 Good afternoon everyone and I'm delighted that all of you could come today. I hope you've enjoyed the session so far. What we'll try to do in this afternoon's first panel is to widen the lens a little bit on US-Indian partnership and look at the question of how we can reinforce and build on habits of cooperation between the United States and India across what is an increasingly complicated international landscape. I think Prime Minister Modi put it best when he said recently that the real test of partnership between the United States and India is only partly about what we can do for each other. It's also about what we can do together for the rest of the world. I truly can't think of a more accomplished or thoughtful group to help us address that question this afternoon than the four very distinguished statesmen on the stage with me, Steve Hadley, MK Narayanan, Shankar Menon, and Tom Donnelly. You've all seen or already know their remarkable biographies and accomplishments. All four served as national security advisors during very important moments in the histories of their country and in the history of the US-India relationship. All four contributed in extremely important ways to the strengthening of that partnership. All four, I think, appreciated what in many ways sets apart the US-India partnership and that is the sense of bipartisan support in both of our capitals, which at least in Washington these days is a rare enough phenomenon. I've had the good fortune of working with all four of them during their 10 years as national security advisor and know each of them not only as a model of leadership and the best in public service, but also as friends for whom I have the greatest respect. So as I mentioned this morning, we've accomplished a lot together, I think, in the last decade of the United States and India, but a great deal of work remains to realize the full promise of our partnership. And as significant as the civil nuclear agreement was, the truth, as all of you know very well, is that one initiative, however dramatic or groundbreaking it might be, is not the real test of a partnership like the one between the United States and India. It's really about the question of whether we can apply that partnership in practical terms across a range of issues on which I believe our interests increasingly converge, whether it's the issue of building order and prosperity for a new generation in the Asia Pacific or climate change or working together to prevent the proliferation of weapons and mass destruction or working together to combat terrorism and violent extremism. So what I thought I'd try to do just to begin our discussion is to ask each of my friends and colleagues here to take a step back and reflect a little bit on their 10 years as national security advisor. What did they expect? How did they see the US-India relationship at the outset of their 10 years? What did they see to be the possibilities, the major challenges and opportunities? What kind of lessons and broad terms did they draw from their experience? So Steve, if you don't mind, why don't we start with you? Well, let me go back a little step. I grew up in Toledo and then Cleveland, Ohio, and the first time I left the United States was actually the year after I graduated from law school and I went to India for seven weeks with a law school classmate of mine named Bill Drayton, who subsequently founded an organization called Ashoka of Social Entrepreneurs, and its first operation was in India. And that seven weeks in India was really quite formative, and the thing that struck me at the time was why these countries that had so much in common had had such a difficult relationship. And I thought to myself, well, if I ever have an opportunity, I'll see if I can do something about it. And then, of course, we get into the campaign for the presidency in 2000. And President Clinton really, and this is Bill's point, this has been a project over three administrations, both in the United States and in India. And Bill Clinton really got it started with that historic trip he took to India at the end of his presidency. And then President Bush in the campaign said that one of his objectives was to forge a strategic relationship between the United States and India. And that was the opportunity we really had when we came into office. A lot of people have said, well, that was because India was needed by the United States as a balance to China. That was really not how I saw it. And I don't think it was how President Bush saw it. And it's not how he talked about it. What he said was India is going to emerge and is emerging on the world stage. And India is going to be a huge player on the world stage. And as we look at the problems we all face, increasingly they are going to be global problems. Bill mentioned them, terrorism, proliferation, the environment, energy, stable economy, and all the rest, for which we will need India's cooperation if we are going to solve them. So the President's view was let's get ahead of this situation and use now as an opportunity to forge the kind of relationship with India. So as India emerges as a global player, it will be a partner of the United States rather than an adversary of the United States. And that was really what motivated it in the first place. I would say two other things, Bill. One is everybody remembers the civil nuclear deal, and I'll talk about it. But really I think more important was, and Ashley will remember it because he was central to this, was what we called Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, which did not have a lot of publicity to it, but was an effort to forge Indian-American cooperation in three or four areas. One was missile space technology, one was advanced technology, one was in the civil nuclear field, three or four areas. And what we did was develop a situation of sort of a glide path going forward where there are suspicions on each side. And the way we arranged it was if India, for example, would take a step to reassure us on the proliferation front, that would allow us to loosen up and start forging cooperation in the nuclear front. And there were flip sides. If the United States would take a step, then India would take a step. And that step-by-step approach allowed the two countries to build confidence in each other over time. And that really set up a situation where we then said, well, then let's pick one of these areas of cooperation. And our criteria really was where is an area of cooperation that if the United States and India can have a breakthrough, it will really capture the imagination, the intention of both of Americans and Indians and let them know that it is now a new relationship. So the nuclear, civil nuclear deal with all the problems it had in terms of people who are concerned about the proliferation consequence, the advantage of it was it had the potential to really break through in that way and the consciousness of both Americans and Indians, send the message it is a new relationship, and then open the door for the kind of cooperation on global issues that was really where we wanted to go in the relationship in the first place. Thanks, Steve. That's a terrific story. I really don't know where to start, because I think I'm perhaps the oldest man in the room. So I've seen the worst days of the India-U.S. relationship, and I was very much a part of keeping the