradual withdrawal of winding down of our activities. We had one oil production field in Russia, Karaga that we sold and we exited that. We had a gas field for domestic supply, thermocast and we exited that. Then we communicated that we deconsolidated our interest in Novatec. We kept our interest in Yamal LNG which is a liquefaction plant supplying Europe. One of our principles being that we continue to supply LNG from Russia to Europe as long as European governments actually are considering that this is desirable and that there is no sanction of that. The cost of all this I think is public because we took total depreciation on Russia of $14.8 billion to be specific. So close to $15 billion, $14.8 billion. No, the government did not help us. It's not a practice in the company to ask for monetary support from the government. I don't think we would get it anyway so we're trying to manage our business by ourselves. Yes, it can be the other way around. You mean that you are not like the big banks when you have a problem, you don't ask the government to help you? No, no, no. So yes, it's a hit on the business of the company but it's a hit that the company can manage. We have a limit in the amount of capital employed that we put in each individual country. So in Russia we were at the higher end, not far from the limit, but it's the same rule and actually the Russian crisis has demonstrated against us that we need to stick to that rule. What is the maximum? It's 15% per country or what? 10%. So that's what I can say. After, of course, there is an impact on our production, you know. Total energy was, if you look at our annual reports, we were 2.8 million barrel equivalent per day company two years ago. Last year we were at 2.4, this year 2.5, so there is a gap. We are developing our LNG business outside Russia, you know. So we have a number of projects. We recently announced that we joined Rio Grande LNG in the US. We are preparing to take a final investment decision on Papua LNG. We are participating in the very large north field expansion in Qatar, in those six new LNG trains. We have Mozambique LNG, we are participating in expansion in Nigeria LNG and Oman LNG. So we are growing our LNG, I would say, from outside Russia. We increased actually a lot our LNG imports to Europe from other sources last year. And I think we contributed in a meaningful manner actually to the continuity of supply of gas to Europe. So that's the way we are doing. Thank you, I think that's a good opportunity to leave the floor to Jean Abidboul, Jean Abidboul who is president of the international group of LNG in Qatar and who spend all his career in natural gas. And so Jean, you have the floor for 10 minutes. So I will preach more or less for my church and mention more specifically natural gas, but I will start. So this one seems a little bit complex, but it shows three different things on the same slide. The size of the square is the size of the world market. So in 2000, 2010 and 2022. Then the color shows the different kind of energies and inside one color you can see the different countries. So it's a little bit complex and I will not spend too much time on that, but it gives you all the figures related to the different kind of energy. There was a question about nuclear. Nuclear is in orange pink. And you can see that nuclear is still a rather small part of the world energy mix. It was 7% in 2000. It is 4% on the world energy mixed in 2022. So in black you can see the coal. So you can see that the coal is still very important and the increase it shares 25% in 2000, 27% in 2022. So coal is still very important. You can see the growth in green of the renewable, 1% in 2000, 7% in 2022. And the size of natural gas is more or less the same, 22% in 2000, 23% in 2022, but of course it's 23% of a larger square. The global energy mix went from 9.2 million tonne oil equivalent to 14.4 million tonne equivalent. Just a snapshot on coal. Coal was 30% in 2010 and is 27% in 2022. And a big part of this decrease in coal consumption has been replaced by natural gas. So as a consequence, next slide, you can see that the GAG emission... I didn't press the button. See, it's a new one. It looks like the old one, but it's a new one. You can see that the GAG emission, CO2 emission to be more specific, have been growing by 2.8% per year for 2000 to 2010. And from 2010 to 2022, the growth is only... It can be discussed, but it's a fact, by 0.9% year on year. So the main explanation to that and the fact that the main explanation to that is a replacement of coal by natural gas. There is also a small part from renewable, but the share of renewable is still too low to have today a significant impact on CO2 emissions. Now the LNG, so the VCs, the part of inter-regional gas trade on the left side, you can see that the pipeline part of inter-regional gas trade has decreased from 2021 to 2022 by 5% and has been replaced by LNG, so it's a direct consequence of the Ukraine war. On the left, you can see the LNG import by sources and by destination. You can see on the top of the graph the big three export countries, United States, Australia and Qatar. Qatar and Australia are more or less the same, but you can see the growth on United States 21 and 22. And you can see that Europe from 21 to 22 on the downside part of the slide has grown significantly, also as a consequence of the Ukrainian war. So in Europe, LNG has filled the gap, the gap created by the disruption of Russian gas. You can see on the left the Russian piping port in red or orange. You can see the decrease and you can see on the right the increase of the US LNG to Europe. So to make it short in Europe, the Russian gas has been replaced by LNG from the US. So I like this one because the title of this one could be the invisible hand of the market or could be also entitled leave me alone. What do I mean by leaving me alone? All the governments have tried to do something to cope with the issue of the Russian gas in 2022 and beginning of 2023. So they have tried to imagine new systems in Europe of common purchase, which by the way is illegal and under the competition law. They have tried to imagine price cap. They have tried to imagine common tenders, et cetera, et cetera. One could think that part of these measures have been useful. Personally, I believe that the market has done the job. When you look on the left part of this slide, you can see that the LNG imports from 2021 on the top to 2022 on the back. You can see the growth from 70 to 110 million tonne per country. And on the next part of the slide, you can see the decrease of LNG import in Asia per country. And you can see that. So there is an increase in Europe of 40 million tonne of LNG import, partially offset by a decrease by about 20 million tonne of LNG, which used to go to Asia. And how is it possible that this LNG doesn't go anymore to Asia? But the answer is very simple. The answer is go. The prices of LNG have skyrocketed so much that some LNG countries, some Asian countries, especially China, India and Indonesia, have naturally replaced LNG by call for their electricity production. It's not an intervention of the government. It's not because Emmanuel Macron has asked to China, please give me some LNG to replace Russian gas. It's just because the market has been working. So there was a double swap, LNG to call in Asia and LNG from Asia to Europe to replace Russian gas. So the price signals did work without any intervention from the government and from Europe. And since today in the LNG market, 30% of the quantities are spot. You have 20 exporting countries. You have 45 importing countries. You have 734 LNG tankers. So you have a huge fleet of LNG tankers. The market works. We had already seen that during the Fukushima issue where it was