 Well, hello, everybody. We get seated. I'm noticing that it's already less than 30 minutes we have to talk about this important issue, which, frankly, is probably a little bit underreported. And maybe as a member of the media, I bear some responsibility there. So hopefully we'll learn something and can think about it. We're here talking about this kind of mini-nuclear arms race in South Asia. And kind of, is it real? Is it not what the impacts of it could be? Because we're short on time, I kind of want to skip introductions and make everybody kind of do very quick little kind of elevator speeches, as it were. We get a sense of where they are and what they're thinking is, and then go from there. I think there's a lot of factors at play. I mean, candidly, I don't know a lot about this topic, but these guys really do. So I'm interested to kind of hear what they say. It seems like there's a lot of factors at play these days with the kind of nationalistic government in India increasing, always increasing instability inside Pakistan, the US role in both those countries. But also, and I think interestingly, I think we'd be remiss if we ignored the impact that the US so-called withdrawal from Afghanistan could have on any of this that we're talking about. So again, you can refer to your programs. Trust me that these guys know what they're talking about. We won't get into who exactly they are. You can check your programs. But, or do you want to just go and kind of give us a sense of where your thinking is on this, and then we'll go down the line? Sure, happy to do it. It's a pleasure to be here. My overall answer is that on the current trajectory there is within the next two decades a significant possibility that there will be a nuclear war in South Asia, and also a significant possibility that South Asian nuclear weapons, most likely Pakistan's, will be used against one or more third countries during that period. Why do I think that? Well first, with regard to nuclear war between India and Pakistan, as Greg Koblenz pointed out in a recent CFR study, South Asia is the region most at risk of a breakdown in strategic stability due to an explosive mix of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals. Growing nuclear arsenals. While several nuclear weapons powers, including the US and Soviet Union, are downsizing their stockpiles, South Asia is witnessing a buildup. Unlike the remaining P5 countries, China is increasing and diversifying its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan and India have been involved in a nuclear and missile arms race since 1998 that shows no signs of abating. Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear program in the world. Another point, with regard to strategic stability, was expected that nuclear weapons would have a stabilizing effect in South Asia. Instead, it seems to have had the opposite effect. Pakistan reportedly was emboldened by its nuclear umbrella to become much more aggressive against India. Following its acquisition of nuclear weapons, Pakistan in the spring of 1998 infiltrated into the Kargil area of Kashmir and seized territory held by India. At a conference a few years ago, senior military officials from both India and Pakistan acknowledged that nuclear deterrence was much harder than they had been led to believe it would be, and they expressed their concerns that their countries actually had become less secure since the introduction of nuclear capabilities. There have been a number of specific crises in addition to the Kargil crisis that give cause for concern. My fellow panelist, Mohi Joseph, has in several articles done an excellent job in describing the Pakistani-India crisis of 1999, 2001, and 2008. The worst was probably the 2001-2 crisis, which was explicitly a nuclear crisis. Both sides made nuclear threats of particular concern during that crisis, India and Pakistan reportedly stopped all channels of direct communication. Direct hotlines were shut off, shut off, not a good sign for reducing tensions. We look at the history of the US-Soviet nuclear relationship and we see the possibility of miscalculation, which was reflected in several very close calls with the Soviet Union slash Russia. For example, in 1995, the launch of a Norwegian weather rocket prompted fears in Russia that a surprise attack was underway, leaving Yeltsin and his top aides just a few minutes to decide whether to undertake a retaliatory strike. Fortunately, relations between the US and Russia were good enough that Yeltsin decided there must be a mistake. US couldn't possibly be attacking. Absence-similar reservoirs of goodwill between India and Pakistan, and with much shorter flight times and sharply reducing decision-making timelines, a miscalculation could result in disaster. Quick mention of reasons why South Asian nuclear weapons might be used elsewhere. Number one, as we know, Pakistan has already been a leading proliferator of nuclear technology to rogue states. With AQ Khan now freed from even the very minimal punishment of house arrest, the message to other Pakistanis who may wish to proliferate is that even if they're caught, the punishment may be minimal, especially if they can portray themselves as a hero. Number two, given the weakness of the Pakistani state, there's a significant possibility that Pakistani nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of a non-state group, perhaps not as the result of Pakistani leadership decision, but rather decision by rogue officers or even a theft by non-state actors. Number three, there are persistent rumors, which seem to be well-founded, that Saudi Arabia helped finance Pakistan's nuclear program in return for a promise that if Saudi Arabia asks, Pakistan will transfer technology or even warheads. The assumption is that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, or perhaps even if Iran gets close to acquiring them, Pakistan will provide nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. In light of the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a nuclear exchange between them with the Saudis using Pakistani weapons is conceivable. In addition, there have been significant tensions between Pakistan and Iran. For example, in October 2014, last year, Islamabad reportedly filed a diplomatic protest with Iran after attempts by Iranian security forces to chase militants across the border led to the death of a Pakistani soldier. Shortly afterwards, the two sides exchanged mortar fire, shooting battle between Iran and Pakistan. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear exchange between Pakistan and Iran is conceivable. And finally, Chinese Indian strategic stability may be eroding. Indian China fought a brief border war in 1962, and they have a number of potential flashpoints between them. India's 2012 test of the intermediate range Agni-5 ballistic missile marked the first time that major Chinese cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, came within range of India's nuclear weapons. If you add it all up, there are a lot of reasons for concern. Thank you. All right, thanks very much. So we're gonna skip Mawid, because he's gonna bring up the rear, maybe handicap some of the previous comments. And then I think we're gonna go to Shumat. Sure, thank you. I thought I'd talk a little bit about the US angle in the India-Pakistan relationship. Every new American government that comes in has a very ambitious goal of wanting to be a peacemaker in South Asia and solve the Kashmir conflict and introduce rapprochement into the region. But my perspective is that the main interest of the US and South Asia is not to be a peacemaker. It's actually to prevent any kind of bilateral tensions between India and Pakistan so that those tensions don't lead to a nuclear escalation. If you strip away the other interests that the US has in the region, Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, economic interests in India, what you're left with is actually the nuclear issue at the end of the day, and that is the most consistent interest of the US in the region. So that's where I think we need to start from. In terms of what the US thinks might actually trigger any kind of escalation between the two countries, again, very straightforward. One is cross-border terrorism between India and Pakistan on that border. And then there's also the kind of re-escalation of traditional security conflicts, Kashmir, any other kind of long-standing conflicts that exist between the two countries. I would argue, since we're looking at the future of war, that Afghanistan is a new landscape for this conflict to unfold, and that's something that the US is particularly concerned about in recent years. There have been attacks on Indian interests in Afghanistan. The buildup of the Indian presence in Afghanistan is also of concern to the Pakistanis. So this is a new landscape, and we actually don't know what these triggers might lead to. Even though Indian interests have been attacked in Afghanistan, we haven't seen any kind of escalation on the nuclear side, but it still remains very much a possibility, and the US is going to be more concerned about that. In terms of what levers the United States has to actually prevent conflict between India and Pakistan, again, very straightforward and very limited, I would argue. The US, in the past, in 99, in 2001, has pressured the Pakistanis to clamp down on cross-border infiltration. But I would argue that the Pakistanis have limited capabilities, more and more so, over these militants that they've used as proxies, and they're sort of being held hostage or victim to their own proxies, so it's something to pay attention to in the future. Congress is always happy to start talking about Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, and that does have a domestic impact in the country. Whether they go down that path or not, I think that's pretty unlikely, but it's always something that is very provocative in the Pakistani context. There can also be delays of US military assistance if there's some kind of escalation. On the positive side, there can be very successful attempts at being a intermediary. The US did this in 99, and also in 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage had gone to Pakistan to kind of talk to the Pakistanis and also to the Indians. The US has done this in the past, if need be, in cases of crisis. The United States has also worked with the Chinese, the Brits, the EU, and other international partners to put pressure on both countries. So I wouldn't look for anything kind of revolutionary or novel. I mean, these are all very traditional approaches, and they're really what we have, given the circumstances on the ground. Perfect, we can come back to a couple of those things. Anish, do you want to talk a little bit about India and its perspective in all this? Sure, thank you, Gordon, and thank you all for inviting me here. It's a pleasure to be here. The new government that just took office in India is a bit more nationalistic than the previous one that they took over from. But just because they're nationalistic doesn't mean that they're any more inclined towards nuclear weapons as an option when it comes to their national policy towards Pakistan. They remain as committed to the no first use policy as the previous Indian governments have been. And what's more