Americans at bay. I'm sitting back here and to think that today I'm part of a group which can claim some role in completely transforming the nature of the relationship, is something which I would never have thought possible. I mean, you give me more than seven minutes. You can take as much time as you want. Anecdote age is part of my Anecdote. No, the point is that the sort of Cold War years appeared a great hostility, and as you rightly said, three administrations. I would like to say on the Indian side, I think several prime ministers, I would say Mrs. Gandhi when she started her second tenure. It so happened that I was an intelligence chief to five prime ministers, so I have some idea of what their thought process is as well. And Rajeev Gandhi took it forward. Mr. Vajpayee, whom I did not serve directly, but he was always sometimes just sent for me. And of course, then we had Mr. Manmohan Singh and others. So each of them played a major role in trying to sort of tear aside, not the bamboo curtain, what I would say the jute curtain that we had between India and the United States. But I for one never imagined, I must confess that a day would come when we would establish the relationship that we have been able to establish today, and particularly that the nuclear issue would become the centerpiece. And well, there are lots of people who are responsible for this. I want to pay a homage to President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, particularly because I think this morning I used the phrase, I don't know where I got it from suddenly, the suspension of disbelief was the real reason why we were able to achieve what we did. And I also want to say a big compliment to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Rusty Hadley, who was the midwife of this entire program during those days, played a remarkable role in sort of facilitating the ideas and the concepts that were put forward by these two leaders. But the element of trust, President Bush's belief that India's time had come and that we must be part of the process. And I agree entirely with Mr. Rusty, at no time during the entire process was there any hint, suggestion, etc. that India should be used as a counterbalance to China. This often figured in the debates, in the debates that used to take place saying, is that why the Americans are being so friendly? And nobody could quite understand why were the Americans so helpful to us. I mean, there were difficulties in terms of the nitty-gritty of the discussions on the nuclear issue. But without our two principles, the two leaders who steered the destiny of our countries during that period, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the Indian side, President Bush on the US side, we just could not have achieved what we want. I mean, there were three, I do one, two instances were mentioned briefly this morning. One was on the night of July 17th and 18th, when I think, but for the, I think I clarified the issue, saying that it's not that Mr. Manmohan Singh did not want the deal, but there was something that Steve and I had worked on, which we found had been altered over the, over the period of the next few weeks. So we finally, but I think in that case, the President and Condi Rice and Steve worked the whole thing out. The other one was, which involved Steve and me directly on the, on the night of the 1st of March, the President gets down from the plane and he, we were on the receiving line, he came up to me and he said, I want the deal. You remember that Steve? And he said, I'm not going to negotiate, it's going to be between you and, and Steve. And we worked till midnight and we broke, the talks broke down. And I remember ringing up Mr. Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister and saying that sir, it is not working out. Next morning, they came back. Once again, the two sides, the principles came to us. So I think where you get a fundamental transformation in the natural relationship, I think you require great leaders who, as I said, can suspend disbelief. You know, the, the, the most important thing is not to be taken in, but what MTA says or Shankar says, but please accept the bigger picture because there's a greater good that one looks for. And I think that is the fundamental way that we need to, to look at it because while there were incremental improvements in the relationship, we required the India, US nuclear deal to completely transform the natural relationship. Today, you go across to any university in India, you go to any city in India. And I think there's no question now, in your number, where does India and the United States stand? They're on the same page, quite, quite clearly. But you required a deal like this. And I think that was sustained in relation. Whenever there is a decline in that, I think things don't, so in this group, I'm the only non-diplomat. And that's why I'm taking a dig at Shankar. I said, I'm a non-diplomat. And I said, with all the brilliance of the diplomats and the hard work they put in, finally, when you come to a big deal, you require the top leaders to have a common understanding. And I think the nations, the two nations to be, as I said, on the same page when you come to a stop here, just to give you as to where we are. And I think there's a lot more to be said as to where we could go to later. No, that's great. And us diplomats will need to stick together here. So let me turn to Shankar also, because that's a very good transition to, you're certainly both of you are absolutely right about this, the power, not only have seen the big picture, but of leadership and being willing to take risks in the pursuit of that big picture. And then that opens up the question of, so how do you take advantage of it? How do you build habits of cooperation across what is today a kind of bewildering array of international challenges? And I can't think of anybody better suited to begin to talk about it than you Shankar. Well, for me, it's remarkable. Looking back, if you think of what's happened over the last two decades to the India-U.S. relationship, the transformation that they've spoken of, and the leadership that our leaders have shown in this relationship, if you think of it, this is the process pre-911, pre- and post-Mumbai, pre-2008, post-2008. I mean, if you think of the environment in which this has been going on, look how transformed it is. Not just the rise of China, but the whole change of the Asia-Pacific balance and the rise of so many powers in the Asia-Pacific. And yet, this is steady. This is a constant for the last two decades. I find that incredible. And I don't think enough people quite, I don't think we diplomats, but certainly leaders, give ourselves enough credit for what is happening. So why is this happening? Why is it such, why have we managed this despite all the changes around us, whatever we see? For me, there's three big parts to this. One is increasing strategic congruence. Even the issues that used to divide us. When I was foreign secretary, when we used to talk about Iran, Myanmar, I mean, those are no longer issues that divide us anymore. And when you look at the new issues, contention in the global commons, cyber security, maritime security, things like that. There are all issues on which we actually come closer and closer. You look at maritime security, for instance. Cyber, I mean, we all seek