 Good morning everybody. My name is John Hamry. I'd like to welcome you here. I am Delighted to have you and I'm delighted to welcome my very good friend Espen Bardaita He gives me personal hope because this is a number two that made it to number one you know I something I've never accomplished and But I draw a great deal of personal joy in his in his success. I've been Back to Norway a number of times in in recent years and I'd always go to the state secretary's office saying When oh Lord when do we see he finally is recognized for his talent and of course that That came through and he's been appointed defense minister and we're very glad for that. He's a genuine talent he also gives hope in a second dimension, which is Espen started life and Still I think considers one of his great joys being in a think tank. Well, that was real hope for me then That there is possible life after think tanks, I'm not sure I mean Espen's got a lot a lot of runway left for him I don't think I have much left for me, but but it is a great joy to welcome him here I've had opportunities to to work with with Espen now for number number of years and We first met when I was in government and I've always been Impressed that he is a he's a Demanding intellect in the right way. I mean it your best friend is not someone who tells you what you want to hear your best friend is someone who tells you what you need to hear and Espen has always had that capacity excuse me I I Minister Bart Ida has always had that capacity as A as a committed friend to tell us what we needed to know Not always been comfortable There have been some some good challenging and pointed exchanges Through the years, but invariably it strengthened us. It strengthened us It strengthened our confidence in working with Norway now, of course I'm a soft touch being Norwegian by background, you know, but But I think it's standing to his reputation. He was warmly greeted when he came to town yesterday had excellent meetings with Secretary Panetta and There's a wonderful new bright future, but it's going to be a partnership a genuine partnership Going forward interesting intellect and an operational job at the crucial time So would you please join me in welcoming Minister Bart Ida? Thank you so much John for those very warm words I was almost getting concerned because you're raising the bar with this beautiful introduction But it's great to be here and as John said I am I'm a transatlanticist at heart coming from a transatlantically oriented country and personally I'm from the think tank world. It's just that for close to 10 years now I was realized that maybe my job title is a politician But I'm sure that I will be back with the think tanks and continue to come to CSIS as I'll always done also in that world But but for the moment Minister of the fence I served for several years as Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Defense Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister again, and now was appointed Minister a couple of months ago and I Want to my introduction today will be in the future business And just as a disclaimer to say I'm not going to speak much about Afghanistan or Libya or Iran Although we are also very concerned about Iran And and follow what's going there and the collective policy on that closely We are deeply committed to Afghanistan and Norway will have troops in Afghanistan until the very last day that there is a NATO Presence in Afghanistan and we're there in strength and we'll stay there in strength And we were an active participant in the operations in Libya. Well, by the way Together with some other smaller north western European countries whose air forces should to be very able for that particular campaign Thanks to military transformation plus will and resources But that's not really what I'm going to talk about now and I'll ask question about anything But my focus is about the future and I met Secretary Panetta yesterday And I think we had an extremely good meeting as Ministers and Secretary and as a meeting of minds and I actually said that I have read the defense strategic guidance And I liked it And I did not say that to be polite because as Jonas told I do not always say things to be polite But because I actually like it. I'm not taking it. I'm not addressing the issue of the cuts I'll leave that to the American audience, but the strategic direction that it points out and And the reason I say that it's actually the way we have been thinking for a while that the world is changing in fundamental ways Not incremental ways. It's getting fundamentally different from what it used to be and and used to be not as in the Cold War But used to be as in the short Period of Unipolarity that followed the Cold War where we in the sense had the challenge of dealing more with asymmetric than with symmetric challenges But also the opportunity to focus on that rather than the potential emergence of Symmetric enemies or adversaries Which in the sense is a challenge and the luxury and we're leaving that period and we have to look into a future Which is fundamentally different at the at the heyday of Western dominance The collective GDP of the West liberally defined which would be Europeans not Americans and Australia and so on was way beyond Way above 60 percent today We're approaching going down to 40 percent and by the middle of this decade is estimated 30 percent So the West is not gonna run the world at least not on its own There are a lot of people now It's very fashionable to say that we're entering a multipolar world I may have used that word myself, but I think that's while it's fair to say that unipolarity is over I'm not sure if multi polarity has arrived because multi polarity suggests that somebody else is ready to pick to fill the vacuum That somebody is sort of to take the place that we abandon in sort of the carriers of the system And I'm not really seeing that you see emerging powers which have a strong economic dominance on the global scene It's not only China. It's also the the India's the Brazil's the Indonesia's and so on But I don't yet see that they really go in and take kind of a systems Carrying role and the way that America first and foremost and America plus its Western friends used to do That's a very different world and if that world will will lead to very different thinking on our military Investments and capacity and long-term planning We've been saying that for quite a while and our current defense plan We we have a four-year plans which are then you know in the four-year plans We're taking 10 to 20 years ahead and then we will roll that over for the next four-year plan and so on and in the current plan We were just completing which ends in 2012 and which I was very instrumental in in writing in one of my previous positions as deputy Defense ministers we said many of these things the central gravity is going to be Asia So China see is probably going to substitute the checkpoint Charlie as sort of the center of international security And and we have to think about that and we as a small country have to think about that For two, you know for two types of reason one is that it affects us directly in our case Because well if you're here and think about China You'll think about the Pacific because you have to cross the Pacific to get there if you're in Norway It's across the Arctic and across the Arctic used to be you know, not the way we thought because the Arctic was the end of the map You know and so there wasn't anything up there. The point is then when you go over there something there and that's Asia, right? and with the and with the and with the with the you know fundamental Changing of the Arctic not landscape to seascape the melting of the ice This is actually becoming relevant. There's more activity the resources being found We just found a new oil field with you know Decades of more oil good for us But the Russians will find much more and there's a lot of interest in the in the in the in the in the subsea resources marine resources fishing and Access, you know the the sailing routes and so on so that's sort of a more immediate reason that we have to follow What's happening in the Asian theater? It's getting closer to us but but the second and probably more important reason is that we are part of an alliance in which the Biggest member and the most important ally is the US and we have to understand what the US will think about in the future And as I said to John earlier regardless of what the US thinks today So we have to help ourselves to think what what is probably going to be the outlook of America in the future We have to make up not because we're any better at it than Americans themselves, but there's also it matters to us, too So we also that deal with that. So what I'm reading in this new Pentagon Document is our things that we've been saying for quite a while and hence I welcome it and then I was told That I was actually the first European to say I liked it And I understand and I don't want to make a comment on what my colleagues have been saying actually beyond saying that Apparently there was a perception in this town that there were certain responses that were more of a parochial nature Why