 Good afternoon and welcome to the United States Institute of Peace. My name is Dr. Joseph Sani, I'm the Vice President for the Africa Center at the Institute. The United States Institute of Peace was established by the U.S. Congress in 1984 as a national non-partisan public institution dedicated to helping prevent, resolve and mitigate conflict around the world. In Africa, we focus on mitigating the adverse effects of global powers and middle power competition. Also we focus on addressing fragility, different drivers of fragility, such as political instability, violent extremism, misinformation and disinformation, and also to strengthen peace builders, networks of peace builders, regional and local peace architectures. We are gathered today to launch the USIP's newly published report, China's Space Collaboration with African – Implications and Recommendations for the United States. But you may wonder why having this discussion at the US Institute of Peace will think that we may have the discussion at the United States Space Study or something. Why the United States Institute of Peace? Space exploration and the pursuit of ambitious space programs have been a significant part of the global agenda for various countries. As great powers live for dominance in space, the risk of conflict between them looms large. Space programs play a crucial role in ensuring national security and strategic capabilities. Accordingly, the inability or failure to keep up with other great powers may be perceived as a threat to a nation's influence and geopolitical standing. In an environment where space assets are essential for intelligence-gathering, communication and military operation, disparities in capabilities could heighten tensions and create an atmosphere conducive to conflict. Space programs require substantial cooperation and information sharing between nations. However, as competitions intensify, the trust and willingness to cooperate may diminish. Misunderstandings, miscommunications or deliberate disruptions in communication systems could easily escalate into full-blown conflicts. The absence of effective channels for dialogue and de-escalation only exacerbates the risk inherent in space programs. But gone are the days where space programs were only developed by few great powers. A new normal is emerging in space exploration and technological development, one where space programs are recognized as essential components of both economic growth and national security architectures in nations across the world, even in the global south. Since the start of the 21st century, numerous African countries have invested in the development of their space programs as a function of broader development and security goals. Today, space programs exist in over 20 African countries and are rapidly growing in number and investment rates. Several countries are in the process of developing their first satellites in Africa. Many of these African space programs are receiving funding from the Chinese government and work in collaboration with Chinese state-owned enterprises. China pushes space collaboration in Africa in a very intentional way by allocating funds and identifying areas of existing African prioritizations like climate change and counterterrorism efforts for focused satellites' development collaboration. Why U.S. private and public institutions do collaborate with African countries in the space industry and program development? These efforts are not coordinated throughout current U.S. foreign policies. As the U.S. strategizes ways to deepen collaboration with African partners, it is important to understand why countries are choosing to partner with China. Now, our panelists will introduce a report and dive into its implications for the U.S. African partners and the space industry. After the initial panel discussion, we invite you to ask questions via the online chat box for those who are following us online and for those in the room just to raise our hands and that will be easy. My colleague Henry Todengard will introduce today's panelists and thank you for listening. Good afternoon. Today's event will be moderated by Henry Tugentot, an economist with the China team here at USIP. Tugentot focuses on issues related to China's impact on conflict dynamics in Africa and Latin America. Prior to USIP, Tugentot worked at the Institute of Development Studies in the United Kingdom. The China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University and the World Bank Group's macroeconomics trade and investment team. He's currently finishing his PhD at Johns Hopkins University. Our report writers, Julie Klinger and online, we have Temi Dio O'Neill soon will be joining us on our panel. Julie Klinger is an assistant professor in the Department of Geography and Spatial Sciences at the University of Delaware and faculty in the Minerals, Materials and Society program. Dr. Klinger's research focuses on the dynamics of global resource frontiers and space-based technologies with particular emphasis in China, Brazil and the United States. She's published numerous articles on rare earth elements, natural resource use, environmental politics and outer space. Klinger holds a PhD in Geography from the University of California, Berkeley. Temi Dio O'Neill soon is the founder and managing director of Space in Africa, the leading analytics and consulting company shaping the future of African space and the satellite industry. Prior to founding Space in Africa, he was the African regional coordinator for the Space Generation Advisory Council. He advises governments and commercial space players in the industry value chain and just recently led an African Union Commission baseline study on the socioeconomic benefits for the establishment and operationalization of the African space agency. Temi Dio is a 2021 Forbes Africa 30 under 30 award recipient and is a current PhD candidate at the University of Delaware. We would also like to welcome two panelists who will be joining us to discuss the implications of this important report today. Brian Whedon is the director of program planning for the Secure World Foundation and has more than 20 years of professional experience in space operations and policy. He is a former member and chair of the World Economic Forum's Council on the Future of Space Technologies and the former executive director of the consortium for executive for execution of rendezvous and servicing operations. Prior to joining Secure World Foundation, Dr. Whedon served nine years as an active duty officer in the United States Air Force where he worked in space and intercontinental ballistic missile operations. Dr. Whedon holds a PhD in public policy and