 So hello Naval War College colleagues and welcome to this lecture of opportunity or Lou about China and climate change. My name is Commander Andrea Cameron and I coordinate the human climate and human security studies group at the Naval War College. For those of you who don't know about the group, it is composed of faculty staff and students interested in engaging on nontraditional and transnational security threats. In addition to climate security issues. We also look at human security topics like food insecurity water scarcity health insecurity economic development migration and the resultant humanitarian crises. If you'd like to join the group. Please put your email in the chat or you can email me directly at Andrea Cameron at usnwc.edu. This lecture of opportunity kicks off a great year of lectures courses and events. Just to give you a heads up, we will be hosting a human security in the maritime environment conference on October 28 and 29. And this conference explores the intersecting strategic implications that happen in the maritime environment, which navies would be particularly interested about. So we'll be talking about IUU fishing illicit trafficking and modern slavery piracy and armed robbery cultural heritage protection and how all of these interact with the lives and livelihoods of people ashore. Also on January 14 2022 will be hosting the national security significance of a changing climate conference, and this year's version will have the theme operationalizing climate security. And finally keep watching the Luke calendar for other great talks coming your way. Today, we host Dr Scott Moore. He's a researcher and policymaker focused on emerging environmental and technological challenges. Dr Moore is currently director of China programs and strategic initiatives at the University of Pennsylvania, where he works with the faculty across the university to design and conduct research on emerging challenges facing China and the world, including climate change, artificial intelligence and gene editing. Dr Moore's own research focuses on environmental politics and policy, especially water resources. Dr Moore was previously the water resources management specialist at the World Bank Groups water global practice and served as the environment science technology and health officer for China at the US Department of State. In this capacity. He was responsible for developing and coordinating all aspects of the US China environmental cooperation and worked extensively on the Paris agreement on climate change, as well as ocean conservation and civil space cooperation. Dr Moore's research and commentary is widely published, including his first book, subnational hydro politics conflict cooperation and institution building in shared river basins. And that book examined how climate change and other pressures affect the likelihood of conflict over water within countries. And his new book on China's role in global public goods issues in the context of great power competition is due to be released released later next year. Dr Moore holds a master's and doctoral degrees from Oxford University and an undergraduate degree from Princeton. We are honored to have Scott join us today bringing together two of the biggest concerns within the Department of Defense, China and climate change. For those watching the presentation will be recorded, but we will stop the recording at the end and open the floor for questions from the audience. Scott, thank you so much for joining us today. You have your screen shared already and I invite you to start your presentation. Thank you. Thank you very much, Andrea. And I appreciate that generous introduction, but the honor is mine. I thank you all for joining me today. I want to say and actually I don't think I mentioned this to Andrea for corresponding about setting up today's talk but I had the chance to pass by the Naval War College a couple of weeks ago. I was up in Bristol, Rhode Island, a couple of towns north of Newport and I got to see the college from the sea. I suppose it is meant to be seen in some ways, but I hope one day have the chance to visit and meet some of you in person. Also, I just want to say that thinking of everyone who may have been affected by tropical storm Henry is a you may have heard me say on a couple of minutes early, certainly thinking about everyone who was affected by that but I think that if you do, if you did lose power in your home, presumably you have it somewhere if you're logged on, but they put it back soon. So I just want to kind of start in and we'll, as Andrea kind of mentioned, we'll try to focus a little bit on some of the national security economic competitiveness dimension of China's relationship with climate change but I wanted to just sort of start by flagging just sort of the wider context in which you talk about climate change period. In light of the IPCC six assessment report, the part of which was was released a couple weeks ago as many of you may have seen a couple of key takeaways from that report basically the tuition is pretty dire. At the same time, the evidence has been strengthened that whatever we can do we absolutely should do as quickly as possible, because every degree Celsius informing that you can prevent or can ever does have a measurable impact on all of the things that we're really concerned about when it comes to climate change and something that you know Andrea has been closely involved in along with many others in the Department of Defense over the last six months or so has been thinking about a number of those effects as they relate to climate change and national security and international security and that's something we can come back to but briefly that includes the prospect of a significant increase out migration from from certain areas, political instability as a result of food, water and other climate environmental stresses, and not least extreme weather events, which we'll come back to because that's one of the more significant kind