important is that they have no national interest in engaging in nuclear warfare with Pakistan. And I think when we talk about war in South Asia, it's important to separate conventional war from nuclear war. The threat of conventional war is ever-present and ever-perpetual following the crises that Orr talked about. But nuclear war is an escalation that neither country really wants to engage in. And in 99, in 2001, in 2008, there were significant triggers that had everyone worried about what was going to happen in the region. But in all those instances, the Indian government showed an enormous amount of constraint. Not only did they not escalate things to the nuclear brink, but they didn't even start conventional wars in response to these terrorist incidences that had happened in their territory. And so I don't share the pessimistic outlook of my colleague, Ward, here. I actually think both countries have an interest in making sure the nuclear weapons are not used. As Shamila said, the United States also has very strong interest in making sure that nuclear weapons are not deployed in South Asia. They sent an intermediate in 2008, as well as the previous two times, to try and calm tensions down. And both countries are fundamentally different than they were in 99 in 2001 and 2008. India is growing very fast. The new Indian prime minister is very focused on economic growth. Doesn't want anything to derail him from that. Doesn't want to pick a fight with Pakistan. Doesn't want to invade Pakistan, because honestly, the Indian government doesn't want the chaos that is Pakistan to be their own responsibility. And so I believe that you're going to see a lot of constraint, a lot of careful calculations going forward, and only some cataclysmic event could maybe trigger a nuclear escalation in the region. Thanks so much. So you maybe, likewise, can handicap the premise here from our colleague. Talk a little bit about that. Talk about the safeguarding of nuclear weapons in Saipakistan and the instability there, too, if you would. Yeah, thanks, Gordon. Thanks to the organizers. I think I'm somewhere in the middle. And I'm deliberately being a contrarian here and being provocative, because I think that the mainstream view on South Asia and nuclear weapons is what Audis just put out. I would submit, and if you pick up my writings, you'll find tons of pessimism in terms of nuclear weapons. But I would submit that there is a universal truth. Wherever there are nuclear weapons, you're going to have risks. And so we can lay down everything that can go wrong, because the slightest error, and you could have two countries blow up. So that, I think you have to take as a constant. Nobody can debate that. Second, I think in some ways, we also have a sense that these new nuclear countries are less likely to be able to manage this than we were during the Cold War and the near misses and that experience. If you look at it from the perspective of Pakistan in India, they would probably argue that just because you didn't do it well, don't come and tell me that I can't do it. So I think we have to sort of keep that in mind. Let me say that my basic submission is that at this point, I don't see a major problem in terms of sort of a threat of nuclear war in South Asia. And let me give you reasons for that. And then I'll qualify this towards the end. First, and I think this is the most important one. South Asia, unlike the Cold War rivals, has recessed postures of its nuclear weapons and relaxed storage policies, which means that their delivery systems and their war heads are not mated together. They kept separately at a distance. So at any time that they want to escalate, they will first have to go and spend anywhere between two to four days preparing for something that may look like a usable weapon system. Otherwise, there's no possibility of something being launched just because they feel like it. Second, I think the previous crises have been dangerous in other ways. But there has been a very strong reluctance to touch the nuclear option in any form or fashion. Yes, there's been nuclear signalling, but that's where they've stopped. So even Kargil, I mean, I think what is right one year after nuclear weapons, the tests, they went in and had a crisis. But what did the tests do differently for Pakistan than pre-98? Pakistan still had the capability, presumably. They didn't develop the capability in 1998. And so I think if you look at the crises very carefully, they've talked a lot about nuclear weapons, but they're very carefully focused on the conventional option to fight the war if there was going to be one. Third, I think peacetime, Pakistan and India, because of their postures, have a lot of lead time. So this conversation about very short flight times only comes in when you've actually got a deployed weapon system ready to go. So that doesn't apply here. In crises, I would argue that the risks rise astronomically if you have deployed weapon systems in place. But South Asia has not gone in that direction or not even close to it so far. So if you were Pakistan and India, I think I would say that you could argue you've done fairly well in terms of limiting your crises and escalation. Now the qualifier, which is that I think two decades from now, I will be closer to odds view than I am today. And let me give you the reasons for that and end at that note. One, so far the sizes of Indian and Pakistani arsenals have been stabilizing, not destabilizing. The most dangerous size of a nuclear arsenal is when it's so small that the other side thinks that it can come in and preempt and finish this off. So they're past that stage. They're large enough that there's no