public administration from George Washington University in the field of science and technology policy. Finally, last but not least, we have Kun Chen Lin who is a professor of military and security studies at the Department of Space Power at the Air University and is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced and International Studies. His current research focuses on great power competition in the space domain and in industrial policies of Asian superpowers. Prior to his current roles, he was a university lecturer at the Johnville and Kayas College and directed the Center for Rising Powers and the Center for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge. He was also a post-doctoral fellow in contemporary Chinese studies at the University of Oxford and Tautic Kings College London and at the National University of Singapore. Kun Chen received his PhD and MA both in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Thank you, and I now turn it over to Henry Tugentot. Thank you. And if I may, am I on? Can you hear me? And if I may also briefly thank and introduce Lindsey Taring who is a program specialist on our China team, focusing on China time one and China Africa issues. Well look, I'm going to hand it straight over to Julian Temadayo to present their research and hopefully give us a succinct overview of everything you've found, why it matters and where we go from here on your report and then we're going to move down the line and go to Brian and Professor Lin. So I'll hand it straight over to you. Thank you very much. All right, wonderful. Thank you very much, Henry. So in a couple minutes, we'll give you a whirlwind tour of our research. But first I want to say thank you to Henry and the USIP for having us here and for fostering this kind of policy-engaged research. So just a couple of broad strokes. One of the things that really is motivating this research is a long-standing concern with the lack of appreciation for the dynamism of the global space sector. And we find this to be quite troubling given that the infrastructure of outer space is essential to the infrastructure of everyday life. So everyday life as we know it, whether we're talking about trade or communications or entertainment, relies on space-linked infrastructure. Vital infrastructure, such as public utilities, for example, also relies on and it's increasingly integrated with space-linked and space-based infrastructure. And so this makes the domain of outer space inseparable from our standard or perhaps more familiar security concerns. And so given this, talking about and increasing the appreciation of the possibilities for peace and for peaceful collaboration in the space domain we think is especially important. So it's been a pleasure to work with Tamadayo on this report because we bring together two very different backgrounds to what we hope in this report can answer some persistent areas of uncertainty. So my own background is deeply rooted in several years of in-depth and long-term research in China and looking at China's overseas activities more broadly. Tamadayo's expertise, he's at the forefront of the development of the space sector on the continent of Africa. And so by our powers combined and with our multiple linguistic and cultural interests and ties, we are very much invested in the world and particularly the U.S. government getting this right, right? So we understand also that this is a really challenging moment to be talking about space cooperation when we have the militarization of outer space that just seems to be running away, right? So from the establishment of the United States Space Force to, of course, the related or complementary or reactive efforts that have occurred since then. And of course, even before the establishment of the U.S. Space Force, there were of course anti-satellite missile tests and various efforts to various shows of force and capability that were occurring around the world. And all of these things fundamentally undermine outer space as the peaceful domain, the peaceful province of all humankind. And in fact, it is that status of outer space as the peaceful province of all humankind that has enabled the development of modern life as we know it. I mean, think about it. We're talking in this report about satellite cooperation especially. But let's think for a moment about what a satellite is, right? A satellite is a very delicate and very expensive piece of technology that is a culmination of human scientific effort and achievement. And the fact that any country in the world, and in fact many business entities, research entities and what have you, have the confidence in the order of the international system to place these very delicate and expensive pieces of technology in orbit has been fundamental for so many of the conveniences that make modern life work. And also these things are fundamental for achieving various socioeconomic and development goals. So with the big picture here, the other thing that I will say, and I'm not going to repeat the report in its entirety because you can read it at your leisure. But the other thing that I want to say is just to kind of sensitize the audience to the dynamics of China's space program. So we live in a time of intensifying tension between the US and China. And over simplifications are rife, right? And so if there's anything that I can offer the audience today, it's I'd like to give you a picture or a conceptual framework that helps you understand China's space sector and space industry. And then I'll hand it over to Temadio to say a few words about the dynamism and trends in Africa's space sector. So the first thing, I'll actually start with the US. The space sector, the space industry in the US is dynamic. It is hybrid. You have your civilian, your military and your private sector components. And depending on the project, depending on the policy mandate, they all do or don't work together, right? And then of course, you have the proliferation of private sector entities, service providers and a lot of innovation and activity happening in this space. You also, in this context, have a situation where not everyone knows what everyone else is doing, right? There are sometimes surprises. There are sometimes accidents. People sometimes step on people's toes. I think that the same can be said for China's space industry, right? China, of course, has its flagship national space agency, CNSA, China National Space Agency. But they work with a number of state-owned enterprises and private firms and a whole chain of subcontractors that are doing their best to cash in on the growth of the space sector. And this includes forging international