 Go ahead and call the meeting to order. This morning we meet to discuss the national security challenges in U.S. military activity in North and South America. We have three witnesses with us, Ms. Melissa Dalton, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemisphere Affairs at OSD, General Laura Richardson, who is the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, and General Glenn Van Herk, who is the Commander for U.S. Northern Command and North American Error Space Defense Command. Greetings, and thank you all for being here. There are a lot of challenges in the world right now, as we all know. I don't think anyone can argue with the basic statement that the threat environment has increased significantly in recent years, in recent months, and even in recent weeks. And most of our focus on that is overseas in other places. Over the last 20 years, we've had a huge focus on the central command in Iraq and Afghanistan. We see China as this has been described, the pacing threat in the world, and obviously we all know the threat from Russia right now, what's going on in Ukraine and the broader threat that they pose. But I think it is very important that we have the commands before us today that we have, because it's important to remember that our primary job is to protect the United States of America, to protect the homeland. And what's closer to home are the primary threats that we need to be worried about. And there's two big things about that. One, there are threats here at home. There continues to be a great deal of instability, certainly in Latin America. We've seen the impacts of that in a variety of different ways. The drug trade, the criminality, immigration flows, all of that has a profound impact on us. Domestically in the Northern Command, we are concerned about how that impacts us, but there are cyber threats and many others. So there are threats here in this region. But I think as importantly, the threats that are overseas are also present here. Certainly we all know about how transnational terrorist threats can come home. But Russia and China are both very active in this hemisphere, certainly in Latin America and elsewhere. So if we are looking at an era of great power competition, then that competition is here as well. And we need to be aware of the threat that poses. As we talk with our witnesses about how we're going to meet those threats, I'll hit upon the point that this committee has been very focused on for a number of years, and that is updating our technology and understanding how to meet the threats in this age. To me, it's all about information and survivability. And certainly here in the Northern Command, protecting our information is at the top. We are very vulnerable to cyber attacks. How do we make sure that we better protect ourselves against that? And then equally, how do we take advantage of innovative new technologies to make sure that our information system broadly speaking is robust, effective, and protected? It is my opinion, and I know the ranking member shares this opinion, that the Pentagon still needs to pick up the pace on implementing those new technologies, on making sure that we take advantage of AI, machine learning, and other technologies that are crucial to defending us, to understanding how the battlefield has changed, and what it means to truly defend yourself in the modern era. And I think our witnesses today and the commands that they are responsible for are incredibly appropriate to answer some of those questions. How is it going? How are we doing at protecting the homeland? How are we dealing with the threats that are right here in our hemisphere? Even as we see the threats metastasize around the world, mindful of the fact that those threats around the world are a lot closer than they may appear in terms of how they can impact our own security here at home. So I look forward to our witnesses' testimony. The questions and answer is always. And with that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Rogers. I thank the chairman for holding us here, and I thank the witnesses for their attendance and their service to our country in the Western Hemisphere. As we focus on the growing threat from China and Putin's appalling act in Ukraine, we must not neglect the many national security challenges in our own backyard. Homeland defense is the foundation of our national security. A strong homeland defense enables us to project power around the globe. We rely on Northcom for everything from ballistic missile defense to stopping illegal trafficking of drugs and migrants across our borders. But this mission has become increasingly difficult. Our adversaries are enhancing their ability to strike our homeland with ballistic missiles and now threaten us with hypersonics. Non-state actors trafficking narcotics and human beings across the border continues to be a major problem. In fiscal year 2021, Customs and Border Protection encountered more than 1.6 million inadmissible individuals at Southwest Land Border. That is the most ever encountered. Last year, border seizures of cocaine grew by 68%. And seizures of fentanyl increased by 134%. CBP is simply overwhelmed. It must rely on support from the Department of Defense and Northcom just to perform its basic mission. I look forward to hearing from General Van Herk and Assistant Secretary Dalton's perspectives on how to best tackle these threats. In Central and South America, instability is growing and further undermining our national security. Southcom works hard to counter instability by building partner capacity, carrying out counter-narcotics operations, and responding to disasters. They do a tremendous amount of good, but their job is becoming more difficult. China and Russia are expanding their influence both economically and militarily in the region. Their presence undermines our national security. To counter these threats, we must build new and enhance existing partnerships in the region. I congratulate General Richardson on her new command and I look forward to hearing how she intends to tackle these challenges. The threats to our national security in North and South America are complex and increasingly connected to our great power competition. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and getting their best military advice on how to overcome these challenges. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you, Ms. Dalton. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers and Distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am the Principal Civilian Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Homeland Defense, Mission Assurance, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Western Hemisphere Affairs, and the Arctic and Global Resilience. I'd like to emphasize two points up front. First, DOD is working to increase preparedness to prevent and respond to threats in the homeland, namely from state-based strategic competitors. Second, to build resilience against these threats, DOD is modernizing our approach to partnerships for homeland defense missions. The U.S. homeland faces challenges from state and non-state competitors, as well as transboundary challenges like climate change. These can put DOD's ability to defend the homeland, project power, and counter aggression. The People's Republic of China is the pacing challenge for the department. Its rapidly advancing capabilities could allow the PRC to hold our homeland at risk and disrupt our ability to mobilize the joint force. Russia poses an acute challenge to the United States and our partners. Abroad, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has already resulted in loss of life and threatens global peace and security. At home, Russia has sought to weaken our democracy. Rogue regimes Iran and North Korea pose persistent challenges. Iran has attempted to execute influence campaigns in the homeland, including the 2020 presidential election. The DPRK focuses its malicious criminal activity on exploiting international financial systems, allowing it to evade UN sanctions. The United States faces cyber threats from state and non-state actors, their proxies, and cyber criminals. The PRC and Russia are among our most sophisticated cyber competitors. They exfiltrate sensitive information to erode our economic vitality, and they undermine voter confidence. The Western Hemisphere's relative stability can be maintained only by building strong defense relationships with partners in the region. We know that competitors seek to foster instability and that transnational criminal organizations enable corruption and erode democratic institutions in the region. Our nation also faces natural and man-made hazards. COVID-19 has claimed the lives of 936,000 Americans. Last year, the homeland endured 58 major disasters, including hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding. Climate change is affecting the Arctic acutely, opening inroads for U.S. strategic competitors. DOD's priority is to defend the homeland. One of the key ways the department will do this is through integrated deterrents, working seamlessly across war-fighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our alliances and partnerships to apply a coordinated effort to alter our competitors' perceptions of the potential costs and benefits of aggression. The resilience of our critical infrastructure and capabilities at home strengthens deterrence of competitor aggression. Central to this effort is building the resilience of critical capabilities, particularly non-DOD-owned capabilities on which we rely. This requires cooperation with our partners and other departments and agencies, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and the private sector to address vulnerabilities and build resilience. In the cyberspace domain, DOD is ensuring the joint force can fight and win wars even through disruption and while under attack. DOD also executes cyberspace operations to enable its partners and to disrupt cyber threats. Protecting our democracy from foreign-based malign influence and election interference attacks is a DOD top priority. DOD supports federal, state, and local partners in securing our borders and responding to man-made and natural disasters. Over the last year, this has included providing support to whole-of-government responses to COVID-19, Operation Allies Welcome, and the Southwest border. DOD is supporting the national response to COVID-19, including approximately 118 requests for assistance last year. As of February 28th, DOD had 63 teams to holding 1,424 personnel identified to support hospitals and medical centers. Over the past year, DOD supported care through Operation Allies Welcome for more than 80,000 Afghan evacuees through Operation Allies Welcome and with temporary housing and medical support at eight domestic military installations. DOD support for evacuees at military installations has ended, but will continue at a non-DOD facility. DOD has supported DHS's mission at the Southwest border for 17 of the last 21 years, roughly 2,500 DOD personnel are deployed to the border providing intelligence analysis, aviation, and other support. To address shared threats in the Western Hemisphere, DOD has partnered with the region's militaries based on support for democratic institutions, civilian control of the military, and respect for human rights. To conclude, the department is committed to increasing preparedness with partners in and out of government to build homeland, resilience, and advance U.S. national interests. Thank you for your support of the Department of Defense, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, General Richardson. I don't think your microphone's on there. Thank you, Chairman. Great, thanks. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you alongside General Van Herk and Assistant Secretary Dalton, two of my most important teammates in keeping this Western Hemisphere safe. I am honored to be here with you, representing the men and women of United States Southern Command. To discuss the challenges we share with our neighbors in this hemisphere, but also the opportunities we can unlock together. Today, more than ever, America's fate is inextricably linked to events beyond our shores. This region, our shared neighborhood, is under assault from a host of cross-cutting, transboundary challenges that directly threaten our homeland. I have been in command for about four months now, and the biggest eye-opener for me has been the extent to which China and Russia are aggressively expanding their influence in our neighborhood. Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing insecurity and instability that has been greatly exacerbated by COVID-19. The People's Republic of China, our long-term strategic competitor, continues its relentless march to expand economic, diplomatic, technological, informational, and military influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and challenges U.S. influence in all of these domains. Without U.S. leadership, negative PRC influence in this region could soon resemble the self-serving, predatory influence that now holds in Africa. Meanwhile, Russia, a more immediate threat, is increasing its engagements in the hemisphere as Putin looks to keep his options open and maintain relationships in our near abroad. In January, the Russian foreign, the Russian deputy foreign minister said he could neither affirm nor exclude that Russia would send military assets to Cuba or Venezuela. Just days before the Russia unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Russian deputy prime minister visited Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela, countries that maintain close ties with Russia and offer Putin a foothold in our hemisphere. Finally, recent visits between the presidents of Brazil and Argentina with Putin in Russia demonstrate a concerning potential broadening of Russian ties in the region. And this hemisphere, transnational criminal organizations operate nearly uncontested and blaze a trail of corruption and violence. And this creates a wedge and allows the PRC in Russia to exploit these countries. They threaten citizen security, undermine public confidence in government institutions, and drive irregular migration to our homeland. These TCOs traffic opioids, cocaine, and other deadly drugs into the United States fueling both drug overdoses and drug-related violence that have affected so many of us and our loved ones. And my initial travels to the region is it has become obvious to me that our partners are our best defense. We must use all available levers to strengthen our partnerships with the 28 like-minded democracies in this hemisphere who understand the power of working together to counter these shared threats. We must maximize important tools like security cooperation programs to train and equip our partner militaries, multilateral exercises to build interoperability, and the State Department's IMET, FMF, and FMS programs to educate, train, and build capacity that our partners use to stand shoulder to shoulder with us. Columbia, for example, our strongest partner in the region, exports security by training other Latin American militaries to counter transnational threats. US Southcom is putting integrated deterrence into action every day, using innovative methods to work seamlessly in all domains with the other combat commands, the joint force, allies and partner nations, Congress, the US interagency, NGOs, and the private sector to help build a shared neighborhood that is free, secure, and prosperous for our generation and generations to come. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, General Van Herk. