 Din gwych gwaith yma. Fe itul i chi ddim yn dweud a ddim yn ystod y byw'i cymdeithas yng Nghymru i Gymraeg i eu chymdeithasion dda. Felly yw ddim yn dweud ar gyfer eich ddal hon yn gweithgol yng nghymru ac i'n ogylcheddod ein bod chi'n gwybod ar ôl o'i'i lle gyda'r gweith gydag y gallwn ôl i ddefnyddio'r gwaith ddae chi'n gwybod yng Nghymru. Y talo yn ymgyrchio'r ysgol iaith ymarodol yn gyffredig o'r ffansafol, ac yn ymgyrchio'r gwahanol sy'n amser a ddim yn fawr i'r bwysig o'r eu bach o'r ffansafol yw eu Llywodraeth eu Llywodraeth i'w bach. Ymgyrchio'r ymgyrchio, mae yna bod wedi'i gweithio byddai ffansafol yn fawr yn fawr. technically definitions suggests that our Navy is that part of our country's armed forces principally designated for military operations that are from the sea. Thepause it is more complex than that, some organisations to call themselves, as mysterious organisations to say they don't really focus on military operations, and some that are not called Navy do. Song way out in the dictionary definitions will suffice but we do need to acknowledge that there is no template for what defines what a particular Navy seeks to do. Dwy'r cyfalaeth eistedd o'r cyfrifiadau SAF yn ddefnyddio'r gymwy�, a mae'n gwybod i'r llefnod ddiffrwyneb gyrfaίau pa'u ffordd gyhoedd. Mae'r llefnod dchyliadol gwaith sydd have o'r cyfrifiadau sydd gennym o fynd meddwl mae'n gweithio arweinio. Rhaid am beth o wyf, mae'n gweithio i'r lleffordd, eu cysguffyr, achoseg, lwystyr, cyrfiadau a'r cyfrifiadau. Mae'n gweithio'r lleffordd gyfaf arweinio yn allanodol ydych chi'n gweithio uesio. If defining a navy can be more difficult than you might think defining a small navy gets really problematic nobody wants to be called small around a two day conference in 2012 that maneuvered to discuss the issue and we've got 30 speakers from 17 different countries and at the end of the process all we managed to do was disagree I don't plan to reopen that process today because we will be here until 5 o'clock for our purpose it's enough to say I think the small navies are those navies with limited assets and limited capabilities navies that do not attempt to fill the full range of naval roles and missions Milwysu, maen nhw'n gofodd, ffodill fel yw'n gofodd, byddai'n gwneud ei ddweud iawn, fyddwn i'n gwneud ei fod yn sicr. Felly, hefyd, mae'n gwneud eich llyffodol a'i gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio, mae'n fan ymlaen i ffocl ynglyn â gwaith. Mae'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gwaith i'r ffotnotau, ac mae'n gweithio'r gweithio'r bwysig o ddweud o'r mynd i'r cyffredigau o'r dŵl o'r dŵl a pheswyr. Jeremy Black has written very persuasively the dangers of paradigm diffusion models and military analysis, but there does remain a tendency to judge armed forces of all types by measuring them against the biggest, forgetting that they may be designed to do something completely different than the big armies or navies. That something may not be necessary less important to them or less important to the international community. I was reminded very forcefully, a number of years ago, a symposium I attended in the UK, i'r eistedd o'r U.S. Navy, bydd yr event o'r broslwtio gynhyrch yn cael eu hunain. Gynhyrch i'u cyfleoedd o'r drath o'r newydd o maritime strategiaeth, sy'n arwain yn 2007. Yn y cyfweld y gallu'r gynhyrch ymddangos yn ymddangos ymddangos yma, rwy'n mynd i'r hynny'n gwneud yn fwy o'r iawn i erbyn o'r pethau ironig. Mae'r lleidiau iawn ar y cysyllt iawn i ysgwrs mewn UK, ydych chi'n gwybod yn rhan i gaf i'r rhwyng. ..dy'r US wedi bod yn ei wneud am y byd yw'r neidio o'i nifer o unrhyw o'r neidio. Mae'r rhai yng nghylch yn ystod yn ymgyrch yn ymgyrch. Ymgyrch am Ysgrifennu Maritime, ynghylch wedi ein neidio ymgyrch yn unrhyw o'r neidio... ..ynghylch yn ei wneud oherwydd mae'r neidio ymgyrch yn ymgyrch. Ymaratim strategiaeth ymgyrch yn ymgyrch yn eich cynnig yn yng Nghymru. Mae'r neidio yn ymgyrch yn unrhyw o'i neidio. Roedd amser â'r cwmhlu'ch cyfnodol yr ér wneud o'ch gwneudio yn siwrwr no gyda fy mòon pethion yng Nghymru, ac mae'n thaw o ffer o ddweud yn 400 miliwn y sydd ar gyfer y Cocaïn, o'r llinio ar The coast of Cork. Dyna'r llinio, dyna'n cyfyrdd yn imbryd yn gwneud yn gyfaf i ddigon o ddweud eich cynnydd i'r aelodau yn dweud y ddweud ar gyfer y samhelliaiddur arcyfg 저도fiant i'r anker yn Portsmouth. ac rwy'n dweud dwi'n rhoi'n ddaeth yr documentenon cyngor i ddysgós. Felly, mae'r whole pofyn y dyma'r strategiaeth maritai yn mynd i gael y byd o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud i ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud. i ddweud o'r llwynt sicrhau gwaith yng Nghymru o'r 21 yma. Mae'n yn ôl amser cychwynol ateb o cwyntiol, ddim yn meddwl am y Blyneddau Fydoedd Cymru. C Brandon is far from irrelevant, Walter Green will be very dangerous to believe that it was, but it didn't conclude all of the other things that actually threaten our security on a daily basis, things that small companies made manuelactly se t o deal with, so he was wrong. I've been incredibly fortunate, over the last 20 years or so, working with naval personnel from very many different countries. And one of the things that tends to unite those wearing dark blue is the claim that wider society doesn't really understand what they do. That people and perhaps more importantly policy