partnerships, including with counterparts in Africa. So I don't want to go over time here, but I'll turn it over to Temadayo to offer some comments to the public on the dynamism and growth of Africa's space sector. Thank you very much, Dr. Klinger. Generally, space program is growing in Africa and space has now been identified as a critical tool to help shape the future of Africa. And this is evident in the African Union Commission agenda 2063, which laid out the plans and goal for building and developing the Africa that we all want. There's an increasing business opportunities in the industry. We're also seeing a lot of advancements in space technologies in Africa, emergence of a lot of commercial companies that are building critical space infrastructure in addition, space has become a critical tool for diplomacy with African countries and space is helping to solve some of Africa's critical problems from agriculture to security to disaster management and monitoring to hub and development. In addition, several nations are now working closely with Africa to help develop its space program. And in recent years, China has emerged as the leading partner for Africa. We've seen a lot of collaborations across all industry sectors, including communications, head observations, navigation and positioning, as well as space. And finally, this current dispensation is the beginning of the future for space program development in Africa. And right now, China is well positioned to help shape that future. Thank you very much. Well, that was very succinct. Well, I think I think what you've raised in this report and more generally in your remarks is how much of these developments are really driven, being driven by African actors themselves and how this is a very pivotal moment for the development of this technology because there are there is so much demand for cooperation. There is so much demand for collaboration on the development of these technologies but also the sharing of knowledge and technology and information itself. And I think what you're really achieving in this report is pointing out the gaps that the U.S. could and should be filling. But of course, you're also highlighting an aspect of this developing technology that many people are not familiar with, which is that China is actually becoming somewhat of a leader in this space on the African continent. And I'm curious, Temudayo, if I could start with you when we get to the Q&A, if you could tell us a little bit more about what that looks like from the continent. But before we get into questions and answers, I'm going to hand it straight over to Dr. Whedon to share some reflections on what we've heard so far. Thank you for that. And again, I want to commend the authors on the report. I think it was excellent. To me, it is very unique in this field. I have not I'm not aware of similar research. And I think it really adds a lot of value to those that are looking at these kinds of problems. So my organization is the Corral Foundation. Our focus is twofold. On the one hand, we are focused on how do we use space for all the benefits we've all been talking about and the things that ways that we can use space applications to help prove our daily lives and improve global society. But at the same time, how do we address the potential long term sustainability of using space? As was mentioned, there's a lot more countries getting involved in space. There's a lot more activity, many, many more satellites are being put up just as a broad number. Ten years ago, there was something on the order of 115 or so satellites put into orbit. Just last year, there were nearly 2,500 satellites put into orbit, radical increase. And the projected growth curves are even higher. Now, we're seeing lots more benefits, but the question is, how do we deal with some of those challenges? And so that is something that I think is we're trying to grapple with. And then you add into the geopolitics of not only this growing tension between the U.S. and China. Let's not forget Russia. Let's a little bit outside of the conversations for today. And how do you have just these broader international collaborations to be able to set the framework so we can all use space like we all would like to be able to use into the future? I think one of the things that struck me reading through the report is what a different future this means for the way the U.S. has approached this issue of space collaboration historically. Historically, if you talk to somebody and ask for this government, they would say, well, we're going to collaborate in space with countries and in ways that provide benefits to us, that bring a technology or bring funding or bring something to this program we have, whether it's the shuttle program or the space station or some remote sensing satellite. And it was very focused on, we're going to do this for this substantive benefit. And I think that has led the U.S. to frankly ignore large parts of the world that could have been good opportunities to collaborate. And now we've seen other countries, especially China, sort of fill in those gaps. And in some ways either identify that there was a gap there to be filled or just have a different approach to collaboration. And that then, of course, spark this response in the U.S. by saying, oh my gosh, what are we going to do about this? And in some ways, part of me tends to say, well, I mean, did you not see this coming? But at the same time, there is still a serious issue here. And I am heartened in some ways by seeing there has been a shift underway in the way the United States is approaching some of these questions of space collaboration and partnership and cooperation. But it's a slow change. And so I think this report is going to help identify some areas where there can be a bigger shift towards more concrete changes and some concrete goals that are going to benefit both the United States and Africa and hopefully better parts of the world. So I'll stop there. And I know we've got a lot of the questions we want to get to throughout the conversation. Thank you very much, Professor Wing. Dr. Lin. Thank you very much. I'm going to take advantage of the fact that my predecessors have been very succinct to offer a slightly longer version of my piece. That's all right. But thank you for inviting me here. I also want to just state that my views do not reflect that of the US Space Force. I think the report has offered a very compelling diagnosis that space technology has not been a focus of US policy in Africa. It needs to be. So I guess my feedback is to try to push the report further by asking the next questions to follow. And I think this report needs to be duplicated for