 Okay, Char, we're live on YouTube. I'm gonna resume recording because if anything happens, we don't want to lose, you know, if the YouTube stream goes bad or something, we still have the recording and we can post that. And, hey, Daniel, hey, Tim. We got participants here. Good morning. Oh, hey, co-host. Hello. Good morning. All right. Char and Tim, you guys are co-hosts. I'm doing that mainly because we had problems with my internet yesterday. And I don't want to, like, you know, drop the entire stream or something. So if anything happens to me and I disappear, this meeting's gonna go forward. We are recording and we're live on YouTube and y'all can take it away. Wonderful. Thank you so much, Sean. Yeah, sounds good. Thank you. We'll give everyone just a minute or two to kind of trickle in before we get going. Sounds good. Yeah, this week we're a little last minute with our speaker, but we do have one lined up for our next meeting in two weeks. So we'll get the word out earlier, which will be good. Hi, Karim. Thanks for joining the call. Hey, there. Yeah, last time I couldn't join because we were in Spain. I was a team that, yeah, not happy to be here. Yeah, absolutely. I hope you had a good time in Spain. That was pretty cool. Nice. Flew in the entire team. Wow, that's fun. Yeah, it's good to meet each other once in a while. Have remote workers, as you know. Right, right. All right, well, it is 8.02, so I'm just gonna go ahead and kick us off here. One second. Can everyone see my screen as we follow along here? Yes, looks great. All right, sounds good. Well, yes, welcome everyone to the Identity Special Interest Group. And today is, what is it, May 18th. And today we will be doing a couple of things, starting with the Working Group status updates, followed by a presentation on post-quantum cryptography by Vipin Baharathik. So I see, I think I saw him just come in, so welcome, Vipin. Do you wanna give us a quick introduction to your talk today? Yeah, I mean, I would rather go straight into the talk when the time is ripe. I just created a short set of slides for this, which I will share with the group after my talk. All right, sounds good. Well, as we usually do, we're gonna start off with some Working Group updates from some other groups working on open source technologies. Starting off, it looks like the Indie Contributors Working Group, this is a future meeting, so it looks like they have not met since our last meeting, unless anyone can correct me on that. Yeah, we met last week. And yeah, I can give a brief update. We, on the sovereign node pipeline, the pipeline is in place updating documentation. So very close to done on that and excited to get that over the finish line. We also talked about the URSA end of life and the way that impacts Indie is that the BLS signatures portion will move into Indie with its Python wrapper. And so there's work happening on publishing the, on the publishing pipeline and updating the existing projects to switch over. We also had a presentation from Stephen Kern on Tombstone-ing, which is high on the priority for the roadmap of Indie and Tombstone-ing refers to, it's a mark associated with the transaction that means the transaction shouldn't be returned if it's requested for read access. And this is helpful when you have private or illegal data on the ledger that should not be there, or if you want to remove access to transactions after a certain amount of time so that people don't use test networks longer than they should. And so, yeah, went over some past approaches and some potential solutions. So that was interesting to hear about. And then we also went through and did a bunch of very satisfying cleanup on node and plenum repos, closing PRs that are no longer relevant. So lots of good progress there. Sounds good. Thank you, Shar. So it looks like the hyperledger AriesGroove met just yesterday. Was anyone able to attend the Aries Working Group meeting? Yes, I was. The talk was mostly about what there was some talk about did something do, I believe, but the majority of the call was spent on well, the discussion around moving the Aries project to the Open Wallis Foundation. That discussion was not nearly finished at all. So that will probably continue next week. Or no, it's actually on the agenda to finish it or to continue next week. But that was what was discussed. All right, very interesting. Thank you, Karim. The Aries Byfold user group looks like they met on the ninth. Was anyone able to attend that call and would like to summarize for us? All right. Looks like they're doing some updating to NDVDR and looking at a 2023 summit. If you'd like more information, you can find the notes there. Aries Cloud Agent Python user group met on the 16th. Was anyone able to attend this meeting that would like to summarize it for us? Yeah, I was there. I gave a brief update on the Anoncreds update in Acapai project. So we're wrapping up the revocation work, which has just been a lot more complicated than expected, working on moving logic out of the old indie components and refining the new Anoncreds admin API endpoints. And yeah, getting that wrapped up soon. And then also talked about webhooks issue that got fixed. Yeah, well, you have the Acapai mediator in Redis and instance versus tenant settings. All right. Appreciate it, Shar. Looks like Aries Framework JavaScript met on the 11th. Was anyone able to attend this session? Yeah, well, we actually met two hours ago again. Yeah, it's a busy day. Today, the talk was mostly while I hosted a discussion on the future architecture of Aries Framework JavaScript. And this is