 Force 39 met them and routed them. It's the conquest of Bruttle Canal, culminating in the surface engagement of the 14th and 15th of November, 1942, so disastrous to the Japanese fleet. Our forces have advanced steadily in their drive to oust the enemy from the Solomon Islands. June 1943, Rendova was occupied and initial beach heads established on New Georgia. July, the bombardment of Munda Point was conducted to assist the advance of our ground forces who captured Munda Airfield on the 6th of August. August 16th, troops landed on Vela la Vela and by the 9th of October, Jap resistance on that island had ceased. When enemy positions on Kolombangara and Vela la Vela became untenable as a result of our control over surrounding islands, the Japs resorted to the use of small craft to effect an evacuation. Several attempts to use warships for this purpose were frustrated by our surface forces with severe losses to the enemy. We were now faced with the task of eliminating Boogendeel as the last obstacle to complete the domination of the Solomon Islands. Dog Day for the Marine Landing at Empress Ocusta Bay was set for dawn of November 1st. In preparation for the landing, the plan called for a surface bombardment of Bukka and Boone's airfields by Task Force 39, shortly after midnight. The landing of the Shortland area at 0600 on Dog Day. With completion of the Shortland's bombardment, one destroyer division was to break off from the Task Force to fuel from an oil guard in Hawthorne South. According to plan, at 7.30 in the morning on Dog Day, Task Force 39 was retiring. Destroyer Division 45 was released to fuel at Hawthorne South. Shortly thereafter, plans were changed somewhat of on receipt of reports from Khmer cells that search planes had made a site contact and were tracking four enemy cruisers and six destroyers heading north towards St. George's Channel at 25 knots. Anticipating a reversal in course on the part of these enemy ships, Khom Saupat ordered the force commander back to Empress Augusta Bay to cover the landing forces. Task Force 39 arrived at 14.15, amphibious forces of about 15,000 men from three divisions of large transports were staging their initial landing in the Empress Augusta Bay area. Threatened air attacks delayed the unloading and departure of the transport. At 1800, the transports headed south of it, covered by Task Force 39. In the meantime, destroyer Division 45 had completed fueling and was on the way to rejoin. Some of the transports did not complete unloading, so had orders to detach from the retiring transport group at 2300 and return to Empress Augusta Bay. Fortunately, Division 45 arrived as the partially unloaded transports were detaching and fell into formation with Task Force 39. The presence of the enemy surface force previously reported near St. George's Channel made it expedient for Task Force 39 to precede the returning transports to provide cover for them and for a group of mine layers still operating off Cape Mulcage. At this time, it was definitely established that a Jap force was headed toward Empress Augusta Bay. Successive reports from reconnaissance planes spotted their positions, course, and speed, so that CTF 39 was able to determine a minimum speed for an interception at a point west of Empress Augusta Bay. It is possible that the following assumptions were made by the enemy that only one cruiser Task Force was in the South Pacific, that this force had bombarded Bucca at midnight and the Shortlands at dawn on the 1st of November, then covered unloading operations of transports at Empress Augusta Bay, leaving with the transports at dusk on the 1st. That, accordingly, our cruiser Task Force was retiring for fuel, ammunition, and rest. The enemy probably believed the night of November 1st was an ideal time to clean up our newly arrived landing force. Commander's general plan of battle was to maintain the cruisers across the entrance of Empress Augusta Bay to prevent entry of enemy units. Gradually to push the enemy westward to gain sea room for maneuvering. And so, in case of cripples, we could retire on a disengaged side. The cruisers will fight the action at distances close to maximum range of enemy torpedoes. Recent actions in this area had brought to light the existence of an enemy torpedo with phenomenal range and a large explosive charge. It is thought also that enemy cruisers are equipped to carry such torpedoes. Even after considering the fact that 8-inch gunships were in the enemy line and that our 6-inch would not penetrate his armor at long ranges. It was elected to match 6 against 8 rather than close to effective torpedo ranges during early stages of the battle. In favor of long-range action was our radar fire control versus the enemy's optical, which necessitates illumination. In this particular instance, it was considered more important to defeat the enemy decisively than to annihilate him at the risk of having several of the cruisers out of action before the completion of the landing operation. To exploit the element of surprise by sending in the destroyers first to attack with torpedoes. Follow destroyer doctrine where possible. Attack on opposite boughs of a single column. In instances of two or more enemy columns, destroyer groups attack different columns. And on launching torpedoes, retire in opposite directions. Turn to parallel the objective before opening fire and hold fire until cruisers open up unless under gunfire. Cruisers are required to hold fire until torpedoes can arrive at target. Unless the enemy opens fire first or evidences having sighted us. Doctrine should be simple, plainly announced and understood by commanders as was apparent in this action. As Task Force 39 approached Empress Augusta Bay, low dark clouds hung over the formation and it was raining steadily. At 0100, general quarters were sounded. Plane reported contact with an enemy force of 8 to 12 ships, varying approximately 325, distance 85 miles, course 125, estimated speed 25 knots. 