of climate insecurity nexus issues when it comes to China. Also just to kind of set the stage, there are really two fundamental kind of features of China's role and contribution to the global climate change issue this graph will show you both of those. The first feature is that historically, China accounted for a pretty small portion of total greenhouse gas emissions and this would be roughly the same if you were looking at total greenhouse gases greenhouse gas emissions. This is kind of the period industrial revolution as well, but so relatively small proportion, but since the early 2000s since around 2005 has been the largest single emitter. And as a kind of side note to that, you can kind of see that as we get over to the right hand, kind of most recent part of the graph there. You start to see is that although the Western industrialized countries do still account for the majority of historical emissions, we're kind of starting to get close to that evening out, even when you look historically and in large part because of the growth in China's emissions to some extent also emissions increase from other Asian countries, India, etc. But the kind of takeaways here are one from a kind of total historical perspective. It's the Western industrialized countries that are responsible for most of the emissions. For the last 15 years or so China has been the single largest emitter. And the size of that emissions contribution is in fact so large that you're getting close to balancing out that historical imbalance or asymmetry. To be fair, another way to look at China's contribution to global climate change is on a per capita basis. And when and certainly that's the point that China often has made in international climate negotiations less so recently, but certainly historically has. And I think, you know, with some good reason, it is helpful to kind of switch to a per capita perspective when it comes to contribution to global emissions. This is just CO2 although again it's roughly kind of indicative of total greenhouse gas emissions as well. But of course US per capita emissions are far higher. They're almost twice twice as much as Chinese per capita emissions. It does bear being said that the US is not necessarily the worst offender. Canadian per capita emissions are actually higher. And certainly the highest are tend to be both states and oil produced. The US isn't the worst offender, but still has per capita emissions that are roughly twice those of China. China in turn has emissions that are lower even than Japan, which is a pretty energy efficient industrialized economy, one of the two or three most energy efficient industrialized economies. But sort of on the flip side of the coin of kind of saying that China's per capita emissions are considerably lower than most industrialized countries, they're also far far higher than most other developing countries. And you can see at the bottom of that graph there per capita emissions for India. And, you know, just to take one example of one of the least developed countries, Afghanistan, and the gap between China and the less developed and developing countries. So China sort of fits in a sort of almost unique in-between category in terms of its contribution to emissions where it's an extremely large, it's the largest total emitter, and also a fairly large but still kind of middling overall per capita emissions. And I think this kind of helps to frame thinking about China's contribution to reducing emissions, both in terms of kind of what's fair and maybe what's just even, but also in terms of the politics that are in play and thinking about where these relative per capita countries. Now switching back to thinking about kind of driving forces, what drives China's climate and energy policy. And I think a lot of it is shown in this graph here and what you see here is about 30 years of evolution of China's energy supply. This is basically also capturing the rise of China. Certainly, this kind of growth trajectory really started to take off beginning in the mid to late 90s, received huge boots in 2001 with a session to the World Trade Organization. So really what you're seeing here is the rise of China. And what you can see pretty clearly from this graph is that that rise has been almost entirely powered by fossil fuels, especially coal, which is that light blue portion at the top of the graph, but also pretty significantly oil at the bottom of the graph. And that oil, that growth in oil as a part of China's total energy supply, it's significant because China is not a major oil producer, does have some domestic supply, but it's not a very significant producer. And that means that over the same time period, China developed pretty significant oil, energy insecurity problem. And in fact, I think you could make the argument that a decent chunk of China's major foreign policy initiatives over the last 20, 25 years, including the Belt and Road, has been at least in part a response to this fundamental energy insecurity when it comes to the supply of oil, in particular being very dependent on seaborn transportation, primarily from both region to last or extent, some parts of Southeast Asia, or that for that oil supply that is easily disrupted, whether it is from terrorism or political instability, or hypothetically, in a conflict by a foreign adversary, not the United States. So I think what this kind of graph helps us to kind of understand is just how fundamental growth in fossil fuels has been overall economic rise and why the dominant kind of consideration in thinking about climate change as an issue has been how to kind of balance this dependence on fossil fuels with trying to keep our mental objectives, as well as to some degree diplomatic. It's something they talk about the interest is the role that climate change play in China's public diplomacy, and it's sort of influence building campaign on the internationals, really the global governance issue, on which China kind of coalesced as a an area in which