partly related to the discussions that have been going on, well, regarding moving Aries to the Open Wilder Foundation, but the discussion is mainly about what do we... Because if you look at the structure of Aries Framework JavaScript, what lives inside the core package? What is the structure of Aries Framework JavaScript? What is its own package? What has its own package? What is a separate module, et cetera, et cetera? It's a bit confusing. We have moved away from Indie SDK. So Indie SDK has been moved to its own package. Sorry, Anon Kreds recently. That logic was moved to its own package, but then still in the core package, we have logic related to the W2C credential format. So it was basically a discussion on, okay, how do we go forward and what are the rules around, yeah, where, what code lives basically. Also to be continued. No, absolutely. All right, awesome. Appreciate it, Karim. Cheers. Looks like Anon Kreds met on the 8th. Was anyone able to attend the Hyperledger Anon Kreds meeting? I would like to summarize it for us. Okay, it looks like there was updates to the V2 working group and some other fun things happening. You can click the link later for full details. Trust over IP. Looks like they haven't met in a little bit. I think we also met on the 4th, but I'm not sure if we covered this governance stack to IP meeting. Was anyone able to attend this session? All right. It looks like they mainly looked at a debrief from IW and then looking at the governance requirements task force. This is older stuff. It's March 16th. We've met since then. It looks like the Diff interoperability group met on the 17th of May. Was anyone able to attend this session? All right. Well, yeah, they have zoom recordings that you can find here. If you want to learn a little more about that. That has not met. All right. And I believe that concludes our working group updates. Unless anyone else has any questions. I think that concludes our working group updates. Unless anyone else has any last minute additions they'd like to add or interesting meetings that they set it on recently. If they'd like to tell the group about. Just, I think we've announced this before, but May 31st is in a non creds workshop. And I think there's a link at the top to register. If you're interested. Oh, thanks, Sean. And then also in two weeks on this call, we'll have another speaker will be joined by Wenzhen Chu, who will talk about the open wallet foundation. So I hope you all are able to join us for that. I had an announcement about the non creds workshop and char beat me to it. So thanks for that. No to everybody. The community architects at hyper ledger. We have recently done. We're going to be working with the community. We're going to be working with the community. Contributor maintainer check ins with the fabric community. We are starting to do that with the indie community. And we're going to want to do it with the areas community. One of the amazing things about open source is no one needs to ask permission to take this code and run with it. One of the frustrating things about being a community architect at hyper ledgers. We don't know who's running with our code. So we are working with some community members to identify teams that are interested in the business. And it's a great opportunity to talk about their experience with areas, the areas community. What they're doing. Let me know on discord. We would love to talk to folks. This is an effort to make sure that we are. Checking in with the community and talking to folks. Also third thing. I'm going to put this into the wiki for the next. Identity. Cig call. If you have news about areas, let me know on discord. signal boosting, all the amazing work that's coming out of the Indy in the areas in the non-credits community. So if if you've got an implementation that's going live, if you've got a cool use case, if you're doing something, just let me know. Thanks, Shar. Thanks, Tim. No, thank you. All right, I think without further ado, we will hand it over to Vibin. Hold on. Okay, I probably should share my screen, because I have a little presentation here. Are you able to see the screen? Yeah, looks good. All right. So the agenda is very simply. Why post quantum cryptography? This is occasioned by the publication of NIST 1800-38a. If those numbers don't make sense to you, they don't make sense to me either. But we know that of that series, this is only the first document, 38a implies that. And it is open for commons. And it's a very, very simple document. It's essentially an executive summary of what whatever's been going on. There are a number of candidates for PQC, but they're all stuck in commons and various other activities inside NIST. And NIST, as you know, National Institute of Science and Technology, will be the ones to spearhead this move for the United States. And some people, of course, are suspicious of NIST because they think some of the algorithms have deliberate or otherwise backdoors. But this is what we have today, other than the commercial enterprises. And once it comes out of NIST, it will be adopted by everybody. Then the third one will be a look at the applicability of this particular, this particular document or this particular set of guidelines to our identity solutions. And the next steps according to NIST. So what's why PQC, why post-column computing? Advances, as we all know, the quantum hype advances will break existing algorithms. That includes all all the algorithms that are currently in use across, you know, a lot of, a lot of the ecosystem, and a lot of use in various applications, including