0114, friendly planes to port. We increased speed to 28 knots. Distant flare reported on starboard bow, probably a snooper over our mine layers. Flare two points on starboard bow, about 30,000 yards. Ships contacted, varying 016 at 20,000 yards. Identified on TBS as the Wrenshaw and mine layer group retiring southward. Unidentified plane over mine layers. Wrenshaw reports she's bringing a snooper with her. At bearing 328, distance 28,000 yards is a rain squall. There is also something just beyond which may be the nips. At 0227, there's a definite contact bearing 308, distance 38,000 yards. Contact is verified and designated enemy. The task force commander has the ball. From now on, the course of action will result in the success or failure of the engagement. According to battle plan, destroyer attack units were to go in upon getting contact and approximate torpedo solution. Osborne has the contact. 45th Division heading in. There now appear to be several ships in enemy group. Estimated course 150, speed 29. There's the 46th, ordered to counter-march to 180. Foot misunderstood and turned at once ahead of the other three destroyers. Cruisers execute turn 180. A second enemy group is contacted at 278. Then a third group at 272. Each of the three groups seems to be composed of four ships. The northern group appears to have changed course to the right. Then shortly later back to the southeast again. It is quite possible that the enemy is zigzagging. Commdes, dear 46, has now made contact and request permission to be released for attack. This request was difficult for CTF to approve, well knowing that his forces would be divided and not knowing what future developments would take place. Nevertheless, dear 46 was ordered to attack enemy rear group. The destroyers turned by column movement to course 270 and increased speed to 34 knots. Foot continues southward, separated from her unit. Cruisers are waiting word from Division 45 that torpedoes are on their way. From a distance 5,600 yards on the fourth bow of the northern enemy group, Desdair 45 fires a half salvo of torpedoes and executes turn nine to retire on course 050. Claxton comes on in and fires a second half salvo at what she believes to be a cruiser and turns to a position, a stern of Stanley. To quote from the report of Commdes, dear 45. We lived years waiting for the torpedoes to explode. It was probably only half a minute after firing that the squadron commander and the flag captain started to commiserate with each other as to how we could have possibly missed. We regretted driving into such close range where the enemy might have sighted us as we fired. About one minute after our fish were launched, reports were received that our targets showed paint flashes, which observers thought were torpedo tubes firing. The enemy exploits its torpedo menace at the first opportunity. The enemy did not open with gunfire, nor did any of their torpedoes hit. Although there were several reports of torpedoes passing close on parallel courses. So Division 45 stood on its retirement heading of 050 until it had opened to 10,000 yards instead of turning to a firing course of 8,000 as originally intended. It was estimated that six minutes would be required for our torpedoes to reach the target. However, after three and a half minutes, CIC reported that the enemy group had turned to starboard, indicating our torpedo attack had been detected. So the cruisers were ordered to open fire. It was a great relief to Commdes, dear 45 when three explosions, small but definite, were seen on the northern Jap group, indicating they had unsuccessfully turned away from our torpedo attack. Shortly thereafter, two other explosions occurred which were later revealed as hits, resulting from the second half salvo fired by Claxton. The cruisers having previously opened fire, Division 45 now joined in. The cruisers all firing came to course 210. The enemy replied to our fire almost immediately, but his opening salvoes were short and consistently ahead of his targets. Flares two points forward of the starboard beam. Division 46 executes turn nine to avoid these flares and to get out of the cruiser line of fire. This was a break for Foote, who swings west to rejoin. The task force now being divided. The chance of embarrassing one of our groups has materialized. The Denver is forced to shear out a formation to avoid Foote who is crossing to rejoin her division. Enemy fire is still short. Cruisers nearing maximum range come to course 230. Montpelier reports her target dead in the water. One destroyer steamed off at high speed to the north. It is