multi-stakeholder involvement in global internet governance. I think if you look at it over time, that congruence has grown. Secondly, I'm from an Indian, purely Indian point of view. Of course, the U.S. is an essential partner if we want to transform India. There's no way we could do this without the U.S. So I think that's very clear. But the third thing I think is that we've actually had a series of successes. Civil nuclear has been the most prominent and I think it's one that got all the attention. But if you look at the defense technology initiative and look at how far back it goes, I think Steve mentioned the next steps in strategic partnership and what it did for high technology. In December 2008, I think India was still subject to something like 28 different kinds of U.S. sanctions on various things. Today, there's none of them. And frankly, high-tech exports to India get cleared as fast and get similar treatment to what happens with Israel with the UK. I mean, that's a remarkable step forward. We're now talking about working together on an aircraft carrier. So when I look for the way forward, it seems to me we should build on those successes. Those are the things that I would look at. Defense technology initiative, the strategic conference, improving the dialogue between us and seeing what we can do together on these things. Already, we've expanded Malabar this year to include Japan. I think we're the exercises. So there's a whole series. And most important to me is that we need to look also at issues of the Asia-Pacific order going forward of how we ensure that the kind of peaceful enabling environment that we've had, which has permitted this tremendous economic growth in the region, that this can still be enabled in the years to come. I can go on, but I'd better stop. Come back to that. But thanks very much, Shankar. And Tom, I mean, this is a very good setup and a way for you, because you deserve a great deal of credit in the Obama administration for building on all the achievements that everyone else has talked about already. So let me just turn to you. Okay, thank you. It's great to be here today. Thanks, everybody. And Shankar and I spent many, many hours together working on this. And he was a great partner, a great representative of this country. A couple of things to start with. One, I think it is important to underscore the arc of the relationship since President Clinton's visit there in 2000 through three administrations. And the arc, and it's never going to be perfect, and there are going to be disagreements, and there are going to be bumps in the road. But it is important to take the long view. And the long view on this is that the relationship between the United States and India has been transformed in ways that really couldn't have been imagined in the mid-1990s. And I think that's an important piece of this. A second bill, as you alluded to, this has been a thoroughly bipartisan policy in the United States, which is an unusual thing. Third, it also has had, in part, its basis in deep people-to-people ties. You know, there are some 3 million Indians working in America. We have 100,000 Indian students in the United States. And the connectivity between our societies and our peoples, I think, it's also had a lot to do with this. And I think it provides a real source of strength going forward. With respect to our coming into office in 2009 and how we thought about India, I'd say the following things. Number one, we did see strategic conversions and sought to build on the steps that the President Bush 43 had taken. Number two, we had a set of specific issues in mind as well. One was that we were, in addition to revitalizing our alliances, which had gone through a tiring time, a very exhausting time in foreign policy. We also were looking to build new relationships and trying to imagine what the partnerships we were going to require in the future would look like. And we really couldn't imagine taking on global issues in the future and not having India as a partner. And President Obama thought very clearly about that. Indeed, he said on a number of occasions, quoting Prime Minister Bhadrapati, who's been recently quoted by Prime Minister Modi, that in fact that the United States and India were natural allies in the famous phrase. And we sought to work towards that. Even more specifically, we undertook beginning in 2009 a policy called the Rebalance to Asia, which I worked pretty intensively on. And this matched up almost exactly with the India-Go East policy. And there were just a number of things that we sought to work on together geostrategically going forward. And I think that all worked out pretty well. So the first state visit to the United States was Prime Minister Singh to the White House in 2009. President Obama then took a trip, a very quite successful trip to India in 2010, where he stood in the Indian Parliament and declared the United States support for India as a member of the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Another, I think, an important step building on, again, the work that had been done before. And then to be candid, we hit a bit of a stall in the relationship. So you have to ask why that was. Lots of different reasons for it. Always there are many things going on in the world. You know, in the United States has a lot of things that it's working on day to day. I do think that the civil liability legislation in 2010, which seemed to diminish the promise of the civil nuclear deal, and that's been hopefully revitalized now as a result of the work by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi in last January, that I think did take some of the air out of the momentum in terms of the relationship. And then I think there were issues on the Indian side in terms of reform stalling to some extent. I do think, though, in the second term with President Obama keeping his eye on the ball here in terms, again, of thinking through what are the partnerships the United States needs? What are the partnerships the globe needs in order to attack global issues? We're back, I think, and revitalizing the relationship. And so you've had reciprocal visits to India and Washington within a four month period. My own recommendation, if I were still in my old job, would be that President Obama not finish his term before having another visit here by Prime Minister Modi. I think that that systematic encounter at the highest levels is really critical because it drives the systems. It ensures that the list of things, and there are dozens and dozens of things that came out of these last two reciprocal visits, that you're constantly working on them and you're called to account when the heads of state or government get together. So I would schedule another round, if you will, with Prime Minister Modi. And I think, again, that underscores the strategic convergence, the view that President Obama's had from the beginning, to build on what had been done before and, again, to imagine the United States and India as essential partners going forward. It's also the last thing I'll say about this. It has been a test of imagination to some extent. Take it over some of the old ways and the old ways of thinking. And I think that we're at the point now where both sides can actually imagine what a natural alliance looks like finally. And you saw that, I think, when President Obama was invited by Prime