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. It's my honor to represent the men and women of United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. It's also an honor to appear today with General Richardson and Assistant Secretary Dalton. Northcom and NORAD faced the most dynamic and strategically complex environment in their respective histories. The commands face multiple simultaneous challenges from strategic competitors who have openly declared their intent to hold our homelands at risk in an effort to advance their own interests. Today, strategic competitors, rogue nations, non-state actors possess the capability to strike our institutions and critical infrastructure in the United States and Canada. To put it bluntly, our country is under attack every day in the information space and the cyber domain. Our competitors, especially Russia and China, are spreading disinformation, actively sowing division and internal discord with the intent to undermine the foundation of our nation, our democracy and democracies around the world. We're seeing this play out with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Those same competitors have invested heavily in conventional precision strike capabilities and advanced delivery platforms, which Russia is currently displaying to the world. Their intent is to hold targets in the homeland at risk below the nuclear threshold in order to limit our decision space for our senior leaders by threatening critical infrastructure, by disrupting and delaying our ability to project power globally while attempting to undermine our will to intervene in a regional crisis overseas. I believe the strategic deterrent is the foundation of homeland defense and that it is necessary for the United States to maintain a reliable and effective nuclear triad. At the same time, I'm concerned that deterrence by cost imposition is currently over-weighted and does not adequately account for the conventional capabilities our competitors have already fielded. This over-reliance increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation because it limits our national leaders' options in crisis and in conflict. Our competitors have advanced conventional capabilities, make it necessary to balance deterrence by cost imposition with a model of deterrence by denial and integrated deterrence that employs all elements of national influence, leverages the asymmetric advantage of our allies and partners, and provides leaders with a wide range of timely deterrence options. We must continually demonstrate to potential aggressors that they will not be successful in achieving their objectives with an attack on the homeland by demonstrating our homeland readiness, responsiveness, resiliency, and displaying a range of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to deter and if required, defend the homeland. Northcom support to civil authorities and security cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical to integrated deterrence, as is NORAD's mission to provide warning and defend the approaches to North America. This strategic environment is the new normal. The operating model that assumed we could project power globally from a safe and secure homeland has been eroding for the last decade. In order to provide national leaders with timely and informed options, they need to achieve favorable outcomes. Northcom and NORAD in our homeland defense design are focused on four key principles. Starting with all domain awareness, from undersea to on orbit and everywhere in between to include the cyber domain. All domain awareness is required to achieve information dominance, which is the use of advanced capabilities like machine learning and artificial intelligence to quickly analyze process and deliver data to decision makers at the speed of relevance. By doing so, we will increase senior leaders' decision space and enable decisions superiority over competitors. Finally, today's problems are all global and all domain and demand globally integrated strategies, plans, and actions. These principles are vital to elements of our ability to execute a layered defense and integrated deterrence. And they are critical to our nation's ability to deter in competition, deescalating crisis, and if necessary, defeating conflict. I'd like to thank the committee for all you've done to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians. The FY22 National Defense Authorization Act continues to advance our national defense priorities and the missions of US Northern Command and NORAD. However, today's strategic environment calls for sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding in order to prevail. Persistently operating under a continuing resolution has continued the erosion of our nation's competitive advantage over the last decade. I join my fellow commanders, service chiefs, and the secretaries in stressing the importance of passing the FY22 omnibus and the restoration of normal order in the appropriations process as a matter of national security. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much and amen on that last point. We are optimistic that we'll pass the appropriations bills next 48 hours apparently. But hopefully we'll get that done in the future. It needs to be a lot closer to October 1st than March 1st and we are aware of that and working on that. Just two quick questions first for Stolten and General Van Herk on the cyber front. We're aware of the threat, what would you say are the two or three most important things that this committee can do to help you meet that threat? Thank you, chairman. Well, we don't have a specific or credible cyber threats right now as they relate to the current crisis in Russia, in Ukraine. We are mindful of the prospect and do you see that as Russia is conducting cyber attacks in Ukraine that there is the potential for spillover? Right, but speaking more broadly, like I said, we're aware of the threat. What I'm interested in is what, as you look at it and you're looking, whether it's Russia, whether it's China, whether it's transnational criminals, as our systems are, what are the two or three most important things you think to meet the threat? And I'll broaden it, not just what this committee can do, but what we as a government need to be doing to meet those threats. Absolutely, chairman. So continued support for U.S. cyber command and the unique capabilities, talent and expertise that it brings to the equation. And they're more broadly for authorizers and appropriators that support DHS to ensure that they have the capacity, talent and expertise to work as part of a whole of government approach and be engaging with the private sector to patch current vulnerabilities is paramount. Thank you. General. Thanks chairman. The last one I would agree with, capacity. We need to look at the capacity of our cyber defenders, not only across the Department of Defense, but Homeland Security as well as CISA are under director Easterly. This is a domain awareness problem. Cyber domain. And we need to have tools and capability to ensure we understand the vulnerabilities within our cyber infrastructure and the critical infrastructure. Also, I would say that we need to look closely at policy and law, which today limits our ability to sometimes look within side our own country at specific vulnerabilities. As we move forward, I think from a national security perspective, we will only become more vulnerable. We don't know what we don't know on some of the critical infrastructure. So we need to go assess some of the limitations in policy and law. We need to figure out from a policy perspective what the most critical infrastructure is that we must defend and apply that to the limited resources that we have chairman. Thank you very much. In general, Richardson, as you mentioned, Russia and China are very active in Latin America. Where are we most vulnerable? What are they trying to do and what should we be doing to counter it? Either in terms of the countries they're closest to or what their overall strategy is to destabilize us from being active in your command. Well, thank you for the question, Chairman. And they are very active, certainly with China and being our long-term strategic competitor. The advances that they've made with the Belt and Road Initiative, 21 of 31 countries have signed on to this initiative. As we know, it starts with the infrastructure economic projects and then furthers into exploitation. A lot of those are state-owned enterprises by China and certainly were concerned about the dual use just like in Africa. I see that the Chinese are using the same playbook that they did in Africa 10 to 15 years ago and they're using that in the Southcom AOR now. In terms of Russia and what they do to so discord undermine our U.S. interests globally, the disinformation campaigns that they have, Russia Today, Spanish, as well as Sputnik, Mundo, the social media, the meddling in elections that our partner nations are very concerned about. And so certainly across the entire region as we work with our security partners from Columbia, Brazil, very concerned with the inroads that our competitors are making. And we look to out-compete our competitors. We've got to be on the field, we've got to be with them every day. They want to partner with us and so it's important that we're there and that we're working with them with what they need. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. General Richardson, you and General Ben-Hurt have done a pretty good job characterizing the threat both China and Russia pose in your areas of responsibility. Do you expect to see the resources that you need to combat that threat in this year's PBR? General Richardson. So I haven't seen the budget just yet but I aspire that it will give us modest investments in the AOR. I think a comprehensive strategy in the Southcom region as we know, as we looked East and West quite a bit we don't look South so much. This is a very important AOR and so I'm hopeful that we'll get what we need when we don't in terms of we look for other ways of low cost, high yield investments. And I'll talk to AI machine learning here in a little bit but certainly as we look at innovation and using our AOR as a testbed as well with the capabilities where we might not have competitors watching us so closely. We're able to work a lot of projects and innovation and things like that for the services and for the Department of Defense. By saying that you hope you get the modest investment that you need, would that be an increase over what you had in FY 2021? Congressman, I would say that in terms of I do my assessment in the region, I've been in the seat for about 120 days now, four months and I think that we could do better in terms of a comprehensive strategy for the AOR as opposed to just asking for bits here and there. I don't have assigned forces and so that forces us to be very innovative and as we look to partner with our partner nations, militaries and security forces. General Ben Hurt, same questions. So I think from a domain awareness perspective, I think I'll see increased support as I've conveyed over the last 18 months since I've been in command but I haven't seen the final budget, Congressman. From a theater security cooperation perspective, I think there'll still be work to be done. A little goes a long way in the Western Hemisphere and to compete as part of integrated deterrence, I think we could do more. China and Russia are both global problems. Instead of running to the South China Sea or to the Yukon AOR, we need to factor in that they're here in the Western Hemisphere and ensure adequate funding for integrated deterrence as well. Well that's the point I wanna make is the theaters that y'all have responsibility for as well as APRICOM are pretty inexpensive for us to do what we need to do. So what I would request is that if in fact what you need is not in the President's budget request that you will guarantee this committee that you will try to get it in your unfunded requirements list. Congressman, I will absolutely do that. General Richardson. Yes, Congressman. Okay, General Van Hurt, in your testimony, you referenced Russian capability to launch cruise missiles at the homeland. Can you update us on what NORAD is doing to improve our capability to defend against that threat? Yes, sir. So we're working closely with the department and with the Department of National Defense in Canada on our Homeland Defense design which starts with domain awareness as I previously discussed. I look forward to seeing the 23 budget. I'm confident that we're gonna move the ball if you will down the field on domain awareness both in the air domain, space domain, and undersea domain. We do need to work more on NORAD modernization on the way forward which would include infrastructure in the Arctic to get after that problem which also allows me to position forces for the cruise missile problem that you're talking about as well as have an organized, trained, and ready forces to operate out throughout my AOR. That's a challenge for the services today that we're working closely with. The final thing I would say, Congressman, on cruise missile defense is the department needs to select a single point of contact to own cruise missile defense of the homeland. And we haven't done that in accordance with the NDAA directives, I believe, in 17. Do you expect that to happen? We're working closely with the department on the missile defense review. I've advocated to have a specific point of contact. I think we'll get there, but I haven't seen the final version. Okay, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langeman is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hand me okay? Mr. Langeman? Yeah. Can you hand me okay? Yep, we got you. Go ahead, Jim. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, our witnesses, for your testimony today. The panel was right to focus on the cyber challenges that we faced, and I want to build on that. Ms. Dalton, in your testimony, you stated that we are developing new opportunities to help partners improve their cyber. Hey, Jim. Sorry, could you get a little closer to your mic? We hear you, but it's kind of faint. Okay, is that any better? Yes. Okay. I'll start over again, but this is Ms. Dalton. In your testimony, you stated that we're developing new opportunities to help partners improve their cyber and network defense capabilities so they can deter, detect, and defend against cyber threats in support of a free, secure Western hemisphere. And let me just say, I'm so glad to hear that. I think it's very appropriate, as I long believe that we'll never again fight a war without some type of a cyber component to it. So in this unclassified setting, can you expand on the work that is being done with our partner nations in the Western hemisphere when it comes to cyber? Thank you, Congressman, and it's an excellent question and an area that I look forward to building upon as Assistant Secretary. I'd like to break down the response that actually into two parts in terms of the range of partners that we work with on this challenge set. First of all, domestically with the private sector and with the defense industrial base, we have three entities that work very closely to provide, with the private sector, to provide cyber security services and tools. Our Defense Cyber Crimes Center, the National Defense Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and of course NSA all provide cyber security services to key defense industrial-based companies to help identify key vulnerabilities, potential mitigations, and also can enhance information sharing in the event of attack to other partners in the Dib. So that's a very important line of effort that we are building out closely with our colleagues in the interagency. And then with respect to partners in the hemisphere through our security cooperation efforts, we are increasingly looking for opportunities to provide cyber security patches. There's a lot of great actually capability and technology that's off the shelf commercially that we can provide to partners. So it's really along those two tracks that we are working along those lines. Thank you. I hope we can increase those engagements sooner rather than later as well. General Richardson and General Ben-Hurk, how is cyber being utilized and developed in your defensive strategies? General Richardson? In terms of cyber, we need to do better in cyber. Our countries want to work with us. They aren't very long in terms of their cyber capabilities. And so in terms of working through, they all want help. And assistance with cyber, with their networks, making sure that they have protected networks. And so we have small teams, joint cyber capability assessment teams that we send about 13 man teams with cyber experts and network experts to these countries and help with our partner nations, help do over-the-shoulder training to try to assist them with this because they are very much worried about the protection of their cyber capabilities and their networks. Congressman, it's important to point out the mission of United States Northern Command in the cyber domain. I'm the discus synchronizer for support that would be provided to CISA if we needed to respond outside of either the Doden, the DoD infrastructure, or federal networks that CISA provides. The cyber protection forces would be provided through me to support that. We are closely partnering with both CISA, Homeland Security and Cybercom to further our partnerships to understand the threat as well. I would also provide defense support of civil authorities in the event there are outcomes from a cyber attack such as lack of potable water, fuel, those kinds of things as well. I think it's important to go back to a comment that I made that we're partnering with the department first, but also with the inter-agency through DHS is to identify the key critical infrastructure that must be defended, those things that would be strategically significant if identified in a crisis that could bring us to our knees, whether that be power, projection, finance, energy, those kinds of things. Those are all key parts of our strategy. And last question, in what ways are you prioritizing joint initiatives such as JADC2? At Norcom norad, we are absolutely prioritizing JADC2, as I said, my opening statement. We're conducting experiments, the global information dominance experiment that brings all the combatant commands together. JADC2 is required to execute the integrated deterrence strategy. The elements times expired. The chair recognizes Representative Wilson South Carolina for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank each of you for your service. It's so inspiring. And General Richardson, I recently was at Southcom. And so congratulations on your command. What extraordinary people that you have serving with you. I'm grateful that the South Carolina National Guard bilateral cooperation is with the nation of Columbia, Columbia through the state partnership program. It's only appropriate, Columbia to Columbia. Our dedicated National Guard soldiers are dedicated to working with the Colombian military and capacity. It will be used against the criminal cartels to manufacture illicit drugs, including fentanyl, which will end up the United States being smuggled across sadly our open border. What other bilateral agreements are underway to empower our South American partners to fight back against drug smuggling? So Congressman, thank you so much for mentioning the state partnership program and the state of South Carolina's relationship with Columbia and Columbia to Columbia. So absolutely. What a huge enabler to our efforts in the Southcom AOR. The National Guard state partnership programs are aligned with our strategy and with our campaign plan and Southcom. And they are so important because they've had relationships over decades. And you really look at the strength and the trust with our partner nations, our National Guard state partnership program is absolutely key to that. And so in terms of the bilateral agreements, I'd like to talk about the Columbia staff talks we just had at the Southcom headquarters with the chief of defense and his joint staff that came. And we had developed a framework, believe it or not, we've had such a great relationship over the past couple of decades with Columbia, but actually developed a framework and then lines of effort with things that we wanted to work towards. They have very important elections in Columbia coming up the end of May. And so we wanna make sure that what we've seen in countries that have elections and change administrations is that the security relationships maintained are strong, they continue to be strong, but we wanted to put in writing these lines of effort in our focus areas that we wanted to work towards. Three lines of effort with about six focus areas per each one. And we both signed that myself in the chief of defense, Joe Navarro in January. So we look forward to continuing to strengthen our military partnerships in cyber, in the human rights, rule of law, women, peace and security. I mean, it covers the whole gamut of what we do in security cooperation with our partner nations. And quite honestly, our partner nations are our best defense. And I wanna congratulate you, socialist dictator Maduro of Venezuela of all things is violating international sanctions and buying oil from Iran. And this, in fact, you have already stopped 1.1 million barrels of Iranian petroleum products which were going to Venezuela, which would actually pay for terrorist activity to achieve their goal of death, digital death to America. And so what is being done again to stop such violations by the Maduro dictatorship? So Congressman, I appreciate that. As we know, Iran is the single largest state sponsor of terror in the world. They exchange arms and petroleum to avoid sanctions and they exchange that with Venezuela. And so in terms of the sanctions and things like that, that's more of an administration question. I don't get into the sanctions part of what we do for Southcom. Thank you. It's inconceivable a great country like Venezuela that should be producing oil and benefiting the people of their country to buy Iranian oil. It's mind-numbing how insane this is. Secretary Dalton, I visited the U.S. border with Mexico and it was shocking to me to see an open border where there's human trafficking, drug cartels and terrorist. With Homeland Security, how many on the terrorist watch list have crossed the southern border in the last year? Congressman, thank you so much for highlighting this critical issue for our country and for our partners in the region. This will absolutely be a priority of mine as assistant secretary to work closely with interagency partners and partners in the region to address. For your specific question, I will have to take that for the record. I don't have the number at my disposal, but would be happy to respond. Thank you. Well, the American people need to know how many terrorists have come across. I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Larson is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Van Herk, I had some other questions set up, but then you mentioned that it sounded like the DOD was thinking of going into the intelligence collection business inside the United States. Could you clarify your comments so I understand what you're talking about and how you propose to stay on your side of the line? Congressman, I did not say DOD should go into intelligence collection. I said from a national security perspective, we need to analyze policy and law to ensure that it best meets our nation's needs to ensure we have full domain awareness of where our risk. So why can't we rely on civilian law enforcement to do that with, in a, why can't DOD cooperate with civilian law enforcement to do that? We can, certainly. That should be DHS in my mind doing most of that. So why would you need additional authorities or policy to do that when that exists? I just think we need to look at the whole broad nature of that and ensure we fully understand where the risk and vulnerabilities are. I'm not advocating that we need to do it right now, but we do need to understand where our vulnerabilities are from a national security perspective. Right now. Do you say, are you, you might be right. Are you saying, have you concluded that we don't? No, I'm not saying that. I said we need to go look at it to ensure we fully understand where those vulnerabilities may be. The world is changing, Congressman, dramatically. General, I'm fully aware of the world is changing. But thank you for reminding me. Secretary Dalton, on page seven of your testimony, you discuss a recent initiative to institutionalize capability to conduct the deep data-driven analysis required to understand critical infrastructure and dependencies. Is that related to what the general is mentioning or is that something different? Thank you, Congressman, for highlighting this issue. I believe that it is related in the sense that in working closely with civilian-led agencies that have the lead for protections here at home, DOD is working very closely with the interagency to understand where critical vulnerabilities may exist. And then if working together, we have the right tool set in place to close those vulnerabilities. So that work is ongoing, working very closely with Northcom and other components in the department, but in support of civilian-led agency efforts. All right. General, I understand the questions are fervent and perhaps uncomfortable. So I don't, you know, part of it is putting you on the spot just to answer our questions because you are sitting on the spot. So I'm not trying to get at you personally, but I need to, I want to be assured, having been here for the 22 years and seen the world change over that period of time and having had experience in those 22 years with oversight at the DOD, I want to be sure that at least I'm getting my point across about that past experiences where the DOD has crossed that line is not, I'm not comfortable with that. I just want to make that point to you and try to do it in a nicer way in my second chance with you on that. So that's the first thing. Second, I do want to ask you particular, the department's doing a 5G pilot projects throughout the, throughout bases in CONUS and just wondering about your role, Northcom's role in those 5G projects and what you expect to get the results, what results you expect to get and use from those pilot projects. It is not my role. I would point that out Congressman, but I do applaud the department for looking that in time of crisis and conflict, it is important to be able to have the ability to command and control forces across the homeland and around the globe. 5G could provide additional capability and capacity to do that through data and voice capability. Thanks, General Richardson. Can you comment on the role Southcom is playing and I'm sorry, role SOCOM is playing in Southcom to the extent that you can share that with us here in the committee? So I have a component command, the Special Operations Command South, so SOC South and one of the theater Special Operations Commands and they're doing a fantastic job. Small teams that are working with partner nations in 12 to 17 countries, depending on which day doing low level. They've had these relationships augmented by seventh group that in terms of cultural training, language training, working with these Latin American countries for many, many years, already built the trust and really proud of my special ops team and then the support that I get from General Clark and SOCOM if we need extra capability or sometimes we cost share on some AI ML programs and things like that. I'm sorry that this time has expired. And I think Congressman Larson raises an important point. We talked a little bit about it when we met General Van Herk and I think what you're talking about is the vulnerable abilities within the US systems. A lot of that is in the private sector. We saw it in the energy sector when we got hit by cyber. You know, there's also food processing all kinds of places and while you and others are in charge of protecting our critical infrastructure, you don't know, they can be attacked and we won't ever see it. So how do we deal with that? But Congressman Larson raises the right point. You know, in our country, we don't do it by the government inserting themselves. But I think it's gonna be a difficult policy choice. I appreciate him raising that issue and something we need to talk about. How do we protect against those vulnerable abilities without having the government reaching into information that our constitution and our laws don't allow them to? It is a big challenge to protect ourselves and protect our civil liberties. Mr. Lambert is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Dalton, I know you're new to your position. So maybe that explains it, but I didn't see anything in your written statement about missile defense. And yet that's a critical job in your portfolio to help with missile defense. Northcom, I'm about to ask some questions of General Van Herk about that. But I really would urge you to get up to speed as quickly as possible. And we haven't seen the missile defense review that's supposed, that's I think overdue already. I hope there's no weakening in that when that comes out on the part of this administration. Okay, General Van Herk. I was in your office real recently a few weeks ago and one of the things we talked about was North Korea and the missile defense capabilities that we need to have to counteract their threat. Now, I know we'll have a classified session later today, but here in open session, what can you say about our ability to keep up with the evolving North Korean missile threat? Congressman, I'm currently comfortable with the capability we have today for ballistic missile defense against the threat that I see today out of North Korea. Certainly they're trying to increase their capacity and capability, that's why you see the test nine since the beginning of the year. That will challenge us going forward. I would point out that North Korea is a very tough target to gain intelligence to understand their exact capability and capacity. Going forward, it is crucial to keep next generation interceptor on target, on time, if not field it sooner and continue to service life, extend the current system to give us more reliance and capability as well. Okay, thank you. And what about the threat? Do we need to make changes in our space architecture to detect whether it's that threat or better detect hypersonic threats from near peers like Russia and China? Congressman, I believe yes, we need to go to space as soon as possible due to detect hypersonic threats that will challenge my ability from a domain awareness perspective to see them and provide what I think is crucial, that's threat warning and attack assessment that directly informs continuity of government, posture of the nuclear forces and those kinds of things. Okay, thank you. And General Richardson, you already answered some very good questions by my colleague, Representative Wilson, about drug interdiction and fentanyl in particular. I know you have a lot of responsibilities, but drug interdiction is one of those, is it not? So Congressman, by law, we do the detection and monitoring to help with our interagency and partner nations do the interdictions. That's excellent because fentanyl and other drugs are a crisis in our country. And I noticed in our briefing paper on page five, it says DOD has an interest in preventing drug trafficking organizations that operate with tacit or explicit support of Venezuelan authorities from entering the United States. What can you tell us about Venezuela's involvement in drug trafficking? Well, certainly drug trafficking is very prevalent in the, as it comes from the Central American and North tip of South America towards the homeland. And certainly transnational criminal organizations are very prevalent. As I said before, we work very hard on the detection and monitoring. I'd like to highlight that we have 16 interagency at my giad of South command in Key West, as well as 23 foreign liaison officers. And quite honestly, it's a great news story in terms of the training investment that we provide with our partner nations, sharing of actionable information. They have increased by 62% the interdiction. That's excellent. I'm gonna have to interrupt because my time is about to run out. I'm concerned about, and I've zeroed in on Venezuela in particular, because according to sources in the news, I don't know if this is accurate or not, but apparently we have administration officials that are about to or have gone to Venezuela to talk about importing some of their oil to the US to replace the possible loss from stopping Russian oil imports. And I would just be real concerned if that's true. You don't have to answer this, but I'd just be really concerned if Venezuela plays any part of supplying US energy. When we have American energy that just sitting there not being used because we've shut down permitting and pipelines and everything else. Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you. Thank you. It is worth noting that we're at the highest level of production of oil and natural gas that we've ever been at. And it's going up literally every week. Certainly we could do better, but it's going up, not down. I just wanna make sure we're clear on that. Mr. Courtney has recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for being here this morning. General VanHurk, in your testimony, your written testimony on page six, you did focus on the maritime domain where you talked about the fact that Russia launched its second Severed events cruise missile sub this year and there's more on deck in their shipyards that are there. You describe them as designed to deploy within cruise missile range of our coastlines. Again, having been through a few of these hearings, normally that's a focus on UCOM, but I mean, I think now that it's in North coms, we're obviously dealing again with something that is very close to home. Later in your testimony on page 17, you talked about the fact that we need to increase our maritime domain awareness and that we can in fact quickly improve that with the IUSS sensors and the OTHR sensors. Again, maybe you can just sort of explain what that means a little bit, in an unclassified fashion because acronyms, I think kind of go over a lot of people's heads. Absolutely, Congressman. So from a domain awareness perspective, first for the submarines that you're talking about, that would be the integrated undersea surveillance capability that the Navy brings. And I would point out that Canada partners with us on and provide some of that capability as well to track and maintain awareness of submarine positions around the globe. A very challenging environment in the Central Atlantic when they get on the mid-Atlantic Ridge to be able to track them. And so to hold them accountable, if you will, before they become a threat is important. That's part of that integrated deterrence that we also talked about. And we partner very closely with UCOM and we need to move that into the Pacific as well. I'm confident that we'll see some of that in the 23 budget that we talked about. You mentioned the SEV, the second one, they're on their way to field nine. Russia will be a persistent proximate threat to the homeland in the maritime domain within the next five years. China is about a decade behind, but they will do the same thing. And so 24-7 in the near future will have both persistent proximate threat in the sub-drain from a submarine perspective but also surface. OTHR over the horizon radar capability gives us out to about 4,000 miles in the maritime domain and the air and space domain to be able to see much further than we can today. We're limited today by curvature of the earth because typical radar systems have that limit because they can't see over that. Over the horizon gives us that and the undersea gives us the undersea domain awareness as well. Great, well, thank you. I mean, again, I think the one comment you made in your testimony is that those systems can actually be quickly deployed. And I, again, I know this committee will be watching for that in the 23 budget when it comes over. Congressman, you're exactly right. Over the horizon technology exists today. It's employed by other nations around the globe. It's something that we can move out on relatively quickly as well as undersea surveillance. And the point that this is a really almost iconic example of integrated deterrence. I mean, anti-submarine warfare is a team sport and having Canada with the new agreement that the president signed in 2021, that to modernize NORAD, I think this is, again, a poster child example of that and the same is true in the North Atlantic. General Richardson, congratulations on your new position. Your testimony, you mentioned, again, the success of the LCS in terms of counter-narcotics, which kind of echoes General Fowler last time he was here. It seems like the LCS has finally sort of found a home in terms of its long career. But I would just note that last year, the Navy came over to decommission for LCSs. We still don't know what's in 2023. I think some of the chatter is that we're probably gonna see some of that in the budget that's there. It seems like given the fact that we're selling Coast Guard ships to Latin American allies, that the LCS, given its success that you've described, would be a great candidate for foreign military sales to some of our allies to bolster their navies. What's your thoughts on that? Well, certainly I am, I do, I think FMS is definitely a tool. We have to make sure that our partner nations can maintain the vessel. And that's what's really important about the equipment. We have to make sure that it's great to get the equipment. We've gotta be able to maintain it and help them through that as well. And I think that's an area that we can certainly help in Southcom with our partner nation, the military's logistics is hard, maintenance is hard. The LCS has done a fantastic job in my AOR. I don't get a lot of assets. I don't have assigned forces and I have very little gift map resources that I do get, but I do have two LCSs right now. They do a fantastic job working with the CNO to get maintenance done in the theater. So when it has to do maintenance, while it's in my AOR, it doesn't have to sail back to Mayport, Florida, take a week to sail back, and then the theater. I'm sorry, the gentleman's time has expired. I should have said this at the outset. Even if we're in mid-question, we try to cut it off right at the time and get on to the next person, which we will do now. And that is Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and generals. And ma'am, thank you for being here and Ms. Dalton and General Richardson. I think this next statement is probably for you. And Ms. Dalton, I know you spent a fair amount of time at the Defense Intelligence Agency in some dealing with some pretty sporty regions of the world. When we talk about Southcom, we typically talk about the fact that more Americans lose their lives to drug overdoses, not all of it coming from that region, but a lot of it, then to terrorism. We talk about gangs, we talk about drugs, we talk about crypto, cyber, China, Russia, and the disruptions to democracy in the Western Hemisphere. 12 months from now, I think we're gonna be talking about the issue of hunger and the disruption of democracies in the Western Hemisphere because of the lack of food supply. This is a direct result of Russia's incursion into the Ukraine. It is gonna come from the loss of the ability to put fertilizer on a lot of crops around the world. My understanding is that the Russians have now said they're gonna withhold fertilizer from the rest of the world, including countries like Brazil, who produce a tremendous amount of food supply. I don't expect you to answer this question necessarily, but I do think it would be worthwhile for this committee to see work done from the Defense Intelligence Agency on what a 5% reduction in the global food supply and a 10% reduction in the global food supply would mean to the people in the Western Hemisphere and the potential disruption of democracies in that hemisphere. And so if you could help us have the Defense Intelligence Agency work on that, I would very much appreciate it. I do think this is coming. Russia and the Ukraine are responsible for about 12% of the calorie supply inside the United States, is my understanding. If the Ukrainians are not able to plant their crops over the next couple of months, and it certainly does not look like they will be able to, there's gonna be a tremendous disruption in the food supply. And if the fertilizer is not able to come out of the Black Sea region and it does not look like it's going to be able to, there's gonna be a significant reduction in the global food supply. I can tell you farmers in the southeastern United States where they normally would plant crops on what we call dry land that does not have irrigation and the production on those pieces of dirt are not as productive as they are if it's irrigated. Farmers, because of the cost, whether it be diesel or fertilizer, in many cases are not gonna plant the dry land fields. And I think that it would do well for the U.S. to be prepared for the potential disruption in democracies from food supply. So any help with that would be appreciated. With that said, I wanna go back to the Russia issue in Southcom. You've hit on it before. They continue to exert their influence on the Southcom AOR. The disinformation and propaganda that they have become very good at. General Richardson, would you go over our strategy again with regard to how we combat Russia and their misinformation? And I would appreciate it, especially if you could talk about it with regard to Venezuela and Cuba. So we were, our partner nations are very concerned about this and they voice that, Columbia voices that, very concerned with the disinformation that they saw, the Russian media conglomeration Russia today in Spanish, as well as Sputnik Mundo that I mentioned earlier is continue, I mean it used to have seven million followers in RT Spanish and now it's over 18 million. Their ability to put out disinformation and just so an environment that is full of untruths is very prevalent in the region. And so we work very closely with our partner nations to, with Columbia, with Brazil, with the, in the cyber capabilities with the small teams that will send forward. Our National Guard state partnership programs, they have the cyber battalions that are very effective. And so we try to utilize those capabilities because there aren't enough high-end capabilities and certainly, Southcom is not the priority AOR, so we work very closely with our state partnership program. I'm almost out of time, but is there discussion about actually taking those channels off the networks? So we're aware that as of yesterday, we got the report that Ecuador took RT Spanish off their network, which is really good and so we'll continue to work with our partner nations and thank you. And again, I'm sorry, I apologize, Jim was time has expired. And Mr. Garmini has recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Van Herk, Stalton, General Richardson. Thank you for appearing today. Thank you for your testimony. I want to hone in on a couple of issues that have been put on the table already. We've not spent a lot of time talking about the Arctic. We know that it is a new area of considerable concern and we in the 2022 NDAA asked for a report. Ms. Dalton, what is the status of that and does that report look at the necessary assets, military infrastructure, other assets that are necessary to address the Arctic? Congressman, thank you for the question, just a question for clarification. Is it the Arctic Strategic Ports Report that you are asking about? The Arctic Assessment Report. Arctic Assessment. Yes. It's due like soon. Yes. In any next month. Congressman, thank you so much for highlighting that requirement and I will expeditiously move it over to- In other words, you don't have an answer for me today where it is and does it deal with any of the specific issues like airfields and facilities and over the horizon radar, things of that sort. I know we've been working very closely with Northern Command on the production of the report so perhaps General VanHurk would be best positioned to answer. Congressman, we're working feverishly on that report. That report is tasked to me to do. I will coordinate with the services and the department to do that report right. It's likely not gonna happen this month. We're gonna seek an extension here in the near future. I will be very candid in that report what the department needs to be able to operate in the Arctic. Good. Will it include ice breakers? I promise my colleagues here I wouldn't mention ice breakers again but it's a promise not kept. It will. We will look at everything. Persistence is something we have to have to operate in the Arctic. Communications. Persistence requires fuel north of Dutch Harbor. Communications require satellite terminals to utilize the bandwidth that's being put up there by commercial companies in the infrastructure that you're talking about. Well, when your pencil gets down to broken and no more lead in it, then you'll send the report to us. I will send it as soon as it's done and ready. I'm pushing my team hard. As you and I discussed, we'd like this to be in this year's NDAA. We don't wanna miss another year on this one. Thank you. Critical infrastructure. Again, I promise my colleagues I wouldn't mention GPS but it is the single point of failure for most everything in this nation. Are we addressing that in the critical infrastructure issues that you've talked about, General and Ms. Dalton and? I work closely with General Dickinson's at United States Space Command to ensure that we maintain precision navigation and timing and GPS capability. It's crucial for day-to-day operations. It's crucial for our economy to make sure we do that. Yes, we are working that hard. No, you're not. We've been at this for 10 years, actually for 23 years and we still do not have a backup to the GPS system and the advanced GPS that the military is supposed to have will not be completed for another decade. So let's look at critical infrastructure. That's one of them. But your point about having to defend the critical infrastructure is critical and that requires integration with the Department of Homeland Defense, Security, which our colleague talked about a moment ago. Mr. Dalton, are you working with the Department of Homeland in defining the threats that the military, Mr. General Van Heck has to deal with? Congressman, thank you for the question and absolutely DHS is one of our closest partners on the Homeland Defense portfolio. In fact, there is a unified coordination group on domestic response and preparedness that has been stood up to look at the implications of the current crisis in Russia and Ukraine, but that is in the broader context of daily communication and synchronization with DHS. Well, General Van Heck's testimony speaks to critical infrastructure over and over again and what he needs to have domain awareness. It seems to me, given what my colleague said about the titles, that he's not supposed to mess within the United States, but he has to defend it. That requires very, very close coordination and I'd like for more detail on how you are. Thank you. Chairman