threat of preemption. But they're going to a point where I think they're going to end up with way more of a sort of quantitative arsenal than either of them require. And then peacetime management becomes more difficult because you've got a larger arsenal to deal with command and control and everything else. Second, and I think the biggest problem or the biggest reason for me to believe that I'll be less optimistic two decades from now is the induction of new technology. And there are three specifically that I worry me most. One is tactical nuclear weapons that Pakistan has introduced and I am pretty sure India will follow suit at some point. The reason for my worry is that these weapons systems to be effective have to be deployed in the field. And as I've said, the reason I think there is not much of a danger right now is their recessed postures. So that posture will disappear if tactical weapons come in. Second, India's triad. So a sea-based capability for India. Again, like tactical nuclear weapons to be effective, a sea-based capability has to be deployed all the time. So again, you don't have the luxury of waiting four days or six days to negotiate before you go to that point. And finally, I think India's worst investment so far is in a ballistic missile defense capability, which will never be effective given the geography of India and Pakistan, but will nonetheless force Pakistan or prompt Pakistan to build its weapons faster and to create new options for its offensive capability that it shouldn't or wouldn't otherwise. So the new technology actually worries me a lot. Third, Pakistan is quickly losing any semblance of conventional parity with India. So as Pakistan's conventional apparatus gets weaker and weaker compared to India, they're going to be more and more dependent on nuclear weapons. And so the use of nuclear weapons, the threshold will probably decrease as time goes by. And finally, there is no prospect as far as I can tell of dispute resolution between the two countries. So they will have life crises, the potential for life crises to continue unless there is a rapprochement between the two sides. So none of this still adds to a nuclear war automatically, but I think the risks will be higher than they are today. Let me just end by saying that we in the US need to internalize how central our role is to India-Pakistan nuclear crisis management, because both of them have used the US very cleverly in the past to come in and mediate. And so we need to be ready to play that role any time we get there. And the last point I'll make on that is that the US has been an excellent, or the international community I would say, has been an excellent crisis manager and a terrible dispute resolver. And not resolving disputes basically means that you are getting ready for the next crisis in which you'll do fairly well to de-escalate it. But if you really want South Asia to be safe, the game is dispute resolution, not crisis management. Let me stop there. Good point at the end there. Real quick, just because I just got back from Afghanistan with Secretary Carter, the Pentagon chief, who I think will probably slow down the drawdown of troops from Afghanistan. But in the end, the American presence in the region is going to be diminished over the next year or so. Real quick, what's the impact, if at all, on the US kind of withdrawal, so-called, from Afghanistan the next couple of years? What is the impact on the India-Pakistan relationship? Yeah, on this issue. Well, I think if the US has a much more significant presence over a longer period of time and commits to that, I think that that will have a balancer effect on India-Pakistan relations. In some ways, that's what we've seen in the past decade. The Indians have been attacked several times by these groups that are linked to Pakistan or maybe based in Pakistan. They've shown enormous restraint, which is what Anish was saying. If the US was not there, we may not see that kind of behavior. We may also see, if the US is not showing a strong presence, we may also see some of these militant groups become even bolder and do whatever they want, basically. And the Pakistanis, maybe behind the scenes, are not pressuring them as much to stop things. So I actually think for all of the ills that we talk about, the US presence in Afghanistan has led to, I think it's created this ironic regional stability that, in the absence of the Americans, we would be wishing them back. Anybody disagree with that, generally? Real quick? The only thing I'll say is I don't think there's a direct link to nuclear war as such. Sure, I think things could get trickier. But you have to keep in mind, unlike the Cold War, where the war was going to be fought in Europe, and there was this whole question, whether the US and Soviet Union were as serious because it wasn't their territory, India and Pakistan are guaranteed not to exist the day after a nuclear exchange. I mean, there are no two ways about this. And so Anish says they have no interest, absolutely, because they won't survive. And so if you want to look at nuclear war in South Asia, what you've really got to look at is what are the possibilities of accidental nuclear launch in South Asia? There's never going to be a moment of deliberate nuclear launch. And there, I think, until you have deployed weapon systems, the threat is almost zero. Not there. OK, good. So in our four minutes and 53 seconds or whatever here, let's just quick open it up. Anybody got some really good questions? Don't be bashful. Right there in the back of the booth. My name is Intasar from Afghanistan. I think the India in the Pakistan are two close neighbors to Afghanistan. And I think