makers suffer from a kind of sea blindness. And that this has a deleterious effect on support and funding for a service that spends much of its time out of sight over the horizon in an environment that many people prefer to avoid because it's cold and it's wet and you can't drink it and it's horrible. And there is, of course, a degree of special pleading in this argument. Navy's are suggesting they really, really are terribly important if only people would just realise it. And in order to try and convince people, Navy's often say the same sort of things. If you pick up any official statement on maritime strategy, on naval doctrine, on naval policy, you will be assailed by the same series of facts. That two thirds of the planet is covered in water. That measured by weight 96% of global trade travels by sea. That at least 40% of the world population live within the coastal zone. That fish provide a billion people with their main source of animal protein. And that global fish exports are worth more to the third world by an exports of tea or coffee. But that mismanagement of the global fisheries may result in over 46 billion euro in lost revenue annually. That organised crime and seaborn trafficking are estimated to be worth 1.9 trillion euro a year. And I could continue what you will undoubtedly have heard this stuff before. And if you haven't, you can update yourself by looking at the policy statements of, for example, the British, US, French, Dutch, Indian, Singaporean, Australian or New Zealand navies. Or the maritime strategies of those countries and others. Or of NATO, the European Union, the African Union or the relevant departments of the UN. All saying essentially the same stuff. Navies and commentators like myself repeat themselves and each other when trying to convince others as to the importance of events at sea. But that's mostly because these things really, really are important. And ignoring them doesn't make them go away. Insecurity at sea inevitably is less visible to us than it is on land. But that does not make it less important. Seaborn transportation provides the only economically viable medium for the bulk movement of goods upon which the global world economy is entirely dependent. With around 50,000 merchant ships trading internationally. If the movement of these ships is interrupting delayed or halted, there is a cost to be borne. The World Bank estimated that at its peak Somali piracy resulted in a yearly loss to the world economy of 18 billion euro. And fear that trade can be interrupted can excite the attention of larger navies and very often not in ways that are helpful. Merchant ships are clearly vulnerable to attack by pirates, terrorists or by rogue states. There are also numerous large cruise ships across the oceans filled with very soft, desirable targets if you're a terrorist. On a different level navigation can be challenged intentionally or otherwise by the activities of belligerents within a crisis zone. Or even by the detritus left by past conflict we're still fishing live mines out of the North Sea and the Baltic that were laid in the 1940s. It is in the interest of us all to try to avoid events like the 1980s tanker war in the Persian Gulf or other forms of conflict elsewhere that can interrupt the movement of trade. The EU Commission estimates that 4.74 trillion euro worth of maritime trade each year is affected by disputes in the South China Seas. These are not the kind of figures that we can ignore safely. Simply, the sea is a vast area largely unregulated and barely pleased. Within it lie resources upon which billions depend for food and our economic well-being. Ships bring us things that we want and need. They also bring us things we really do not want, including arms, drugs, counterfeit goods, people and potentially even weapons of mass destruction. Even something as simple as a ship dumping fuel where it should not are navigating in a way that is not safe can pose serious threats to maritime environment. Half of the last 22 major oil spills globally occurred in European waters. This is a threat that exists close to home. Activity at sea must be controlled and regulated to ensure that such incidents are minimised. If we are to exploit the potential for blue growth and develop economic potential at and from the sea, we must have security. Navies are absolutely not the only agencies responsible here, but they are or at least should be central to any response. It is important to remember that there are things within the sea and under the sea that are valuable. Competition for access to these is therefore to be expected. There are thus a bewildering variety of jurisdictional disputes across the globe. With competing claims of sovereignty often supported or disputed by naval presence and not infrequently by much more robust forms of naval diplomacy. This is not confined to South East China Seas. Disputes also exist in European waters. The opening of navigable routes through the Arctic and the possibility of resource extraction within the Arctic Circle pose interesting potential for further conflict or cooperation. It is not absolutely clear yet which it will be. For those wanting to cause mischief at sea, the March of Technology may provide them with a very interesting array of capabilities. Even Hezbollah, a sub-state group, are now equipped with anti-ship