Latin America, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. That's certainly a logical extension of this significance of the report. And one way that I've thought about this issue is to think about, and I think Tim O'Day will ask about this question earlier, is the report states very clear that African countries have many options at this point. It's not just, oh, we recognize there's a need. We're going to step in and do our hegemonic thing. But then we also need to recognize that it's not a question of zero-sum game here. And it's not that we're countering China in some ways. It's more of an issue of, and I tell my students this the whole time, is that we have to think about, what if China were to succeed in its aspirations? What if it becomes a major player in the space industry in Africa? At the same time, we need to ask the question, what if China were to fail as a space player? So a lot of projects do not come to fruition. And oftentimes in developmental history, we in the West, institutions, governments, end up having to intervene or to help countries recover from the consequences of that. So to think in that direction, I think one thing that's really important, there are two aspects I thought was emerging from the report and could be extended further in future research. One is to really be specific about what kinds of effects are we expecting from this growth industry. The economic spillover effects and the synergistic effects as the report posits are exactly that. They are hypothesized. And it's not entirely demonstrated. And I, of course, this has to do with longer term research. But the question is, how do we expect these projects to play out over time? And the second aspect which is related to it first is what are the opportunity costs of using US State Department, USAID, US DoD resources to focus on space industries instead of other purposes and tasks. And I think to determine the second one, which is a sort of first step towards strategy, is to think about to have some initial assessments as to how these things are gonna play out. And so to that, I think the report has a few points which are very well worth developing. One is there's a very clear recognition that China does not, repeat not, dominate across the board. So this really depends on this unfolding value chain of the space industry. There are many points. Launch market is competitive. And as a member of US Space Force, we're certainly pushing for our launch capabilities over the next few years. Space manufacturing is also very competitive. I understand that space, you know, satellites are delicate instruments. But frankly, it's not a high tech instrument, right? Many countries can produce satellites. I have college students in Pennsylvania who are producing them in their own backyards. So it's a matter of where are we competing on this chain? Then there's a second point is the impact of China's investment operations remain to be studies. And so the report focuses a lot on data pooling implications, right? We have Earth observation, we have Beto navigation system, we have climate change mitigation usages. So it will be very interesting to get an insight into, for example, the terms of the contract, right? If we're positing ourselves, the Americans as the one to offer shared information, open architecture, what exactly are the Chinese being restrictive about? And what are they steering these contracts towards? That will be interesting. Second is that as the space industry develops, one of the most important things is space enabled services, right? So we talk about training of engineers and operators, Beto centers in some countries, military operations, domain awareness, security apparatus training, all these sort of subsequent products are hugely important. And one of the interesting idea in the report is that the Chinese offer this bundling of resources, right? Both finance, production, services, and everything else. And the idea is that somehow is that would tend to be synergistic. But from our understanding of other fields, other products, that is not necessarily the case. So what I would like to point to is the example in solar panels. For the purpose of the report, I try to actually look up my literature. And there's obviously not a lot written and hence the value of the report. But one thing that's been fairly well studied is the attempt to start solar panel industries in South Africa and other African countries. And this is one of these examples, a high tech sector, which is capital intensive, at least the startup cost. It's got very limited employment opportunities. So if you're looking at sustainability and opportunities for local population, it's not necessarily the industry you invest in. It's got limited socioeconomic benefits for a broader population. It's got very marginal developmental input. So these are some of the limitation of an industry like the space manufacturing as well as solar panels. So that's sort of the basis of comparison. And if you do look at that, I mean, the reports show that, not this particular report, but all the studies on solar panel, shows very limited, very limited impact in terms of developmental and environmental for African countries that have launched these projects. And there are many reasons for that. And some of the reasons is regulatory. For example, in South Africa, they don't have very good local content requirements. And even when they put in local content requirements, Chinese firms through transfer pricing on a mechanism tend to bolster that, but not actually delivering the benefits. There are also issues with the market being limited. You have very limited capability in terms of technology and consumption. So the market itself is necessarily externally oriented. What usually works is that if you can start small manufacturing firms and then train people in larger firms, but that's a total order. So what we're looking at, and I think this is the key thing, is that Africa has experienced so many waves of promises of development, technology-driven sometimes, otherwise it's industrial policy, trade policy. And the question is, how is the space industry different than the previous waves? How can we make it different through U.S. support? We do not want a new dependency, so dynamic happening. And this is something that perhaps would be expected because in the past, in the Cold War period, space industries joined space clubs, precise because they got particular support from either Soviet Union or the United States. Is that going to repeat itself? Are we going to see African countries which essentially do not have clear comparative advantage to space manufacturing than sort of being attractive