banking, including TLS, including, so basically, all network libraries, all, I mean, all cryptographic libraries, all network interactions, and all wallets, everything. But is this hype or is this real? I mean, you know, this is the other problem, because we have been hearing about QC for breaking the factoring huge numbers is still far away. Because of couple of limitations of quantum computing, what is that you need enormous amounts of error correction circuits for this particular use case. And we are still in the 200, 300 qubit state, which is not enough with millions of error correcting circuits. So is it still an engineering problem or a physics problem? Meaning, is it much more basic, like it's not going to happen? Because it breaks certain fundamental loss of physics? Or is it an engineering problem? Well, it appears that many people think it is an engineering problem. But it's a very, very hard engineering problem only solved by probably state actors in the beginning, and then later on big companies. And it's not going to be released into the open, at least in the beginning. In the next 10 to 20 years, who knows. So the point is that since any large scale deployment of PQC will need a long lead time, because we have observed that in other algorithms, it takes about eight to 10 years for libraries, tools, methods, processes. So it's not, it's not going to happen tomorrow, even if it may happen. But so I have read from both extremes of the debate, meaning people saying it's possible to create something that will break RSA. And some people saying it's never going to be possible, at least not with a lot, you know, the scale of quantum computing needed, because of the physics problems. Anyway, the list of 1838 is basically an executive summary. The new algorithms, of course, there are several candidates already proposed, they need to be resistant to both classical and quantum computers. It is not going to be a drop in replacement, because there are differences in, you know, various aspects, which means that serious engineering has to take place in order to put these new algorithms into context. And the new algorithms are not mature enough. They have several problems with speed, with setting up, you know, all the all the steps mentioned here. So there may be multiple touch points within the app. Usually the application programming, people do not have control over the algorithms, because it's always sourced from the outside, and then maybe caught it up. But, you know, usually it's, it should be for us anyway, it should be more of a process, first a survey, identify where and how public key algorithms are used, you know, non-creds in the areas that come everything else. And here is an important piece of information dangerous due to store and break. That means all the encrypted traffic or significant encrypted traffic can be stored, you know, somewhere and broken at a later time. So if that traffic is not important, let's say 20 years down the line, then, you know, it doesn't matter. But if it is, then it's a possibility that it could be broken then and used for other purposes. So they are going to produce a set of tools into identifying the quantum vulnerable algorithms for these three types of code bases, cryptographic libraries, network, network, you know, transport layer security, and applications like every application, including wallets, everything else. So maybe we can even do a simple, you know, identification of what I used in these, in our set of libraries or things under the hyperlogy umbrella, just to prepare. So the next step is release of 1838B and 1838C. B is going to be more for program managers and C is mostly for IT professionals, which means people who are deploying the algorithm. Initial interoperability and performance testing will cover all these various things that I've mentioned here, including HSMs, which should send a shiver down the spine. So most people who rely on HSMs for any kind of security. So these are references, any questions you can ask me and I will try to answer if I can. My exposure to cryptography is long, but not deep. But you know, I did write a seed function for initial versions of the audible player, which has a patent. Unfortunately, they have the patent. But, you know, that's my introduction to cryptography maybe back in the 90s. And the algorithm I came up with or the process and the way in which was implemented in software did, let's say, gain the approval of many wise cryptographers, of which I don't claim to be one. Then later on, I've also worked with the ZKB standardization efforts. And as the chair of that empty working group earlier, I had multiple people speaking on this topic, and I've engaged with them, mostly on my own level, which is obviously not as deep as a mathematical cryptographer developing new algorithms. That's about it. And I'm stopping the share and you can ask me any questions. And I would be glad to answer any that I can. That was really interesting. Thank you for presenting. Do you know how an algorithm is determined to be quantum vulnerable? Well, it is mostly based on the fact that if it involves factoring huge numbers, then it's vulnerable. If it's not like lattice cryptography, certain, I mean, there is a whole bunch of ways in which, you know, that it is, I mean, for example, hashing functions are still persistent to quantum. Meaning, if I have a hash, significantly large hash, it would be so what is the attack? The attack is to produce another, another, you know, let's say string that would hash to the same value. This is not the original string, original set of binaries, whatever