missiles and successfully hit an Israeli warship in 2006. Last week, Houthi militia apparently fired missiles at US warship of Yemen. Sub-state groups now have access to anti-shipping weaponry. Others may use them and be less restrained in choosing their targets. Still more may take more innovative routes exploiting cyber capabilities to attack the critical infrastructure upon which maritime trade depends. All of which requires some sort of response and we all internationally have a shared interest in maintaining good order at sea. And equally of course in time of conflict control of the manoeuvre space represented by the sea is a critical factor. Often it is the critical factor that enables a successful application of joint military power. The sea can provide the access necessary to support expeditionary operations or humanitarian missions, which gives us the opportunity to spread good order from the sea. If you can use it, the sea provides global connectivity for good or for ill. If you can't use it, bad things happen. Even if we don't always appreciate this in advance. In some respects, using the sea is a bit like breathing oxygen. We don't think about it until its availability becomes challenged and probably it's a little too late to start thinking. Far back in 2008, the UN General Secretary's report on the oceans and the laurels sea identified seven general threats to security. Namely piracy and armed robbery, terrorist attacks, illegal trafficking in arms and WMD, illegal trafficking in narcotics, smuggling and trafficking of people, illegal and unreported and unregulated fishing and intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment. Subsequent annual reports have also emphasised cyber security and this year the problem of microplastics, which is terrible for fish, so please choose your face creams carefully. The report identifies things that are typically covered under the rubric of maritime security and in this respect is just not dissimilar threats identified by international organisations and by states including the African Union's integrated maritime strategy of 2012, the British maritime security strategy of 2014 and so on and so forth. The EU maritime security strategy, which is adopted by the Council in June 2014, is founded on the notion that, quote, the maritime security is a shared need for the welfare, the prosperity of the EU and the world and that the seas nurture growth and render key environmental services, the words of the commission. Security is part of the foundation upon which the security, security at sea is part of the foundation upon which the EU is built. The EU recognises that threats are transnational and interconnected by nature, that they require a multilateral integrative response compatible with the comprehensive approach. So the EU maritime security strategy emphasises an international response, co-operations between civil and military agencies and a cross-sectoral strategy that pulls together all of the different stakeholders, which appears appropriate. And to some extent words have been matched by action. The EU missions deal with piracy of Somalia, EU now for Operation Atalanta, ably demonstrated what could be achieved through multilateral action and this plus activities such as the capability of building mission EU Capnesto and the land-based EU training mission Somalia reflect the kind of multi-layered approach later advanced by the maritime strategy. I'll also show them appreciation that problems like piracy have their origins on land as much as at sea, in fact more at sea. At sea you can mitigate the consequences, only on land can you actually solve the problem. So a naval response alone is not enough. You will know that Irish ships did not participate in Operation Atalanta but Irish soldiers were engaged in the EU training mission and twice that was commanded by an Irish officer. Chris Reynolds, the director of the Irish Coast Guards this year, took up charge of EU Capnesto. The island has been very proactively engaged in dealing with the security problem in Somalia and associated seas. Operations severe undertaken by EU now for Mediterranean reflects just one element of a broader EU comprehensive strategy to respond to the migrant crisis, focusing on a systematic effort to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and other enabling assets. Albeit legal problems mean that they can't operate in Libyan waters so they can't actually do any of that stuff, which is again entirely representative of the kind of challenges one faces in security at sea. But you also have front-ex-operations for Simon and Trident providing support to Greece and Italy, further front-ex-operations providing monitoring in the Western Mediterranean and in cooperation with NATO in the Aegean. Coast Guards and naval forces working together in a coordinated sense with some degree of success. It's better than nothing. It is most widely recognized that maritime security requires above all intelligence and good information. An initiative such as the maritime surveillance project Marsaur launched by the European Defence Agency in 2006. A new also European border surveillance system should enhance the capacity for monitoring and surveillance, as should the new European border and coast guard agency launched a few weeks ago. But as ever with EU foreign security policy, it