believed that two ships of this group were severely damaged in the torpedo attack. A fourth target has appeared to the southwest. The northern enemy group is firing on Division 46, who is now clear of enemy illumination, but still in the cruiser line of fire. So the destroyers execute turn nine to the attack course. Thatcher turns too soon and collides with Spence. Thatcher suffers damage, but both ships are able to continue. Foote still attempting to rejoin receives a hit on the starboard quarter and is out of action. To clear Division 46 from the line of fire and to close the northern group, cruiser division comes to north. Eight inch shells flashes now reveal the presence of heavy cruisers and explain why the enemy has been content to keep his distance and not close on us. No gun flashes are visible from the direction of the enemy. They can shift fire to a target in the center group. A large explosion is seen on this target. The Columbia opened fire on a target in the southern group. Montpelier is effectively pounding the northern group. The leading cruiser changes course sharply to the right to avoid collision with a ship dead in the water. It is the Foote who reports a torpedo hit in the steering engine room. She is completely disabled but can keep afloat. The torpedo either came from a submarine or from the northern enemy group, in which case it was released before 0249 and ran a distance of 22,000 yards at approximately 36 knots. The torpedo salvo was probably directed at Division 46 on its first sortie to the west and their fortunate retirement southward at 0253 carried them out of range except for Foote, who stopped one. Apparently the Foote followed the rules set by all stragglers. All targets of the northern group are dead in the water. In order to close the center group and to cut off his approach toward our transports the cruisers reversed course to the south. A thought constantly in the mind of Task Force Commander and his staff was an attempt by one or more of the enemy units to make an end run into the waters of Empress Augusta Bay. At about this time, according to report of Comm Desder 45 two pips were noticed on the PPI scope that were in fairly good position to make a torpedo attack on our cruisers and he could not understand how two Japs could have arrived in such a position so quickly. An IFF failure. Checking with Dyson, he learned that in the retirement Division 45 had lost Stanley and Claxton. Luckily he was able to locate and identify them as the two pips he had seen. At this time he had two choices. First, to carry out his original intentions and head for the enemy with only two ships. Or second, delay until Stanley and Claxton could rejoin. He chose the latter. Swung right and headed south so the returning ships could reverse and reach their original stations. So far the cruisers were faring well. The enemy had not registered a single hit though his fire had been very heavy. However at this time the enemy's star shell illumination became most effective. A string of brilliant flares appeared ahead on the disengaged port bow. Course was changed 30 degrees to the left to put them on the starboard bow and escape being silhouetted. Resumed course 180 with the flares between the cruisers and the enemy battle line. This did not interfere with our radar control firing but definitely slowed up the enemy fire. Counter illumination was ordered with star shells short of the enemy. An excellent procedure against an enemy using optical observation. First from enemy planes now augmented the illumination. Even the familiar red stars were released indicating to the Japs that our formation was made up of cruisers. According to report of Commdes dear 45 this illumination was the most brilliant any of us had ever seen. They appeared to be stars properly placed to silhouette the cruisers. They descended at a much slower rate than any we had seen. These stars served our force as well as the Japs in that it helped the attacking destroyers to check the location of our cruisers. Destroyer division 46 is closing rapidly on the central enemy ships while being fired upon by the northern group. Spence receives a hit at the water line permitting saltwater to enter a fuel tank. At this point CIC on Spence reported the center group on which they had been closing to be friendly. With no time to investigate the division commander immediately swings his ship and heads for the northern group which is firing on him. Division 46 has had four distressing mishaps in quick succession before firing a shot. A ship wandered from formation. A ship torpedoed and out of action. A collision. And a shell hit. This coupled with the confusion occasioned by radical changes of course at high speed had very likely disoriented CIC. Because of poor identification a golden opportunity was lost. On the Montpelier pips indicating division 46 merged with those of the center enemy group. From this time on there was doubt as to the identity of ships near this bearing. Too much emphasis cannot be paid to the efficient operation of the IFF system and disbursed groups informing OTC of their location. During the next 10 minutes the enemy illumination steadily improved as did his shooting. The three leading cruisers were straddled in range salvo after salvo. Most of these