the US presence in Afghanistan for the last 13 years has made a different scenario from one side. They made Afghanistan a little bit stable in developed country. But from second side, that's going to be a very good ground for India in Pakistan to compete their political and economic interest in Afghanistan. We saw there the Indian embassies has been attacked many times. And there were a huge claim in Afghanistan that many of the sources of extremism in Afghanistan is cross-bordered. I think these two grounds in Afghanistan can lead to the insurgents in Afghanistan to attack the nuclear power of Pakistan. That remain a very big concern for the Afghan people and as well for the Indian government. My question is, what Pakistani government should do to ensure that insurgents do not have access to the nuclear power of Pakistan that make big disasters? Good, thanks so much. May I join, expand on a little bit on that? Look, I mean, the only thing I'll... I don't have any information. None of us know what really is the protocol, the plan or whatever. The only thing I'll say is, if one is to be comforted, I don't think there's anybody more than the Pakistani government and authorities who are worried about this in the world. I mean, if this happens, they're finished. And so my guess is that this will be the last thing to fall in Pakistan if you ever get to that point. But they're worried, but is there the capacity to kind of back up the worry with the resources? We just don't know. My point is there's so much written on this, but nobody has real information on what the protocols are, how things are done. Now the risk factor, of course, is there. If a country is blowing up in this terrorism, you're always gonna be worried, you should be worried. My only submission is that I think this is the crown jewel that Pakistan defends more than their own lives. And so, if at all you get to that stage, I think this will be the last thing to fall. But again, this is conjecture because we just don't have information. Gordon, could I just add on to that? Even if there was theft of nuclear material by terrorists or the defenses break down, it's not as simple as stealing a nuclear warhead and then deploying it and detonating it. These are very complex nuclear weapons systems that require a lot of technical knowledge to deploy them and to detonate them. So I'm not sure that terrorist groups have that technical knowledge, and that it's not something that you can just do in Google search on and find on the internet. So there's a significant technical barrier to the deployment of stolen warheads. Maybe that fear is a little bit overstated because the capacity of whoever would be taking it over. Real quick, anybody, who else has got one over here, gentlemen, in that blue? And just try to make it quick, if you would, sorry, to be real. Just a quick, Colonel Andy Fallon, I'm a retired military up on modern other things. But the question is, is the risk of nuclear war increase or decrease with the ascendancy or re-ascendancy of the Pakistani military versus the political, the civilian politicians? We continue to see that back and forth of the ascendancy. There was the attempt to prosecute Musharraf, and then they backed off of that. But then the fear is that the military is in ascendancy once more. How does the risk vary with that change? I would argue the Pakistani nuclear program is military run, whether the civilians are in power or not. I think the final decision on who presses the button if it comes to that, quite honestly, the world has never seen that moment. And I don't know what happens then. I don't know what happens in the best of countries at that moment. But at this point, I think you basically take it at face value that it's a military run program. And the security policy, for the most part, on India has been driven by the military. So take it forward. I would argue, though, that the environmental risks have increased, as we've all said. But the way that the institutions are structured and the way the governments are working together, the risks haven't increased in that sense. I would agree. We don't want to give you the last word here. Sure. Just a couple of quick points. One is, with regard to the threat of theft, I think there actually is a very big concern. Because you can figure out on the internet how to make a basic nuclear explosive device. What you can't acquire via the internet is HE, highly enriched uranium. So if an outside party or if a group were able to get their hands on highly enriched uranium, they wouldn't necessarily want the other part of the bomb that maybe has some failsafe mechanism. They could just put together their own bomb. The other point that I would make in closing here is there's been some reference to the US and Soviet Union were able to pull it off despite the close calls. I would say that strategic stability between the US and Soviet Union was relatively simple because it was basically bilateral. The deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan is intertwined with that of China and could become intertwined with an Iranian nuclear arsenal. In such a circumstance, strategic stability is complicated with the fact that what you do to defend yourself against one can have the effect of making a third or even fourth state feel insecure. And you can have a kind of domino effect there that is harder to control than if it's just a bilateral relationship. Thanks. I hate to end this with a kind of a Pat statement, but obviously this issue is complicated. Thanks, everybody, for making us a little smarter on it today. Give our panelists a round of applause. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.