it wants to be seen and portrayed as a responsible global stakeholder. Though, again, as we can get into, and as we'll see in a couple minutes, you know, somewhat often exaggerated in terms of its total contribution to solving the another important way of thinking about China's motivations and it's with the sort of drivers of its stance on climate and energy policy is just to think about economic structure. China is a very heavily industrialized country, and this graph shows kind of two ways of looking at that one is manufacturing as a percentage of total GDP value of the economy. That's the orange bar and then the gray bar is that country's manufacturing sector as a percentage of total, total global manufacturing sector. And what kind of stands out about China is that not only does manufacturing a portion of the of the economy about a third, but it also accounts for the single greatest concentration of the global manufacturing sector that's different from really all other industrialized countries, you do have other countries where manufacturing is a substantial part of the economy like Germany, South Korea, but they're a considerably smaller fraction of the total industrial sector. What this is telling us is that not only is industry really important to China's economy, but China's industrial sector is extremely important to the global sector overall. This links the climate change simply because industry is probably the largest single portion of greenhouse gas emissions, depending on how you count electricity and power generation. This is probably the largest single single driver, certainly carbon dioxide, which is another way of saying that China is contributing to climate change is in large part a reflection of its economic structure, which is heavily dependent on industry. And more, more so even than that is particularly dependent on heavy, very carbon, like steel manufacturer, cement production, better. Another final kind of point on economic industrial structure is that historically speaking, Chinese, the Chinese industrial sector and Chinese industrial concerns are were pretty inefficient by global standards, meaning that they did not have the latest equipment. They produce relatively little in terms of energy inputs. So for a ton of coal that was burned. Most other countries competitors would have been able to do more with that ton of coal that most Chinese firms that kind of gap has been proving in recent years but it's still percent. And so what you see is China as a country that it's dependent on this pretty inefficient relatively very kind of heavy industry dominated and pretty heavily polluting economic and that's in large part why you see China's climate change problem. Another kind of way of looking at this is in terms of the change in emissions, both in terms of production and consumption. So one aspect of China being so heavily industrialized, one reason it's so heavily industrialized is the export led growth model. This is really what probably the single biggest driver of China's rise over the last 30 years has been this model where China produces goods and then exports them to the rest of the world. In exchange gets significant quantities of foreign direct investment and and in blows of foreign currency that it then uses to to develop its own economy and very especially and including infrastructure. That's kind of what's known as workshop when people call the workshop world, they're really referring to that export led economic growth model. Certainly that's resulted in a very significant increase in GDP per capita, which is the top line of the graph here. But for our purposes and think about China's contribution to climate change. Another aspect is that there is a relatively small but nonetheless meaningful percentage of China's emission that is actually generated by export. Now, one arguable way to look at this is that some significant fraction of the rest of the world's emissions, particularly Western industrialized countries have been effectively outsourced to China, because these emissions are being generated in the production of goods that are then exported to the west. Again, not a not a terribly significant chunk of China's total mission, but it is meaningful and I think it is worth keeping in mind and thinking about China kind of responsibility as part of the global climate change problem and you can see the production based CO2 per capita calculation is the green line on top but towards the bottom part of the graph there. And then consumption based CO2, which is purely domestic emissions essentially. There is that that gap and that feature of China's economic model and it's related to China's overall green gas emissions. All this being said, despite China's kind of status as the world's largest emitter and the kind of fundamental and systemic reasons that it's the largest emitter. Again, coming from that industrial structure that that port led economic model. Nonetheless, China has been decreasing the overall contribution of fossil fuels to its energy base. This graph shows the chair of primary energy coming from fossil fuels. So again, principally coal and oil, but also natural gas and some other, other less fossil fuels. I mean you can see that that share has been falling over time it was essentially 100% prior to 15 years ago or so that started to slowly decrease but since around 2015, we have started to see a significant decrease. And a lot of this is driven by policy most of this decrease driven by China's climate and energy. Principally, a couple of things. One are a range of policies reports given to renewable energy. So initially those were more or less direct subsidies, including guaranteed preferential rates that were given power generated from renewable sources. A lot of those subsidies have fairly recently been paid out, but they're still pretty positive for that exists to renewables especially solar. In addition to that, there's been a kind of poll series of measures near toward trying to