salvos were a matter of feet to the right. So close that the ships were running through the splashes and probably creating the impression in the alleged minds of the nips that they were on in deflection. These salvos averaged in pattern from 1 to 200 yards. One salvo landed less than 100 yards ahead of the Montpelier but most of those fired at her were over. Between 03, 20 and 25 Denver received three 8 inch hits. She was straddled in range and deflection by five successive salvos and was forced to turn out of formation although she continued to fire at increased range. Turn 2 was executed to throw off the enemy's fire control though all ships were zigzagging independently for the same purpose. As for our gunfire it was superb. Our ships were hitting continuously. A fact most evident on an extremely dark night. The results obtained by our gun batteries under full radar control has been most gratifying. Frequent offset practices for ballistic corrections at long ranges pay dividends. Cruiser division is ordered to make smoke both chemical and funnel. The effectiveness of the enemy's fire fell off at once while our own continued at a high rate. It was obvious from the many shell bursts seen on his ships to the south that the enemy was taking terrific punishment. Four large explosions were observed and one ship was reported to have blown up completely. At this time the rain had ceased but a heavy bank of clouds hung over the formation at about 1500 feet. As the enemy's brilliant star shells broke through the ceiling of clouds acted as a reflector and enhanced the intensity of the illumination. The effect of the smoke was to fill this space completely. Division 46 approached the three remaining ships of the northern group. One a cruiser was disabled and steaming slowly in circles. The other two were retiring to the northwest. The fourth ship of this group, a destroyer, had sunk as a result of torpedo and gun hits. At a range of 6,000 yards Division 46 fired eight torpedoes at the cruiser and took up pursuit of the two destroyers retiring to the northwest. At about the time torpedoes should have arrived at the target two underwater explosions were felt by personnel in CIC on the spence but top sides reported that no flashes were seen. Division 45 is also closing on the crippled cruiser and is tracking contacts believed to be enemy ships retiring to the northwest. At 0349 they opened up on the cruiser and hit it consistently at 7,000 yards for one and a half minutes but continued their chase after the fleeing ships. It is evident that Division 45 was chasing Division 46. Due to inoperative condition of IFF on the destroyers much valuable time was wasted at a critical period and created the possibility of firing at our own ships. It is regretted that both destroyer divisions attacked the same enemy group. Otherwise enemy losses might have been greater. However neither of the commanders knew that both divisions had concentrated on the northern group until the composite track chart was constructed two weeks after the battle. At 0344 our cruisers had stopped making smoke as all enemy ships were retiring. Montpelier attempted to illuminate her cripple of the southern group with star shells but the illumination was not effective. More effective star shells are in production a greatly improved performance can be expected with a recent modification. Montpelier ceases firing on her target which is dead in the water. The ship is believed to be a destroyer. The cruisers came to course 240 to close this cripple which is smoking heavily. The pip shortly thereafter disappears from the screen. He may have sunk but could have been another contact picked up later a few miles to the west and reported by Columbia to have exploded. Cruisers come to course north. These radical changes of course are intended to frustrate torpedo fire from enemy cripples. To the everlasting credit of the cruiser captains during more than an hour of violent maneuvering amidst deafening din of battle formation in any way confused nor disrupted at 0352 destroyer division 46 having closed the enemy to 3,000 yards changes course to the left and fires 19 torpedoes. About two minutes later two explosions are felt and a single column of black smoke rose from the target group. Again no flashes of explosions were noted. The division opened to 7,000 yards and changed course to the west to cross the enemy tee from a stern and at 0358 opened fire. Spencer's first salvo was seen to go over on the radar screen but second and subsequent salvos appeared to land in the center of target. At 0401 Ridge reported two targets being hit and on fire. At 0403 division 45 cited this gunfire to port and shortly afterwards picked up Spencer's report that she was engaging two targets. Division 45 was chasing a target that must have been making about 38 knots but lost it by 0407 when it disappeared over the horizon. At 0410 Spence lost suction and fell out of column. Salt water in the fuel was causing her to smoke badly. At this time one ship was tracked pulling out at good speed to the northwest. Converse and Thatcher engaged this target. It slowed to 7 knots as many hits were made and a flare up served. Division 45 now coming in spotted a ship ahead which was smoking badly and being unable to identify reported