do you leave my base? I mean my base is your base is my hometown why the why are you taking the way? I think it's perfectly logical I think I would do exactly the same thing and I actually do not see it as a weakening of the transatlantic ties as long as It is substituted by more dynamic presence presence that and in exercises Pre-positioning if necessary as we've been doing you know continued an increased intelligence sharing sharing of awareness and and Continued effort to keep article five relevant And that's actually quite important to message because we all we always begin with article five or at least end with article five When we have NATO speeches, but article five is not in such a good shape It's not the such a good shape as people think not talking about political will But our actual ability to deliver if something happens in the transatlantic theater of a more classical type of aggression I am not sure how well we are fit and I think we're getting worse at it because the many cuts What will happening in a lot of European countries? Not mine because we have real Increases in our defense budget, but in many European countries plus the changes that will happen here may if we are not smart May lead to and further weakening of the core ability to defend ourselves in both the classical and in the more Novel ways and if that happens If if NATO is undermined at the core if NATO is not able to deliver in Area in article five We will soon the implication will be that NATO will equally be less able to do out of area non-article five Because just think of it non-article five presupposes in its own name, you know that article five exists and an out of area Presupposes area and that's sort of a theme that we've been raising In the NATO strategic concept process and I think successfully so because a number of countries particularly interest this is interesting particularly the new members of NATO Norway and the US had a very good dialogue on this where some of our West European friends were so so much So deep into you know the current thinking of of Afghanistan Iraq type of mission that there wasn't really room for thinking beyond that and NATO was began identified as being simply the organizations that take our sons and daughters and send them to to far away places to do nation building in the desert and that is And that's a challenge that we have to take seriously We've been working that for a while I welcome that there was thinking on this in the US and I think it's actually in a very interesting direction and I again say And this is not the comment about the cuts is it's a comment about the direction and the strategic vision that lies behind it I Also want to say a few words about we've been doing over the last years. We've as I said, we've kept up and actually increased Somewhat our real defense spending will continue to do that But at the same time we made a lot of Rationalization of the armed forces So we used the luxury of not having to cut to actually get rid of a lot of basis and all the infrastructure Which was only relevant in a scenario where our defense forces were based on mobilization Of course, if you're going to mobilize a lot of people you need to place the place put them You need Officers who are ready to command people were normally not in but only in mobilization. You need sort of weapon They pose for a lot of people and so on so we did the way with most of that in order to invest in very modern Platforms with a particular focus on the sea air and Intel area So we invested in the new fleet of egis frigates Working closely with the US Navy by the way, we have a lot of programs on situational awareness in our vicinity closely working bilaterally with the US on top of the NATO partnership and We've done quite some modernization in the rare force and we're purchasing the F 35 Hopefully we'll get it. So that's also one of the Themes of my discussions here I'm going to see Bob Stevens at look in Martin and I talked with panetta about that of the woods But we when we chose the F 35 and this is why the connection of why let me make that connection between our Strategical look into the future and that purchase we made Very complex set of simulations of different scenarios and we had four candidates We had the rough how the Eurofighter the next generation Gripen and the F 35 and the simulation suggested that if we will go On to fight Afghanistan type wars. We could buy either of these aircraft They will all do so probably well and more than enough for any one of these missions because the adversary is not advanced on the battlefield They won't have air defense capabilities and the Air Force of their own that actually challenges in a serious way any modern Generation aircraft if however, we would theoretically be up at any given Power in our vicinity without mentioning any names Who is still innovating and becoming more modern? We would there was only one aircraft that would do so, you know So there was a direct link because on the need to go to continue to invest in the high-end part also for a small country And that is only meaningful if you believe that that kind of conflict is theoretically possible That does of course not mean that we think it will happen and don't get me wrong But that is theoretically possible that we still live in a world when these things can happen So that comes back to the theme that rather than assuming that any future conflict will be Organized states versus chaos we can again see a world where you can have a conflict between organized states meeting an organized state And that we still deterrence and deterring by presence and deterring by having the right capabilities again becomes meaningful So that's sort of my my first point my second part of this intervention is I'd like to share with you my concern about Europe. I'm very concerned about Europe And I think you should be more concerned about Europe than most Americans are because Europe is actually in a rather bad shape Think for many years and for quite understandable reasons The the main I mean the security community in Washington has the vision of Europe is that there's a reason bunch of reasonably rich countries Relatively lazy and not standing up in America American in Initiated missions abroad as much as they should and I understand that perspective. I'm not there's not critique But today there's a completely different type of crisis. So there's a there's a crisis at in the idea of Europe in Europe We have several countries which are now a very significant unemployment Particularly among the youth Spain has a 45 percent youth unemployment, which is sustained over time There is no particular is no reason to believe that that's going to change in the next several years We have a couple of well-established European democracies who have substituted elected politicians with technocratic governments Actually quite good technocratic governments. So I'm not necessarily concerned of those particular countries But the the the the the tendency may be alarming that people don't really believe in sort of elected office in the way That used to do we have some countries in Eastern Europe where signs are of moving away from democracy rather than towards democracy and The crisis for many Europeans resembles in certain aspects the 1930s in certain aspects the depths of the economic crisis the the the economic crisis turning into a social crisis because of unemployment people losing their houses and so on some of this of course is well known in America as well but it's deeper in certain European countries and And and then the potential that the economic and social problem can be a political problem domestic because we people lose faith in the leaders and In the next round a security policy problem that can be exported from one country to the other There is ample room these days for a Senate Senate public responses for trying to export the problem for one country to the other That's the aspect where the crisis resembles the 1930s where we have a major difference from the 1930s is Two things we have several more generations with an experience of democracy which gives a certain robustness and Secondly that we have a whole series of institutions European and global that can be used for collective action European Union itself obviously NATO on a security front the the World Bank the the IMF the European Bank These institutions are there now they weren't there in the 30s But they are not they will not fix the problem in and by themselves It requires political win the leadership and that will and leadership is not really there and that's that's a serious problem That problem as I'm describing it is an internal problem to Europe but it was also a problem for the rest of the world and it's particularly a problem to the vicinity of Europe because One of the great successes and this is our collective success of the 1990s was the way we peacefully helped dismantling the Divorce of Pact The comic-con and where we reached out to hand saying to a lot of countries that used to be in principle Adversaries because they were allied with the Soviet Union that you are welcome not only to become our friends But to become part of us part of the