 and coordination at all levels between the governments of Canada and the United States, both military and civilian, Navy, Army, Coast Guard, Air Force, and Merchant Marine. This film depicts the operations of the Central Group during military sea transportation service Arctic operations 1955, carried out under the command of Rare Admiral George C. Towner. These operations were unique in naval history, in that large numbers of ships were able to navigate the uncharted waters off the northern coast of Canada, hitherto considered impassable. And deep draft cargo ships rounded point barrel for the first time, operating as far eastward as Amundsen Gulf, and successfully withdrawing. The most critical part of the operation was the limited time during which ships could go through the narrow leads around point barrel. Proceed eastward and return. Usually the ice pack recedes from the shoreline sufficiently to permit entering and leaving the Beaufort Sea via point barrel from 7 August to 25 September, indicated by the black line. The red line, which shows typical conditions in 1955, demonstrates that this was not so. The ice pack never receded more than five miles from the islands off the coast, and usually rested on the coast at three or four points, receding from these points intermittently and giving the effect of a series of doors opening and closing at random, barring the movement of ships. For this reason, the open season as such did not exist. In a normal year, the storms moved northeast over the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, as shown by the black line, establishing a warm northerly current, also moving warm air northward and setting up an offshore wind circulation. These factors melt the ice and move it away from the beaches, creating wide leads. In 1955, the early August storms originated far to the north, as shown by the red line, and were accompanied by cold air and strong onshore winds, which reversed the warm current and moved the ice onto the beaches. By the time the storm tracks moved southward, conditions had deteriorated, and it was too late in the season to bring about the desired conditions. In order to take advantage of open water and to safely move ships, an intensive ice reconnaissance effort was necessary, and since local winds are the principal cause of ice movement, accurate weather forecasting was of extreme importance. The purpose of Arctic operations 1955, which were under the command of Vice Admiral F. C. Dennebrink, was to establish distant early warning radar stations along the northern coast of North America in order to detect the approach of enemy aircraft over the polar regions. The mission of the central group was to deliver material and equipment from staging areas on the west coast of the United States to the sites where these radar stations will be established in the central sector between Point Barrow and Shepherd Bay. To accomplish the mission, the central sector was divided into four parts. Area two, commanded by Captain R. J. Ramsbotham, with 16 ships, was to deliver cargo to eight of 11 sites from Point Barrow to Herschel Island. Six sites in the Mackenzie Bay area were assigned to the Northern Transportation Company of Canada. These were not a part of this operation. They were supplied from the Mackenzie River by tugs and barges. Area three, commanded by Captain J. M. Clement, with four ships, was to deliver cargo to seven sites from Cape Bathurst to Bernard Harbor. The eastern area, commanded by Commander H. H. Deloreal, with 19 ships, was to deliver cargo to 11 sites from Lady Franklin Point to Shepherd Bay. Each area had Army transportation forces embarked to handle cargo. This total force consisted of 1,500 troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Henderson, United States Army. To provide essential support to the cargo vessels, there were three icebreakers, a survey ship, four repair and salvage ships, and a tanker assigned. The primary staging areas for the central group were at Long Beach and Seattle, where loading commenced on 22 June. At Seattle, the majority of the material to be shipped was loaded at the Seattle Port of Embarkation, the Naval Station, and Ames Terminal. Here, by 7 July, were assembled all the cargo vessels for their final loading. Ship types employed included deep draft victory ships, the smaller and lighter Simabes, and naval assault cargo ships and landing ships tank. Special Arctic preparations were made on most of these ships, including ice propellers and extra side plating. The LSTs had special bow sheathing, which proved most effective in the ice later on. Cargo assembled on the docks was segregated into stacks and labeled for discharge at a specific site. Each box had a color code marker to indicate its contents for ease of stowing and dumps ashore. Loading plans required cargo for various sites to be loaded in