over TBS that they were going to open up on it. Spence also smoking from loss of suction replied, don't do it, that's us. Consequently Desdiv 45 passed up this target which later received the attention of Converse and Thatcher. At this time it is not clear how Thatcher and Converse escaped being fired upon by Desdiv 45. Converse and Thatcher engaged the smoking target leaving it burning extensively and in the opinion of the commanding officer of Converse in a sinking condition. Perhaps both of these enemy ships sank. Neither one was sighted by our large airstrike which covered this area a few hours later in daylight. When Spence sheared out of column she steered a westerly course during which time Division 45 was definitely trying to locate her. At 04.38 Osborne made a contact on her port bow and tried for 3 minutes to identify. Then deciding it was an enemy ship Division 45 opened fire. Unfortunately Spence was straddled with 5 salvos before the target was established as friendly. This is another instance where a ship of Division 46 had no IFF. Converse and Thatcher 45 instructed Spence to trail his division to minimize confusion in identifying groups. A sound procedure. In the meantime Spence had picked up a new target to the southeast. Cruiser Division 12 now on a westerly course had been tracking this ship for some time and strongly suspected her of being enemy. At 04.58 Montpelier fired an offset salvo across her bow and asked by TBS if the ship on that bearing was a friend. Receiving no reply a salvo was delivered by the whole division. By a strange coincidence Spence was on the same general bearing but beyond the target. Spence reported immediately that she was being fired on. Apparently the enemy ship was firing on Spence at the same time. Division 45 was chasing another fleeing target toward the northeast while Spence was closing the target that had fired on her. At 05.10 Spence identified it as enemy and open fire. Which fire was returned immediately? At 05.15 Division 45 came to course 230 to assist when Spence reported her ammunition almost exhausted. At 05.19 Division 45 commenced firing. The fire was accurate and effective and a few moments later the target was a fire. The bow completely inflamed. A condition which was soon corrected. Within three minutes the bridge was demolished and Division 45 closed to identify it definitely as a Pubuki class destroyer. At 05.42 the target sank. The cruisers crossed a heavy oil slick as day dawns and all ships are recalled to rendezvous at foot's position. As Task Force 39 left the scene with foot in tow no other surface ships were visible. The radar screen was clear except for friendly planes. So the only important question of the moment was how do you all want your ham and eggs, sir? Safe observations are indicated which may have helped us in our future battles. I've jotted down those which are the most apparent to me. We found that our own aircraft scouts two reports on the location, composition, course, and speed of the enemy were phenomenally accurate. The Task Force commander's plan and doctrine were well known by his cruiser and destroyer captains in frequent conferences and tactical exercises. With a favorable tactical situation obtaining destroyer Division 45 was immediately released after contact and the expectation of achieving surprise. A policy of immediate destroyer attack requires A that the destroyers be ready for attack and B that the attack be initiated at the favorable opportunity after contact. No weapon that can inflict early and continuous damage to the enemy should be held in reserve. Our position at the time of contact was favorable for sending both destroyer groups in to be attacked on either bow of the enemy simultaneously had the commander of destroyers left flank obtained an earlier torpedo solution. His slight delay was due to his greater distance from the enemy. In view of the darkness of the night, the very brief period of training that destroyer Division 46 had enjoyed in other than screening formations and the intention of the OTC to maneuver his cruisers radically by simultaneous ship's movements it was desirable to send in this division as quickly as possible before it became disorganized. The early initiation of a determined torpedo attack may result in the disabling of vital units and render the enemy a much easier target for gunfire. In this battle, as in so many others, the light forces wound up a melee. Such a displaced melee is not surprising in a night engagement. It's rather to be expected in the type of naval warfare we are experiencing. It's therefore all the more urgent that Task Force commanders give it intensive consideration with the idea of developing a technique and doctrine which will make it possible to press a pursuit and mop up without having the units get out of hand and get lost. Cover the same area or target unnecessarily. Interfere with each other or mistake a friend for an enemy and fire on him. Our very success in putting the enemy to flight in night action has introduced this difficult tactical problem. This difficulty is enhanced in proportion to the number of our own and enemy ships which are disabled and in leaving formation create additional pips on the radar screen. The tracking of own groups becomes at times as