collective us the European integration protest and the transatlantic security project That had a tremendous security effect didn't say bang So he wasn't reported maybe a security But it probably the best investment ever and placed me in my part of the world in Enhancing our own collective security, but that Attraction that was based on the power of attraction it was based on the on the on the sense that Europe was able to portray that this was a center of growth and Progress and modernity that a lot of countries and a lot of societies I mean talk with people a lot of people wanted to join because it looked nice in a sense not completely a Different to what the way a lot of Europeans saw to America after the Cold War, you know really it wasn't only the You know the the money and the defense protection, but it was also actually it was very attractive It looked green now It was it was modern and it was freedom and it was cars and it was Hollywood and it was you know Marilyn Monroe and they were all the you know with all these things that sort of made America Attractive to Europeans some of that was for in the 90s the European attraction to East European countries and so on now That's not really there any longer so the disciplining effect of The promise of future membership is much weaker than it used to be and that's significant That's something you have to think about because that's actually that that's a security scale issue in my most recent job before my current job in foreign affairs I was Dealing I had a global portfolio and one of the things we invested a lot in was to engage in strategic dialogue with emerging powers See how can we find sort of connections with with the emerging powers particularly the many? Emerging powers that are democratic in nature in there obviously But also look at Brazil and Indonesia Brazil Indonesia are interesting because their economic takeoff Happens to coincide with their democratization process, which is really good news for us. Those of us who believe that there is a correlation between you know Economy and and and political system So these are extremely interesting partners to talk to and I made it a follow-up some observation Over the last year and I had the same impression in Jakarta and Brazil yeah only months ago That when I went there to say how are things around here the answer well quite good We're concerned about you Right so the British of the Brazil as a well fantastic growth You know Latin America is better than ever more democracy more progress Many issues to solve, but we're working on it, but we're really concerned about Europe And maybe they're right because they were not many maybe they were a little bit concerned about because they like us But the main reason of course the concern of us because of the spreading effect that this can have So this is a very different background from what we've been thinking assuming now for the last 20 years which was basically in one way or the other since the end of the Cold War that we were running the world We were on top our model was succeeding and what we had to do was to go out and fix all the people's problems often in a desert But you know and and so that world has changed and it hasn't changed I mean and we are still going on I mean we still have to commit to what we started that's not my point to my point and when we do the long-term planning We have to have this sort of broader vision third point What does it mean for NATO? Well first and you would expect me to say that as a born Atlantis is from a strongly Atlantic country That NATO is more important than ever, you know, that's the policy line at any given moment But this time is really true because Because you know it's in our collective interest to make this sort of transatlantic project prosperous again Because there were the alternatives is so bad and the alternative for the US of a kind of implosion of Europe is not nice Obviously a similar I mean a potential implosion of America would be extremely and popular in Europe for the same type of reason but also because they we this sort of lower Relative weight in in in the world at least we have to stick together in order to promote our values and Freedom and ideas and and systems Which are now maybe again about to be contested not right now in a very dramatic way But maybe in sort of the long vision and that has some implications also for NATO and NATO cohesion. I already mentioned the need to Re-establish a firm belief in article 5 and our collective capabilities particularly our collective conventional Capabilities which I think has been withering away faster than both our ability to deploy operations to far away theaters and our nuclear capabilities And and it's very important now that on the road to Chicago that we put this Center of the discussion that we do not just go on as as usual But we try to shape the Chicago agenda so that it really addresses this issue One of the answers is what is called the smart defense and smart defense Which is a vision we share and which we actually been working on for many years And we have some concrete examples of smart defense. Let me just share a couple of them We have for many years We have the f-16 our f-16 Environment have been working with the Danish the Dutch the Belgian and the Portuguese f-16 countries in something called the e-path and we've both saved a lot of money on doing things together Purchasing upgrading thinking planning training and also got better by doing that Of course, all of us also working closely with the with the US Air Force on that That was an early example of smart defense that actually delivered and we could see a Significant difference in Libya between those who had been involved in that and some of the countries who also had aircraft but not the same level of interoperability to put in that way and And we are also in the Nordic group being very for several years now trying to purchase important equipment together Gaining the advantage of being a larger purchaser But also saving money by doing, you know the support sharing some of the support costs so that we can have more Money for the actual operational and it actually works and we can come up with some examples that it does work It's not theory. It does work And that's sort of the smart defense is both a narrow Interpretation which is sort of investing in certain common platforms and the broader interpretation which is doing things in a smart way That's what NATO now has to do and it's it's been on the agenda for a long time But it's more important than ever that we do that But I must be admit that I am not extremely optimistic that we will achieve it in the short run And that's based on our own experience and having worked along for many years on military transformation I've learned one lesson which is that it's a very good idea, but it hurts before It pays off because the the first year when you when you change something in the military structure Assuming that you have to have a military all the time You can't sort of said that will will be out of business for five years and then come back So assuming that you want to sort of maintain a certain level throughout you have to do a lot of things on top of just the running costs While you change in order to see maybe in four seven ten 15 years that the synergy effects comes in we see them coming so it's for real it works But it will not work this year so a decision in February to go for smart defense will not deliver anything in May May deliver in May, but it will May 2017 not in May 2012 So you know and and since my many of my colleagues in Europe will know be told by their For by day by a finance minister, you know to cut money not in 2017, but this year It's difficult to square the circle We can all agree that it's marked but it it is difficult so it really takes some serious serious Focus to get there. We also did some exercises Based on the based on the success in the nature strategic concept of enhancing the article five dimension of the Alliance by actually having some force Planning and some defense planning for some of the new members which weren't really planned for before we've conducted some exercises with a kind of Modernized article five scenario and the lesson is that we're not so good at this as I mentioned We're not so good at it. I mean some of that has withered away because of the intense speed of operation the the you know NATO commands that were supposedly both So you know we're supposed both to run an operation and to think about the future Where so much sort of drawn into the operation that they forget taking about the future and the Fundamental lessons were lost and that has as I said some long-term implications I'm conclude there and my main point and main message is that The world is very different for all of us Europe is in the real is real trouble. I mean potential security implications And this is something that an American security audience needs to relate to I think more than that what has already happened and the arguments for Maintaining a strong and solid and vital Transatlantic Alliance are stronger than they ever were. Thank you for the attention Minister Bartholomew, thank you so much Rare is