a particular order, which in general was the reverse order in which it was planned to be unloaded. This did not allow flexibility and was to cause trouble later, when it was necessary to change the order of unloading. Under the supervision of the army, loading was done expeditiously and in a routine manner. In addition to the cargo, 11,000 tons of support equipment was loaded at Seattle. It consisted of cranes, tractors, trailers, forklifts, and many other items required to handle cargo at the isolated beaches, where no type of offloading equipment was available. There were many of these awkward pieces of cargo, which were difficult to handle. The LVTs and docks were loaded in the LSTs at West Point Beach Seattle. Heavy cumbersome equipment, which had to be landed in operating condition, was easily accommodated in an LST. This loading served as a rehearsal, because this support equipment had to be put ashore at each site to handle cargo, and then reloaded when offloading was completed. Upon completion of loading, the ships took on provisions to their capacity. The cargo was secured. The ships were made ready for sea, and the troops of the army transportation portions embarked. The first ships to depart for the Arctic were LSTs and Simabis. On 15 July, they were formed into a slow convoy and sorted from Puget Sound. Convoys included ships with three different types of crews, commission ships, civil service man ships, and merchant ships. All steamed smoothly together in convoy. Meanwhile, the AKAs and victories, which remained in Seattle, completed their loading. These ships, capable of making more speed, were formed into a fast convoy and departed five days after the slow convoy. The amphibious command ship, Mount Olympus, was the flagship of the Central Group. By the next morning, the fast convoy had cleared Puget Sound, and was formed up at sea for the long trek to the north. 900 miles ahead, the slow convoy was making excellent progress in good weather. The small shallow draft cargo ships in this convoy are called Simabis. The name is derived from the maritime administration's designation of this type ship, C1MAV1. The slow convoy transcended Unimac Pass on schedule. In the Bering Sea, the convoy encountered Pog for the first time, and it was to plague the entire operation. And about this time, the ship survey unit was beset in heavy ice near Point Barrow. This unit, composed of a survey ship and two ice breakers, was attempting an early ice transit in order to survey the uncharted portions of the area before the cargo ships arrived. An additional mission was to survey sheltered anchorages to be used as wintering insights in the event the ice sealed the exits and prevented the withdrawal of ships. The unit did succeed in making the early transit, but the survey ship requisite received considerable damage, and the ice breaker north wind received damage to one propeller, which was to handicapper during the remainder of the operation. The fast and slow convoys rendezvoused at Point Hope to reprovision and refuel, and make last-minute preparations before entering the ice. At this remote spot, ships were able to provide some welcome fresh provisions to the missionary and the local inhabitants. The task group then proceeded toward the southern edge of the ice pack at Icy Cape. First scattered ice was encountered just south of Cape Lisbon. By 31 July, all ships were at anchor at Icy Cape. Fast and slow convoys were dissolved, and the area units organized. An unusual mirage called looming magnified the apparent size of the ice in the Arctic 30 times and served as an omen of the hazards that lay ahead for long weeks to come. However, reports from ice reconnaissance planes and the weather forecasts indicated that conditions were temporarily favorable for the passage of some ships. So on 1 August, rear Admiral Counter made the decision to send the shallow draft ships of the eastern unit through the ice. The signal get underway was sent to the eastern unit. These ships were to steam many hundreds of miles through uncharted waters and overcome many unknown problems before returning to safe waters. The icebreaker Staten Island led the formation through gradually increasing concentrations of ice as it neared Point Barrow. The unit rounded Point Barrow on 2 August and proceeded eastward. At first the ice was not a particularly deterrent factor. Although there was no darkness at this time of the year, the midnight sun dipped low on the horizon and made a beautiful sight. Then fog was encountered. The combination of ice and fog first slowed the column and finally forced it to anchor for three days, 300 miles east of Point Barrow. Much ice was avoided by taking advantage of the shallow passage inside the chain of islands along the northern coast of Alaska, which forms a barrier against the polar pack. Use of this passage required skillful