Minister Modi to be the honored guest at Republic Day for the first time for a U.S. President. And that embodied a lot, I think. It really did set a lot to me about the full embrace, the full embrace between the countries. And the last thing, of course, is I do think that Prime Minister Modi's election and the energy around that, I think, is also brought, re-energized on the U.S. I predict in the American business community. Thanks very much, Tom. And I know MK, you wanted to add a comment. And let me just preface that by saying that no time, I think, introduced one of the most significant areas of convergence as Indians and Americans and our two governments look at the world. And that is the convergence between the rebalance in this administration, building on what the last administration did, the increasing priority attached to the Asia Pacific and an Indian policy that's not just about looking East but acting East in some very important ways. So MK, why don't I turn to you for your comment and also talk a little bit more about the Asia Pacific and how the U.S. and India can work together. Okay. But I mean, in the euphoria, I thought I might inject a certain amount of realism because I thought that was coming. No, the reason is that we almost stumbled on the India-U.S. nuclear deal on the domestic front. And since that was an area which I worked on very closely because of my past anger, there is a certain amount of residual, what should I say, distrust of where we stand. The reason I wanted to press the point is we need to work hard on this. Let's not take it for granted. I know that at many levels, Indian industry, I think even amongst the youth of the country, et cetera, but deep down in the political hierarchy, it is still a great deal. I won't say a great deal. There's considerable amount of atmospherics which need to be sort of sorted out. And we need to look at this and the just now Tom was mentioning about what sort of stood in the way. Part of it is this I mean, you know, when things don't work out in the speed at which happens, these forces come to the surface. So we need to do a great deal with regard to ensuring that the relationship proceeds in the way that we do. And of course, industry will play a major role. The Indian Americans, Indian United States and others will play their role. But I know that even minor pride like we had to do, I did 47 meetings to sort of soften the blow as far as the deal was concerned. And we were lucky, we got the support of President Kalam, who was just demoted office and he came on to and he had to sort of come in. So I mean, I just wanted to mention that because I think we need a certain. So I think that's a very good point. I mean, it is, you know, I think we've been describing a an enhanced and positive bilateral relationship, which is undeniable, I think. But there's a lot of work to be done on the strategic side and building is toward the true strategic partnership because there are many areas where we don't see eye to eye and they continue to cause issues, whether it be Russia, Iran, climate, so these are all the things that we can discuss. But it's a, I think that the point's both taken a lot of work to do. I think one of the things we have on this strategic trust is very interesting. If you talk to the Chinese, they will say, well, we can't cooperate until we overcome the strategic distrust between the United States and China. I think, you know, countries don't really have trust or distrust. They have interests and you try to address suspicions and but oddly enough, if you say we have to have strategic trust before we can cooperate, you'll never cooperate because the way you build strategic trust is by cooperating. So this U.S.-India relationship is a little bit by like the bicycle, you've got to keep going and we need to keep identifying areas where we can cooperate and demonstrate over and over again to our people that there are common interests that link us together and there are things that we can do together that are in the mutual interest of both countries. If I could put one footnote to something MK said, it is certainly true the two, the leaders at the top really make an enormous difference, particularly when you're going to do a breakthrough initiative. I would also say personal relationships really matter. I had complete confidence in MK Narayana and, you know, he would call me up on the phone and he would say, Steve, the negotiations have broken down again. We need to get together and get it all, let's sit down and we would figure out a way to get it back on tracks. Thirdly, this was an example where the NSCs in both countries worked very closely with their foreign ministries and state departments. There was no division, there was complete transparency and we were working actually both columns for a common objective. That is very important because when state and foreign ministries and the NSC are working together in harness, you can really get a lot done and if there can conflictually bring the whole process to a halt. So in terms of good governance and how you run the process, there are a lot of lessons here I think that are applicable more generally to how to run a governmental process in a way that can actually achieve our objectives in advance. No, it's a really important point, Steve, and I think it reinforces what Tom said before about the significance of structure so that whether it's regular meetings between leaders that helps to drive the bureaucracy and build those kind of habits of both institutional and personal cooperation, it's really valuable. Shankar, let me just turn to you for a second on especially on the Asia Pacific as a former ambassador to China, one of the most thoughtful observers of China around, you know, obviously China's rise is of enormous significance for all of us. It's not the only critical issue in the Asia Pacific but it's certainly center stage and so how do you see not only the India-China relationship but how the United States and India can work together across the Asia Pacific because there are challenges with regard to modifying institutions which exist and dealing with the introduction of new institutions like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, so how do you see that whole set of challenges? Well, I think, you know, if there, it's not so much a question as Steve Hadley said, I think about trust. I think first you have to assume that all the actors are going to, you trust them to follow their self-interest. I mean that's all you can trust them for the rest of it. I don't think you need to at this stage worry beyond that especially when you look at the Asia Pacific as a whole. You know, if you're going to wait for trust and whatever, understand them to break out, then I think you have a long wait coming. The rise of China, I think it's more than just the rise of China. I think it's a fact that we today don't have the political institutions and that the politics, the security order in the Asia Pacific is way behind the economic development and the economic order and in fact there's actual dissonance between the two today when you look at the situation in the Asia Pacific. I think both the US and India have the same interest actually that we bring these back in alignment that we create an enabling environment within which growth development, the peace and stability that we require in