Stam has expired. You're back. Gates is recognized for five months. General Richardson, you said in your statement that Russia posed a more immediate threat in South America than China. As we know, China has their space mission there. We know the Chinese space mission is dual use and to end which capabilities that Russia maintains in South America concern you more than China's space mission. I think Congressman, in terms of China is more our long-term strategic competitor, Russia is just more of an immediate security concern. I think that they undermine US interests globally. No, but in your AOR specifically, which Russian capabilities are you most concerned about? I'm concerned about the relationships that they have with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. Capabilities, not relationships. Capabilities would be the aircraft, the tanks, the air defense systems that they try to help Venezuela maintain in Venezuela that's close to our homeland. And so if Russia wanted to marshal all of their South American capabilities to do as much damage to the United States as they possibly could, what would they do? I think that they would provide parts to these capabilities that are in Venezuela. As we know, the deputy foreign minister probably about three or four weeks ago talked about not taking off the table about increasing infrastructure capacity within the region. Okay, so as I'm trying to understand the moving pieces, China's got a space mission. That's not the more immediate threat than the Russian threat in South America. And the worst thing that Russia can do to us is to engage in arms enhancements in Venezuela. Right now, the Biden administration is working to potentially purchase oil from Venezuela. If Venezuela saw a mass infusion of cash, what do you assess they would do with the money? I don't know what Venezuela would do with the money, but... That's concerning, right? That is concerning. If we're making policy choices that could move a lot of resources into Venezuela, if your biggest worry about Venezuela is Russian military cooperation, isn't it possible that Venezuela all of a sudden ended up with a lot more cash that they would use it to buy Russian military equipment? They could. They also have quite a big humanitarian crisis on their hands as well. Humanitarian issues have never really been as important to Maduro as military activity, right? That is true. Right, so we cannot rule out that our policy choices of swapping Venezuelan oil for Russian oil as some sort of moral imperative wouldn't result in our most immediate threat in our hemisphere than using that money to go buy Russian arms from the Russian Federation. That's your testimony, right? Well, I am concerned about the increase in relationships, the touch points that Russia is having in the region with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. How many people does Russia have in South America either through their conventional or unconventional forces? We anticipate about a hundred. And that's a more, a hundred Russians in South America concerns you more... Between the three countries. Than the sum of China's activity. That's very stark to me. I don't know that it concerns me more, Congressman. I have to worry about all the, our adversaries and the competition within my AOR, so I don't... Why I'm asking is I didn't expect you to say that you saw Russia as the more immediate threat in your AOR than China. I always viewed China as the more immediate threat there, but I do appreciate the testimony. I think it's very telling because the way you think that threat would manifest is actually exacerbated and made worse by some of the policy choices that we see at least under consideration. General Van Herk, what percentage of the people that DOD trains in Mexico end up working for the cartels or transnational criminal organizations? I don't have that info, and I'd defer that to Homeland Security. You're talking about DOD person... DOD train, I know, we do all these train and equip missions of Mexico. So when we train and equip Mexican special forces, elite Mexican forces, what percentage of them end up working against us and for the cartels? I'll have to take that for the record. I don't... If that's information that we track? I don't personally track that in DOD. But you know of cases where that's happened, right? I would suspect that some folks have gone on and done that. I don't have those numbers, Congressman. Yeah, I have a number of anecdotal piece of information. I'll be submitting those for the record here. And so maybe as a question for the record, we could get that information. I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Gallagos, I can answer five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ms. Dalton, thank you for your testimony. I'm pleased that in your written remarks, you mentioned that we need to continue advancing our defense relationship with Colombia. I believe it is our closest military partner in the region. And as you already know, this year marks the 200 years diplomatic relations with Colombia. And as the first Colombian-American in Congress, I look forward to continuing to work to deepen strategic partnerships between the United States and Colombia. As we mark this important milestone, what steps can we take to further strengthen our ties? Thank you very much, Congressman, for highlighting one of the most important defense relationships that we have in the hemisphere. The Colombians bring significant capabilities to the equation in terms of what they're able to do, counter-VEO, what they are able to do to extend their influence and exert territorial control in the face of some of the extremist groups that have plagued the country for decades. And frankly, you also are a great partner in terms of being able to train up other partners in the region. So I very much looking forward to working closely with the Colombians, with General Richardson and Southern Command to advance those partnerships. Thank you, Ms. Dalton. General Richardson, in your written testimony, you mentioned that Russia intensifies instability, including engaging in disinformation campaigns. Could you describe in greater detail how you're seeing Russia conduct Spanish language disinformation operations in South America, and whether it differs from the way China is doing the same in the region? And what steps do you think we should take to better combat disinformation? I think with the reach that the disinformation has with Russia and then also you add in China and the followers that they have and the prevalence just not in terms of in print, on radio, social media, Twitter, all over the place. And so quite honestly propping up candidates that are more authoritarian leaning and talk about aligning with China that has the BRI and lots of cash and lots of projects. And these fragile democracies, 28 of 31 are in this region. Tragical democracies trying to make it, trying to deliver for their people. COVID has really rolled back the advances that some of these countries have made by 10 to even 20 years due to the economic impacts of COVID and depending on what area of the region. And so they're trying to deliver for their people. And quite honestly, the disinformation campaigns are very prevalent and we work very closely with the partner nations to try to help them counter it and advise them. Columbia just developed an information operations center, just stood that up within the last couple of months to try to get after this problem. Excellent. And then I wanna also ask you a little more about the Chinese influence in South America. And you're written testimony and you just talked a little bit about this, about the one Belt Road Initiative. Are there particular Belt Road Initiative projects that concern you the most? Which types of projects do you think are most important for us to prioritize as we not only monitor Chinese infrastructure investment, but also seek to provide alternatives to it? So it's not the bigger picture, but specifically are there port projects, energy projects that we should be aware of that concerns you? So the projects that China has in the AOR are extremely prevalent. And when I, there are other agencies that are providing projects like USAID and things like that. My lever really is the Corps of Engineers and the projects that they do. But in terms of for the Department of Defense, that's only about 250 million in projects over a five-year period. If I look at what PRC is investing in the AOR over a five-year period of 2017 to 2021, 72 billion, it's off the charts. And I can read a couple of the projects. The most concerning projects that I have are the six billion in projects specifically near the Panama Canal. And I look at the strategic lines of communication, Panama Canal and the Strait of Magellan. But just to highlight a couple of the projects, the nuclear power plant in Argentina, 7.9 billion. The highway in Jamaica, 5.6 billion. The energy refinery in Cuba, 5 billion. The highway in Peru, 4 billion. Energy dam in Argentina, 4 billion. The metro in Colombia, 3.9 billion. The freight railway in Argentina, 3 billion. These are not small projects that they're putting in this region. This region is rich in resources. And the Chinese don't go there to invest. They go there to extract. All of these projects are done with Chinese labor, not with hostages. The time has expired. Mr. Bergman is recommending this for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Van Herken, General Richardson. When it comes to national security, having secure borders is a critical component. Can you describe in what way your command is supporting DHS with its border protection mission currently? Congressman, today we have 2,421 guardsmen on Title X status that are providing detection and monitoring, intel analysis, and aviation support to the Department of Homeland Security on a day-to-day basis through the end of this fiscal year. That's what Northcom is contributing right now. In addition to that, I have JTF North, Joint Task Force under me, that provides direct support and the same kind of supportive analysis in support of Homeland Security and other agencies as well trying to get after the border problems. Okay, thanks. General Richardson. Yes, Congressman. And so we work very closely with our partner nation militaries on the professionalization of their force, human rights, the rule of law. And in terms of the support that they provide, a lot of them have been doing a lot of domestic support, especially with COVID, as we have in our own country. Let's say directly related to the Southern border in an unclassified way. Can you get a little more particular in that? So I would say, Congressman, with JTF South, the command that I have underneath me, where we do the detection and monitoring and then pass that actionable information to our interagency, the Coast Guard, as well as our partner nations to do the disruptions and intradictions to protect our border. Do any capability gaps exist in the mission that currently is that exist? Any gaps that you see that your command could support but you lack resources for? So I would say domain awareness is absolutely essential in my AOR. And I wanna thank Congress for the support that you give to me and this AOR in order to shore up some of the shortfalls that I do have in the area to understand our threat, to know where our threat is, to expose our threat, extremely important. And because we don't have enough ISR and I don't need high-end capabilities in this region, what I do need is just capability. I don't need big, I need low-cost, high-yield solutions which forces us to work very closely with Honorable Moultrie, Director of Intelligence. We have Project Maven in my region. We also have five joint capability technology demos from Heidi Shue from Research and Experimentation and OSD. And then we're also using actionable information. So you got a lot, I hate to cut you short because I got some more questions. There's a lot of things you could do. General VanHurk, any thoughts? Domain awareness is certainly one of the challenges. What I would say is I don't see Southwest Border, which I view as a law enforcement challenge as an enduring DOD mission. I think DHS needs to be fully resourced. They need to plan for this mission and execute the mission, which is a law enforcement mission on the border. And more broadly, I think we need a whole of nation and a global approach to the problems on the Southwest Border. Candidly, I think transnational criminal organizations are the problem. Symptoms are human migration, counter narcotics, those kinds of things. And a broader strategy to get after that, in my mind, such as going after finances, weapons that are flowing that direction, challenging the fentanyl or the precursors to fentanyl that flow in, those are things from a whole of government approach. Okay, so quickly, this is not, but for both of you, there's been a debate about whether combatant commands being regionally oriented is still appropriate, giving the changing dynamics of the threat environment. Any thoughts on do we need to reorient the combatant commands based on function or domain, which would be more appropriate because we know we get into food fights in different ways, domain or function. Congressman, I think we ought to take a look at the UCP and see if it could be adjusted based on the world that we're operating in. I think the value of day-to-day having regional combatant commands is through the relationships, the integrated deterrence, the theater security cooperation, the partnerships that you build with that. Whether we fight regionally or we have a single combatant command responsible for a global operation, such as against China or Russia, we could go take a look at that. General Richardson. I would say that I agree with General Van Hurt quite honestly. It's the relationships that make the difference, the trust that we build with our partners. Southcom has a reputation that- And I see my time has expired, so I will yield back whatever that half a second that was left. Appreciate your generosity. Mr. Carberhal is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Richardson, China's Belt and Road Initiative is a part of its strategy to assume a greater leadership role in global affairs, including in the Southcom AOR. Chinese investments, as has been said in Southcom, demonstrates the need to further U.S. engagement to offer an alternative to the countries in the AOR. However, we are all very aware that the U.S. has a mixed history in Latin America. Iran contract comes to mind for an example. That has led to distrust and the need to reset relationships. How does Southcom security assistance funds help offer an alternative to China? So it's absolutely essential, Congressman, and thank you for the question, because that is my most important lever is the security cooperation, the triple three funding. And quite honestly, that is what gets us on the field with our jerseys on, working with our partner nations. As I've said before, our partner nations are our best defense. And if we're not there working with them, they're gonna work with whoever is there. That's how desperate they are. And quite honestly, our competitors are there ready to take our place. And so that security cooperation funding is extremely important as my main lever. My next lever would be exercise funding. What proposals have gone unfunded due to limited resources? And in addition, what whole of government initiative should be expanded in the region to expand your work to improve cooperation with countries where there might be mistrust of U.S. intentions? Congressman, if we did not receive our funding in my security cooperation funds, we would be absolutely seeding what I call key terrain. And we would not be present on the field. And that void will be filled, and it won't be filled with something or by relationships. It'll be with our competitors, unfortunately, because they are very prevalent. The thing is, is that the PRC doesn't have partners. We have partners. We have exercises where I have 29 countries that participate for Panamax. Every year I have 29 countries that participate in this. Trade wins, which has been known for many, many years. 