at this time due to their geographic location, rare earth minerals, potential contribution to a network effect for Chinese architecture in terms of digital space and communications. But what happens when these effects disappear? What happens when India and Malaysia are producing the same things? Do we then see a round of protectionism? Do we see countries locked into a lower end sort of industrialization process which has been seen before, just focusing on what they have resource-wise but not so much promoting the upgrade? So I guess the question is then, does the report suggest ways that the US can make a difference when some of these dynamics begin to kick in? And just to conclude, I do see at least a couple of things we can add in terms of recommendation. One is that, and this is harking back to an area I know more about, which is East Asia. For example, we have Japan, which is taking a lead in the Asian space industry by promoting certification and standard sitting capabilities for the regional players. And this is something that we can think about about adding to the list of excellent recommendations in the report is that we can find a partner, a center that perhaps we could help to develop trade policies, standard-setting regulations, these soft power capabilities so that regardless of the partner involved, the African countries would be better in managing these developmental effects. Second, I think there needs to be an inter-agency process going between the state, DOD, and various other agencies because a lot of capabilities are coming online, but what are we offering to our partner is not always coherent. And lastly, we need to think about this interesting thing about, and the report clearly shows, that China has these sort of cluster of stay-on enterprises and private actors and contractors that go into every project. Well, given the fact that the report points out that Africa constitutes 0.7% of global space expenditure, it's not gonna be a big priority for SpaceX. How do we then motivate our firms to enter into these markets, perhaps through the certification programs? I mentioned that would reduce the transaction cost for engagement. So these are some of the things I think the report points us towards and we should certainly develop further. Thank you. Fantastic, thank you so much for those reflections. Well, I think we should start by handing back to Temideo and Julie just to reflect on some of that feedback and then we'll open it up to questions in the room and online if anybody has any questions. Please start submitting and we'll start gathering those up but I'll start with Julie and Temideo. Okay, excellent. Did you wanna have Temideo address the question that you put out initially? Sure, yeah, actually, Temideo, if you could also speak a little bit more to what the considerations are for African space agencies either as individual agencies or in terms of the multilateral collaborations that currently exist when choosing international partners and how it's come to pass that China has become such a significant player in this space. Okay, thank you very much. So to talk a little bit about your first question on what China is specifically doing, there's a lot of work going on around technology development. So developing satellites for different African customers. China has so far viewed satellites towards close to now $100 million for African countries. Beyond satellite development, they're developing a lot of ground station infrastructures. They've done this for Ethiopia, Nigeria or Nigeria just to mention a few countries. There's also a lot of space program financing as well as technology financing. So providing loans for satellites and we've also seen cases of China actually gifting satellites to an African nation. Beyond these, we're seeing a lot of push for the adoption of Beidu navigation and positioning services as well as a lot of space applications projects where through the ground stations that they're installing for African countries, they're able to provide free satellite data from either Chinese government satellite or satellite that belongs to specific organizations. The China is part of providing this data for different African customers. And to respond a little bit to what Professor Litz comment on the specific effects of China's collaboration with Africa in the US context. I think there are multiple ways to look at it. So first is let's not look at this as just the US government. We can look at this from the perspective of US commercial space institutions also. So take for example, I think Africa offers a decent business opportunity for global space companies. And we're already seeing a lot of global space governments doing a lot of business in Africa. And it's also evident that a lot of not just the US, I think a lot of global space companies are currently struggling. We've seen several companies, one public in the US for example, Vias, but currently struggling. A few of them have had to declare bankruptcies. So there is a lot of business opportunities in Africa and Chinese companies have been capitalizing on this for several years. And it's now that the US companies they're waking up to this reality. Yes, the US space industry is the largest in the world. But for specific companies, especially those operating in the downstream segment selling data services or even those selling communication services, being able to sell these products and services and having a chunk of the African markets could actually help a lot of them to stay in business. Beyond this, I think now space diplomacy is actually influencing and helping with general diplomacy. So African, China is saying that one of the ways to come in to build very good relationship with African institution, not just China, even Europe is realizing it's one of the ways to build solid relationship with Africa is to actually come in through space. And this makes a lot of sense, especially because the African government, African Union, for example, they've specifically identified that space. This is a critical area that is a priority to them and that can help them address a lot of the fundamental problems and build a future they want. And beyond all of this also for the effect of what China is doing in Africa, in the US context, we're seeing a lot of push for Chinese product and services. A good example of this is the Beidou navigation system that I mentioned earlier. And a lot of devices in Africa, globally, to the already being built on this particular line for structure and for China. Could you tell our audience members what the Beidou satellite navigation system is just for people who might not already know what it is? So