exactly the other way around. And additional LNG went to Japan to replace the nuke, which was cut by the Fukushima issue. So my main message is the LNG market really provides flexibility. The price signals work. Of course, the replacement of LNG by call in Asia is not a good news as far as CO2 emissions are concerned. But there is today such flexibility in the LNG market that LNG market can cope with crisis. So the next slide is expectation on the future. I will not spend too much time on that, but it is numbers coming from the EIA in two assumptions. The one on the top is stated policies scenario. And the one on the downside of the slide is announced pledge scenario. So on the top it is a state of the art assumption. And on the back, when you can see what would be the consequences of what the different states have announced in terms of pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emission. On the right, just for information, you can see different scenario on the growth of LNG. You can find the big three, United States, Qatar and Australia. And there are two countries which can provide additional LNG. It's United States and Qatar on a significant point of view. So this is basically what I wanted to say. Thank you. So I leave the floor for a few questions. Jean, this Russian attack of Ukraine, do we have an idea how much it costs to Europe or to Europe consumers to shift from Russian gas to American LNG or Qatar? Do you have a vague assessment of how much it costs the European consumer? And my second question is in terms of carbon emission. The fact that we saw that India, China and Indonesia went back to coal. What is the impact on the carbon emission of the decision of the West to stop importing Russian energy? So these are good questions and I'm not sure to have the full answer to those questions. On the first question I read, not by you of course, but others which are less informed, that the US has paid a huge amount of money because Russian gas has been replaced by US LNG. This is factually true because to make it simple, in Europe the spot prices were around, let's say, 8, 10 dollars per million BTU, Olivier, the order of magnitude. So this is the order of magnitude. After the invasion of Ukraine, this number went at the maximum of the crisis to 50 dollars per million BTU. So it's increased by 400%. So people said the US LNG costs a huge amount of money to the European consumer. No, it's not the US LNG. It's because there was less LNG on the market and the price signals did work. And if there was not US LNG to replace part of the Russian gas, the prices would have been maybe not 50 dollars per million BTU, but maybe 100, 200 or whatever it is because there would be a physical gap. In the supply demand of LNG and this gap would have not been filled by prices and we would have to cut the gas in Europe to consumer or to industrial consumer, whatever, which has not been done. Having said that, it's true that multiplying the prices by four or five, even for a limited period of time, it has cost a lot of money because US LNG, mainly US, was in competition, there was a competition between Europe and Asia. And it took time to displace gas in Asia to be replaced by coal. So the exact numbers, I have no idea, but if you take maybe Olivier with an idea, if you have an increase of 400% of the gas prices during three months, this is the equivalent of doubling or tripling the prices during one full year. So if I multiply by, I need a few seconds to do the multiplication. I gave some figures in my presentation and in fact the cost for Europe of the crisis, there are two crises. The crisis of the European market of gas and electricity in 2021 and on the top of that there is a crisis of Ukraine. And the figures I presented is that the spending on energy in Europe represents 2.2% of the GDP in 2020. It moved to 4% in 2021 and 8% in 2022. This may mean that the crisis in Europe of the markets, electricity and gas market, cost 2% of GDP and on the top of that 4% due to the Ukraine crisis. Just rough idea. Yeah. It's very interesting to look. If you give me one second to address the second question of Renault on the cost in terms of CO2 emission. So in rough numbers, in China, there was an increase, I would say by 30 million tonne oil equivalent of coal increase. 30 million plus, I would say 50 million, I would say 100 million tonne oil equivalent. And each time you replace gas by coal, you multiply by 2 the CO2 emission. So I ask for help from my friends, Nicolas Olivier, on 100 million tonne oil equivalent if you multiply by 2. How much CO2 does it cost? I'll give you the figures afterwards. Okay. So there are two questions. Thank you Olivier. It's not necessarily a question, more of a comment. It's very interesting to look from the policy point of view of the cost after, but I will kindly put for the analysis to look what were the costs before because of the dependency of Europe of the Russian gas. And Olivier, in a humble way, I can challenge that actually the winner of Nord Stream 2 was the United States. In my humble opinion, I think the big winners were the central eastern Europe countries who got their chance to not be prisoners of the Russian gas used by Putin as a weapon. And I can tell you from my personal experience, when I was deputy prime minister in 2018, it was Romania and Poland who was saying in Brussels on the record and off the record take away the energy from Putin's hands because he's going to use it as a weapon. Unfortunately, we were right. So maybe as we are talking from the policy point of view, it will be interesting to look what were the costs of being so dependent on the Russian gas. It's not necessarily the case of my country Romania because we've been quite wise in terms of having the energy mixed and we were practically from all the central eastern Europe countries, we had the less dependency. But I can tell you for that 15% that we were getting from Russia, the same gas from Russia for Romania was the highest. Actually, there was another country who paid higher was Republic of Moldova. Then it was Romania and the same amount of gas and the same day from Russia, we were paying the highest price where other countries in Europe, in European Union quite frankly, were paying the cheapest. So I think looking at, you know, from drawing some lessons and recommendations from the future is, you know, look what was happening and how energy is practically a matter of security in my opinion and it should be treated this way. I think I agree when I said that the U.S. where the winners it's on the economic point of view because it reinforced and now the European Union is depending more and more on U.S. LNG. I would like to highlight, we discussed about Ukraine. I would like to highlight the fact that in 2014 the share of Russia in the supply, in gas supply of Europe was 30%. And after and in 2014 there was the invasion of Crimea and the share increased for 30% to 40% how blind we are, especially Germany. I would like if you allow me Olivier to say a few words about the winner U.S. etc. I think you are right when you say that U.S. was against North Stream, it's of use. It's because U.S. was not comfortable of having Europe too dependent on Russia for strategic reasons. And they were right, but it doesn't mean that they aim was to replace Russia with U.S. LNG. Two different issues because in the U.S. there is a debate. There are people who believe that it's not a good idea to export gas from the U.S. They believe that the consequence would be first to increase the price of gas for domestic consumers and they also believe that in doing that U.S. is not keeping for itself its strategic advantage of having cheap energy. So there is a real debate in that and until Chénière built its first export