the region that all the countries in the region say they're interested in. But I don't think today we have either the places where we talk about this among ourselves in the region. East Asia summit was a beginning, we've tried some of us, but clearly there are some countries, China included, who are uncomfortable with the idea of multi-lateralizing those discussions. And I think there's a long way to go before we can actually do that. So it becomes important therefore that what the US, what India, what Japan or all of us do in the region helps to create a situation where we can at least start looking at building up an order which will work because frankly this dissonance is really is worrying. I mean I find it particularly worrying and in the longer run because not only has Asia grown very fast economically, we've used that money in the last two decades for the world's biggest arms race actually in history if you look at it. So there's a fair amount of kindling lying around in terms of disputes, in terms of you know capabilities which have been built up and that's something that I think we therefore need to seriously look at issues of the order. And I think frankly when you look at interest as Steve said US and India I think here are very similar ground. Tom, do you or Steve want to comment on that because you both give a lot of thought to this? Yeah well I think I think Shankar underscores what the President Park of South Korea has called the age of paradox which is an ever-increasing integration economically but persistent security issues and nowhere near the kinds of architecture or order that is required and these issues rooted in nationalism and history and unresolved disputes coming out of World War II and afterwards and so there is this paradox in Asia. Number two, Steve said earlier that the US India path forward was not about China principally. It's not about China principally but it is about China to some extent and that the United States and India share an interest in creating the environment in Asia that would be conducive to a peaceful rise of China. That's a shared interest I think. We do have a deeply shared interest in the security of each other's interest in Asia so again you can't really ignore China's rise that you have a strategic discussion about Asia and I do think we have shared interest in that in that respect. With respect to the order and the institutions the EAS is an important institution that's developed I think. We can go into more detail on that but you know the President of the United States made a decision to participate at the head of government level on a yearly basis in that institution because it seemed to us to be the most likely institution that could grow in to being a premier region wide place not to address political and security issues. We have APEC which works quite well on the harmonization and economic issues and we can talk about India and APEC which at some point but the EAS I think is an important institution was seen very important by President Obama in terms of the future of the region and the right people were there. I was at a conference in Shanghai and Pascal Lamee was there who's a great trade negotiator and he said geoeconomics is driving Asia towards interdependence prosperity and peace and the question is whether we can keep geopolitics from upsetting that evolution so it is the management of geopolitics. I would say to Tom just this A it was not about China it was about India's emergence on the world stage there is an issue about China the more you make cooperation with India about checking China the harder you make it for us and India to cooperate and I think that's true generally in the region. This is a region of countries who do not want to have to choose between the United States and China and I think one of the opportunities and it's very much consistent with what Tom said and the focus on the EAS. You know we used to think of Asia as South Asia and we kind of imprisoned India in South Asia and then we had Southeast Asia and then we had Northeast Asia. Well you know it's all Asia it is all Asia and I think the ticket for managing the dynamic change that is occurring in Asia is that everybody's got to play in Asia and one of the ways of managing China's rise is for us all to be in the pool together surrounding and embracing China but also helping China understand what a peaceful rise really looks like and so as an example this is why I think Republicans and Democrats generally think we missed a bank bet on the Asia infrastructure investment bank rather than saying no we're not going to participate unless you do some things we should have said yes we're going to participate we should have encouraged everybody else to participate and then embraced it lovingly to insist that China adopts standards of transparency and global standards and really established an institution that was not going to be about geopolitics but was going to be a economic development. I think that's the model going forward for managing that in Asia and it is essential for India to participate because without India's weight in that strategy I don't think it will work. Thanks Steve very much and then okay one final comment. I would just like to stress the point that we need to look at what's happening in West and Central Asia. I think it's critical for it's definitely critical for India I think it's critical for the world I think we have not seen this kind of turbulence anywhere in recent history and I think this is an area where the United States and India need to work very closely because I think the issues are not clear we have the rise of of a group which talks of spiritual purity which is garnering support almost by the minute if not by the by the hour and I I think the whole region is in turmoil our Prime Minister has taken the lead he's gone to Central Asia to talk of of the threat posed by the ISIS and other agencies I mean countries like Tajikistan are already rocked by by this but the whole of West Asia and it has a great deal of the same for us Afghanistan for instance is coming into the vortex can we really think of the United States and India having some kind of a common what should I say kind of action rather mundane phrase to use to deal with the threat which is going to which is going to engulf not only Asia but large parts of Europe and Africa etc. I don't know about the United States you know separated by a huge ocean perhaps but I think this is an area which I think we can't I think this morning there was a reference to this I think some didn't bring bring this up in the morning about looking at what's happening in Afghanistan but I would I would grow even further because what's happening across the whole of West Asia is having repercussions of various kinds and I think this is something that maybe we should take as one of the outcomes of the meeting which you could discuss if it's thrown out it's one okay thank you very much and I think that's a very good stepping off point for questions from the audience because we've had a good balance I think of the the upbeat and the promising and the non euphoric and so all I would ask is please raise your hand wait for the microphone to come to you identify yourself please be brief and please end with a question mark sir Dave Ramaswamy with Africa Agribusiness magazine one of the national security threats that us and