an opportunity when a minister gives us a tour a Candid clear assessment. I think sometimes the transatlantic relationship is plagued by giving each other the talking points We've heard for decades and sometimes good friends have to really speak very truthfully and Particularly in a public setting where we can have a debate and dialogue So you gave us a very great treat and privilege. Good morning everyone. I'm Heather Conley. I direct the Europe program and We also in addition to focusing on Europe our Norwegian colleagues have also Provided an opportunity for CSIS to take a look at the Arctic the high north as our Norwegian friends call it We keep telling them we just call it the Arctic here And to to provide some some good think tank work in that area in the long term So we're very grateful to you So we have a wonderful opportunity for the next hour or so to have a wonderful candid conversation with Minister Bartholomew I'd like to remind everyone that this is an on-the-record presentation And if you could raise your hands and and provide your affiliation We are very anxious to get this dialogue started But as the moderator I'm going to take my prerogative and throw out the first pitch as we like to say here You're in the batting cage has been For these many balls curveballs fastballs slow balls whatever you'd like to throw in here to to the cage And my first question looking to the road to Chicago one element of the agenda will be missile defense obviously and the continued Conversation and it's growing increasingly strained conversation with Russia and NATO on future missile defense architecture So I'd I'd appreciate your perspective on that and while we're on Russia. I have to ask an Arctic question I can't hold myself back Obviously Norway and Russia Have worked incredibly cooperatively in the Arctic and in fact when you last visited CSIS and spoke publicly You were unveiling a new demarcation agreement in the Arctic a 40 year Agreement at least in the works, which was really heralded as a sign of the that the Arctic will be a place of multilateral cooperation I'd love your perspective on on the Arctic security environment today in particular attention to Enhancing Russian cooperation security cooperation in the Arctic So those are my first two pitches and then I promise we'll open it up to you Missile defense we decided in Lisbon on the Faced approach missile defense and we'll come we'll so stick to that. It's very important that we have an open door to Solid participation with Russia and good information to the Russians But they are not supposed to have a veto on where we go So they're invited in and then why invitation should remain open, but we're will go on in any case and and the argument of course is that the Way back in the Cold War there were certain good reasons not to have an Well to have an ABM pretty and not to invest in missile defense because we we were kind of surviving on each other's vulnerability Now of course when when potential and adversaries are of a completely different nature like a major country in the Middle East That that logic is gone. You need a complete you need a defensive posture as a part of the system So we'll have to continue to work with that For reasons which has nothing to do with Russia and then we have to have a dialogue with Russia as good as we can I agree with you that they strain right now and it's a question about what it will look like at Chicago But but but it's they it's a it's it's our idea not theirs And we're going to continue on that one on the Arctic. Yes. I'll the the the delineation agreement with Russia was Great success. It was definitely and I can testify to that a great success for Norwegian diplomacy But I actually have this strong impression that the Russians also agree that this was a success for their diplomacy This was actually because we apply the United Nations law of the seas convention Which was a very useful tool and I'll use every opportunity to encourage any country that hasn't yet signed to use the opportunity And the US is actually only losing out or not signing because your current position is that you respect everybody else's claim But you can't make your own claims because you haven't signed the treaty and I'm still trying to find out how that is smart but But but but the negotiation is very interesting and let me repeat what I said then when I was dressed It was actually the day it was unveiled. So it was and you were always perfectly time We had negotiate for 20 for 40 years for zero years first forced with the Soviet Union then with Russia Always with the ambition actually to succeed but the negotiations were you know They moved forward with glaciological speed. So which was only with the melting of the ice that it started to work faster And eventually we were able to divide the area into two. It's much more complex legally speaking What happened it was based on precedent that was being developed in in all the cases There was you know, there was something in the the Black Sea and some other areas where there were Court decisions that sort of laid the foundation for where we would fall down But it's clearly to both countries benefit now we can explore and exploit the resources On our respective sides of that before we had to stay away from that But also because a potential source of tension potential source of conflict is taken away So it does actually confirm to what is our main Message on the Arctic or high north which is high north low tension and that the Arctic is actually just to see It is not like the Antarctica, which is land with sea on it So if the ice melts on Antarctica first we're in deep trouble because there's much more ice there But if it happened it will be land and that's where we need the treaty in the Arctic is just water. So it's another ocean opening up It is socialing is this opening up and we have to deal with that That's what we've been talking to you and a lot of other people on for many years Yes, please thank you Good morning Chuck Berry with the National Defense University and thank you very much for your comments Minister Barthetta my question is About the the effect of sovereignty issues on smart defense you mentioned this is a long Stroke engine that's payoff is years down the road and that makes sense But we can also look back and see that there were many efforts in the past to synthesize either purchasing or logistics efforts yesterday in the in the defense news there was an article about Cooperation on literal defense in the Baltics a Baltic Sea With the Baltic States and I think I mentioned Finland and and Sweden but not Norway my question is as you see this euro crisis Kind of pulling countries apart is the opportunity may be lost for For countries to collaborate in smart defense because the the economic crisis would tend to fuse us together But the euro crisis is pulling them apart Well, thanks. Good to see you Chuck Well, there are Again, I mean there are different levels of this because if you talk about actually investing in common a common system In that way used to have a wax and we have ever express an old system Well, then at least you make sure that you get it Even if one or several countries do not is not involved in a particular operation that actually happened recently and worked We have then the program like to see the C17 pool that we have joined with a number of other countries You you buy ours you respect that the others use it for the whatever purpose We we use it for our purposes and all the country can use for this purpose But we own it together and as to put it mildly It's much cheaper to own it together to hand your own fleet those C17s. I know the price So that's sort of one level the other one is the more the more extended version, which is that this the the effects of having buying the same equipment Co-operating on the upgrading and the training facilities that can actually be done Even if you in the operational end are not integrating and becoming dependent on each other And of course in the Nordic experience that was particularly important because a NATO country like Norway Although we are enthusiastic about working closely with the Swedes We cannot make ourselves dependent on the Swedish decision to join or not the NATO operation so we must retain and you know as This is not really sovereign, but we must retain and you know prerogative of the NATO System over over the Nordic, but that is perfectly achievable as long as you think it into the system And that's what I think we're trying to do So some of the experiences I would describe being and could you share in much more detail actually suggests that you can square That circle as well at the very sort of deepest end is the systems that only work with everybody Actively is in favor every time you work it and then of course you have certain issues on the sovereignty side Sure. Good morning. Now George Nicholson from Stratt Corp Alluding to the success of programs like the joint C17 the joint AWACS I know one of the things the tyranny of distances up in the north of looking at a SAR search and rescue capability or even with a success of special operations growing and everything else is Norway or do you see