was a tight. Not everybody chooses to engage, including Ireland. And there is, I think, much more that could be done. But it is certainly helpful at least that the EU is taking positive steps. It is moving to mainstream security at sea and is trying to meet some of the challenges that exist. My guess, however, is that if you were viewing this from southern Europe, you'd think an awful lot more could be done. Some years ago, Jeffrey Till, my first boss, by the way, had the idea that navies would display the mix of modern and post-modern tendencies. The modern was almost old-fashioned ideas of what navies did. Navies confronting other navies in terms of state interest. And that post-modern was something else that was reflective of a realisation that the real security challenges that we face are complex and transnational and can only be solved by navies actually working together. And that navies that adopted post-modern approaches would show a cooperative tendency. And he cited the navies of Scandinavia as a perfect example of this. Sweden, Denmark and Norway shifting their focus from sea denial against the Soviet Union in the context of a major war to providing for participation in multinational operations overseas in support of a cooperative vision of international security. And the effort to suppress piracy of Somalia will be a perfect example of what he's talking about. So post-modernism became very prominent in discourse about naval affairs. And it is important to remember also until we try to emphasise this, security can be threatened in more traditional ways by states and by navies. Well, she's hinted at within the European maritime security strategy but it's not emphasised there or in the action plan. NATO has fewer qualms discussing such things and it lists maritime security as a sub-category within a broader maritime strategy that encompasses more robust use of naval force including deterrence, collective defence and cooperative security. And in truth I think NATO has it right. Maritime security is defined by the UN in the EU reflects just one aspect of a maritime strategy that must also cater for more traditional threats. So, where's at least more navies? In terms of post-modern maritime security tasks they have a clear and important role. As a 2007 US maritime security strategy made clear even the biggest navy in the world hasn't got the numbers required to police every sea lane, every estuary and every maritime choke point all states have a shared interest and thus a shared responsibility in ensuring the maintenance of good order at sea. The first and most important task for any small navy is to look after its own backyard, to police the maritime environment ensure the freedom of navigation, to deter criminality, protect national sovereignty and uphold the law. And sadly, too many navies are simply not capable of doing this. They need help. And small navies can do an awful lot here. They contribute into a cooperative approach, the kind of global network of navies that the US navy were talking about. Thus, for example, the wide range of navies large and small that contribute to Operation Atlanta or to capability development in West Africa through the Africa Partnership Station or for example, the Maltese navy, the smallest of small navies working with the Libyan Coast Guard in the aftermath of the 2011 war trying to re-establish a local capacity for maritime and stabulary duties. There's an awful lot that small navies can do if they choose to engage. In terms of hard security, small navies can also be relevant. A point strongly emphasising the most recent update of the 2015 version of the US maritime strategy which focuses now much more on the anti-access area than our challenge apparently posed by other navies and by sub-state groups. The US pivot to Asia and the precipitate falling numbers that has affected the middle-sized European navies since the end of the Cold War means that Europe will have to face future challenges at sea with fewer assets. It will be incumbent on all to contribute, whether that be through role specialisation, as in the case of the Baltic states focused on mine countermeasures, through participation in NATO standing groups offered bilateral or multilateral initiatives such as Vultron, or activities such as the Dutch and the German navies sharing the use of the new Dutch joint support ship, the Carol Dormann so that two navies have access to one asset and therefore can share resources. Or the German force protection battalion integrating into the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps signal weighing which smaller European navies can work together as a good effect, albeit I'm not entirely convinced the Germans and Dutch would like to think of themselves as being smaller navies but we can debate that later if there are any German or Dutch representatives in the room. Anyway, the point stands, close cooperation and integration may be the way ahead. Of course though this poses challenges for a neutral country. At the most basic level states will still require navies to defend their sovereignty to protect the presence or passage of unwanted visitors and to send them back where they came from. Sovereignty means nothing if it's not defended. Quite literally at sea where issues of customary usage can determine the shape of the law. This does not require