India face is climate change as well as Islam is terror both of these two issues combined to form a toxic brutal in Africa especially desertification driven by climate change resulting in large-scale human migrations and in many of these areas Islam is extremist groups have stepped in where states are failing where do you see India and the US cooperating to combat these two threats to the national security thank you it's a very good question who'd like to start off on the answer Shankar well I think on the extremism on terrorism if you look at what we're doing today and compared to what we were doing eight years ago 10 years ago it's really a whole phase transformation both the India both India and the US working together on counterterrorism what I think we may be going forward what we need to do is look much more at processes of radicalization and what it's not animals saying about what's happening in West Asia because that's a much broader phenomenon than just extremism or radicalization and it's tied into the geopolitics of the area it's tied into the economy it's tied into a whole series of and I think that's the kind of conversation where we need to see how do we deal with this and we need to work out a common way of dealing with it on climate change frankly speaking for ourselves our own position is evolving and it's evolved considerably if you look at it on HFCs for instance if you look at it on renewables India and the US have done very well working together on energy on new and renewable sources of energy they've done less well in terms of the actual negotiation the international negotiations on climate change but for me much more important than what you do on a piece of paper and finding the right wording is the actual outcomes that you can produce on the ground and what we do what we have done and the kinds of commitments that the government of India is now making 175 gigawatts of renewables and solar commitments and so on I think those are very important commitments but these this is an evolving situation the change in India is driven actually by the Indian middle class which doesn't want to have to breathe bad air have their children growing up in Delhi as the most polluted capital air capital in the world and so on so that's going to drive change not an international negotiation or general arguments about but that change is coming and so as I see it there will be more and more opportunities for India and the US to work together on climate change issues as well but as I said it's not going to be a simple formula or a simple you know linear sort of extrapolation from the present self-interest is usually the best driver a change you're right Tom anything you want to add no I think radicalization is I think I think that's what that's basically the question that you were trying because I think what whatever we have tried in the past is turning out to be non applicable if I might use that term and I think that's in that's an area where I think the United States can come I'm just brilliant scholars I hear such so many opportunities we need new ideas to to stem this I'm the present part of you know a lot of physical activities going on bombing drones are killing people before there's one leader still a new one is coming up but I think what is really happening the way we dealt with for instance fighting communism fighting etc at one stage I think we need something more with regard to the models that we had certainly the 20 years ago are no longer so I would I would suggest that in answer to that question and I think Africa is really on on the I think what the Boko Haram and others are doing us spreading and in the literature I still manage the literature which comes into both on the internet and even by kind of thing it's really frightening so my only addition I will say is that maybe this is one thing that we need to look at thanks sorry yes sir hey it's right behind you I'm sorry Jeff I'd like to go back to an issue which of course was what kept us apart for many years I don't I'll speak for myself and I think most of the people in the room are very happy with the fact that we have this new relationship and it's going forward and we're today about what can be done in the future but that's sort of the element in the room because it's kind of still there uh you know if you go back and I think Steve and I were both on the NSC and I said before one time he got word that uh he's been looking at the explosion type of law of course we're all hopeful that maybe India is still used in the future for that and that might in fact help us keep Pakistan non-nuclear and some other things but that history is gone it couldn't occur and in particular it didn't occur with regard to what happened in Pakistan and it's not entirely clear that the situation between India and Pakistan is safer now that there's nuclear deterrence there many people and I'm one of those think that it's perhaps the most dangerous nuclear confrontation in the world and the one that's most likely to lead to some kind of nuclear catastrophe so I just would appreciate those who are on the panel both reflecting a little bit on perhaps how that played in the initial decisions years ago and more importantly how it plays in the relationship today and what can we best do to move together forward on this problem especially given the historical situation that you have with Pakistan but is there a way we can get beyond that and move forward on this particular critical problem thanks Jen very much Steve well Jen what we and Ashley and Bill and others can come in but my recollection is our logic was this it was pretty clear India was not going to go back and become a non-nuclear weapons state that was first second India's non-proliferation behavior in terms of not proliferating technology to neighbors or terrorist groups or anything else was actually quite good and we saw the opportunity of the civil nuclear deal not only to address the strategic consideration to send a message of a new relationship to help India with a real problem of satisfying its needs for energy in a way that would be environmentally responsible but we also thought it was a vehicle for bringing them into the nuclear non-proliferation framework because part of the deal was that they had to sign up to all of those arrangements so in our view it was a backdoor way to make them a responsible state in terms of proliferation and that was that was our thinking there was a lot of criticism why won't you do the same thing for Pakistan and our answer was because Pakistan's record on proliferation was quite different than India's and it was an issue that Pakistan needed to address. If you want India to sign the NPT she's quite happy to do so as a nuclear weapons state I don't think that's the problem about India and Pakistan and being the most dangerous place in the world now that's a subjective judgment I know it suits the Pakistanis to say so and to convince you of that fact because they are interested in making getting the rest of the world involved not just in India-Pakistan relations but in Pakistan itself and Pakistan's future but if you look at the actual record when did we fight our wars before we were nuclear and what we've done since then might not be pretty but it isn't of the same scale as what there was before and if there have been real attempts of trying to solve the issues