this is China's version of the GPS. So of course GPS is global, maybe for the next decade or two, no one can actually express that. But there's a lot of push from the Chinese government to actually push the adoption of Beidou in Africa. In fact, there has been over 14 meetings in the last couple of months between several Chinese institutions and different layers of different layers in the African Union Commission to conceptualize projects and programs that would help with the adoption of massive adoption of Beidou in Africa. So these are, this may not matter so much, but these are some of the things that would eventually affect US, global, and Germany. So a lot of these things, they may look irrelevant now, but by the time you combine all of these things together into the future, this would definitely shape what's gonna happen in the next couple of years. And to answer your, okay, there was a question about the African Space Agency and working with different national government. One of the ways to, there are 54 African countries and it may not be realistic to move from one country to another to figure out ways to work with them. One of the approaches that actually work effectively is working with the African Union Commission to conceptualize projects and programs that can be implemented or that can actually involve, if not all of the African countries but most of the African countries. And this is also perfect because the African Union Commission is the custodian of the African Space Agency. And until the agency becomes fully operational, I think the African Union Commission is a perfect avenue to build some of this critical relationship. And lastly, to respond to the question on how the US can actually make a difference. I think that one of the ways to, the US can make a difference is, right now there is an opportunity for the US to actually help to shape and promote the use of half the space for peaceful use and for good. So whether it's in, we, you know, Brian is from the Civil War Foundation. You know, there's a lot of conversations around space sustainability now. So maybe this is a point where the US can come in taking space or stability messages globally because no one is having this conversation on the continent right now. And the second area is there's also opportunity for the US to work with African institutions on areas that actually pertains to both parties. You can work together to address common problems. Then this is what we're seeing with cooperation from Europe, for example. So, you know, the US foreign policy towards Africa is mostly around safety, security, you know, political freedom, economic opportunity. And in terms of, you know, security, whether we're dealing with disaster management or monitoring or, you know, economic prosperity, building, you know, a critical ecosystem that can facilitate, you know, commerce. I think the US can come into some of these channels capitalizing on global space infrastructure to actually push this. It's not all, you know, cooperation with Africa, but I mean, I understand that, especially, you know, where China is concerned, a lot of conversations around China, you know, it's usually around how China is, for example, taking advantage of African problems. But, you know, beyond these, there are ways to work with Africa to capitalize on the resources to, you know, build commerce. And I think one of the things that China is trying to do now that, you know, may actually shape the way space program is gonna be done the next decade in Africa is exploring Africa's territory for satellite launches. You know, they're currently talking to Djibouti to set up, you know, infrastructures to launch satellites from Africa. And this is an area that no one else is currently paying attention to in Africa. A lot of the African countries are the equal, they provide, you know, very good landscape, you know, that can actually support a lot of, you know, whether, you know, satellite launches or even, you know, lunar missions. US is already in a lot of work with South Africa in capitalizing on its territory and infrastructures to support US missions. So a lot of work can also be done, you know, with other African countries, you know, capitalizing on the continent, on the continent infrastructures and, you know, geographical locations to support a lot of space missions. Thank you. Thank you so much, Tamindayo. Julie, did you wanna reflect on some of the opening remarks? Yes. I'll say, because I know we have questions. We do. And what have you. So first, thank you, both to Dr. Whedon and Dr. Lin for your remarks and your reflections on the significance on the report and also ways that it could be pushed further. I'll just address one question, you know, posed by Dr. Lin, which was, you know, what are the opportunity costs for, say, the Department of State, for example, to focus on space? And what would be, you know, we can think also about what the opportunity costs would be in building interagency coordination around this, moving toward, you know, what Dr. Whedon said is a very different kind of future in terms of how the U.S. engages in space-related activities and space diplomacy. And in a way, that question kind of, it resonates with earlier debates around how to engage with the internet, right? Or mobile phone technology, even in that way. And I think one of the things that we're seeing with the dynamism in the space domain and also its profound integration with everyday life, hardware, software, hard power, soft power, is the importance of building out the capability to understand how different actors and entities engage through space-based and space-linked technologies, much in the same way that it's been crucial to understand how different actors and entities engage via, you know, via cyber technologies, for example. And so I'll just say, in the interest of time, I'll just say that, but to kind of, if you'll allow me to, instead of actually answering your question directly, to kind of put it in the perspective of earlier iterations of this tech and policy question. Thank you. Well, we've already got some questions online. If there are any questions in the room, please put your hand up. But I'll start with what I've got here. To what extent do you see cases like Espacio Alejano Space Station in Argentina as instructive for African countries engaging with China on space programming? I have to admit that I'm reading this verbatim because I, myself, do not know what this Espacio Alejano example refers to. So please tell us what that refers to in the context of your answer. And then how can the US strategically align its space-related engagements as well as provide support for African