ship handling and navigation. The margin of safety was slim. Ships drawing more than 16 feet could not use this passage. Once through the passage the unit rejoined the icebreaker, which because of its deep draft had been required to make its way through the heavy ice to the seaward of the islands. Progress was slow but steady through the ice that was encountered all along the northern coast of Alaska. Eight days were required to travel the 468 miles to Herschel Island before ice-free waters were reached. The eastern unit now stretched out in a column miles long, passing through the Canadian gulfs, following the routes sounded and marked by the survey unit. Ships which were to discharge cargo at sites along the way were detached and left behind to commence work. At each of the sites, contractor personnel had been flown in with limited construction equipment to prepare the site for receiving cargo and to build air spirits and roads. At this site, 1200 miles from Point Barrow, the first detachment of the eastern unit was left behind. This ice mound, called a pingo, is found only in the Arctic. The only permanent installation in the eastern area was at Cambridge Bay, where Royal Canadian Mounted Police headquarters, a trading post, and a radio station are located. Cambridge Bay became a combined center of operations for Canadian and United States activities. Headquarters were established by the contractor, the Army, and the underwater demolition and hydrographic office personnel, who surveyed the Canadian site. It was also a clearinghouse for mail and passengers. On a tour to view the progress of operations were General Yelp, Chief of Army Transportation Corps, General Collins, Commanding General, United States Army, Alaska, and Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, who commanded the Army Transportation Forces in the entire central area. One of the next detachments was left at a site 100 miles east of Cambridge Bay. At sites where the beach would not allow an LST to beach with a dry ramp, earth ramps had been built out and were ready when the ships arrived. In Queen Maude Gulf, progress was halted for five days when heavy ice was encountered. But by this time, all involved had come to expect that the unexpected would occur. And it again demonstrated the value of two principles to bear in mind when operating in the Arctic. Keep your plans flexible. Be patient. The survey ships, also blocked by this ice, reconnoitered alternate routes, and did succeed in finding a good route through the ice in deep water. With the heavy ice left behind, the Eastern unit proceeded, with the survey ships ahead sounding out a safe passage towards narrow, shallow, Simpson Strait, which was the last danger to be encountered before arriving at the end of the line. At King William Island in Simpson Strait, ice was still present, but it was rotten and offered little trouble to the ships which offloaded there. After passing through Simpson Strait, the last ships battered their way through the final belts of ice and were led into Shepherd Bay by the Stores. It had taken 14 days to travel the 1700 miles from Point Barrow through ice, fog, and uncharted waters. Much credit for their safe arrival must be given to the ship survey unit. Preparations were immediately made to begin unloading operations. The LSTs discharged their amphibious vehicles, so as to lighten the bow sufficiently to allow beaching with a dry ramp. Underwater demolition personnel in boats served as pilots to guide the LSTs to the beach. Underwater demolition personnel in teams with Hydrographic Office personnel had made a detailed reconnaissance and survey of the beach at each of the sites in the central area before the arrival of ships. They had determined the gradient of the beach, had marked safe approaches to the sites, and had located and fixed the positions of all underwater dangers. Key personnel talked over last-minute details to coordinate the final arrangements for the unloading of cargo. Army personnel unloaded ships' holes, operated boats and vehicles, and stowed the cargo in dumps ashore. In general, the method of discharging cargo at all the sites in the eastern area was the same. First, support equipment was landed, such as cranes, tractors, and vehicles used to handle cargo on the beach. The LST then remained beached, and its cargo was unloaded through the ramp or over the side into ducts and LBT's, which then took it to the dump. The cargo of ships, which anchored off the site, was unloaded into LCMs and ducts. When all cargo was offloaded, the support equipment was reloaded and made ready for use again. For some ships of this unit, unloaded at as many as four sites. The Army's cargo handling procedures proved to be speedy and efficient. Cargo operations were completed according to plan. With support equipment aboard, all its ships unloaded, the