facility in Sabine Pass, exporting natural gas from the U.S. was illegal. The law forbids the U.S. to export gas. So in order to do that U.S. had, it was during President Obama's mandate they had to change the law. So I don't believe that the U.S. had in mind to do something which at the end of the day would allow them to export gas. Sorry, the time is moving rapidly. I would like to clarify, I was not implying that, but I was just saying that energy was treated as a matter of security. And exactly from that point of view, yes, I don't think that was wise for Europe to be so dependent on the Russian gas. And as a matter of principle, I think going for the future we should be very careful not to replace one dependency with another dependency. This regarding the names, just as a matter of principle and as a lesson going forward. I'm afraid that when, if Trump is coming back, it will be very difficult to find natural gas for the supply of Europe. And anyway, it will be very, very expensive. So, but just a comment. Yeah, just a short question and short answer. Short comment, short question. Short comment, that is that you focus on U.S. exports of LNG. Remember that just from July to August, July 22 to August 23, the exports of U.S. coal to Europe rose by 50%. Export of U.S. oil to Europe to the point that now the dollar is a commodity currency. That's just a point. No, my question is, we spoke about the price of natural gas. Usually we had three markets. We had the U.S. market, we had the European market, and we had the LNG market in Asia. We have still the American market, and more and more the European market is linked to the LNG market in Asia. That LNG market used to be for a long time a market of long-term contracts. In recent years, spot transactions developed and all the prices you mentioned were on spot transactions. What is the situation nowadays? I heard that, for example, Total assigned a 27-year contract with Qatar. Any and shall have more or less done the same. I don't know what are the conditions of prices, but does this mean that the reference of prices will be an eventual spot market? What kind of spot market? We don't have for the moment any futures on LNG. What do you think could be the future? Knowing that the price of gas in Europe now is subject to what happens to strikes at Chevron and Schell's facilities in Australia, or eventually the absence of export of Israeli gas to Egypt? Do you think we'll have globalization of LNG market with spot and futures, or we will go back to, I don't know if Total could tell us how much they will pay in 27 years, the natural gas they will import from Qatar? But at what kind of price mechanism are you, or are we going like any other commodities just on spot and futures? Oliver, we have three more speakers. Would it not be four more speakers? Perhaps it was a very good question, but we should have the speakers first, perhaps. I'll be very quick. First, what we need to keep in mind is that today the LNG market is very tense, and would remain so for three, four years. So any event, the price go up very quickly. But then a lot of projects are coming. So you know by 2028, probably it's going to change. That's number one. Number two is long term contracts. Yes, of course. Everybody is in favor of long term contracts. We advocate for long term contracts. The problem is that to take a long term commitment, you need to have a long term visibility. And in Europe, it's a problem. Because in Europe, if the EU is saying we want to eradicate gas from the energy mix, then how do you want people to build infrastructures and take long term commitments on gas? So it's complex. There is a risk that we're going to pay the price for this in Europe. I suggest to move to the fourth speaker, Igor Yogan. So we will move to the more regional approach after the approach by energy. Igor will focus on sustainable development in Russia and the Russian Economic Union. He is the chairman of management board of the Institute of Contemporary Development and vice president of the Russian Union of Industrialist and Entrepreneur. So you have the floor. I give you ten minutes. Thank you very much. To be a good Russian, I will curtail my speech because there are so many people behind me. So let me just show you what I wanted to tell you and then a little bit comment on the situation in Russian energy sector. So Russian Federation started a real integration into the ESG world. There is a carbon regulation. There is a sustainable finance regulation. There is regulation of ESG risks by the central bank. And we create a methodical framework for talking all of those ESG factors into the development of industry in Russian Federation. Not only industry and financial markets too. But we're not alone. We want to build it on the Eurasian space. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are part of this union. Kazakhstan is very much in advance. They started in 2013. So they already have a carbon exchange. They have a pretty advanced financial market with green bonds and stuff like that. They have taxonomy approved. They have mandatory disclosure of non-financial information for all organizations. We don't have it in Russia. It's only voluntary and it's only a fraction. Kyrgyzstan is a little bit behind but they are beginning very serious development. In Bishkek they now have the draft national taxonomy and now they approve the guidelines. And they copy Kazakhstan because this is the closest neighbor. And definitely there is serious progress there. Belarus talks a lot but is not very much on time schedule. But they're developing different subjects of this sustainable development. And they have a state concept of the green bonds of republic. For example verification system and so on and so forth. Armenians a little bit behind but they also have elements of stock exchange with green bonds and national road map for stable finance. And I want to just to on this part of my presentation I want to say that no matter what we do Chinese regulatory system and Chinese stock exchange Chinese financial instruments and standard setting are well ahead of us. They work for at least 15 years on that stuff. And if we know that international sustainability standard board which is headquartered in Montreal decided to take Asia on board they delegated to Chinese people's republic because they are so advanced in methodology, regulation, financial motivation of those who want to be green that it's a feta complete. Another matter is that of course and Eurasian space will be by and large I'm absolutely sure they say that they will be independent. They will be autonomous. But they will copy Chinese example of how to transfer their economies and financial markets to ESG transformation and sustainable development. Of course you know that they promised to be to get the peak out of their energy mix by 2030 and then start drastic to curtail drastically the emissions and all of that stuff. And at the moment as we all know on electrical cars, automobiles, on turbines for the windmills on all of this they're well ahead of us, they're well ahead of Europe and then number one in the world. And nevertheless as was shown coal production is growing and will be growing until 2030 but that's now in the constitution of people's republic of China and in their documents of the 25th Congress judging by how disciplined is the process is they'll probably manage zero by 2060. A couple of words on Russia. You're absolutely right when the war started and you cut Russia out of your supplies the pivot to Asia was declared and at the beginning discounts were 40 percent both in India and in China. And in India we couldn't convert this money. There are still 14 billion worth of in rupees and we don't know exactly the scheme on how to recuperate