any? Efforts of looking at for instance a joint CV 22 capability that gives you the range and the speed and The area coverage that could do search and rescue could support special operations forces and work in support humanitarian operations What I can jump on if you could just also expand a bit on the challenges of search and rescue in the Arctic And I know there's some really unique stories coming out of some Norwegian operations about how incredibly difficult it is to perform in the Arctic Well, I mean I It's not on the table, but it's not excluded either to have that kind of joint investment what we have done So far is that the Arctic Council and its last meet ministerial meeting Decided to delineate the responsibilities between the countries in the north between the Canada US Denmark, Norway, Russia and also to to Start an exchange about the information systems and who to call and when to call and how to cooperate on the real life SAR operation That is sort of way below actually come invest common platforms But at least it's the beginning and I as I keep saying to people we we probably have what we need for the current amount of activity But we definitely do not have what we need for the next 20 years because there will be much more sailing activity transport ships cruise ships up there and and there is Some issues on the SAR capacity and I think an even more obvious issue for joint investments is the situational awareness because the the geostationary satellites only covers up to 7980 degrees north and south so they don't cover the north pole and at last 10 degrees and And we are not really there with a complete sort of real life picture of what's going on up there that is compatible with the expected future activity and those investments will be so Expensive that I think few countries. I mean maybe the US but few other countries can do it on their own And I guess that will be an area for for joint investments coming out of the Arctic issue Thank you. Clara Donald visiting fellow Brookings I had two questions on Libya The first is of the various strains that became apparent in the armed forces of several European countries during the operations Which did you consider the most problematic and the second one is there's been a view which has been expressed by several US Officials and European officials that on the trends of the current spending cuts several European countries Would not be able to perform as they did in Libya several years down the line and this would apply to the UK To what extent do you agree with that assessment? Thanks? Absolutely, I mean I think Well, first I should I think Libya was a success that we made it So I mean as the starting point is not it was a failure It was it was a success. It was the right thing to do and we did it and and the outcome As of now looks far better than the alternative which was not doing anything with with Gaddafi And it's important to remember I think that's sometimes forgotten that this was not the NATO decision This was it was a UN Security Council political decision And then it was ad hoc coalition basically forged in Paris in the Alusé Palace. I was there with our prime minister I saw it happening that was you know, it was Let me put the way the the preparedness were Not suggesting that this will definitely become a success But it did and then only later it sort of reverted to NATO for lack of something else And that's important when we and that we were a country who Went straight into it. We were really committed to it We sent the F-16s that did a good job and they they did much of the you know Fair share of the of the heavy bombing precision bombing was done by Norway but also country like Denmark Belgium smaller countries who have this capacity But I would be careful not to criticize countries who didn't join it because it wasn't I mean If NATO decides in the first place then there was another kind of moral commitment in this case It was more that it was accepted by Germany and others that you use the NATO backbone without you know Actually taking active part of it So we have to understand the nuance in that but to your second part and and and well I mean there were some countries experienced the lack of munitions Not because they didn't have much but because we agreed only to use the most advanced munitions Which are precision guided missiles in order to have Kinetic effect exactly where you wanted it and nowhere else because this was a protection civilians Campaign and you know to start by inflicting mass damage on civilians would not be very helpful to the political purpose of the campaign That of course meant that a lot of countries not us by the way, but several countries actually sort of Used up most of their stocks and how to repurchase most of that and had to loan from each other And there were certain technical issues. They were what one of the more committed countries was Sweden And they sent the grip and they didn't do bombing that there's a lot of important surveillance jobs For the first two weeks, they didn't get the NATO Classified information or actually they did get it, but I didn't get it into the airplane They had to go with the diskette to another place and take it back which is kind of awkward in these days and So they were kind of that kind of lessons learned but all in all I think we did quite well in Libya I would be extremely careful to suggest that we're gonna do it well next time around Because there were some unique circumstances around Libya I mean Gaddafi was more isolated than most leaders have ever been So the collective will at least at the beginning at Security Council was surprisingly high I mean we focused on the division actually was surprisingly high and and you could fly straight into Libya from Allied airspace how often does that happen, right? So and on top of that is a flat desert and people driving tanks in the desert is relatively easy to identify with you Modern technology this is not normally what's happening. And so I while celebrating let's not think that this is the golden Key that will all solve all problems on the cheap And to your second part. Yes, I think it's interesting to recognize that some of the equipment that actually did well in Libya Is now being scrapped by some countries I but again, I'm not gonna go into their decisions But I will say that my view is we have to keep up a high-end capability Let's be careful when we cut not to cut in the upper ranges I think it's better to cut in sort of the sort of large army structures if we have to make a choice Because it's more likely that we'll need sort of seer Capacities than sort of sustained army operations in the future as I see the future and happens to be as pentagon sees the future Thank You Lloyd hand King and spalling mr. Minister to piggyback on the last question not to lure you into Political discourse in the US, but I'm sure you're aware that the president Was characterized as having led from behind In the context on Libya in the context of your early remarks about the increased emphasis on collective security and smart defense Be interesting to have the European view of the US role in the Libyan operation Well, I'm really glad you asked that question because I wonder what's the problem with I mean I actually think that there I think there was some sound thinking in this country In the White House, I think also at the Pentagon of time that maybe not every operation should be led by the Americans I mean there are certain Echoes of other operations that would emerge if it was a very strong American push So actually to allow a couple of European countries UK France to take the lead and then be joined by us and others Was probably politically quite smart now what we discovered of course was that although we many of us have Capable aircrafts much of the sort of Intel and systems Backbone that you always need is actually only present on American platforms And so so, you know the US had to be there in a certain way But it was the demonstration that it's possible to have an operation where the US is not always in the lead And I think that's actually good. I think that's I mean it and I think the lessons that we Europeans have to draw from that are Lessons that you know if we if we learn them well Make a better collective defense system in the future And that's why I never really understood why a lot of people here thought this was so bad. Maybe this was great Yeah I'm Julian Josephson with the bootstrap press here in this area Yeah, your your remarks on the resources in the Arctic sort of Take me back to another meeting. I attended ten years ago in which all this was predicted. So let me That there would be exploitation of resources more military non-military Ship traffic in the high north as the years went on. I heard this first time Mentioned in February 2002 at a marine technology society meeting to Continue do you see as more resources become found of it, you know available Do you see that there could be possible in a international? tensions over those that currently, you know do not exist or adornment and secondly With the exploitation the continued use of the Arctic Ocean the high north what would be done to Protect the