between India and Pakistan it's been since we actually went nuclear it's been after 74 so I'm not sure that you need to worry that much about it it's not a satisfactory situation certainly what exists in Pakistan in terms of tactical nuclear weapons in terms of you know the possibility of well an insider threat of the wrong people getting their hands on nuclear weapons but that's not an India-Pakistan dynamic at all so I think we need to be a little clearer about that I the last thing I'd like to point out is as Steve said I mean India's adhered to the MTCR to Wassenaar to the Australia group to you name it and is ready to join the NSG has actually has implemented the NSG guidelines probably better than some NSG members in the past so in effect I think the civil nuclear understanding helped us to to take those steps and to implement them I think I think I'd like to make it Indian law actually yeah if you look back at the think about what's the and this was a controversial in the United States as it was being considered obviously and you look back and ask what the but what the negative scenarios were the concerns were at the time the United States was considering considering the the civil nuclear deal with India and I think the outcomes here actually too right one is as Shankar said India has become a quite positive and detailed member of the non-proliferation regimes in the world and a very positive player and secondly the knock-on effects that folks worried about right in terms of non-proliferation really have not emerged I mean the non-proliferation threats we have today are not the result of India coming into the non-proliferation regimes that we talked about here today they're there for in Iran and North Korea totally different dynamic so I think in both and both places the the negative scenarios have not played out and we've had a very quite positive scenario from a non-proliferation perspective and India has a no first use I mean too I mean India cannot be accused of starting a starting a conflict using nuclear weapons and I think our doctrine is very clear unless we are proven that we've been hit by a nuclear device from a particular country there's not a question of our use I mean I don't think any country really has that degree of so that it should be the most dangerous place in the world I think the little overdoing that statement and turn to the back please yes sir good afternoon my name is Nisim Rubin I'm assistant director for Asia at the American Jewish Committee and Mr. Menon when you you and later ambassador Aaron Singh were there in Israel and then you were in SA and before you Mr. Narayanan you built on the foundations of Mr. Majesh Mishra in late Mr. Dixit on building a very solid strategic India-Israel relations that can survive any administration now and in the future can you comment a bit on Mr. Modi's upcoming visit to Israel what are the areas we can expect I you cannot talk about anything that you don't want to it's just a Shankar I hope no I think seniority right it's a real partnership no you know I think there's another Modi in the audience but I want to say that that Mr. Modi I think is a is I think a great admirer of Israel and the way the Israel for that matter I think a lot of people in India are admirers of of Israel I mean we don't quite go along with with their preemption doctrine which is something that we find difficult to accept but so I would presume that the visit of our Prime Minister to Israel would greatly cement a relationship which already exists because Israel has been helping us over the years in many ways many of us we don't want to reveal just now but we shall do so so I think the short answer to your question would be I think that it would set the steel of or stamp of approval on on what is already taking place and I think Israel relationship would go forward in a manner that we can only hope is almost as good as the India-U.S. relationship well I agree entirely and I think it's successful visit and let's see because there are so many things that we're doing together between India and Israel and let's see but I'm very optimistic about the nature of that relationship it's interesting because it's a popular relationship in India and that that says something and I think that's because of the longevity of that relationship thanks Shankar yes sir Paul Joyo NSI thank you for the wonderful commentary today by all the participants one one thing that was mentioned was the potential or the particularly irritant in some ways between the US position of Russia and India's position on Russia so my question is in the last few years the I would say the velocity of aggressive foreign policy from the Russian side has increased especially to to towards the United States and my question is have you seen this velocity translate into attempting difficulties in the let's say development of relations between the US and India and secondly to MK with his long tradition of understanding from the Soviet period forward and understanding the long-term success that Soviets had in penetrating many elements of the Indian government according to the metrokin papers if you see that this is a if this is carrying on in any way shape or form you know I think the the the Russians are the aren't the only country the nation that is penetrated the Indian system if I might say so I mean I spent a lifetime probably more than anyone else in this game so but but I think I think the that hasn't in a sense destroyed the relationship with any of any of the country's concern it's a job we have a counterintelligence wing which is supposed to be doing its job it is not as good as it should be but so we have not sort of taken it as as a sort of entirely damaging the the framework of state-to-state relation in that sense so I don't think that is an issue but I do want to make a point saying that the Indian tradition is that to be loyal to anybody who stood by you for long and there's no denying the fact that the Russians whether they were Soviets or non-Soviet as the case may be they have and I think Ambassador Arun Singh is an expert on this on the subject I think they stood by India and therefore there's an India-US-India-Russia relationship which I think you you cannot quite overlook or forget but that has not prevented us from widening our embrace with the way we are now looking at the India-US relationship even in defense and related matters so there's nothing that that impedes the relationship but it doesn't mean that we can only go forward with the India-US relationship by divesting ourselves of our relationship with the Russians I think that is not not on because but I think Russia has come to terms with that because they are not particularly happy at the enlarging scope of India-US relationship on defense and related matters where they almost had a monopoly at one stage or for that matter with some of the other countries but India is quite clear that it knows what it needs to do in these matters but it does not mean that it it will accept that somebody else dislikes your friend and therefore you should should divest yourself of it so I think it's it's a comfortable relationship in this in this case in actually India in the driver's seat rather than being on the on the sidelines I I like I want to make the point I'm not the diplomat I I just barge into it by mistake and thanks and thanks to Steve we