that and transfer it to real capital, real money. Same in China. China, yuan of course, we have the trade in yuan so it's easier. But at the moment I would say that according to our Ministry of Energy the discounts go to 10 percent and the volumes are considerable. Definitely all kind of further sanctions, secondary sanctions and so on and so forth are in force. It's difficult to transport oil and gas to the countries, to the friendly countries put it this way. Lloyds for example forbids insurance but there are always great great schemes and Russians insure it in the international waters the last mine is taken by Turks, by Egyptians even let us be honest by Greeks and people from your jurisprudence. So from this point of view if someone thinks that Russia suffered a lot yes at the beginning it was a serious blow. At the moment we don't feel it. Inflation is at 6 percent and the GDP growth is at 2.8 almost 3 percent so when we compare the economic situation economic warfare didn't work the way it was planned. That's the fact of life. But that short term, long term, mid term and long term would be much more difficult because technological gap will not be covered and then we will be dictated by our Chinese brother who becomes a senior brother and senior brother always is a little bit tougher than equal brothers or twins. So that will be felt. That's already felt in the Far East very much so on many instances and in many fields. But I would like to say that of course as it was discussed today in the political panel on Ukraine the sooner we start negotiating and ceasefire the better for everybody and in view of what Total said on the general need for the energy in the world I don't think that the best solution would be further sanctions, super sanctions, super super sanctions because you left Novotek, Novotek immediately replaced you by Chinese technology which is for needs for the Arctic drilling okay, not immediately from the best producers but you know immediately gray zone and this so called parallel import technology arrives to Moscow to Russia, excuse me. So I will end up here. Russians especially young Russians, academic Russians, intelligentsia want to be with you in the same world process and that was shown in the first part and the second part will largely depend on geopolitics much more difficult because here the invisible hand of the market works less efficiently when the politicians get into that the sooner we finish this tragedy the better for everybody. Thank you very much. I hope that I economize for some of the speakers. Thank you, thank you for those for the presentation and for the, you are very precise. Please. Just one simple comment that the easiest way to get rid of all these problems is for Russia to leave Ukraine. Tell it to Mr Putin. Of course, of course. Yes. Thank you very much. In fact you referred to sanctions to be frank. The Russian oil and gas revenues came back now to the levels before February 2022. So are the sanctions. Sanctions cost us overall not not energy about from one to two percent GDP. Nevertheless, and it is felt no question about that. But to say that it was a, how should I say, successful economic warfare. No. Okay. So we may move to another point of view. And Narendra Taneja with the chairman and independent energy policy institute, which is a new daily think tank. So I leave you the floor to discuss about the governance. Please. Well, thank you very much. The last almost couple of hours has been very different color and mood in the room. So I don't know. You see the global energy gravities center is no longer in Europe or Atlantic. It's in Asia. And the 405 billion energy consumers in Asia, they are consuming, you know, maximum energy. And that's where the future lies, whether you're a Western company or Eastern company, you're from Europe or Russia or America. If you want to secure your future, you have to look at Asia. That's the reality. However, when I travel to conferences like this is a conference actually in global south in Abu Dhabi in Asia. But since yesterday morning, I've been feeling I'm in Europe somewhere. And 70% of the time I feel is an echo chamber. You're talking to each other. Then why did I travel from Delhi? Or why did, for instance, people travel from Africa? So you have got this habit. You go to understand the world has changed. What has changed? And you see, in global north, there are only 1.4 billion people. In global south, there are 6.7 billion people including people in Abu Dhabi. This is global south. We've got to understand and acknowledge it. You see, I travel to Europe almost every month and it's so suffocating to go to conferences. Because, you know, the world is changing. Today Briggs, somebody mentioned today, Briggs total GDP on PPP basis actually Briggs is today bigger. From the first of January, Briggs is bigger than G7. Why do people realize that in Europe? Investment part of the world? Why there is no realization that look is a one small planet? And the world has changed. Energy, in this room we're discussing energy. And going by the question answer it seems that only region that matters is Europe and maybe the United States. That's the end of the world or the beginning of the world. My friends, the world has changed. You've already spoken for 2 hours so allow me 10-12 minutes. Because this is where the heart of the global energy is. So I'm representing the heart. I'm going to focus on energy governance and global energy order and therefore, of course, security. You see, the fact is half the world today is not even talking to each other. Because you're Russian, because you're Chinese, or because you're Hamas, or because you're Israeli, or because you're Africa, you're very poor. You don't deserve to be in the high turbo. Somebody mentioned yesterday the richest continent on the planet is Africa. So we got to understand that whether it's energy or it's climate, we need to engage the whole world. Unless the discussion or the conversation is truly global, we will actually end up reaching to the wrong conclusions. And when the conclusions are wrong, solutions that we propose to the world or for that matter to the people of Europe would not really produce any results. And look at, for instance, climate. Climate for us in India, we have 1.4 billion people, densely populated country. Climate for us is science. How do we go forward? On the one hand, we have to eradicate energy poverty. And at the same time, we have to mobilize sufficient energy for our people. How do we do that? So it's science. But for many in the global north, I'm not targeting anybody. You know, I love Europe. I spent nine years of my life in Europe. I went to universities in Europe. But for many, climate has become a religion. You just can't have conversation on this matter. If you say, look, I mean, there are 3 billion people energy poor on the planet. We need to engage with them. We need to do what? No. Is it a religion? How can you question it? I'm not saying everybody, but there are many. And that has become a problem. And at the same time, when you look at the global narratives, whether global narratives on energy or global narratives on climate, because the West has the experience, you have a good think tank, you have diplomats, you know how to articulate, is English language, or the French language, and all that, all these narratives are dominated by the West. I'm sorry to use the expression, but that's the reality. So the result is, what we have seen in this room, for instance, and we have seen in the conference also since yesterday, that that has become a challenge. The result is, until very recently, energy and climate were always stopped in the same breath. Now, the global North, or if I may use the expression, the West, has decoupled