a book, the whole complete works of Shakespeare anything is a string. So that is resistant. So Merkel trees, probably are resistant. But most of the signature algorithms, and the Divi Hellman stuff, and, you know, session key, like establishment. I don't know about the symmetric keys algorithms, but I would assume they are too. But mostly it's the asymmetric key, the private public key type algorithms that are vulnerable. Interesting. Thank you. All right. Anybody? This is Tim Bloomfield here's a quick question on the, I will read, I'll read the list article. I haven't read that. But any talk there about zero knowledge proof, post quantum algorithms? I haven't seen that because there is a there are a bunch of candidates that have been proposed since 2016, 2017, I haven't seen anything to do with. Well, because zero knowledge also, you know, it's heavily dependent on hashing. So in a sense, there may be some inbuilt protections. But I haven't looked at the details of that. And anyway, like I said, I'm not exactly qualified, but just a interested amateur with long exposure to the stuff. Thank you. Anybody else? I was curious. So it sounds like you've read about the extremes of the opinions about what this will mean for the world. Where do you land on that? What do you think about the possibility or impossibility of quantum commuter breaking many of our current algorithms? Impossible. Well, only because you know, at scale, interference is a problem. Right. You have multiple quantum qubits. Then I mean, right now, most of the most of the quantum computing is done in very specialized labs at very low temperatures. There are guys who are claimed to have done stuff. You know, in the, let's say at normal temperatures, otherwise, you have to go to absolute zero somewhere around there, you know, in order for most of this to work. But there have been some advances. And there, of course, have been multiple claims of quantum supremacy, but mostly debunked on serious quantum computing sites and blogs from professors. So I mean, it is possible to do some quantum computing for doing things like optimization problems, quantum annealing, for example, you know, which is basically trying to find a minimum or maximum local or global, or, you know, those kind of problems which are basically basically very useful. I mean, very useful. But factoring is another game. And that's that's why it requires, you know, of course, nobody is going to come and say, oh, don't do it because we have seen those predictions fail a lot, you know, in the past. But there are also predictions which, which, you know, the sun is not going to rise in the West in my lifetime. For example, so there are some extreme predictions that you can make. But there's all kinds of extinction events waiting for us, including AI and everything else. So there are people making predictions about, you know, all carbon lifeforms are going to be wiped out in 20 years, which I don't think is going to happen. But hey, I'm just a carbon lifeform. Trying to be positive. Right. Yeah, interesting. Thank you. We have all this up with the, sorry, Karim. Go ahead. Oh, no problem. Yeah. So I don't know if you mentioned this, I was briefly going in between because there was someone at my door. But one thing that like I'm asking, or I'm wondering about, and my knowledge is not too, too, too, too good to answer that myself is. So I think right now we're using all kinds of cryptography to encrypt stuff in our wallet and in our storage, which as I understand it correctly, some of those algorithms can potentially break or be broken when when quantum computing is a little further ahead. So would we, is it possible to sort of re-encrypt your wallet in order to protect against those kinds of future threats? Or would this, for instance, mean that we would have to start with a completely fresh wallet? And like as soon as we have those algorithms that are quantum or post quantum, should we like start over in a sense? Yeah, I mean, this is a very serious topic under discussion by various people. Of course, they have been discussing mostly on things like, you know, because the UTXO set in Bitcoin, for example, is forever. So you cannot, you know, so how do you transition? How do you make the leap, starting to protect some of the most vulnerable parts? So some of the ideas that are contained in Kerry, for example, key rotation, which shouldn't be just key rotation, it could be method rotation too, right? I mean, because you can't just, I mean, it's, it's against key compromises, but, but now you will have to change the method to to PQC. In the case of wallets, I think the action can be quite rapid, like you said, meaning, but you have to have a plan, you have to have a way of looking at it very carefully and saying, how do you migrate? And this, this is the aim of this talk to at least take a look, right? So that we can say, okay, if PQC becomes a reality, meaning, you know, there are some standard, tractable algorithms, meaning something that does not consume your whole computer, or is not incredibly difficult to set up, which, which, you know, which is an engineering problem, right? I mean, once you have the PQC, and once you have a bunch of very serious companies, in fact, there is a list in that publication, it is like the who's who of, you know, all the big corporations, Microsoft, Google, you know, alphabet, Amazon, blah, blah, blah. So they have tremendous resources. So they will, somebody is going to come up with the library. And as far as we are concerned, we'll just have to be concentrating on the process. That means