space programs? Okay, great, thank you. So the first one, I love this question because it's a comparative question. And I really like it because it's actually how I came to the question of space-related activities on the African continent was actually via my focus on this question in Latin America, right? And it was the cooperation between Latin American space agencies and African space agencies that ultimately, long story short, led to the research collaboration that you see culminating in this report today. So just a little bit of quick background on the Espacio Alejano. This is a ground receiving station that is part of China's deep space research network. So there are a number of such stations around the world. I think seven or eight, some in polar regions, some aboard ocean-going vessels. And the case in Argentina is particularly provocative because it is leased to China for a 50-year term and there is no local oversight mechanism. So it's been critiqued as effectively Argentina handing over a segment of its territory to Chinese sovereignty and there's been a lot of concern about this ground station being used for other things besides deep space research and observation. In response to which the Chinese counterparts have offered assurances that it's not used for these purposes, but again, there's no oversight mechanism in place. And so that's essentially, that's a case where you have a little pocket of another sovereign country being leased to China for their particular space-related purposes. I think that's instructive if we view it in comparison to say the Chinese satellite and ground station contributions in Ethiopia that we talk about in the report. And so this is a very different situation where you have a collaboration between Chinese and Ethiopian counterparts. Again, you have public as well as private sector entities involved here and one of the outcomes of this agreement was not just the construction of a satellite for Ethiopia, but also the construction of ground receiving stations and capacity building and training for Ethiopian personnel so they can operate it and they can work with their own satellite. Right, so that's two very different approaches and one of the things to understand also about that is that the case in Argentina is for China's deep space research network and the case in Ethiopia is built very much with Chinese support and collaboration for Ethiopia's space agency. Thank you very much. And I know that you've addressed this in some of your opening remarks already but if there was anything else you wanted to add on the US's ability to strategically align its space-related engagements or support African space programs, that'd be wonderful. Yeah, thank you. And I think actually to address this, I'll draw on an earlier discussion and some insights offered by Temudayo. I mean, one of the issues here is that the US does not have a sort of clear strategy for engaging with African counterparts in the space domain and this is in contrast to China, to the European community and to Russia. They have dedicated personnel, dedicated plans that are about specifically engagement with Africa and space. And so that's one thing. And so there's not a kind of, the US doesn't have a clear strategy or a peer strategy to these other programs. And the other observation is that US engagement with Africa with respect to outer space is quite transparently reactive in response to China's moves in this foray. And so this is pretty transparent. And it also, the fact that it's reactive is again underscores the lack of careful engagement with the African Union Commission, a lack of engagement with individual African countries in order to really understand how both sides can benefit. Really underscoring the points that Temudayo has offered us earlier. Thank you, Temudayo. Did you want to jump in on any of this? Yes, so just to add to the last comment, talking about the lack of clear strategy, you see a good example of this is in the last December, there was the US Africa Space Forum in DC. And there was a lot of conversation on how the US one walked after the black, nothing concrete came out of that. I said, two countries signed and you had to miss a card. And last month, there was another event that was organized in Bafu and in a lot of half of the time parts, but invited again to discuss the same issue. But the problem is nothing is actually coming out of all of this conversation. And it's already getting to the point where, African leaders are beginning to see engagements with the US as a waste of time. Because when you have similar meeting with the European Commission, for example, one held in Dhaka last month, the meetings are very clear. There are clear objectives, clear strategies, either new programs have been announced or clear the vibrations are happening on where the two regions are going to come together to work together. This is the difficulty in all of this conversation. It's surely clear how to come up. Engagements with the US has not yet had any, so it's beginning to seem like, for a lot of leaders, it's possible that when future meetings are called like that, they may not show up because there's a lack of strategy. So I think for future engagement, it's very critical for the US government to work on it. Thank you very much. Well, we're coming up to time soon, but I do want to take the opportunity to bring Dr. Lin and Dr. Whedon into this conversation a bit. Firstly, if you have any reflections on anything that's been said, but more specifically, Dr. Lin, you spoke about the concern around space clubs as they existed in the Cold War and how this might be growing. I'm curious if you have any thoughts on either how we might avoid that, if that needs to be avoided, or indeed areas where there are perhaps even overlapping interests between the US and China, or any foreign counterparts over the developments of this technology. And Dr. Whedon, I'm curious, given your own background and expertise, whether you have any insights on why the US has been lacking in this relationship with Africa when it matters so much? Well, I'll start with Dr. Lin. Thank you. I'm going to start off with, in response to Tim Dayo's last point, is that in referencing us to European countries, I mean, if you're to read the strategies of Britain or France on space strategies, they're very clearly geared to commercial gains. And this is something that we do not do simply because we have bigger fish to fry, like we have a bigger stake in a lot of issues. But I think what's really important is that we do need to steer to a geo-economic understanding of what we can do with African countries that are mutually beneficial. And one of