it. Now say, energy is a different, sovereign, different world, and climate is, if you're talking climate, you can't talk energy. Energy, then basically you can talk only about renewables. This climate extremism is actually bad for climate security. Because if you can't have conversation, how can we find a solution? It's bad for climate security, it's bad for energy security also. Now, this climate radicalization that we see in quarters in the global North is today the biggest threat to energy transition. Because unless we go about for honest conversation where the interest of everyone is taken care of, how do we move forward? How do we move forward? And I give you an example. In my city, I live in New Delhi, we recently hosted G20 summit. And you know one thing? In G20, we have tracks on everything. We have tracks, tracks means this conversation on agriculture, on medical sciences, on damn everything you name it, and it was there. But not a single track on traditional energy, fossil fuels. They were kept out of the room completely. Energy, a green energy, many tracks. In the final declaration, no mention. And this is G20. I asked some people, because we hosted it, but a host does mean that you control the narrative. Because narrative is still controlled by the West. And they said, oh, they don't want it. Now imagine, you are talking, you are G20, you are talking of securing future, but you have no discussion on that. Now the biggest challenge is, the biggest challenge today basically is that the way I see it, that no conversation is allowed on this, that we need to kind of recouple energy and climate. There is no other way. There is absolutely no other way. Number two, this tendency on the part of the Global North to have conversation on the energy transition, roadmap energy transition, which is basically the way they want it. Not realizing energy and climate. Go to any village in Africa, go to any village in Asia, go to any village in Latin America. These are highly emotional issues and local issues. People worship trees, people worship local sources of energy. For many, energy and climate are very deeply integrated the way they live, the way they breathe. But if you think the West has got the solution and they have the template, you either accept it or we are going to make your life difficult. If you are a smaller developing country, we will punish you one way or another. If you are a big giant like India, well, we can't punish you, but still we will see. That's not how we work. Energy transition, different countries, different, you know, characteristics. Third point I want to make here is, look, Ukraine happened. Prime Minister of Senegal yesterday, she spoke there, Senegal, she used the word and quoting her, these are not my words. She said, Ukraine is white-smen war. These are not my quote. I'm just quoting her. She said yesterday. Now, the point is that, you know, the result was that energy has been weaponized. And you know who has suffered the most? Yes, in Europe, you build fortress, you got from the, you replaced your Russian energy with American energy and Australian and so forth. But do you realize that there are three billion energy poor in the rest of the world? Do you realize they are the one who paid the price? Do you realize that, you know, how many children might have died because of that? How many family budgets might have been disrupted and actually killed? How many people realize that? Can you have discussion on this in Europe? I have tried. Trust me. It does work. They don't want to listen to you. Because they love most as echo chamber. They love to talk with each other. The point here is that, you know, when it comes to, when it comes to priorities, you see, I mean, they can have, they have the right because they have money, they have technology, they have everything. But the point is if we really are looking for solutions, that's not the way to do it. Now question is, you know, on a positive note, now what do we do? What to do? I think we need to, when it comes to climate conversations, you know, Abu Dhabi is going to host the next COP summit. I'm not too optimistic. I'm very blunt. We need to basically reset the button on climate. Climate energy transition used to be the very top of the agenda, global agenda until two years ago, three years ago. Honestly, tell me, is climate now on the top of the global agenda? No, it's not. It's Ukraine. It's crisis in the Middle East. It's Taiwan. Tomorrow is going to be something else. But when it comes to climate, if you want to have results, if you're really worried about, you know, the global climate, you have to reset the button. We need to go back to the table. We need to really rework. Now, second thing is we need to democratize all these discussions and conversation on climate and energy transition. Obviously, I mean that the process is not democratic. It's not democratic. It's mostly top-down, top-down from the global north to the global south. Yes, countries like India and China, we assert ourselves because we can. But what about these 54 countries in Africa? How many countries in Africa can actually assert? There can be sanctions against them without calling them sanctions. Now, at the same time, I mean, there are many other things to do. De-weaponize oil. De-weaponize it. Gas. You're playing with the lives of the people, the future of the children, the future of, you know, the economies of smaller countries and more vulnerable economies. 80% countries in the world, they are energy deficit. 80%. They import energy. The biggest trade in the world is actually oil. Oil is number one. Roughly accounts for 60% of the total global trade. Now, the point here is that, you know, at the same time, when it comes to issues like, you know, technology, green finance and all that, again, we need to reset the button there. And we re-couple again, as I said earlier, you know, energy and climate. And at the same time, is there any global energy order in the world? Where is the order? The world is all united. We are basically the polarization that's happening. Russian oil and gas is banned. If it's sanctioned, Russians will have to find a way to sell it to whosoever can buy it. That means you actually are creating a parallel order. And in India, there was a question this, to us, I mean, if Russians offer a better discount, you know, we will buy it from Russia. If the U.S. offers, we'll buy it from U.S. If it's offered by Rwanda, we'll buy it from Rwanda. Oil has no nationality. Molecule has no nationality. We'll just buy it from there. What's wrong with it? You see, that's how it works. And then my important point is everybody is now saying that, you know, rule-based international order, rule-based international energy order, who makes the rules? Who has made these rules? The best. And if you don't follow, then you're questioned. And if you follow, then you have to become a subservient. So what kind of world we are talking about? So just to close it, you know, you can understand, you know, I'm putting a different perspective and many of you are not used to listening to this kind of thing. So you'll say, who is this man? Where does he come from? We were so easy. We were enjoying, you know, this echo chamber. But this echo chamber has been punctured. So sorry for that if you think that's the way you feel. But the fact is we need a globe in new international energy order. Number two, we need a new international energy governance. And number three, we ideally need a global, new global organization, which is basically can play some role in situations like this, circumstances like this, can step in and play some role. And my final point is that for God's sake, de-weaponize oil, gas, and energy. It's important. There are many other things you can play