improve the efficiency of China, especially energy. I'm sorry, especially industrial sector through things like targets that mandate a certain energy intensity meaning or a certain carbon intensity meaning that for every unit of CO2 that's emitted or for a unit of energy that's consumed, you have to kind of produce a certain value per GDP, just a measure of efficient. But that does help to bend the emission curve and does help to decrease the share of fossil fuels for China's overall energy mix. So as advice to say, we do see a meaningful kind of improvement here over the last particularly five to 10 years. And a lot of that is driven by policy that has helped to bend the curve in terms of energy mix and therefore contribution. Nonetheless, carbon is a pretty tough habit to kick. And it's worth kind of focusing in on kind of a current snapshot of what China's energy mix looks like just to drive home the point that although the trend is positive, China's emissions are still rising. And it's also maybe worth emphasizing from this graph. This isn't emission. This is just the share of fossil fuels in the total energy. So although it does translate into emission, that's not the same thing as saying that China's emissions have in fact decreased. They have not on an absolute base continue to rise. And currently are expected to do so for about the next five years or so. And a big part of why is because of the inertia that results from this type of energy. Roughly 60% coal. And actually another kind of important thing to keep in mind in thinking about total energy mix is that even when we kind of shift over to the renewable side of the equation. Hydro is the biggest single chunk of if you take hydro out of the equation, you're really only looking at about 5% you know sort of truly clean or environmentally friendly wind and solar power. You know, still a very small portion of kind of overall energy mix. Another thing that's worth kind of pointing out about this current part of the picture is that 20% petroleum and other fossil fuels liquefied fossil fuels essentially. That's a particularly tough slice of the pie to shrink, because that's primarily your transport applications that's your vehicles. That's your, your aviation, the aviation sector and domestic shipping sector. That's a particularly difficult fuel to work. Simply because at the moment we don't have a great substituter alternative for the energy density that boils per pot. That's really important when you're talking about moving, whether it's difficult or aircraft. So that 20% is going to be particularly hard. We'll come back to that briefly. Now I want to shift into just talking a little bit about China's choices going forward. And for the next couple of slides, I want to make clear I'm actually borrowing slides from a presentation that a senior Tsinghua University professor gave last year, believe it was last October. And I don't kind of include them here because I think you should necessarily take them as gospel. As far as I know, the most kind of authoritative presents the most authoritative kind of outline for China's policy choices going forward when it comes to its climate and energy targets. And in particular, this presentation was made to try to outline specifically how China might achieve the pledge that Xi Jinping laid out in the speech at the UN General Assembly a year ago essentially committing China to achieve net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 26. That it's worth emphasizing is the most ambitious climate policy that China has announced. It's also the most ambitious climate policy that any developing country has. So it shouldn't be under kind of understated or under emphasized in terms of it's important. But what the next few slides are going to emphasize for us. And again, just sort of not as gospel but just indicatively is it's going to be a very, very difficult target to meet. And even if China does manage to meet it, it may in fact be too little too late in terms of the climate overall. So this particular slide shows a couple of different emissions and policy scenarios or rather the effects on a mission of several different policy scenarios. The kind of light blue dashed line at the top there top line is essentially businesses based on current policy. The orange line here is essentially kind of a more ambitious set of policies kind of making existing policy more stringent, if you will. And then the lower two trajectory tier are what would be needed in order for China's contributions or what China would need to do to keep global temperature increased under two degrees or within two degrees. The lower line there is 1.5 degree target. And then this portion, the sort of red portion in the middle here is what would be consistent with that 2050 kind of target overall, and then a more kind of general long term low carbon transition scenario that isn't very well defined in this presentation. But the kind of takeaways here are that one, the 2050 pledge scenario is probably consistent with the two degree target. Definitely not consistent with the 1.5 degree target, which the IPCC report makes a pretty good case. It's what we really need aiming for. And even that, even the 2050 kind of decarbonization scenario that two degree target are considerably more ambitious than what we would be getting if we're on current Chinese policy trajectory, or even an enhanced version of that. So this is going to be a pretty tough act to, to effect. Another thing that's important to keep in mind about these scenarios and again just sort of thinking about whether our objective is two degrees or 1.5 and the IPCC report again makes a pretty strong case that it should be 1.5. It's just how significant the additional emissions cuts would have to be in kind of to get to that 1.5 to 3 target. The orange bars in the center of this graph here show one sort of breakdown of what you would need to get to that level of emissions. There are a couple of things that are worth pointing out