managed to pull off the deal barge away Steve is well yeah I would just add one thing one of the things we had to recognize once we made the breakthrough the civil nuclear deal is that that we could be strategic partners did not mean that India was going to vote with the United States the way the United States wanted to vote on every resolution coming before the United Nations that they had their own interests they were going to have their own positions on issues and sometimes we were going to disagree but I I think the one thing in this dealing with Russia over Ukraine is an example I think the one thing that we could ask for of India is to have the kind of strategic conversation so that India would come to understand the American perspective first of all and then secondly take into account that perspective because India is in a process of becoming a global player and it is learning how to be a global player and that its perspective is changing and that's I think the convergence that was being suggested earlier and India is going to understand that what happens in one sector actually affects credibility globally and I've said for example that I thought the pivot to Asia was going to depend a lot more on how the United States handled what Russia is doing in Ukraine and how we handle what's going on in the Middle East as much as it would on how many base agreements we were able to sign up with allies in in Asia that's the kind of conversation we need to have with India as India takes on a global perspective and starts playing a role globally on issues that two decades ago India would never have to say much about I agree I think that I mean I think that in case exactly it is important to note Paul there has been a real transformation in terms of the diversity of defense relationships that you have in the in the depth and breadth now the U.S.-Indian defense relationship and we just now entered into a new 10-year defense framework but Steve's exactly right and these are the kinds of conversations I think the conversations that come along as you're deep in the relationship and as India becomes a global power that impacts globally the kinds of conversations we would have now would be around the importance of construction of productive powers among and between great powers and when one of the powers like Russia goes actually hostile to the West and to the United States which it has that impacts our ability to work together around the world to address to address global problems next time another question in the back please so this question is for any and all of you looking forward five years from now do you see the world a more peaceful place or a less peaceful place and why do you want our hope or our expectation start with expectation well if we don't do anything it's going to be worse so I think we have a lot of work to do but we certainly hope it'll be more peaceful it helps it well it helps it too but there's an awful lot of awful lot of work to do when it requires it's going to require deep cooperation you know we've seen the we see today basically the breakdown of authority and among Arab states with now a number of out all out failed states in the Arab world the the resulting filling of that vacuum by some of the most violent and aggressive groups in the face of the earth the fact that they've become increasingly sectarian which means that a number of these conflicts are going to be we'll take a long time to deal with we have in the case of ISIS a unique group in terms of its the scale of the territory that it controls it's financing the fact that's got probably 25 to 30 000 foreign fighters who have come into Syria and Iraq to participate a far larger number than came into Afghanistan to participate in the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union so we have a very big problem on our hands it's going to take a long time to deal with and the second piece of this I think of this kind of general breakdown is the is part of the answer I gave to the last question which is we have had in the last quarter of a century productive and constructive relationships generally among the great powers and that has changed in the last year and a half with Russia's activities in Europe and a Russia that's going actively hostile to the United States in the west and kind of has pulled out from cooperation with the number of other powers in the world and that makes the world more difficult to manage frankly and so yeah we have a couple of dynamics here that that are going to make that they're going to be very challenging going to take a lot of a lot of work and are going to be long-term challenges I think now that said there are a lot of positive things going on in the world as well and to date most of these issues have been contained regionally but you can't count on that thanks Tom last question please Elizabeth Colton this Colton related to everything that we've been talking about whether it's Pakistan or Russia or nuclear etc I'd like to bring up the Indian Ocean and it's related to you know the perception of others of this partnership since it's not an alliance and of course during the time of cold war Russia the Soviet Union and India were very closely tied together in the Indian Ocean and now there's the perception that the United States and India are tied together and of course that perception is from especially in terms of Pakistan and China so I'd like to ask if you could speak a little about our relationship vis-a-vis the Indian Ocean and developments there thank you thanks Liz well just to clarify the the Russians weren't very involved in the Indian Ocean even during the Cold War at the height of the Cold War I mean frankly we never saw a Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean I think that's that's just it just wasn't true well the capacity was limited they had other concerns I think they they were more worried about you than they were about and about other places but but you're right I think it is an ocean which is becoming more crowded much more important to the world economy it is an area where for now for the first time for the last three years the LNAV presence is now uh becoming the new normal as it has already become in the western Pacific and if you look at the levels of interest in what's happening around that ocean partly because of what's happening in the literal and you see the the extent of changes all around it some of it Tom just mentioned but also Africa also if you look at the importance of the energy flows and so on that that go through the energy trade all the that go through those those regions it's now for me it's critical that we actually make sure that the global commons including the Indian Ocean that the stays open and available for all of us and that's where we have a real common interest and that's what we I think have been working on successfully quite apart from you know the other work that we've done together I think that's something that we have successfully worked on for several years and I do hope that we continue to do that thanks Shankar one of the things I hate most about being a moderator is bringing really interesting discussions to close so we do have a schedule that we need to stick to today so let me just ask all of you to join me in thanking our panelists not not only for their wisdom and insights today but also for many years of service to us