with. Weaponize them if that's important. But this is something 3 billion energy poor on the planet. They need it. So for their sake, if you have any love for humanity, any love, and Vest talks about humanity and whatnot, I think de-weaponize it. Let oil and gas and these things or all these commodities flow so that people can at least survive. Unless and until they survive, how can they really worry about things like climate? Thank you very much. Thanks for your patience. Thank you. I have a real, we have a real challenge because the cocktail is taking place at 7.30. So perhaps if there is one question and one question, and afterwards we will move to the next speaker. Is there a question on this interesting presentation? And quite challenging. So I leave the floor to Xavier Plouquin. He will give us the view on this issue of energy and environment and sustainable development. The point of view of the financial institution is investment director and chief of staff to the CEO of Meridiam, which is an investment company specializing in sustainable infrastructure. So seven minutes no more. So hi everyone. I also have a presentation that's way too long. So the good news is that I can pick and choose and I will actually talk just a little about financing because I had my advertising page about investment in the battery giga factories. But I had a quite long introduction that actually echoes I think a little, maybe in a biased way, the speech of my neighbor. Because I wanted to start and to have a focus on my view because Meridiam is a global infra fund developing long-term infrastructure. I personally also used to be energy advisor for the French Ministry of Energy and I had to plan energy in France. So I wanted to share a view that led in the end to the financing part, but since I will make it short, I will try to just maybe share something about what I think is interesting for European strategy for climate adaptation and mitigation, betting on resilience, adaptation and sovereignty. The two first words being words that you don't hear everywhere. And the third one that we use not to hear but that we hear now, the presentation is coming back. So maybe just the first point is that in my view and I agree with what you said, Europe is actually the part of the world that's benefiting the most from the energy transition. Why? Because I think everything has been stated and explained in the other presentation. There is a lot of text. So maybe if we focus just on the big blocks, just to remember that Europe imports massive amounts of oil, gas and coal. 93% of our oil, 89% of gas, 25% of coal and it's not going to increase. We are fully dependent on all the raw materials, lithium, 100%, cobalt, 81%, nickel, uranium. And in addition to that, it is very concentrated. The third point is that we have some manufacturing capacities and we have important one in heat pump for instance. We are global leaders. We are still leaders in wind. Also the position is challenged. We are tech leaders in H2 even though the production is starting to grow in China. And we are leader in nuclear even though our industry had some difficulties and there are no recovering. But some important parts of the value chain are missing. Battery manufacturing. As I said, we have invested so I hope it will change and PV production which is close to zero. Let's not talk about food because I want to talk about food that I have cut the slides. And maybe there are just some elements that are important but everything has been said already. Stated policy scenario from the International Energy Agency. Oil keeps approximately at 100 million barrels per day. So it means it will remain a big commodity. It will remain something with price volatility and something that has an impact on our global balance. But what you can see on the right is that developed countries should reduce their consumption and they are supposed to. Maybe we will grow other kind of dependency. We have not talked about hydrogen today actually because it is still something that is kind of science fiction. But if you project over 30 years, European Union is supposed to be completely different from the rest of the world importing mass of hydrogen according to the IEA. Will it happen? Will it not? Anyway, just a substitution from a dependency to another one. And what is interesting is that in Europe, this is about metal, but I think we have understood that we are basically fully dependent, that the dependency will grow. We will need to expand the importation of lithium by like 18 times before 2030 and 50 times by 2050. So it is huge amounts. This is about PV, I will skip also. And I think we have seen nearly exactly the same chart, Olivier. But yours one about inflation, this one is about the share of the GDP that has been used for energy. And what you can see is that we are exactly in the same situation as it was in the first two energy crisis, which is very huge. And what happened in Europe is that we have completely socialized this with a tariff shield that increased the depth in France, for instance, 2.5 points, which means that this is something that has a huge impact on our capacity to develop in the future. So the consequence of the first part of my presentation was to state that, and I agree with you. When we think about energy transition, it is something that benefits Europe the most because we are by far the most dependent part of the world. Many parts are dependent on energy imports, but we have the largest share for the moment, I think. What's interesting is that European countries could be considered rich enough to transition, and that's also the reason why they can push for that. But the weight of the transition is actually waiting very much on the households in Europe, and they have trouble facing that. This chart is just to mention that if we want to target net zero and not stated policy, we have to find approximately 1 trillion euros in advanced economies to invest starting in the next three years. So it is huge. And what's interesting is that over the long term, the total energy cost of a net zero scenario is supposed to be lower than something that's the stated policy. But the problem is that it requires massive investment. So that's why in the end I was supposed to talk about investment funds. And everything should have in mind because I think that in these chambers we do not talk about households, we do not talk about the people enough that a study has been done in France about the cost of house renovation or about EV, electric vehicle acquisition once you take off the subsidies, how many years of salary it costs to an household? So the households are from left to right from the first decide, meaning the 10% less rich. On the right, the 10% more rich. And what you can see is that basically a complete renovation of your household if you're in the 50% less rich people in France, after subsidies that can go up to 70% of the cost still will cost you approximately two years of salary, which is something that you cannot afford and the return on your investment is not enough or you need to have like very long term debt. It is a bit better on electric vehicle but what is important to understand is that European households, even though they are supposed to afford and to desire climate mitigation do not find the value today and frankly, even though you think it is a religion I think that most of the European households they do not really care enough about climate mitigation to spend two, three, five years of salary to renovate their house if they are told that it is for climate reasons. I think that European households, they are not ready to pay let's say five years of not ready. No, I think they are not at all. Bad news, so this is about hydrogen but that's a figure. Bad news, you