the key things I've tried to emphasize is that if you look at the space industry, in terms of launches last year, 80% was SpaceX, 10% was the Chinese, and then the rest of 10% was the rest of the world. And then aerospace industries, probably among top five, in terms of industries that are most susceptible to things like pandemic and logistics disruptions. So we're talking about a very volatile market that seems to be growing, but could very easily shrink or consolidate in the near future. What are we doing to sort of provide the market intel and the governance support to try to make this a more accessible market for Africa and for countries that are interested in making this sustainable and equitable? Right, this is, I think that's the premise that we need to start with. Yeah, thank you. So as to why the US hasn't done this sooner, you know, partly keep in mind, there's always been two parts to the US-based program. There was the public-facing, which was NASA and all the space people, peaceful purpose and all that kind of stuff. But there's always been this NASA 3D program that sometimes was bigger than the public program, but was very behind the scenes, either deliberately or just sort of not talked about. And on the national security side, historically the US has done a very much go-it-alone approach. Even with our close allies, the five eyes that we've collaborated with in many other areas up until very recently were not pulled into that for collaboration. So on the whole national security side of things, the US just didn't work with anybody historically on that. On the public-facing NASA peaceful purposes, that historically was linked to the Cold War space race, the battle for prestige with the Soviet Union. And there there was a strong focus on big projects that we could use to show off sort of American superiority and again prestige and all that sort of stuff. And then that shifted to how do we sustain these things with things like the shuttle program and the International Space Station where the US is bringing in partners that could contribute significantly to those projects that had countries like Russia and Canada and others that had technology of their own to contribute to the program. There just wasn't this vision of a broader strategy of how to bring in more countries. So again, I think that is changing. I think that there's recognition that needs to change but it is gonna take a while for this government to kind of build in this new, not only this new mentality, but just the capacity to go off and collaborate with a broader set of countries in different ways than they have in the past. Thank you very much. Well, look, I'm gonna finish with one closing question for the panel at large, which, and then please throw in any closing remarks you'd like to make. But the final question is, to what extent should we be concerned about the dual use applications of these satellites and technologies that China is developing with African nations? So I'll quickly start and I'll just say, I mean, I'm increasingly of the opinion that dual use is not the right way to frame this because pretty much everything in spaces has both functions, right? You know, historically on this question of weaponization and militarization, the debate multilaterally within the UN has been on banning the placement of space weapons or preventing an arms race in outer space and a strong focus on things, objects, technologies. That has shifted recently. There has been a shift in the last few years to talking more about behaviors in space because the behavior is what separates how you use something, right? You can certainly use a car as a weapon if you wanted to but we all know that it also has huge amount of purposes that are not related to warfare. So that shift has happened within the context of what was known as this open-ended working group on reducing space threats that the UN held over the last couple of years. What was striking about that conversation is something on the order of 70 countries participated in about 50 made statements, far more than have contributed in the past to similar discussions on these topics in the UN. So that process concluded earlier this year. UNGA just voted to have a follow-up discussion starting in 2025 on this further discussion of norms and these behaviors. So I think that's where things are gonna go. To me, that is a more productive discussion than trying to delineate what technologies are dual-use or military-only or that sort of thing. Thank you. I absolutely agree with you, Brian. Just to add a secondary point, is going back to Professor Debra Rottingham's earlier study about sort of ports and debt diplomacy in Africa. I think one thing for us to keep in mind is that the dual-use needs to be disaggregated. So you need to break it down. Are we talking about contracts? Are we talking about certain purposes? These effects need to be clarified before we make certain assumptions about what the impact will be on our strategy. So that's, yeah. Thank you. I'll take the last word. All right, I'll need a second. That's right, time to die here. Yeah, I just want to say that, you know, the U.S. space traffic towards Africa should not be primarily influenced by what China is doing. You know, because, you know, I think it is influenced by what China is doing at the U.S. might actually use to Africa. Thank you. And building on Brian's excellent point. I mean, this is a dual-use device. This is arguably already militarized. And it's a worst-case scenario that it becomes a weapon, right? And so I think that should help us think about space technology as well. This is a space technology, it is space integrated, space linked, probably a link to five, six, seven, eight satellites right now as we speak. And so I think this is a good closing thought for the USIP. I mean, focus on peace on all fronts, peace for its own sake, peace as its own, as an end in itself, so the tech isn't weaponized. So the behaviors are good and constructive. Fabulous. Well, look, thank you so much. And thank you, everybody, for coming to attend this. Thank you to everyone online. Thank you especially to my colleagues in the China team and the Africa Center for the collaborations to make this possible. And thank you especially to Lyndy Tsearing for bringing us all together here today for this report launch. But of course, thank you especially to Temadayo and Julie for this fantastic report. And I hope you will read it. You can find it on our website. And you can catch up on the beginning of this event. If you missed the beginning, it'll be posted on our web page through YouTube. So thank you again, and please join me in thanking our discussants.