21 countries will participate in that. So we have partners, and that is our best defense. And we show integrated deterrence through campaigning each and every day in the Southcom AOR. Thank you, General Richardson. Generals Van Herk and Richardson, the U.S. Coast Guard provides an extraordinary support to U.S. national security in defending the homeland and in supporting broader national strategic objectives around the world. Its mission is to ensure our nation's maritime safety, security, and stewardship. As chairman of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, I would like to explore more about how the Coast Guard supports both of your commands. What are additional Coast Guard capabilities or assets that your commands would benefit from? I'll go first, Congressman, thanks for that. Absolutely, the Coast Guard's crucial. And as you are well aware, they work for Homeland Security. I integrate the Coast Guard. They were just in my commander's conference. I visit them as much as possible. The capabilities really comes down to capacity, additional capacity that help us for that domain awareness and ensure that we're plugged in from a domain awareness perspective any data they have from radar undersea capabilities to ensure that we're sharing that to give a complete picture of the threats to the homeland. So Congressman, in Southcom, I'd like to highlight the Coast Guard is extremely prevalent. I have my operations officer that's a Coast Guardsman. I have my gy out of Southcom, or my gy out of South commander is also a Coast Guardman. The commandant of the Coast Guard used to be the ops officer for Southcom. So that tells you how important the Coast Guard and the Southcom relationship are. We have District 7, District 11 that are very close to where I am in Miami. And then the assets in terms of the Coast Guard supplements an increase with some capability to Southcom to help with the disruptions in the AOR as well. So just really can't say enough about the support from the Coast Guard. Thank you. Secretary Dalton and General Van Herk, DOD continues to support the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Now entering into the third year, we have gained a better understanding of the virus, our constraints and our limitations and our capacity to fight this virus. As the US and other nations prepare to open travel and trade to pre-COVID levels, the threat of- And I'm sorry- The question gentleman is out of time. That question will have to be submitted for the record at a later point. And we have Mr. Walts is now working to ask for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Richardson, Van Herk. Good to see you again, Ms. Dalton. We could just first talk about the Chinese influence and presence in your AORs. I'll start with you, General Richardson. I mean, just looking through your statistics, we've got 25 of 31 countries hosting infrastructure, 29 port projects, seven countries hosting PRC-linked space facilities. And I think what's most concerning, I know it's incredibly concerning by constituents, is state-owned Chinese investments on the ports on both sides of the Panama Canal. Can you talk to what you're seeing and what we can do to help you combat this pernicious influence? So thank you for the question, Congressman, and obviously the resources that I rely on as I talked to previously, the security cooperation funding, which is my main lover of competing and being on the field with my jersey on, all of my folks in Southcom. That will really hamstring us if we don't get that security cooperation funding. That's what allows us to partner with our nations. And like I said, our partners are our best defense. Everywhere I've been, I've been to Colombia, Brazil, Jamaica, Belize, I've done a Central American Security Conference with seven countries. I just got back from Honduras. They want to partner with the United States. I have got to have all of the Southcom postured and in the AOR ready to partner with our partner nations to counter this. Yeah, thank you, General. And I certainly share your concern. I think many of my colleagues that this isn't, you know, this is a global competition. This isn't just about the Indo-Pacific. Ms. Dalton, my understanding is in the Secretary's Global Posture Review, Southcom lost for structure, for lack of a better term. Can you commit to the department or commit to the committee that the department will continue that security assistance funding that General Richardson so badly needs? Congressman, thank you. And their request. Congressman, thank you for highlighting these requirements. And absolutely, as Assistant Secretary, I look forward to working with General Richardson to ensure that the requirements that Southcom has identified are met. And we also work very closely with the State Department with USAID, with other interagency colleagues to address the holistic picture in this AOR as well. Yeah, I can just tell you from my own experience, Southcom continually gets shortchanged. I'll just be candid. This is our backyard. The Chinese and Russians are in it. And I think of anything COVID and current events have shown us as global supply chains matter and they're never more secure, I don't think, than in Central and South America and Canada and our own hemisphere. So I look forward to working with you on that and going forward. Just very quickly, General Richardson, FARC delisting. The Biden administration delisted FARC. We're now in discussions with Venezuela and Maduro. The Colombian president, Duque, said of the delisting, he would have preferred another decision. Certainly, I think most of our Venezuelan population in Florida and Colombian population would have as well. Do you share Colombia's concerns that Russian military assistance, the Maduro regime, will end up in the hands of FARC and other combatants and that if we end up lifting sanctions and putting more money into Venezuela, that would not be a positive outcome for stability on the continent. Congressman, I know looking in my partner nation's eyes of the chief of defense and the joint staff that works for that nation is very concerned about Venezuela and what Russia is doing in Venezuela. And you can see it in their eyes. They're very concerned about the disinformation leading up to their elections and election meddling. And we've got to continue to work very closely with our partner. Thank you. Just in a few seconds I have remaining. General Fanhurt, can I take for the record? I share Chairman Garamendi's concern about our absolute total lack of basing along our northern coast and in the Arctic. I do think Canada needs to step up as well, but I look forward to seeing that report. And if you could get back to me on exactly the base that you need in along Alaska's northern coast, I'd appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Time has expired. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank all of you for your service and the commitment to keeping America secure and note that the challenges in keeping the homeland safe are complex and persistent. We briefly discussed the negative impact that climate change has causing damage to installations and equipment and reshaping the geo-strategic environment. So General Fanhurt, as the commander of NORTHCOM and the designated DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities, how do you see the department modernizing its systems in the Arctic to meet the growing threat posed by Russia and China? And then the Army has two brigade combat teams in Alaska in an environment where logistical operations, battery life for vehicles and digital systems and power usage intersect with survivability and lethality. As those forces modernize and lying with the Army's climate strategy, will the complexities associated with the Arctic operations impact newer greener systems? Ma'am, the last question is absolutely the complexity of the changing environment. The Arctic will absolutely impact our strategy and our ability as we go forward. So what are we doing and what do we need? Well, presence and persistence in the Arctic and that requires infrastructure to do that. Whether that be maritime infrastructure such as a commercial port that's deep enough for cruisers, destroyers, coast guard cutters to maintain persistence, the communication capabilities to operate north of 65, infrastructure for airplanes to campaign on a day-to-day basis, not only in Alaska but across Canada and into Greenland as well to execute our homeland defense design. It takes services that are equipped and ready to operate in this environment. And candidly, we're not there today and we're working closely with the department to get there, congressman or congresswoman. Thank you. And then General Richardson, we have been receiving reports about the capabilities of China in the Southern Hemisphere. They're growing presence. We certainly have seen Russia try to reassert its traditional alliance with Venezuela and we know both those nations are adept at misinformation campaigns and have great help cyber capabilities. So what tools do you need to combat the cyber threat from China and Russia in the region? So I'm currently assessing that congresswoman and thank you for the question because it's very, very important. I find them with my own headquarters in terms of our capabilities to support our partners in this effort are fairly small. And as this becomes very, very prevalent in the region and it already is, we have got to get after this. And so between my components and what we have, my components underneath Southcom and what we have at the headquarters, that could be more robust. And we're figuring out how to do that and how to make that more robust to help our partner nations counter those adversaries in that realm as they spread this information. Thank you. I look forward to seeing your request in that area. And then with my remaining time, I wonder if you could tell us about the fight regarding international criminal syndicates, what your responsibility is there pattern? And what tools you need to continue the fight there? So as I've said before, congresswoman, us being there present with our partner nations, working with our militaries and their security forces on their professionalism, their strengths is hugely important as we work our exercises. So I have the trade, trade winds exercise coming up in May. I have Unitoss coming up in September and then also Panamex. I mean, this is where we have 29 countries, 19 countries coming together, 21 countries coming together. You can't display more integrated deterrence than that. And that, as I said before, for example, China doesn't have partners, but they are using our playbook in our region. So for example, with professional military education, they're offering one year, two year, all expense paid to Beijing for professional military education with individuals. But they don't have exercises and they don't have partners. So I've got to be able to keep up the security cooperation and the exercises that we do in this region to show the strengths of the partnerships. Thank you. General Ladies' Times expired. Mrs. McClain is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here today. I appreciate it. General Richardson, I want to thank you for coming to my office last week. I appreciate the conversation. I wanted to follow up with you on issues concerning Russia and China's operation in the AOR. Russia has been continuing to try to expand its influence in these countries. It already has a significant military intelligence operation in both Cuba and Venezuela. But the question is really, as the U.S. continues to implement sanctions on Russia due to the invasion in Ukraine, is there any indication that their grip on this region is beginning to wane or lessen or collapse? Part one, part two, is should the United States implement any additional target sanctions that specifically focus on Russia's assets and their influence in the AOR? So thank you, Congresswoman. And thanks for the questions. I can't comment on the sanctions. That would be more for the administration to comment on. But in terms of what we see happening as a result of what Russia's doing to the Ukraine and in our AOR, we certainly see the reaching out by Russia with these countries' leaders trying to reaffirm. We had the visit by the deputy prime minister of Russia to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Also, the president of their Congress visited Cuba and Venezuela as well. And this is all within the past three weeks. And so definitely reaching out to solidify, I think, their ties. Whether they're going to increase, I have not seen that yet. But we are watching very closely. And as I've commented before, our domain awareness is absolutely essential so close to the homeland. What is your sense? I mean, I take a look at it takes two things to fight a war, right? It takes money and it takes people and a lot of their attention is on Ukraine right now. Do you get a sense that that's going to hinder their operations or their? I think that it remains to be seen. We saw the UN vote that took place, the countries that abstained Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and El Salvador. They did not vote to condemn what Russia is doing. So I think that quite honestly, we have to wait and see. I hate to say that, but I think it's too early to tell. Okay, all right. I appreciate that. And then Assistant Secretary Dalton turning to China in the AOR. As General Richardson mentioned earlier in her testimony, the Belt and Roadway Initiative projects have been implemented in really a predatory fashion. Congress attempted to counteract China's Belt and Roadway initiatives in 2018. The Build Act. As far as I can tell, and I may be incorrect, but there seems to be little interest by the underdeveloped nations to utilize the U.S. Build Act over China. Why do you think these nations have been so hesitant to utilize the U.S. to help fund their initiatives? Congresswoman, thank you so much for the question, I completely concur with General Richardson's characterization of what China is doing in the region through its gray zone tactics and leveraging BRI. We have seen those predatory practices play out in other regions of the world, and it's disturbing that it is happening in the hemisphere as well and with our close partners. In response to your question, I would have to defer to the Department of State and U.S. aid colleagues in terms of how the conversations are proceeding with partners in the region as they engage them on the Build Act, but certainly to underscore the need for a holistic approach to the region to get after the gray zone challenge. We're offering help, and they're not taking it. Yes. But yet, so when I talk is we need to provide assistance, we need to provide assistance, we need to provide assistance, then we provide assistance, and they don't want it. So is that really the issue, or is there something I'm missing? It's an excellent question, Congresswoman, and again, I would have to defer to the State Department who is on the front lines of engaging with partners on that particular issue, but certainly from a Department of Defense perspective, we continue our security cooperation commitments and relationships as a great way to continue to build the relationships in the region. But we have to get them off of China and our adversaries, and we really have to spend some time on why, because it