could think that debt was a good way to up from the capex and pay over time but this graph I think is one of the most insightful ones I've seen in years, so even if it's about hydrogen it's why I've put that here. In 2021, if the cost base for a hydrogen project was 100% in 2023 it's 150%. Most part of the increasing cost is the cost of capital. Cost of debt has exploded. Debt is less available and it's the same for every part of the energy transition. So the households that could finance their innovation having 30 years debt at 0% cannot anymore and this will have a huge impact on European households. So I will just use two slides and nearly not talk about financing. My conclusion about the European households is that the green new solutions are more costly than they are supposed to because even if they are less costly than fossil fuel solutions they are not when you compare to the fact that people are already equipped with existing fossil solutions. So they need not only to invest new capex but to write down basically the one that they previously had and people know that and solutions that rely on let's say carbon taxation they don't have the right time pace because you change your car every 10 years you renovate your house every 20 or 30 years but you pay your bill every month. So this is not an incentive that people are ready to accept Green solutions even in Europe are not perceived as good ones because sometimes they are too expensive just the same thing more expensive. Sometimes it's more expensive and you have doubt about the fact that it works there is a huge debate in France in Germany about heat pumps. Do heat pumps really work when it's minus 5 degrees? And this is really hard to target and it is not geopolitical high level discussion but it's something that basically prevents people from buying heat pumps instead of gas boiler. And third, sometimes the solutions are expensive and they do not give the same service electric vehicle for instance they do not have the same capacity as regular gasoline car. So it is very hard to convince people and they perceive that the value is outside in Europe they perceive that if they buy PV they buy Chinese thing if they buy EV it's often Chinese basically they buy foreign products and that does not create jobs and it creates dependency. And finally as I said the financing capacity is completely down at the moment because the debt is higher inflation has struck and in Europe people need most of their cash to buy expensive housing, so they don't have that much room for additional expenses. Would you conclude? The conclusion about this part and it's in one minute was that I think that a good way of probably discussing energy transition and it will involve also the southern countries is to focus on resilience adaptation and sovereignty. IPCC for instance show the graph. That's the most interesting graph I thought we will not detail. It is one of the fact that most of the climate adaptation strategies they also have benefit on mitigation. People are ready to accept adaptation measures because it will give them more value for money it will protect them from heat wave it will protect them for lack of energy for grid dependency. They will be ready to pay maybe western countries should be able to focus on this kind of strategy that give basically the households value for money and to discuss with other countries how to phase out the more polluting fossil fuel but not be completely focused on mitigation because I think it's not acceptable in western parts of the world either at the moment. And I have not had the time to talk about Gigafactories of Battery but I can around the cocktail if you want. Okay, thank you. I fully support what you said about adaptation I remind you that in Kyoto protocol adaptation and mitigation were treated the same way but unfortunately cop after cop adaptation totally disappeared it came back recently and I think it will be very important for cop 28 to increase the consciousness and the consciousness on adaptation sorry I leave just a quick question just to check if we could have access to those slides Xavier if you could send those slides it would be lovely because they were very interesting. Yes, I can circulate those slides. Okay, so now we have just seven minutes left I very very do call some comments on what we heard and what the key messages you want to give us. Sorry, just two minutes. I want to follow up on what you both said first, Narendra I fully agree with you we are much more or too much European centred for sure we are talking about Europe we think that the war in Ukraine is yes it is a very important war but outside Europe they have a complete different vision and I fully support what you said I spend much of my time in Asia and it's true that the debate is completely different for sure something I want to tell you it is important to use what we have nowadays especially in Asia some of the states of United Nations Commission for Asia Pacific three weeks ago I was there I followed the entire week I'm sorry to say but India was completely absent so this is really the place that you have to use if you want to raise your voice and what you mentioned from the global south it is absolutely true but we had only a China who knows how to raise the voice Southeast Asian Asian countries but it's very important what the discussion we have here we need to use what we have and we need to be present it's the same for the European Union we are centred on the European Union outside European Union nobody is following what's going on just to what you mentioned about nuclear it's never mentioned in the UN absolutely never I'm paid by gas companies because I'm the director of the global gas center but I'm struggling to defend nuclear I'm struggling to defend gas renewable gases it's not only renewables we are only talking about renewables and this is a disaster for the global south this is a disaster for just what you mentioned here for even the citizens from let's say the north or west or how you call it you want and it's a completely disaster but we have to be here we have to occupy the field I was at this conference at the UN I was supported only by the United Nations and Central Asia to have one paragraph on natural gas and the role in the energy transition so the member states they have to be here and to defend because only to be present in Brussels it's not enough I'm telling you it's not enough at all and this is only what we see everywhere so I just want to correct all your member states to raise your voice institution that we have it's so important thank you for this very strong comments now I leave the floor to Marc-Antoine with director of the center for energy and climate at IFRI and we will have the real challenge tomorrow morning to present the discussion of this session so you may perhaps summarize a little bit of comments on what you heard I think Narendra woke us all up so I'll try to continue in that vein I think in taking a global perspective let's face it Narendra yes you rightly said we need to talk more with one another and I think still this is also a place where actually we are talking and I think that's very important now there is a very important momentum now we have John Kerry meeting his Chinese counterpart Genois as we speak now during several days and then we'll have the Biden Xi Jinping meeting at APEC in San Francisco and so this is unique because there is no major cop development possible unless the Chinese and the Americans don't agree and this is a momentum so I think we can be expecting that maybe something will happen there the second point is on what will it happen well I think and Nikola mentioned it yes the U.S. has to do much more on fugitive methane emissions dramatically more it has to ramp up