environment up there which given still the very very low temperatures You have much different Rules of biology and chemistry from what you have in our more equitable attitudes thank you excellent question and and Good for always the marine technology seminar good for them because that's that way they were right that was kept Commander Steve Warren who predicted that at the time. Well done. He was right. Well, I'm the resources are definitely there We're seeing it seeming happening now. We just found oil the Russians have much more resource of oil the good news is that as of now most of the known or Expected, you know oil and gas researchers are on within the defined area of one country's economic zone So there is no particular reason for conflict That may change but but most most of this is relatively close to land and hence within the economic zones and as we get them delineated particularly when everybody signs to load the cease convention you know the I'll be only twice You know the that kind of tension is actually being reduced You know the rich the resource war but but but the need for collective management is going up And let's take the fish stocks because fish do not respect economic sound the fish they swing whatever they like and Unfortunately, we have to discipline them and and one of the interesting things that's going on is that the the the the several species of fish Who for and that this is very by the way, this is very important for the world This is not only for a fishing countries for the world because we have you know We used to have enough food on this planet. We just weren't good at distributing it now We actually do not have enough food So we have to eat more fish and that's an enormous potential But only if we have good management if you don't if we exploit all the fish now and eat it will be no more Fish in the future and we'll have a bigger problem So to have sort of a fish stock management is extremely important and that this potentially could lead to tension if we don't get it Right and and many of the fish stocks in the Arctic are now migrating further north Because they prefer cold water and with the general warming they go further north so they go to other areas and they do actually introduce Biological problem because they meet other species in a very equilibrated Biosphere which doesn't fit and all these these are things we look into and also what we see and also what you know what we see on the south pole or on the waters around the south pole is that the The warming of the poles is actually twice as fast as the warming in the equator So if we have a 2% 2 degrees increase in the world will have a 4 degrees increase in the in the poles So I mean again this is not first and foremost the security issue But it has many potential security implications the third one of course is access Because when when when this will be the preferred sailing routes from Asia to Europe Somebody has to look after what's sailing there and most of that are goods We like to have but some of that will be goods We wouldn't rather not see on our shores and somebody has to look after that as well and nobody's right now Thank you, mr. Minister John Glassman from the Northrop Grumman corporation You spoke about the potential capability gaps in Europe particularly in the high-end systems Yet the fiscal crisis with the exception of Norway almost makes this a self-fulfilling prophecy There's no surplus market in the US or in Europe. So thinking about how one could stimulate that kind of Investment one has to think of importing regions like the Persian Gulf or India Do you think there's any logic behind some kind of an Atlantic approach to those markets as you know in the Persian Gulf? The United States is becoming extremely dominant So is there any? Possibility any concept you can think of for an Atlantic US European approach to these importing markets In the Persian Gulf and yeah Yes, I think so I'm not exactly certain what you mean in the Arctic or in the Persian Gulf or where was the address It's unlikely that European industries are going to invest Okay, got it I mean I mean the emerging economies will Eventually have to take more of the burden of doing many of these things as well So, you know to build strong partnerships with other countries outside the typical Western club in order to co-finance Things of common interest is going to be very important I think when it was not exactly what you mentioned but the piracy problem in the Indian Ocean is Not only a Western problem. It's all I mean, it's the Indian Ocean So at least India is interested and a lot of other Countries are actually getting interested in that and I think that's actually part of the answer that rather than believing that this can be Native or EU only we will have to build Partnerships with countries which share our goal in this particular setting although they may not share all our other goals But in this particular setting can forge some rather new interesting alliances with other maritime powers in particular Hi John Gunderson with the Foreign Service Institute and National Defense University Mr.. Minister you as a think tank person and somebody with the foreign ministry as well as the Ministry of Defense, I'd like to sort of turn your attention to the Middle East And we don't know what's going to happen in two years. We don't know what's going to happen in two weeks or two months In Iran and Syria places like this Obviously, it's a foreign policy issue, but it's certainly a security issue I just like you to give some thoughts as to Norwegian and other thinking on Iran because Norway's had a long bilateral relationship and a lot of issues With the Straits of Hormuz Syria what next is there any thinking at the Ministry of what to do? What would NATO involvement be? What is the Norwegian thinking on those issues? I mean unfortunately? I don't have the all on all the answers either. It would be very good. You know first. I'll fix a problem that will get the peace price but I know the committee Little too well The Well, I mean I'm sure that part of the answer is that we stick together and have a common posture and that posture Is both forceful and has a door for an alternative outcome? That's quite easy to say that's at least part of the answer But it is not the whole answer and obviously also to in the case of Iran It's at least to make sure that every other country that is As concerned as we are with Iran and those are many there are many countries with whom we don't work that much But who shares are concerned with Iran that they are on board in that policy rather than we try to go it alone Or to encourage anybody else to go it alone in a way which then trigger a completely different set of issues You know an attack on Iran from a certain country that might be a candidate can trigger a whole set of other issues around the Middle East that we have to take seriously But but I don't really have to have the big answer on that I think what is what is very important and again Sometimes it's important to change our mental maps and when we look back at the Arab Spring You know, what was it was it absolutely successful? No, it was it absolutely failed not no, you know There's Tunisia's doing quite. Okay. There are interesting trends in Egypt. We don't really know yet. We saw what happened in Libya We have seen and you face of the Middle East because the the picture I think many Americans and Europeans had about the typical Arab youth is somebody who is sort of preparing I mean the completely false picture, but the assumption is that there's somebody is planning to blow up something Western And then what we see are people in in jeans You know communicating on Twitter and asking for democracy so it's sort of it's a completely different picture Which was a very nice and heartening Impression and I think we saw about a year ago now An important mental shift from the assumption that things are I mean until then with all things are bad in the Middle East And they can only get worse So the only thing we can do is try to keep them as they are to The assumption that actually things are bad, but they can get better and at times We should allow them to get better and to see some openings I think they I think it's extremely important to have a very solid dialogue with Turkey who is a success successful You know democratize democratizing Muslim country With sort of some model approaches that could be relevant I'm all aware about the difference between the Arabs and the Turks and so on but I mean there's something there that we have to Explore further I think to when you talk about the big Arab picture And on Assad of course we all think he should go and then eventually he will I don't know when but it's going to happen someday Because it's not sustainable in the long run, but I'm afraid that we're going to see a lot of blood being spilled before we get there And I don't have a good answer on that tighter On at a ball graphs. Yes. I asked mr. Minister. I could I take you back to your What you referred to as shifting perceptions of global power in the years to come And I noticed that in Southeast Asia in the South China Seas now the expression of Finland Isation