eastern unit began its withdrawal, gathering up its detachments as it proceeded westward. The remaining ships of the central group had not been idle during this time. They followed close behind the eastern unit. But they were temporarily stopped at Point Barrel because ice breakers were not yet available, and ice conditions were too severe for these deep draft vessels to proceed unescorted. Advantage was taken of this waiting time by unloading some Point Barrel cargo, utilizing the boats and troops available. This provided an opportunity to test out unloading procedures and give training under the conditions to be encountered. While these preliminary operations were in progress, Vice Admiral Dennebrink, Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, and the overall commander of Arctic Operations 1955, made his first visit to confer with where Admiral Towner. Ice conditions at Point Barrel, which initially had been favorable, deteriorated rapidly. Winds and currents drove heavy ice into the regular anchorage to the west of Point Barrel and forced the ships to move into a sheltered anchorage to the east of the point. Here too, a shift of the wind gradually filled this anchorage. Some ice could be fended away from the ships with boats. But finally, this anchorage became untenable and had to be abandoned. This was the pattern of movement which went on all during the operation. In some cases, it was necessary to move 120 miles to the south to reach safe water and then again move north when conditions improved. The command ship, Mount Olympus, had to remain as near Point Barrel as possible in order to best control the operation. The Area 2 unit, which was to deliver cargo to the sites along the northern coast of Alaska, took advantage of favorable ice conditions to commence operations. This unit used LCUs to offload cargo. They were launched from the landing ship Doc Thomaston at Point Barrel and taken in tow by LSTs for the transit to Area 2. This towing enabled the unit to make better speed. They rounded Point Barrel several days after the departure of the eastern unit and proceeded toward the first site. The north wind remained with the Area 2 unit for a time to provide immediate assistance. Captain Maloney, United States Coast Guard, her commander, was also in charge of all ice breakers in the Central Area. LCUs would have been better off if they proceeded independently. They could have avoided heavy ice such as this. Cargo offloading procedures were different in Area 2. LSTs could not beach because of shallow approaches. So LCUs were used to lighter in LVTs and other support equipment as well as cargo. In some cases, anchorages for deep draft ships were nine miles from the beach. This made the turnaround time for light reach excessive even under the best conditions. Fog and ice further increased the turnaround time as well as the danger. The organization and loading of the Area 2 unit did not provide sufficient flexibility. It was not subdivided as in other areas and so had the capability of unloading at only one site at a time. Then move on to the next and so on through the area. Loading restricted selective unloading. Ships had been loaded so as to require them to unload in predetermined order. At this first site, loose ice moved into the shallow water off the beach and grounded in such concentrations that LCUs could no longer get to the beach and the ice pack crowded into the anchorage. The unit was forced to withdraw to Point Barrow. It could not return to its next site for five days. The situation varied little at the next beach. This beach was typical of all the beaches in Area 2. Consisting of loose gravel which afforded very poor traffic ability for wheeled vehicles. Heavy equipment such as this three ton reel of wire was moved only by tracked vehicles. Sleds were frequently used. Off the beach was soft spongy tundra which was impassable to all vehicles in the summer months. At this time the ice forecast indicated that to send any of the deep draft ships further eastward would subject them to serious damage and possible loss. Consequently cargo was then transferred from the deep draft victories to shallow draft ships for delivery to the next site. Even the LCUs could not dry ramp at these beaches. They had to be pulled closer to the beach. The contractor assisted by building an earth ramp each time the landing craft reached. Every ton of cargo landed at these sites in the ice area along the north coast of Alaska represented an excessive expenditure of time and manpower. For efficient unloading in Area 2, the area should be subdivided to permit simultaneous discharge at four or five places. Each detachment of ships should be loaded for a minimum number of sites and carry lighterage and stevedores in types and amounts capable of expeditiously unloading under the conditions expected at the sites assigned. We