here. One is that there's a pretty significant amount of carbon capture and storage that's needed. This is a technology that is pretty well understood in terms of fundamentals, but is not at present commercially feasible. So you're talking about at least one major new technology that you need to deploy in order to make this scenario feasible. You'll also see in the text at the bottom here, they make quite a bit of reference hydrogen. And that is what you would need to achieve these emissions reductions in sectors like industry. I'm sorry, hydrogen is probably one of the key kind of new technologies or new processes that you would need to carbonize steel for. Probably hydrogen fuel that took that in a low carbon scenario. So this is all to say that all of these, whether it's a two degree or a 1.5 degree target for shooting for it's a significant lift for China. But that difference between 1.5 and two is especially difficult. And we do still see a significant gap in terms of what the modeling shows is necessary for 1.5 versus two, which again is kind of what we think we need to avert climate. Also worth emphasizing though probably kind of implicit from some of these earlier slides, this is going to be expensive for China. And I mean it would be expensive for all countries. And here it's worth keeping in mind that China's gross national income per capita is still lower than Mexico. And if you think about it in this context you look at this graph which shows the cost of following some of these different scenarios, certainly the cost differential between achieving that 1.5 degree scenario and achieving kind of the business as usual scenario is extremely significant. The other thing that's worth keeping in mind is that the costs are essentially upfront. And here is where political economy kind of comes in. You think about any really heavy list, any really difficult long term policy. This is not what you want to see because it makes the people who are going to have to bear the costs of that transition gives them that much more reason to oppose it upfront. Whereas if you can find a way of distributing the cost more toward the long term, that can help to lower the barriers to adoption of an ambitious policy. But unfortunately, all of these decarbonization scenarios are the exact opposite. And frankly, I think it's good reason to believe that China may have quite a bit of difficulty in achieving more ambitious policy targets than it's already announced, even though the science is telling us that that's exactly what we need, much more ambitious action from China and other countries in order to curb the catastrophe. And my kind of evidence for this, and admittedly it's early to tell, but so far what we see in terms of China's more near and medium firm policy targets is essentially kicking the can down the road. So two kind of halves to this to this graph on the left hand side, you see plan versus actual targets for energy and carbon intensity under the last five year plan, the 13th five year plan here. And then what you can see is that both energy and carbon intensity targets were modestly modestly underperformed the goal that in itself is is a little bit concerning, but more concerning than that is apparently the response to that in the 14th five year plan shown over on the right hand side is to make both sets of targets less ambitions. And you can see on the kind of third set of bars there. This is what was actually recommended by the gentleman in terms of targets that would that would put us on more of a close to that two degree Celsius target, but the actual plan targets that were were set in the plan are less ambitious than that. That's not what we want to see if our objective is decarbonization. That is maybe what we would expect to see if we're thinking more in terms of politics and economics and thinking about how you're going to convince people to bear these high upfront costs. Unfortunately, I think we probably expect this tendency to kick the can to continue. After all, China may be an authoritarian country, but that doesn't mean it doesn't mean that it doesn't have political economy. Meanwhile, of course, China continues to invest substantial sums in fossil fuel infrastructure, both at home and abroad. The abroad kind of portion has gotten of course the most attention and it is worth just kind of pausing on and emphasizing just how much of China's overseas energy investment does go to fuel infrastructure. This shows just sort of one slice of that, but it is a pretty good data set for those of you may be interested in this run by BU. It only shows financing from two of two sort of Chinese sources so it's not a complete picture, but it is indicative of fact that it's really only a very small portion of China's overseas energy investment goes in renewable or what we really call clean energy technology. The vast majority of it goes oil, coal or LNG substantial hydropower, which is renewable but tends to be pretty environmentally destructive. Also a substantial nuclear portion. We can certainly come back to this in Q&A if you're interested, but it is worth emphasizing that China at the moment is the world leader in nuclear energy technology simply to scale of investment in new nuclear plants have about 30 or so nuclear plants that are in different stages of planning construction for approval, far and away the largest kind of fleet in the world. One wild card in thinking about where China is headed and I presented of course a pretty skeptical view of where China's policy of heading on climate and energy. One wild card is extreme weather. This was covered in the press, some of you may have seen this. This was the second summer in a row in which central China suffered really devastating flood. Last summer it was kind of Wuhan and the disaster was centered on Hubei province. This summer it was centered on Henan and particularly the city of Zhengzhou. These are pictures from the Zhengzhou subway that was flooded. Several people were killed in