identifying the weakness right now, and then trying to, let's say, get it into a transition state. I think Dr. Stornata, who's one of the two authors who have quoted multiple times on, on, I think twice, or in Nakamoto's Bitcoin paper, has proposed some ways to to go forward, meaning, you know, replace algorithms, replace certain key things and migrate. It will probably be a hard fork of some sort. And the problem is the signatures backing the UTXO. How will that be handled? But for the wallet, like, like you said, that may be easier. Yeah, another thing I was just thinking about this, because I mean, the wallet partly, right, is just has credentials and, and all that kind of stuff. But another interesting thing, I think would be how to deal. And I don't think this is a problem we have right now. At this point, but let's say you have like long lasting, did come relationships with a certain party, like how, because I mean, the whole point, the the whole thing that, that, that enables building of the building of trust over a did come connection are the keys in the end. And it's like, how would you, is, is it possible? I have no idea. It's just an open questionnaire. But like, would it be, can we think of something to, to indeed, well, basically rotate the key, but also the key method and still maintain that trust relationship? Or would we like, need to create a new connection in somehow? And I think that's, that's pretty doable. Transfer that trust from, from, from one connection over to the other. Random thought, but interesting, very interesting. Well, ultimately, it is, it is a method, you know, it is methods for transfer trust. Maybe it has to be a one way street in the sense that, you know, you can't do it twice the same thing, meaning, you know, obviously, once you say, okay, this is the method is now transformed into a PQC, you shouldn't be able to go back and say, oh, I want to do it again. Because then you're not sure, especially after the passage of time that the second is, you know, this is all going to be based on trust anyway, in a certain sense. But we have to leave a very few openings or gaps for misuse. So, you know, I think there's a lot of people thinking about this stuff, about transitioning, how do you change basic cryptographic, the armature, the, you know, I mean, basically, you're changing the engine of the car as the car is running, sort of. So we have to have a way of doing it. And I'm sure, you know, this is also in the realm of engineering problems. You had something else to say, Karin? No, I just love that analogy, like, changing the engine of a running car. That's, that's exactly what it is. Well, I mean, simply, simply put, but yeah, I think, I think there, you know, there are going to be some interesting developments. But I may not live to see them. So is there a good question to all of us? Like, is there actually sort of a working group? Or not? Well, I guess it's too soon for a task force. But like, I know there is a lot of people looking at that migration, but like in Aries or Hyperledger specific, like, is there, are there people working on this? And how do we? Yeah, that's like, what are possible approaches to migrating? Is it too soon to do that? Is it too early? Or? Well, there is that whole forward key thing, thinking, you know, that is, in both, I think, Kerry has got that. But there is no formal working group, or any kind of, I think unless unless we get the tools to, to start even scanning the code for QV, that is quantum vulnerable algorithms, you know, we, we can't really make, you know, make headway. But the NIST team is going to publish a lot of material, including, you know, processes and ways in which this switch can happen. And maybe it's time to at least, I mean, I could, you know, write up a blog or something about this, and then we see how it develops. Yeah, yeah, it's just that I like, I've heard this, this term around, but I don't think like there is this awareness is big enough. And then again, like it also depends on how soon this becomes a real threat. But as we've seen with AI, things can go very rapidly all at once. Yeah. I mean, the techniques for developing chargeability four and five were around 10 years ago. But similar techniques for quantum scaling for factoring doesn't seem to be around. I don't know. I mean, I may be looking in the wrong place. But not everything is the same, right? I mean, meaning, you know, just pointing to past rapidity in development in one field does not give you clue to rapidity in another field. I feel because, you know, people always bring up, you know, various analogies. Analogy is great. Except when it's not. Anyway, Daniel, you might are you working on something similar or something to do with this stuff? Mr. Backenheimer or is he just saying it up? Anyway, I will follow up maybe later with some thoughts on this. And Sean can help Thank you very much. This was very interesting. Yeah, really interesting discussion and presentation. Thank you. All right. Yeah, we didn't discuss much about the transition to the new SIG and what it means. I don't know. Did you, Char? Char, sorry. No worries. We talked about that a bit on the meeting two weeks ago. But we can definitely talk more about it. That was mainly just an announcement and brief overview of the merge. But we can we have time if we want to keep talking about that. Yeah, I mean, I think the two arms of the identity SIG, one being the kind of a strategic forward looking and surveying broader field survey and broader field concerns. Versus the detail oriented work in the implementers group, both unnecessary, I