leave the Area 2 unit and shift back to Point Barrel where the Area 3 unit has been waiting for ice breakers for 10 days. This unit was still faced with an 800 mile journey to Area 3. It was the 12th of August before the ice breakers, Britain Island and North Wind were available to escort the Area 3 unit around the point to begin the difficult transit along the Alaskan coast. None of these ships had ice propellers or protective sheathing. When heavy ice was encountered they had to stop or be towed through the ice. It took two days to reach a point about 250 miles from Point Barrel where the ice pack crowded against the coastal islands. Passing through this ice progress was measured in feet and finally the ships were beset. A fellow prisoner was the Canadian motor ship Cassiar bound for Cambridge Bay. It took nine more days to travel the remaining 225 miles before the last ship of the unit reached Clearwater. The Archer Gammon grounded during this time and was refloated only after 1,500 tons of oil were pumped overboard. The Andromeda was disabled when ice snapped her rudder post and she had to be towed from that point on. Helicopters were operated constantly when weather permitted. They continually probed for favorable leaves. It was nearly September before the ships began unloading in their area. Here in area three the lighterage consisted of LCMs, LVTs and ducts. At the Canadian sites the site survey teams composed of hydrographic and underwater demolition personnel made detailed hydrographic surveys of the deep water anchorages and approaches at each site. These charts enabled ships to anchor close to the unloading beaches. As a result the turnaround times were much shorter in area three than in area two. Beach gradients were steep enough to afford dry ramp beaching for LSTs and LCMs at five of the seven sites. There was no ice in this area because of this and the closeness of the anchorages to the beaches a rapid rate of discharge was attained in area three. The Canadian coast in area three is hilly rocky and lined with cliffs in places. The beaches are sand and gravel and the traffic ability allows wheeled vehicles to be used ashore. At two of the sites there were sheltered harbors. Offloading was interrupted at two sites for several days by high winds and rough seas that made boating difficult and swamped one of the ducts. Cargo discharge was speeded up when reinforcements were received in the form of LSTs and stevedores from the eastern unit which had completed its job and was heading back. By late August it was apparent that the area two unit could not complete unloading of all sites in Alaska in the time remaining for safe operation. Therefore the eastern unit which had completed its mission and was headed back to Point Barrow was assigned the task of unloading at the sites around Butter Island. The cargo for these sites was in two victories at Point Barrow. All available icebreakers were required to escort these victories to Butter Island. Both victories were damaged before they arrived. Here at Butter Island LSTs were used as lighters. Army and Navy personnel combined efforts to speed up the unloading. This was one of the few beaches in area two where an LST could get fairly close to the beach. Only a short earth ramp was required to afford dry unloading. These arcticized LSTs proved to be the ideal ships for this type of an operation. They were efficient icebreakers. Their shallow draft enabled them to avoid heavy ice. Although their cargo capacity is less than other types, they could rapidly unload heavy equipment directly to the beach ready to operate. They also provided birthing and messing facilities for crew and troops. The arctic sidewalk superintendent eagerly waited for telephone poles to be landed. As they had so frequently done all during the operation, the ARSs, repair ships, worked tirelessly to repair ice damage so that ships could continue to operate. Repairs affected by these ships ranged from patching ruptured hulls to actually fabricating and installing a rudder. Diving operations under arctic conditions taxed the endurance of the hardiest of men. Round the clock operations were the order of the day, but this late in the season the periods of darkness grew longer and longer and slowed operation. The weather gradually deteriorated but operations continued. At this crucial time Vice Admiral Dennebrink returned to the central area on his second tour to observe the progress of operation firsthand. Shifting winds drove ice into the anchorage and on to the beach. While avoiding ice on the way to the beach, the LST Chittenden County grounded on a sandbar and was refloated after much difficulty. At this adjacent site to the east no unloading could be done because of extremely shallow beach gradients, but at the last site in this area some cargo was landed by the LST Hillsborough County despite grounded