is already being used and I think most of us remember what that meant during the Cold War And I was wondering what you would agree that these perceptions are shifting in the wrong direction in the South China Seas at the present time What would be the argument about Finland the station in the Finlandization surgery in the Cold War was I know what that is, but I mean what what is the corollary today in the would be who is being Finland? Some of the powers in Southeast Asia. Okay, see that shifting Perceptions of power are going in the wrong direction as we see them Well, my impression is that the the until some years ago the the way China was growing was a kind of inclusive friendly soft power growth that Neighboring countries thought was quite good because it created sort of a powerhouse of economic growth that they couldn't connect to I think over the last few years that has changed to a somewhat more assertive line Which is actually pushing a number of its neighbors in a completely opposite direction And I think you know when when the US is putting more emphasis on on the stability in the South China Seas That is very welcome around the site China see Obviously from countries like Korea and Japan, but interestingly also from Vietnam for instance And as we all remember that wasn't always the case, but you know today. That's a very different setting So so I'm not really sure if I see the Finland in this And by the way, you know since you mentioned Finlandization I would complete I I never liked the concept because I think actually Finland did this as well as they possibly could Given the extremely difficult circumstance They would offer off the second world war and then they it's unfair and I'm not letting you do that because I've used an example But I mean it's a fair to Finland because the alternative to Finlandization was to become a Soviet that you know as a colony And and if that's the alternative the Finnish model was quite successful But but I meant with my but the main point where I think we agree is that this is really Becoming the center of the world when it comes to security And I'm not saying that because I think we're looking at you know with a direct confrontation But but many of the issues of really strategic value they have to they they move around this issue our experience with the Russians in actually settling an issue or that would be the third and last time based on the law the C's Is something that some of our Colleagues down there in the non-China part of that region is very interested in because there are some lessons to be learned from How a small country actually can use that Arrangement to settle with a big country as far as I understand the Chinese position is that they respect the law the C's convention But it doesn't apply because the claim was already there, which is legally a strange position And to put it carefully and also since it's called the South China Sea It's sort of suggest that is Chinese which is would also just that the Indian Ocean is India's And so or that the Norwegian sea is Norwegian, which will quite be Thinking of it Yeah, sorry No, so I don't really I don't really I'd actually rather see that there's an increasing interest in in maintaining The presence of the US and maybe some other European countries in in in that region as a small Example in a previous seminar today. I saw general sharp who used to serve lead your brilliant general served leaving your forces in South Korea I met him in 2008 and after that we decided to participate in key resolve with some staff officers Just to demonstrate, you know our interest in that area and to learn from a very different scenario than what we usually been training for Thank you. Mr. Barthard. I wanted to bring you back to the issue of the way ahead in political and security relations with Russia I was in Moscow last month and I had to say that I got the sense from discussions with a number of academicians and think tank experts that Their feeling is is the assessment in the Kremlin is that the reset with NATO and with and with the US Hasn't produced the dividends that were expected and hoped for and that Assuming that President Putin is reelected in May that that the Putin Administration in the future would take the view that that each of these steps towards cooperation would be have to be judged very carefully And or they would be met with countervailing actions and sets hence the rhetoric that we heard in December from both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin about You know retaliatory measures in the absence of a return to some kind of treaty limits on missile defense on Treaty limits on NATO or for defense capabilities that Russia would would have to take countervailing measures I wonder if do you see that as as sort of the as a more difficult road ahead? You know particularly as you look to the NATO summit in Chicago Heather alluded to the fact that obviously the missile defense cooperation has been disappointing Where do you what do you think the scope and limits are of security cooperation with NATO both? with security cooperation with NATO and with your own country and other European countries Well The We see certain developments in Russia, which are concerning. I think I can say that Careful on record as well There are certain concerning domestic developments that we have to monitor very closely and it includes some of their the way They are organizing and planning militarily We see that also as a country who is a good neighbor of Russia and actually has a bilateral relationship Which is better than ever so we have this dual approach and we and I keep saying 63 years of NATO membership has proved to us that is very good to have that platform from which you can reach out a Hand and have a dialogue with a big neighbor. It would be much more difficult without that platform But I mean they are actually Thinking and actually doing things which has to do with counter measure our I mean now the MD Approach it's already happening and we have to relate to that and we have to recognize that It seems that we haven't completely convinced them that it's not about them and in our meetings with Russia And I had some recently in Moscow and including the Security Council I was asked my favorite question to ask in Moscow Why do you speak so much about us because we actually don't speak so much about you? Not because we don't care about it. We don't don't see you as the other I mean your your partner in many cases and and so what's the problem? Why don't wouldn't you be more advised to concentrate on your south and east where maybe more of your issues are and I think you Know I think they are but I think the on the surface level They're very preoccupied with some old issues, which are more comfortable with them the new issues. I Don't want to say more about that right here A couple of time. Thank you Ziad actually American Task Force of Palestine I noticed on your answer about the Middle East that you have skipped over the Palestine Israel conflict And I wonder whether this means that this conflict is downgraded as a source of instability and In a related question. Can you envision a role for Europe? In this conflict that is coordinated but separate from what the United States is doing at this point in time Especially perhaps on the institution in state building You said Palestine Yeah, yeah, well, I mean we are heavily involved in Palestine. We're we're chairing the HALC the donors committee We are been deeply involved in state building in the Palestine in de facto in the West Bank because of the problems in Gaza while maintaining a very good relationship also with Israel and And there is the international effort in it and it's it's American European Arab and it should remain like that and I hope we can sort of save that from other issues that are Penetrating the reason I didn't I didn't mention Israel Palestine nor Afghanistan Not because they are less important But because I would I wanted to sort of move into the future business that also be strategic level this Remains and let me say that very clearly. It's not that, you know, these questions will be solved and then we go to something else It's rather than we will have sort of two lines We'll have a one set of strategic issues which has to do with how we as organized states relate to a number of other organized states and then we have another issue which is the kind of the managing chaos team and counter Terrorism and all that and though these things will be there simultaneously And that's the new thing because if you if I painted broad picture, you know in the Cold War We had sort of one set of issues which were the main concern and everything else was subordinate, right? Then was the east-west conflict and all in a nuclear Parity and all that and then we ended up we ended that fortunately and then we went into 20 years where we were basically Focusing on regional conflicts and issues where which were see very serious, but not really You know on the level that the east-west conflict was and I'm suggesting now We're going to deal with issues on both those scales in the future and that's that's my message now It's not always does not suggest that