necessarily advanced combat capabilities, a standard offshore patrol boat can send a carrier battle group packing if it's able to find it and the carrier isn't willing to initiate armed aggression. But in more serious cases an ability to deny the enemy the use of sea will still be relevant. It is slightly depressing but not at all surprising that the Scandinavian navies once the poster boys for postmodernism appear to be reverting back to their earlier role focusing on coastal defence and sea denial in view of a potential threat from the east. The Terence and Collective defence do remain relevant. So where does this leave the Irish naval service? As an outsider I've always found it really perplexing that from the foundation of this state policy makers appear to ignore the fact that Ireland is an island. For a variety of reasons, some that are more explicable than others, the defence forces have always been dominated by the army notwithstanding the fact that the current chief of staff is a naval officer. We may be in the midst of change I certainly hope that this is the case because the subordinate position of the naval service which is the state's primary agency at sea has served Ireland very badly in the past. Change is necessary. Ireland lies in an important position across the western approaches to Europe. 99% of Irish imports and exports travel by sea. We have responsibility and jurisdiction over a massive area around a million square kilometres which means that the Irish contribution to maintaining EU maritime security is vitally important. We have a key role to be played in maintaining a recognised maritime picture and therefore Irish participation in Marso is to be applauded. There are usually around 400 vessels of various sizes in Irish waters at any given time. Some are going about their lawful business, some are not. Over the course of the last decade the naval service has been involved in the seizure of over 1.2 billion euro worth of drugs and the service generally conducts over a thousand vessel boardings each year. Exports from offshore fishing earn to state around 375 million euro a year and it's a resource that is stolen by foreign boats and sometimes abused by domestic ones. Offshore, oil and gas resources, mineral deposits on or under the seabed and a potential to harvest wind and wave energy given additional relevance to our offshore maritime domain. It must be policed and protected. It is hard to do that with just eight patrol ships and a couple of the maritime patrol aircraft. I think that represents the barest of bare minimums and of course we should not forget the security of ports and other relevant infrastructure for sure. The deployment this year and last ships to the Mediterranean where they have saved many thousands of lives. I think in June it was 10,000 and it's going up on a daily basis so thousands upon thousands of lives been saved by the naval service and this has generated much goodwill towards the country and demonstrates what can be achieved even with very modest capabilities if there is a will. The failure to participate in operation at Atlanta beyond sending a couple of officers to headquarters in London reflects I think at the very least a lack of imagination. Although I'm not sure that the blame there attaches to the naval service even the tiny Croatian and Maltese navies were able to do more. There is no reason at all why Irish ships and personnel should not take part in such operations making a material contribution to international peace and security helping our European partners building bridges with other navies developing skills and experiences for our personnel that they cannot get at home contributing to a rule based international order. There is no reason why Irish ships or defence forces personnel should not take part in maritime capability building exercises far from home. They have much relevant experience. To be honest there is no reason at all why the naval service could not become the primary means by which this state fulfills its commitment to the maintenance of a rule based international system or be entirely appropriate for an island state. This would require additional investment in the navy. More ships perhaps slightly larger vessels or this would have the added advantage of increasing the assets available to fulfil vital maritime security tasks in whole waters tasks that are central to the security of this state and to the EU. Whether it's in the Mediterranean or not the naval service we fully engaged in active operations 25 hours a day, 7 days a week all year, every year it must be properly resourced. I suspect for this time I probably already tested your patience enough so in summary very quickly what happens at sea matters the threats that exist there are complex and transnational and the EU is correct to state that a multi-layered, multilateral cross-sectoral response is required to deal with these. NATO is also correct to note that maritime security threats as defined by the EU are not the only things that threaten us at sea. Navies are very far from the only organisation to deal with the diverse threats that we meet but they are central or at least should be central to any response and small navies have a vital role to play even if many commentators prefer to think only in terms of larger navies. Thank you for your attention.