this incident. About 300 people were killed overall. Pretty quickly kind of obfuscated by state media. It becomes censorship even more kind of misdirection that this was kind of a freak thousand year flood disaster when in fact this is exactly what we can expect to happen more and more frequently as a result of climate change. It's worth just sort of pointing out we can come back to this again later. Among large countries China is one of the most heavily impacted by climate-linked extreme weather. A large part of that is because of the Himalayan plateau and the high rates of warming that are being experienced on that plateau. That sort of downs the significance of that. But it is possible that if we see this acceleration in extreme weather events it could have some type of impact on climate and energy policy. Though if I had to bet based on recent experience I would bet probably on that. But I do think it is a wild card that could be significant. Last slide is just to kind of say I think what all this adds up to in my mind at least is a case for skepticism and realism about how quickly and completely China can decarbonize its economy. I think there's a bit of a tendency in the West particularly in the media and kind of among the environmental community to almost law China's ability to do things quickly and in state. And indeed China's capacity to mobilize resources does in many ways outstrip our own in large part because of the authoritarian nature of the country the way in which the state is tied to a lot of enterprises and things like that. That's true but I don't think it necessarily follows that China is going to we can really count on China to lead global decarbonization. In fact I think the story is much more likely to be that the West and particularly the United States is going to have to shoulder even more of the cost and effort and resources required to affect that global decarbonization. I think at the end of the day we have a lot of the kind of pieces that of the puzzle that will be required to decarbonize and solve the climate problem but we don't necessarily have all of the technology we need I think a lot more investment in particular technology areas particularly in decarbonizing the transport sector finding an alternative to oil and I think the US actually has the biggest single role to play in particularly that clean tech R&D. But I think the other side of that equation even though I think that if the US is going to have to bear most of the burden I do think there's considerable opportunity that comes with that and this graph is kind of my attempt to make that case. It's a graph of the export value attached to solar essentially to solar energy to solar panel manufacturer and there are two things I think are notable about this. First of all, the value that the US receives in terms of exports of solar panels is just orders of magnitude higher than any other country including China. And moreover, the US is the only major country not to have experienced consistent decrease in the export value of solar PV technology. So I do think there's considerable economic opportunity for the United States in seizing the leadership kind of role in developing this next generation of clean technology and in leading the response climate change problem more generally. I'm going to stop there and I'll look forward to some questions and thank you. Thank you Scott before closing the presentation I'd like to ask you one question. The students watching today are our future leaders and do you have any advice that you could give them regarding how they think about China and climate change in their future positions. Yeah, I mean, I think, I think there are several kind of levels I guess to do that question. I mean, you know, I do think the climate change is sort of like the ultimate existential problem and it's, it's, you know, very easy to feel to feel hopeless about it but I think I would kind of in many ways go back to that, to that first slide from the IPCC. Just demonstrating that every little bit helps. And so I think it's trying to just sort of think about whatever position you may be in there is a way to contribute to the solution I think particularly for both in the security and military sectors. I think there are, there's kind of a unique opportunity in several respects. One, I think, as I mentioned, we do need more research and development of clean technology. I think we're going to need at least one more generation of technology, maybe two. I think that's the point where we can successfully decarbonize the military and you know national security actors more generally have a very distinguished history. Of course, in the United States, promoting some breakthrough innovations. So I think the extent to which we can sort of work with our national security agencies, the military to develop technologies that are applicable. And I mean, in some ways, the application is quite correct. So, you know, if you think about trying to drip out the dependence of expeditionary forces on fossil fuels through renewables through science, battery technology, that would actually be a really substantial part of the climate change puzzle, but it also meets a really pressing military operational. So I think there are a lot of technological solutions. I also think just generally making the case for the public, you know, as compelling I think as the science on climate change is. I think it's still not well understood just how much climate change is going to change the way that we live. And I think is really going to enhance a lot of the threats that we face with the country as a world and I think if we have military leaders, national security leaders consistently and publicly make that case. It will help to build support for the kind of dramatic action. Excellent. Thank you. So on behalf of the whole Naval War College community, I'd like to thank Dr. Scott Moore so much for sharing his expertise with us today. This concludes the recorded portion of this lecture.