important as the tracking of enemy groups. There's a tendency to lose track of groups who go off the radar screen at short scale. Plotted points must be joined, labeled, direction of motion indicated by arrows. Otherwise a plot becomes a meaningless mass of hand scratches. For instance, the 46th Division debated from attack on the central enemy group. Division 45 tracked 46 believing it to be enemy. Division 45 passed up an enemy target smoking thinking it to be friendly. Division 45 fired on Spence. These mistakes understandable under the difficult conditions then encountered can be avoided by tracking methods that ensure all forces are continuously tracked in the application of positive identification methods and confused situations. Both very difficult during battle. Most communications with the TBS except for some use of the secondary frequency for ships outside the TBS range. The restrictions necessitated by wartime radio operations have bred a new generation of radio men who rely more and more on voice frequency with consequent loss of efficiency. Training on key circuits should be carried out at every opportunity. Many failures result from the proper authority not getting the word. These failures frequently occur because of misunderstanding due to new men and to lack of standard phraseology. It would have been very valuable in this action to have had the services of our own spotter in a radar equipped plane. Such a plane might also have been employed as a smoker and for dropping of flares, both for target illumination and recognition and for counter illumination. The use of Tomcats evolved in the South Pacific solves this problem to some extent. There were none assigned on this particular night. The use of smoke had an immediate deleterious effect on the accuracy of enemy gunfire. Soon after the smoke screen was ordered, the enemy closed rapidly. It is believed that the presence of large quantities of black smoke when the enemy thought they were hitting led them to believe that they had crippled us and they were coming in for the kill. The volume of fire the enemy met as soon as they came within the continuous fire range evidently showed them their error. The enemy spotting in deflection was poor. His salvoes were largely just ahead. Our own spotters may make the same mistake. If the target is moving at high speed, this may cause a splash 50 yards ahead to peer abreast of the target's bridge. Cruising speeds in war zones and battle speeds should not be set at even multiples of five. It stands to reason that these speeds are more often than not used in the torpedo and gunry solutions. When the Japanese were about to establish consistent hitting on our ships, damage was avoided by timely maneuvers at high speed, by our own smoke screen, with a serious disabling of some of the Japanese ships and by counter-illumination. The performance of the ordnance material was excellent during the two bombardments during the battle and throughout the heavy enemy air attack which followed the battle. It is clearly evident that our greatest advantage at this time over the Japanese forces' night engagements lies in the efficiency of our radar and its application to our tactical and fire control problems. However, the evaluator must have an excellent grasp of the entire tactical situation in order to pass on this picture and words to the captain on a darkened bridge. Where practicable, the CIC should be accessible to the captain. Otherwise, he must have a tactical plot on the bridge. The OTC must see the graphic plot during night action even if forced by faulty design to fight his force from the bowels of his flagship. And in this connection, we learn the most important lesson of the battle. The CIC of destroyer Division 46 flagship is two decks below the bridge. Normally at night, the division commander handled his division from the station. When the Thatcher and his flagship collided, the division commander dashed up to the bridge and hence lost contact with the plot. His CIC personnel with comparatively little experience became disoriented in the absence of the division commander and reported the enemy's center column as friendly. The division turned away to the northward and missed the golden opportunity to put 32 Peters into two Japanese heavy cruises at 4,000 yards range. The lesson learned is that the captain should have ready access to his CIC, or if not practicable, a tactical plot. The unit commander must have ready access from his bridge battle station to his flag plot. We sailors should all have a clear appreciation of the limitations of aircraft as well as their vatures. When Com Task Force 31 requested the Task Force 39 take position between St. George's Channel and Empress Augusta Bay, Air Solomon's replied that if this Jap Task Force revased its course, the air would destroy it before it could reach Empress Augusta Bay. Only the reconnaissance planes, which made the two excellent contact reports were in evidence on this black and squally night. Had commander South Pacific and the commander of the landing operation fail to appreciate aircraft limitations, the enemy Task Force would have destroyed our transports and mine laying detachment and shell out troops and supplies, which were freshly landed on the beaches of Empress Augusta Bay.