feel, but the other one has kind of lapsed a little bit because some of it is just seen as just talk and not in a faction. So hopefully there will be a good sort of synergy between these two activities. And getting the next week's speaker, the next two weeks away speaker is part of a strategic sort of look. I think I hope he will, you'll do that. And that's about it. We had some fantastic talks in the working group earlier, but it has sort of fallen by the wayside because a lot of people are just more interested in doing things and getting involved in the details. Over. And Vipin, just so you know, Shar and I are talking about videos from previous identity implementers calls that we want to put onto the identity SIG YouTube. So if you've got any demos or or WG calls that you thought were great, let me know, I will I will try to find and grab those videos off the wiki and put them up on the YouTube as well. There is one by Kim Cameron, who's passed away. Unfortunately, I can find that. Yeah. Yeah. That is a very visionary talk. And that was done just weeks before he passed. And Kim has been a very influential person in this space for many, many years before it became fashionable, I suppose. So that's one, at least. And then there is a talk by Sam, Dr. You know, on Kerry, I think his name is Smith, Sam Smith. Yeah, Sam Smith is the person working on Kerry. Yeah. Yeah. So there is a talk by him. Maybe two years ago. There are all kinds of bits and bobs all around. Many of them are talk about the early days are on the identity methods inside all of the, you know, things like Hyperledger Fabric CA, Hyperledger, you know, Hyperledger Sawtooth, and various other, other platforms that we host. We had surveys of their existing identity solutions, which, which are important. And then there was an attempt at a paper, which we hope to revive is more of a survey. There is a paper by there is a talk by people in life, the Global Legal Entity Identity Foundation, which Yeah, legal entity identifier, right? Yes. Yeah. Yeah. There was a talk on that. Because they're using Kerry and ACDC and stuff. Yep. Yeah, but that's now, but when they gave the talk, it was just when they were stepping into the into that. Oh, gotcha. Okay. Because more recently, I thought they presented maybe it was just a trust over IP, like, they're kind of updated trust registry and stuff like that. Yeah. That explained how they're using Kerry and ACDC, the chain credentials. Yeah, but they do support, you know, a huge number of enterprises today. I don't think they use these methods today. I'm not sure. Right, you're right. They do support a lot of different ones. And I believe it was in one use case where they where they use the Kerry, but only because there was no, I think that was the case where there was no other, you know, layer one utility available for a trust registry where they use chain credentials. Instead of I think that was the deal. Yeah, I mean, they I think that it's FATF is requiring an option of LAI. And as as such, I think a lot more people outside the United States are using that. And there may be a legal requirement to go to LAI by the UN agencies and so on. Anyway, that's another talk, which at least for historical reasons, it should be important. But not just for historical reasons, because I think 80 to 90% of that stuff is being being, you know, being used today. The two things that are there, which are very important are one is the governance, legal governance documents that are attached to the enterprises. The other one is to discover all the subsidiaries. So if you have one corporation, then all these hundreds and thousands of other corporations under it, subsidy, subsidiaries of subsidiaries and so on. That's very key. And the jurisdictional documents are very key. These are an extension of the identity, let's say identity space in a sense. And then it goes into things like beneficial ownership, which is a very hot topic. So for all those reasons, LAI and glyph is very important. Yeah, it would be great to dedicate some calls to inviting speakers from those realms to talk about it. Are you still in touch with Carla McKenna, Daniel? Was that a question for Daniel? Yeah, yeah, I mean, yeah, yeah, yes. Not as late, but yes. I just saw as her probably last week in Berlin, but yeah, Carla, it's been a while, but yeah, happy to reach out. And that was that Mr. Schneider? Yeah. Okay. Andreas, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I have both their contacts. And I haven't talked to them in a long time. Yeah, Andreas, I was talking with just last week. Yep. Okay, beautiful. Thank you. Alright, that's that's all from from my end. And I think I've talked enough. Yeah, thank you. I agree about having both the high level overview and strategic forward thinking and the detail oriented low level view as well. I think both are really beneficial and it's wonderful that we've merged and we'll have both of them on this call. So but yeah, I'll turn it over to Tim to close out the call. No, absolutely. Thank you, Char. Yeah, that will be all from us. Quick reminders on just the upcoming things. One last time will be the non quiz workshop May 31 registration link is on the wiki. So be sure to check that out. And our next speaker will be Wang Jing Chu from the Open Wallet Foundation. And that will be on the first of next month, so June 1. So be sure to come back for that. Other than that, I appreciate everyone turning up into the excellent conversation that was had. And we will see you in a couple of weeks. Have a good one. Thanks, Tim. Thanks, Bippin. Thanks, everyone.