really isn't that we're not providing information. Sorry, the General Ladies' time has expired. Ms. Escobar is recognized for five minutes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to first express my gratitude to all of you for your service. It's wonderful to see you all here, and I appreciate the opportunity to talk about these really important issues. I have the incredible privilege, as you all know, of representing Fort Bliss, Texas, here in Congress, and Fort Bliss was the site of Operation Allies Welcome, and I was so fortunate to be able to visit early on with both General Richardson and General Van Herk, so thank you for allowing me to tag along during that early visit. I am so incredibly proud of how Fort Bliss, how our service members and our leadership responded during that time, and just continue to be proud of that. I also recently had the opportunity to sit and visit with JTF North leadership to talk through their mission and sort of their evolving mission and how they have moved away from, you know, more sort of, I don't want to mischaracterize it, but more like soldiers on the ground and focusing more on intelligence, on gathering intelligence in the field, trying to stop crimes like smuggling and human trafficking before they get to the border, which is something I have long advocated for. You know, by the time those challenges, whether it be drug trafficking or immigration, by the time it arrives at our southern border, it's too late, and so I really appreciate the shift in strategy in trying to get to use intelligence to kind of prevent the issues before they arrive at our front door. And so General VanHurk wanted to ask you what you see as the benefits of NorthCom and the shift for JTF North towards more intelligence gathering. Are you seeing benefits already and kind of what's the long-term vision there? Thanks, Congresswoman. Absolutely. I think the benefits are gonna be enabling our partners who provide the law enforcement more opportunities to engage, but even not at the border, but helping our partners in Mexico and even partnering with JTF South and SouthCom to get further ahead, what I call further left, of the event at the border, to provide advice, interdicting or generating effects much sooner in the chain before it becomes to the border. I think this is important to focus on data and info, which are strategic assets that are available to us today and technology on the border in even further South and across the globe that will give us indicators to interdict much sooner before it becomes a challenge on our border and giving that intel to those agencies who do have law enforcement roles to be able to do their law enforcement mission. That's what we're focused on, rather than the interdiction at the point. We're not gonna interdict our way out of this problem at the Southwest border. We don't have enough capacity and capability, and it's actually part of their business model, transnational criminal organizations. They know they're gonna lose so much. What we have to do is focus more strategic and operational and get out of the tactical business. I could not agree more with you, and I so appreciate this very intelligence, this very intelligent, rather, strategy that is focused on that intelligence and making sure that we do this in the smartest way possible. My community is right on the US-Mexico border. I do also, I need to mention publicly because I have been sounding the alarm, not necessarily for comment from you all, but just to raise publicly my concerns around Operation Lone Star in Texas, and I realize that is under a different authority, but we've gotta do better on that front for our National Guard, and I hope that Governor Greg Abbott sends our National Guard home quickly, as soon as possible. In the remaining, almost 30 seconds I have, actually, General Richardson, I had a question for you, but I've got 30 seconds. You and I had a great conversation earlier, and so I'll just follow up with you. Again, thank you all so much for your service and your leadership. I yield back, Mr. Chair. Mr. Bacon is recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I wanna thank Ms. Dalton for being here. Also, both generals, we appreciate, working ahead at the honor of working with Brigadier General Richardson when I was a Brigadier General back in the day, and I got to know Lieutenant General Van Herk, and so congratulations, both of you, on how well you've done and the leadership that you're performing now. I have my first question for General Van Herk, it's about medical readiness for pandemics. In the 115th Congress, the 116th Congress, we put a requirement out for DOD to start building a surge capacity for pandemics, and then we got hit with one, with COVID. So the planning for a future one got overtaken by events of a real pandemic, but I think we're at this point now we should start looking outward again and start planning for the next pandemic, because there's always gonna be some interval. We just don't know what those intervals are. So in 2020 and 2021, Congress directed DOD to establish a national disaster medical system to provide a surge capacity. I'm told that you were made the supported commander in this strategy or this plan. So we're interested to know how DOD wants to fund this and the prioritization of it for starters, and there's a self-interest here because the DOD picked five surge centers that they wanted to build off of, and Omaha's one of them, and Omaha would like to partner with DOD to make this happen. So my question to you, Dr. VanHirk, is what do you see as your role in this medical readiness or a surge capacity for future pandemics, and what kind of resources do you think you need? Thank you. Congressman, first I would say my role is defense support of civil authorities. If it's required to provide DOD forces to support medical in the homeland, then I provide that through my disk of synchronizer role. I think that the task is not mine specific for the overall task. I'm looking at our ability within the homeland and moving those forces in the event of another pandemic, but more importantly, in the event of a crisis or conflict with medical capacity. The one thing that the pandemic has shown us is that medical capacity is challenged, and we don't need to just solely look at a pandemic response. We need to look at medical capacity from a crisis or conflict that may be global in nature, and not only in DOD, but more broadly across the whole of the nation to be able to provide that medical support. As far as specific capacity today, I'll defer to the services and DHA and the department on our current readiness. But thank you very much. And General Richardson, first I'm sorry I missed you the other day, votes came at a bad time for your visit, but we appreciate you coming by. I know how important ISR is to you in Southern command and the services you provide to other countries, but could you share with us the challenges that you have with ISR, because every co-com or command command's wanting it, and how can we better support you? So it's essential for domain awareness. I've said that a couple of times this morning, but it's absolutely critical to know where our threats are, what our threats are doing, and be able to expose them and expose the bad behavior. And so with ISR, I wanna thank Congress for the extra that I get to in order to contract the capability to have some domain awareness. It forces us to look for other low-cost, high-yield solution sets in the AOR, using unclassified data that we're able to, with patterns of life information, actionable information we can share with our partners as well, and that helps. So certainly wanna thank Congress for that. All of the tools that I have, I did wanna talk just briefly about the levers that I have, because I use the triple three security cooperation funding. I use the FMS, foreign military financing, foreign military sales, the professional military education, the IMET, all of these levers. And what I am finding is that we've got to speed these processes up in order to out-compete our competitors that are also out there vying for these partner nations' attention and their money and getting embedded in their countries. And so I look forward to working with my department of state colleagues and also in my own department with the teammates to make in those processes faster. With the short term I have left as a percentage, what would you say is how much of your ISR needs are being met in Southern command? Well, I get about 1% of the global ISR that's available. So like I said, domain awareness is essential, especially in my AOR. I can fly to 80% of my AOR in two to three hours about the time that it takes here to fly to Washington, DC. That's pretty close. Sorry, the gentleman's time is expired. Big Mr. Chair. Mr. Panetta is recognized for five minutes. Not here in you, Jim, I don't know. Mr. Panetta, are you with us? All right, he is not. Mr. Jacob, so are you with us? Okay, we're off to a bad start. Mr. Green, I can physically see you here in real life in 3D. So Mr. Green is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rogers. Thank you for scheduling this very important hearing on the defense posture and Western Hemisphere. And I wanna thank our witnesses for being here. And of course, congratulations for the new assignment. It's great to see the Pentagon making good decisions on its future leaders. The events of recent weeks have made one thing abundantly clear. Cultivating strong partnerships with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere is more crucial than ever. As the Ranking Member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, I am particularly interested in how we can coordinate the US military's presence with our diplomatic and homeland security efforts. Hard power and soft power are complementary tools. During a trying time for peace and national security, we must ensure the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Homeland Security cooperate effectively. Our diplomats, our law enforcement, and our warriors should be working hand in glove to build friendships and deter enemies with all tools at our disposal. Unfortunately, it's clear that President Biden either doesn't understand this or is ignoring the challenges facing us in the Western Hemisphere. The Biden administration is currently negotiating with the murderous Maduro regime to lift oil sanctions on Venezuela. This catastrophic idea reflects a naivete that dictators can be wooed or somehow appeased into acting in the interest of the United States. The actions of Vladimir Putin clearly illustrate that dictators cannot be appeased and do not work for the good of the global community. Venezuela has long been allied with the Kremlin, of course Havana and now Beijing. We shouldn't signal to our friends in South America that you can violate human rights, imprison American citizens if you sell us your oil. That's why I've just introduced a new bill today banning not only purchases from Russia, but Venezuela and Iran. We need to produce more energy here in America, not buy it from our adversaries. That is a national security imperative. We need to produce it right here for another reason. We're the most environmentally safe producers of oil. Why not produce it here instead of asking people to produce it elsewhere? They're still on the same planet and the impact to the globe is the same. Doing so is, as I said, a national security imperative. Changing the subject though, Cuba's Waila, and I say that specifically and purposefully, Cuba's Waila is metastasizing throughout Latin America. Authoritarians tend to link themselves to other authoritarians like Russia and China. Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, the Domino's are falling. And it appears we're facing a new entity, this narco-terrorist state where authoritarian governments are partnering with transnational criminal organizations to basically create a formidable alliance that crosses departments from state, homeland, and DOD. And I wanna hear, in my first question, centers around this. How is DOD working with homeland and state to address this new sort of entity? I guess it's not really new, but how Cuba and Venezuela and the drug organizations are working partnering with Bolivia and other countries' militaries. How are we working together in some task force mechanism strategically to address that? And that's my first question and perhaps start with the Southcom commander. So in terms of in the Western Hemisphere and with our Department of State colleagues in the Western Hem and quite honestly, none of us have the resources to counter our competitors. And so it forces us to work extremely well and extremely close together. I will say that having our ambassadors in place in this region is really, really important. And what we've started back up in Southcom is, and we've been able to brief up four ambassadors as they stop to Southcom before they go into the AOR and assume their position. So we start that relationship very, very quickly, but it takes all of us. And that's why I say integrated deterrence is very prevalent in our AOR already because we all bring allies and partners. We have UK, Canada, the Netherlands, France, all within my AOR as well, but it requires all of us to work very closely together. It would be helpful. And I perhaps, I've heard resources every time I've been in the room. I know you mentioned it too, sir. If you guys could send our office a list, just these are the top 20 things we have to have. I mean, that would be very helpful. And I know I may have missed testimony earlier where that was, had to go talk about China and another meeting on foreign affairs. So, but it would be great to get that list. Congressman Green, these are the top 10 or 15 or 20 things we have to have. Cause I don't want you saying we don't have the resources, right? I mean, that just bothers me. That's a failure of this side of the, this branch of government to get you what you need. I appreciate the AMBO mention there. Unfortunately, that's the other side of the building and we'll push those guys to get people through the non-process. And because I understand Panama and some of these countries haven't had ambassadors for a very long time, and that's unfortunate and shouldn't happen. So we'll push that. But a resources list would be great. And with that, I yield. Thank you. With you on the ambassador point, I will point out that the Senate, and in particular a few Senate Republicans have blocked just about every appointment that's been offered for one reason or another. And if we could get rid of this tradition, it's a bipartisan tradition by the way, that if you don't like some policy the administration is doing, you're just gonna stop them from appointing anybody. If we could get rid of that, I think would really help our country. And like I said, it's Republicans now because it's a Democratic president, but I've seen it happen the other way too. A couple of quick announcements. So we have a classified brief at one o'clock. That is actually the Indo-Pacom, classified Indo-Pacom in Korea. Classified brief at one o'clock, 2212. In 2212, we have a hard stop here at 1230, just so, well, I can get lunch basically in time, but before that one o'clock. So, and staff as well. So we'll go to 1230, no further than 1230. Let's put it that way. Then we gotta reconvene in 2212. With that, we will give Mr. Panetta another shot. Mr. Panetta, are you with us? I'm with you. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for this opportunity. And thanks to the witnesses for being available for these types of questions and providing the thorough answers that you are doing. I know you focused a lot on the Southern Hemisphere. Let me focus North. Obviously the Arctic is a conversion point for a great power competition as we're seeing. Considering just months before Russia started moving troops towards Ukraine, we saw an unprecedented build up a Russian military might in the Arctic. Same time, China's looking to become a quote polar great power by 2030 and including they had a white paper in which they said that controlling the region would afford its government a three continents and two oceans advantage. My first question to Ms. Dalton, Ms. Dalton, at the strategic level, where do we see the Arctic in our national security priorities? And then two, given Russia and China's posture towards the Arctic, can we expect to see a bigger presence of the Arctic in the forthcoming national defense strategy? Thank you, Congressman, for highlighting the importance of Arctic security. From our perspective in OSCE policy, we see really three US national security interests in play in the region. First is the need to defend the homeland. The second is in terms of deterring aggression. And the third is preserving our economic interests in the region as an Arctic nation. And to the second part of your question, in my prior position before being confirmed into this one, I was one of the members of the team working on the national defense strategy and I can assure you that the Arctic is receiving due focus in that review and that review will be forthcoming to Congress in the next several weeks. And going forward, of course, at Congress's urging, we are standing up a daisyship focused on Arctic and global resilience that will be within my team. And so I look forward to engaging this committee going forward on those issues. Great, thank you, Ms. Dalton. General Van Herk, as you probably know, I have the Naval Postgraduate School in my district there in Monterey, California. And I do believe they're doing excellent work when it comes to studying our Arctic capabilities. However, what I've learned from them is that there's sort of a gap in our cold weather training for our armed services. Now, I know we send troops to Sweden, Norway and Colorado, but I think, and you can probably agree with me, that that doesn't compare to actually being within the Arctic Circle. So as you undertake the independent assessment of the Arctic security initiatives outlined in the 2022 NDAA, can you explain how Northcom plans to improve training our forces to operate in the Arctic? Congressman, first, I'd say Northcom seeks every opportunity to have access, either forces allocated to me or that volunteer to train in the Arctic, but candidly, we don't have the forces trained, ready, equipped to operate in this environment. Now, I am encouraged, right now, we do have Arctic Edge ongoing. It's a long-standing exercise we had planned with a limited number of forces, slightly over 1,000, that are training in the Arctic region today. With that said, I'm also encouraged by the strategies. The department has a strategy and the services all have strategies. Now the question is, are we gonna fund those strategies? I look forward to seeing the FY23 budget to see if we do fund, as part of the Arctic strategy, the actual capabilities that you're talking about. You and me both, and I'll leave it at that, and I appreciate your time today. I yield back, Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Whitman is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. General Van Herk, I wanna go to you and specifically about your emphasis on the importance of deterrence by denial. And I think that's incredibly important, especially as we see this increasing aggressive behavior, obviously, with Russia's attack, but also with China and them being opportunists. I think your observation that we have to be resilient, we have to use both kinetic and non-kinetic means to be able to deter, are incredibly important across the spectrum. I know that you told this committee that based on your mission set in Northcom, your ability to combat these growing threats continues to erode, things like having a ballistic missile defense system that's not up to par to be able to counter a hypersonic glide vehicles and other hypersonic weapons. And in testimony on March 1st, you observed that China's effort to develop hypersonic weapons is tenfold to that of the United States. You also mentioned earlier in the hearing, as far as the things that you have in the offing to deter hypersonics include things like over the horizon radars. Could you explain a little bit more about how do you bring what we have today to address the threat today, but also what are we doing to not only catch up, but what do we do to hopefully advance past others in these realms where unfortunately we have delayed that. In fact, I have NASA Langley right on the edge of the district and for years, they did great hypersonic research there for one at beginning about six years ago, for some reason somebody thought, well, let's just stop funding hypersonic research because we really don't need to do that. In hindsight, when we stopped, the others caught up and here we are today. So let me get your perspective on where we need to be and where do we need to make the appropriate investments to not only catch up, but to advance. Well, thank you for the question. And to go back, what I was talking about on the tenfold was with regards to testing specifically, China has tested more about tenfold than we have. What do we need to do today? First of all, it's about domain awareness and sharing data and information that oftentimes is available today, but is actually in stovepipes and not shared and available for decision makers. I think a focus on defense in the homeland, certainly we have to figure out what it is we must defend, but more broadly, I would say we need to get further left. And by that, I mean sooner in the kill chain and even before the launch actually occurs to be able to create deterrence options, such as posturing of forces or use of the information space from the president or the secretary. That's my focus on deterrence by denial. In addition to that, we need to demonstrate every single day with the capabilities we have today across all levels of influence and with allies and partners, our readiness, responsiveness, capability and resiliency. We hide too many things candidly in classified areas. It has no deterrent effect if the adversary or potential competitor cannot see that. Now listen, I agree. And you know the complexity of the physics of trying to shoot down a hypersonic weapon, especially one that doesn't gain a lot of altitude and then can maneuver, going to target, that physics problem becomes right on the edge of impossible. So the question then becomes, just as you said, what do we do to give just enough information to our adversaries to know that if they fire one at us and say per se, take out an aircraft carrier, that there'll be a dozen that go back to them and take out a number of different targets in different areas because the concept of mutually assured destruction when it comes to the use of those weapons is very much like we use in the nuclear arsenal. You want to, as you said, get left a boom so that you are deterring those adversaries and even thinking about launching it. So if you could maybe elaborate just a little bit more on that about how do we do that specifically? Well, thanks. What I would say, again, it's about sharing data and information and having the right domain awareness sensors that aren't singularly focused on a single threat that actually give us the ability to see multiple threats from a small UAS all the way to a ballistic missile. The capability exists today, those are things that we should do. Then we should share that and make it available for all levels of command across DOD and the inter-agency as well so that we can collaborate real time across all domains and develop a common picture, common outcomes and validate through logistics if those outcomes or options are actually executable. Are we making those investments today and if so, should we be doing more? There's more this committee should do in this year's NDAA to address that. I think the department is. The deputy secretary is very aggressive. She's provided over $50 million and provided personnel at each of the combatant commands to work some of this problem. My challenge is we don't go fast enough for me. We're in an industrial age acquisition process when we need to be thinking about a software-based process. Yeah, very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Cahele is recognized for five minutes. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and I really appreciate this hearing. I get my question, I'd like to start with General Vance. Recently the U.S. force did a review for an arc to detect ballistic and hypersonic missiles from space. That analysis. Do apologize, but you have frozen on us. Future system. Which we can do about that. Okay, I guess my question for the general would be, would any type of space-based capability change his requirements for land-based systems? What I would say is I think you have to work land-based systems with space-based capabilities, they're not mutually exclusive. So for example, space force and space command are going down a space-based capability to detect hypersonics. The over-the-horizon capabilities that I'm talking about also contribute to space domain awareness. And those systems have to be mutually integrated and share that data for the more broad domain awareness that we need. Okay, is, well, based on that answer then, is there any way that you could provide some type of details on how those plans or any type of cruise missile defense for the homeland would exist in any critical gaps that exist today? Yes, there are multiple critical gaps that exist today for hypersonics and cruise missile defense. I'm confident that what I'm asking for from the department is getting consideration. I look forward to seeing the budget in 23. I think we're gonna make some progress on that. I would ask for a single point of contact for cruise missile defense of the homeland be designated by the department in the missile defense review. The department has been very transparent and inclusive. And once that's complete, I look forward to seeing the missile defense review. Would, in regards to the development then of the next generation interceptor, are there any areas where you have concern early in the program, which you feel need to be addressed? I'm very comfortable with where we are with the NGI, the inclusiveness of the department and MDA. I'm very closely partnered with Vice Admiral Hill at MDA and everything appears to be on schedule right now. It would be very concerning if the next generation interceptor is delayed. I look forward to potentially fielding it sooner than 2028. Okay, all right, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs is recognized for five minutes. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Richardson, I wanna talk about a facility in your AOR which has not gotten a lot of attention today. There are currently 39 detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and Chairman Smith has long argued that the facility at Guantanamo is not worth the cost of the American taxpayer to continue to operate such an expected facility for so few detainees. So General Richardson, given that so few military commissions have even started, when do you realistically think sentences for all of the remaining detainees will even conclude? It's been over 20 years since most of the remaining detainees were first brought to Guantanamo. I was in middle school back then. And the news yesterday that a detainee, Muhammad Al-Qutani, was repatriated to Saudi Arabia is a step in the right direction. So what efforts are being made to repatriate or resettle any of the other detainees already cleared for release from Guantanamo? So Congresswoman, thank you very much for the question. And yes, we're down to, with that transfer that occurred yesterday, we're down to 38 detainees there in Guantanamo Bay. And so in terms of what I do, Southcom provides the safe, legal, humane care of these law of war detainees. We aren't involved in the scheduling of the transfers or the hearings or anything, the commissions that'll take place. And so I'd have to refer you to the Department of Defense for more information on that. Well, thank you. I will look forward to getting that information from you. Ms. Walsh, I don't know if you have anything additional to add there. Thank you, Congresswoman. So the oversight of the Guantanamo Bay issue is actually an OSD policy solic, not within my assistant secretary ship. So similarly, we're happy to take that question back to that authority. Sounds good. Completely changing topics here. The Biden administration has prioritized addressing root causes of migration, including violence, climate change, and economic hardship in the Northern Triangle. Just last year, USAID announced its Central America locale initiative to empower local actors in those three countries to address drivers of a regular migration. General Richardson, how are our military operations in these countries complementary and aligned with these efforts? And has DOD increased its coordination with the State Department and USAID on its programs and operations since these efforts were announced? So, Congresswoman, we work very closely with our partner nation militaries on their professionalization, on human rights, the rule of law, and stress that as they become or try to become the most trusted partner or trusted entity within their own country regarding migration, obviously corruption, insecurity, instability, the economy causes people to move and become on the move. And so we work through the professionalization of the militaries through all the levers that I've talked about during this hearing to make them more professional with human rights at the top of the list. Well, thank you. And on the topic of human rights, we'll move a little further south. And we've seen some concerning reports of continued human rights violations by the Colombian paramilitary forces and by police forces during the protests last year. How does SOFCOM encourage partners to act in accordance with the protection of human and civil rights? And how would you grade our efforts to teach and train human rights values to the Colombian military and police given the continued uptick in violence from state security forces? Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. And so we work very closely with the military. We don't work with the police or the paramilitary. And so again, it's the professionalization of the military and us by just us being there with them, partnering with them, then participating in our exercises. They are also, I'd like to highlight the Colombian military as an exporter of training. They go to other Latin American countries to train other militaries and security forces. They also run schools within Colombia that are taught in Spanish and certainly work very closely with them. I can't highlight enough, our Colombian military partners are outstanding military partners. I also like to highlight that they fought beside us in the Korean War. So when we look for partners in my region, Colombia with the Korean War and Brazil and World War II. Well, thank you. Well, I would encourage you to continue focusing on human rights and governance of the security sector because as good as all the work is you're doing, we're still seeing very concerning reports. So Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back. Thank you. Generally, this time has expired. Those old questions that we have today, I wanna thank our witnesses for their presentation and more importantly for the work they are doing on behalf of our country. And we look forward to working with you throughout the rest of the year. And with that, we are adjourned. Yes, sir.