finance in that and the Chinese need to peak their emissions way before 2030 and actually both could do that also to phase down coal I think this is possible and for India it's a specific case you emit 1 ton of CO2 per inhabitant when the Chinese do approximately 13 or 14 the Americans 16 and the year the UAE or Saudi Arabia 80 so there is a difference but it brings me to my second point we have to rightly discuss hydrocarbons yes and our governments do this also because I don't know how many phone calls Patrick Pouyanet or the Shell CEO got from governments you know help me here help me there what can you do but it's a new reality so they are not going to disappear and energy security is central also in our country so what we need to have a discussion on is an orderly transformation of the hydrocarbons yes energy security is right but the problem is if it's Iran or Russia that put energy security in the final declaration everybody understands why why so so I think this is clear enough new and the story is the following we need a predictable stable oil price that allows consumers to afford the energy but still to transition the companies and the governments to have the resources to invest in the alternatives but the problem is we need to have this discussion and I think the discussion has gone away that there were institutions for that there were ideas for that but I think it should be reinvested and what we also need is that you for example India tell countries here in the Middle East look if we look at the map of renewables in the world we almost see nothing here in this region how can that be with all the money that you have and then the second thing that you should also tell because so far it's been forced that has been pushing heavily for that it's how come the emerging economies are deprived of liquidity to invest into all these renewables et cetera if we look at the current financial system the risk in the emerging economy is much higher than in Europe it's much higher than in many places where actually the investments are required so this discussion has to be also taken up front by you and hopefully there will be greater financial commitments here from countries in the regions towards financing these low carbon technologies and their deployment if you allow me just a word also I think India and other countries especially us and it was ended several times now we have the objectives now we know that the technologies work we know that the cost went down although they are up again because of interest rate et cetera what we need to focus on is value chains everyone has to invest into value chains and here the states will have a major role to play they have to provide guarantees et cetera because otherwise it will be very difficult for the scale up and that they're risking last but not least if you allow me perhaps a word on you know 3 years ago 4 years ago everybody was planning for an energy transition with low oil prices with low gas prices well now we will have a transition with high oil prices and I think that offers quite some interesting momentum of course everybody is suffering hence the need to order me to organize all that but the point is this is a unique opportunity to accelerate and I think total energy correct me if I'm wrong but you would not be able to commit that much money to renewables which are providing less you know profits if you didn't have these high oil prices and countries like here obviously would be able to commit less to meet their targets if the oil price was $50 so let's work on this opportunity I think and also let's get out of this binary situation where you know the North thinks only about itself the South is demanding and is the victim I think it's much more complex but in any case you're right we need to work more together Marc Antoine Olivier I am not sure we heard the same things this evening what Narendra said was something different I think China was able in 50 years to increase the life expectancy of its citizen by using fossil fuels and I don't believe that the country like India and some African country will be able to have this level of development and this level of energy without fossil fuels so what I heard Narendra saying is that countries like India and other countries are going to use fossil fuels at a much higher level at the actual level and I think your summary was very biased very quickly if you allow me to share very quickly you see when you look at India's track record on renewables what we have achieved the last five years trust me is more than Germany you see is better than our track record what we have been walking the you know top all that we committed in Paris all that we committed in Glasgow or for that mushroom we have already walked we have delivered that but that said at the same time world over 82% energy that the world is consuming is coming from traditional sources in India stories more or less the same 67% of electricity that we consume is coming from Glasgow you see at the same time you have to see India is not some small banana republic we have security challenges from the north from the Indian Ocean from so many side when you look at India's energy scene 88% of oil that we consume is imported 88% we consume 5.2 million barrels of oil every day natural gas we are importing roughly 56% our total requirement 90% of equipment that we are using you know for solar are imported mainly from China uranium big chunk of uranium we import so that makes it extremely vulnerable in terms of energy security now the question is that on the one hand we have to see the renewable and at the same time we have to see the energy security because we are a very large country and also we are threatened from all sides the final point I am trying to make is energy transition in a country like India we are more committed than most countries in the global north you can check it on the cold numbers facts but that I had said time energy transition in India we will do with Indian characteristics based on ground realities in India based on the fact we still have 700 million people who are below energy poverty line so for us that comes first and if there is international pressure for me we are strong enough to deal with it so I am sorry it's perhaps a privilege of the president but it's 7.35 and the cocktail started unfortunately we will not have the time for a debate on more general issues these issues I wanted to debate is what are your expectations for next COP 28 meeting the second is perhaps focus on China it's the elephant in the room and we need to speak about what will happen in China and depending on what's happening in China this will have a dramatic impact on the energy world and also on the environment worldwide and perhaps also a question I wanted to raise in 1973 the first oil shock was created by a conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and perhaps are we at the eve of an oil shock taking into account it was not with the Palestinian it was an attack by Egypt and Syria at the same time the Palestinians had nothing to do with that to just recall that I know but there is there is perhaps there is we are at the eve of perhaps an oil shock we are not taking into account the fact that the depletion referred by Nicola is taking place and the investment of in oil and gas has been reduced by a factor of 2 since 2014 so it's for the time being the Palestinians but what will be the position in the next few weeks of the Arab governments I'm not sure I hope that what we heard from the advisor of the president of the UAE is right so I want to thanks the panelist and also thanks the audience for this debate and anyway perhaps the next time it will be necessary to have a longer more time to have a long in-depth debate all around the world thank you