ice. Cargo which could not be delivered was left at Barter Island for movement by cat train during the weather. Within a few miles of each of these sites there is no civilization but wildlife abounds. With the completion of cargo offloading at Barter Island the mission of the central group was almost completed. Now the difficult return to ice-free waters was the main problem to be faced by all units. The scene which greeted Captain Ramsbotham, the commander of area two, as his flagship led the way home was none to encourage. Reports showed that escape route around Barrow was already blocked and only a marked change in the wind would open leads to allow escape. There were no ice breakers available for Commander Deloria's eastern unit as it departed Barter. Aerial ice reconnaissance which played a vital part all through the operation was now intensified. Aerological units hopefully continued weather observations seeking some indication of an offshore wind that would push the polar pack off the coast. Ice breakers were dispatched to assist the area three unit which was in the most critical situation preparing to enter the ice with one ship already disabled and untold. Wintering in appeared probable. The experience that helicopter pilots gained during the earlier phases of the operation was now fully utilized. As ships approached the last barrier near Barrow the situation had improved slightly but new ice was forming indicating that time was running out. These large pools of ice-free water are known as Polina. They offered temporary shelter from the crushing ice. Bear tracks indicated the Arctic pack was close. From the bridge of a ship it was difficult to get an accurate picture of the ice situation ahead. Only from high overhead in the helicopter which rains miles ahead could the false leads be distinguished from the true leads. There is no substitute for this type of local ice reconnaissance. Talking directly to the ship the helicopter pilot actually served as an extension to the eyes of the commanding officer and guided him to the leads not visible from the ship. The worst ice situation was right at Point Barrow. Here the door was tightly closed but at the last minute the long awaited offshore wind arrived and allowed the ships to escape. This last belt was penetrated only with the aid of ice breakers. This shallow draft coast guard boy tender assisting the TLST 1072 was called a WAGLE, W-A-G-L. It was used as a light ice breaker. These ships were indispensable in shallow water where the heavy ice breakers could not go. Once through this ice ships were in comparative safety the threat of wintering in was now behind. The final cargo offloading at Point Barrow had been interrupted by large ice flows which had grounded and completely blocked the approaches to the beach. Leads had to be opened through this ice so that remaining cargo could be put ashore. Off the Eskimo village there was a partial lead that could be opened by explosives. Underwater demolition personnel studied the flows to find key pieces which, if demolished, would open leads large enough to allow unloading to continue. By the use of explosives and with the assistance of shallow draft ice breakers and the Eskimos two leads were opened and kept usable. The LSD Thomaston placed herself at the seaward entrance to the largest lead in order to prevent drifting ice from entering and closing it. The final cargo was offloaded by LSDs and LCUs. 116,267 tons of cargo were discharged at all sites in the entire central sector. Unloading methods such as this assembly line unloading of drums speeded up the discharge of 45,000 measurement tons at Point Barrow. The last ship rounded Point Barrow and headed home on 15 September. It had taken 45 days of hazardous round-the-clock work to complete this operation. Here was proof of the Navy's capability to operate in all oceans. These operations were not without cost. 13 groundings were reported. There were 44 hull casualties and 22 lost or damaged propellers and shafts. All but four of the 60 ships were damaged. However, no ships or aircraft were lost and there was only one death but it was not from operational causes. Operations in the central area were completed on time. The mission of the central group completed. The Mount Olympus was led southward through rapidly increasing ice concentrations. She was the last ship to reach safe waters. The final operational report of the commander central group, among other things, listed the following lessons learned as being of major importance. Do not send cargo ships with drafts of more than 16 feet east of Point Barrow. Organize the task group into small self-contained area elements requiring a minimum of loading for multiple discharge. Art decays all ships which will operate eastward of Point Barrow. Assign an adequate number of large and small ice breakers to future operations.