any of the remaining lingering conflicts are anywhere near to being sold But but there's another team out there Thank you Matthew Emery with United Macedonia in Diaspora I want to go back to your chat about enlargement of NATO and kind of look at that in a forward tone as well What do you feel about the open-door policy with NATO? Do you can believe that that should still remain in place? And what do you feel are the prospects on future membership for the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro? Thank you Good question, and I'm happy to give you a very clear answer. I think it's really unfortunate To use a very diplomatic word that very alien issues prevented your membership when you were as prepared As several and some other countries when when you were supposed to join the Alliance We strongly supported you and will continue to support. I mean you Macedonia On that issue and please take note that I called it Macedonia and But but but to be but to be very frank and honest, I mean that well, I mean, I think we have to we have to We have to complete the enlargement to the Balkans Because NATO is all around you. You have NATO on all sides, you know Albania and Greece, you know Bulgaria was not Serbia yet, but you know, it's you know, it But but we're very close to having, you know, just a small hole inside the completely naced-wise territory It should be completed. There are certain steps. I mean, you still have to do something Neighbors have to do something but we have to complete that but I think it's fair to say to very honest that, you know It's NATO is not You know bustling with Enthusiasm for further enlargement. You see there's not the impression you get if you go to NATO headquarters that you're looking for a New country to include so I mean you have to keep up the fight Hi, Megan Warren with the Center for non-proliferation studies, so I think you probably know where my question is going What are your thoughts on the current deterrence review that's happening under NATO right now? And what are your thoughts on the future of non-strategic weapons in Europe? I mean I am First we have this country has the most progressive policy on nukes for, you know, many generations by Actually the fact of having introduced negative security guarantees, which has been one of the one of the requirements of the peace movement for many years and I would very much like to see that we could at least copy the American language in NATO texts And the problem is not here but in other countries with nuclear weapons in Europe and And we also we did get into the strategic concept was the principle Determination of NATO to contribute to the work of a non-nuclear world which NATO hasn't said in the same way before I mean, of course It also says that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world NATO will have some of them So I mean that but still you know the principle idea and also the need to connect to the NPT process or so on It's important, so I think you know this is going to be a very important question For Chicago and so on I don't expect any significant decisions, but it's still there But but let me just point out one point which is often forgotten in order to Gradually reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons. We need to uphold a conventional deterrent capacity And one of my concern and one of the things that can can keep me awake at night So not often with good is that you know if we went down the track of special that all our conventional forces were designed for You know asymmetric theaters and not really for warfighting and we had nukes Then we could have a situation which was a little too big for the conventional force We still had but hopefully you know too small for actually going nuclear and we should avoid that so to have a flexible You know a flexible conventional response is part of the work for a you know the long-term work of reducing the salient So nuclear weapons. I don't think that's gonna happen anything soon, but at least we should keep working in that direction Yes, can chestane from the army staff. This is a follow-up on the Balkans question You talked about the NATO reluctance for enlargement You also talked about you said that the promise of the European attraction has gone with the European Eurozone crisis. What about the rest of the Balkans? I mean in recent years Bosnia Kosovo Serbia that area has been relatively quiet with a few exceptions But now if that promise of enlargement is gone What carrots do you offer to keep the situation quiet in Bosnia and in Kosovo and in Serbia? Exactly That's the problem. It doesn't even that's a very good Specification on my point, you know that the power attraction is gone and that's a problem Because maybe that is currently it's more important than the force presence to keep some of these countries Where they are that they have this long-term vision I think you know the biggest country in the Balkans At least if the Balkans means the former Yugoslavia Serbia and they've been doing surprisingly well. I'm actually Positively surprised that Tadec still is there given all the forces around that could draw in a different direction We must be very careful Not to create a situation where we wake up with a completely different Serbian government and wonder what it would wrong when We had him and that and that's really serious We've had working a lot with that and we the the the partnership for peace decision was highly influenced by our working in favor of it and and we have to compete and continue on that path because the alternative is far worse And you know, I think Bosnia has There's one lesson actually there's a lesson from Bosnia to Afghanistan I think and and and I think the lesson is that to have a solid present for many years is unavoidable in certain cases, but you have to start, you know preparing for allowing a mature political life to develop Without eternally being there to say no, you can't do that because if you if he keeps saying you can't introduce that law forever Then you can go on do ethno politics because it doesn't matter because there's a Western OHR or whatever is called for every given moment you can say now you can't do that So I think to you know to be somewhat aware that our presence in this kind of conflict over time can be a part of the answer but also part of the problem and It's interesting to see that some other countries on the Balkans have actually done whom we left earlier are doing better than those who left late Mr.. Minister, I have one final question and this is to take off your defense minister hat And to offer some personal reflections if if you are willing Coming up on the six-month anniversary of the tragedy of July the 22nd in Norway How has Norway changed how has the political body changed and how will it forward? That was something that as all of us watch I had at a time a wonderful Norwegian intern who was giving me his brother I was on the island Came home to us just the emotional Outpouring could you give us your thoughts your closing thoughts on on that six months? Well, I mean it was an enormous shock, you know, not you know It would be a big shock in any country, but I think it was particularly strong in the sense that we were so accustomed to the assumption that we were Are still one of the most peaceful non-violent countries in the world. So it was sort of more You know, it's seventy-seven people keep people people killed is equally bad in any country But there are countries that more used to it than we are. So of course the effect on the society was tremendous But I think you know we do take pride in the fact that we had the collective response that practically everybody joined into by saying that The purpose of terrorists is to change us So the first thing we can do is not allow ourselves to change but to stay who we were to maintain an open society and maintain You know tolerance and so on and and that was the rallying cry both from from the government But I mean actually from everyone in the society and from all political parties, which is increasingly important I mean incredibly important that nobody actually Try to capture this and say this is because we didn't do this so we should have done that We're obviously gonna do certain things on the Preparedness side on and police cooperation with military. I mean there are technical issues But the fundamental features of our society will remain open and tolerant and inclusive and and I know Personally and also heard others say that several Norwegians with a non Norwegian ethnic background are actually saying that they feel more Norwegian after this event than before Because of course this terrorist attack was a white supremacist racist ideology one person Who were attacking multiculturalism? So I mean that's an argument for multiculturalism not against Well, thank you very much and Again, what a privilege and an honor for you to be with us and to provide such a wonderful and Candid assessment of the future and the state of the transatlantic Relationship ladies and gentlemen, you helped make this a great discussion because your questions were fantastic. Thank you so much Thank you. It's been Bartheider for today.