 Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Imti Sahed. Fada, Carnegie's online Middle East Journal. I'd like to welcome you to our last panel of today's conference. We will talk about the spillover from Libya into the Sahel. In this panel, we will try to tackle the complex Libyan conflict, particularly insecurity in the South, its main drivers, and key players. And as if the conflict inside Libya is not enough, of course, events there impact security in the Sahel and vice versa. So our panel will examine the impact of cross-border networks and the movement of people and goods on the region's stability. And finally, we will touch on the role the international community can play to support local actors and communities. So to discuss these issues, we have Carnegie's own Fred Weary. Fred is a senior fellow in the Middle East program where he focuses on post-conflict transition, armed groups and identity politics in Libya and North Africa and the Gulf. Joining us on VC is Faraj Najem. Faraj is a Libyan historian and writer. He's a professor at University of Benghazi, an author of tribes Islam and state in Libya. We also have with us Manal Taha. Manal is a former fellow for North Africa and current consultant at the United States Institute of Peace, where she focuses on Libya and Niger. She was previously with the USAID Office of Transition Initiative in Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan. Each of our speakers will speak for about 12 minutes, and then we'll take questions from the audience. So with that, Fred will get us started. Great. Well, thank you all, and thank you again for moderating. What I'd like to do to start us out with is to canvas the fractured landscape of Libya and to try to understand the drivers of extremism, the factors that enable extremism to flourish in Libya and spill over into the Sahel. This is a map of Libya's contested control that shows you the factional breakdown in Libya today. Of course, the real question is one of a collapsed government, many different centers of power vying for territorial control. I think this also illustrates the sheer lunacy of trying to partition Libya into three parts if you were so inclined to do that. What I'd like to do is sort of look at the southwestern corner in particular. I was there last year in Ubarri and Ghat and Sabha. Obviously, this is a key zone where transnational extremist groups have found refuge, where they've set up logistics pipelines. The key thing to remember, I think, when we're looking at this country, is that the notion of real border control was always illusory, even under Qaddafi. This was a dictator who managed the cross-border movement of illegal goods, of migrants. He devolved a lot of the control to his own tribe, so it was never secure. He never had the mechanisms in place to fully control. And we're talking about a movement of people and goods that have stretched back centuries, whether pilgrims, whether the slave trade. So these are networks that are firmly entrenched. The other, I think, myth that we need to dispel is the myth of communal conflict in the South, especially between the Tabu zone, which is over to the east, and the Toriq zone over to the west. The notion that these two groups are historically enemies needs to be challenged. For hundreds of years, they had an arrangement that divided up border control between the two. There were a lot of unspoken packs that were unspoken power hierarchies. After Qaddafi's rule, those collapsed. And the more important thing that I want to emphasize is that it is the result that the communal clashes, the conflict in the South, is the result of a shortage of local economy. I mean, these are fights over economic resources. First of all, oil fields. If you look at Sharar and Elfield there, the militia, the group that controls the oil field, has enormous leverage over the central government, over contracts. And the second source of conflict is over smuggling routes. And what happened after the revolution is the Tabu zone moved further to the west, threatening the Toriq's historic zone of control. Combined with the closure of the Algerian border, meant that the migrant smuggling route shifted over to the Tabu. So this just shows you that this notion of historic ethnic conflict, I think, needs to be challenged. So when you go to the region and you speak to young men, you speak to activists, you speak to community leaders, you get a real sense of the desperation there. I mean, this is a desperately poor area that was always neglected under Qaddafi. We're talking about shortages of electricity for days on end, shortages in hospital, a real absence of livelihood. And so of course, the default is smuggling. I mean, this is the principal source of income. The other feature of this region, of course, is the utter absence of any formal government institutions, especially in the policing sector. So we're talking about militias that are tied to specific towns, neighborhoods, communal groups, ethnic groups controlling their own portions of territory, controlling the border. And of course, they're involved in the illicit border smuggling. The other feature that impacts Southern insecurity that provides a very conducive and fertile environment for extremists is Libya's political conflict, which is up north, specifically the conflict between the so-called dawn and dignity camps since 2014. Again, very loosely represented between red and over to the West, the government of National Port, which really doesn't exert real territorial control, but we can look at the militias of Masrata moving down into the South. The underlying theme that you find going to the South is that the South has fallen victim to this national conflict. So these young men are enlisted into this Northern political conflict. The Northerners will use them as hired guns. They're used to, they're fighting way out of the South. They're fighting in Benghazi. They're fighting in the oil crescent. And so Northern meddling, this Northern factional conflict has proven tremendously destabilizing to Southern stability, to Southern unity, and it's exacerbated these local fractures. Of course, this is all a very, very fertile ground for extremists. Let me just say a few words about the extremist presence, especially in the Southwest corner. And the two words I wanna emphasize here are transactional and contingent. When you go to the South, you get a sense that any extremist presence that is through this corner is negotiated, is the result of shared interest, is often the result of a lack of capacity. So when I visited the border town of Ghat, right on the Algerian border, there were municipal leaders, there were militia leaders who were in fact charged with securing the border that simply didn't have enough vehicles, radios, personnel to control the border. And then of course, the unspoken truth is that the extremists were able to negotiate access into this border, and they were quite candid about that as well. Obviously we know the story of Toreg grievances and how that has linked up to Islamist militancy in Mali. The thing I wanna emphasize from a lot of conversations with the Toreg is that there was a real sense of disenchantment with the Islamist project in Mali when these guys came back to Libya. Now obviously there is this sense among the Toreg in the Southwestern quarter that we're out here on our own, we're isolated, nobody's helping us. If somebody comes in and offers us a good, whether it's security, whether it's protection, of course we're going to welcome that. And that sort of instrumental approach was crucial to ISIS securing a foothold insert. There are marginalized communities in ISIS, whether certain neighborhoods, whether certain tribes, that will welcome the extremists for what they offer, which is protection, which is really some good. So again, transactional. The issue of Southern extremist linkages to the North, to Northern extremists is certainly there. Going back to Balmukhtar, to his links up to Ashdabia and Benghazi, to Ansar Sharia's role in funneling volunteers down into Mali. But what I think we're seeing is AQIM is primarily focused on the Sahel as a base of operations. They're using Libya as strategic depth for logistics, for resupply, for medical care. And so they're negotiating sort of access in this area. They did issue a very public statement for their volunteers to go fight all the way up North into Benghazi to fight General Heftar's forces. But again, I think that was mostly at the level of a statement. The ISIS presence, again, it's residual, it's pooling, as Eric said. They push down from certs south of Ben-Iwaleed, north of Sabha, they're going to encounter a very crowded marketplace of communal armed groups of rival Islamist militias from AQIM. The competition between AQIM and ISIS was really playing out in Derna up in the North. In Benghazi, there was a tactical cooperation. There was, you take this neighborhood, we'll take this street. So there was a form of cooperation. But again, could ISIS reemerge in the Southwest corner? My sense is from the Torek, it's ability to really penetrate the social fabric in the Southwest is fairly limited. And so again, we're talking about logistics, we're talking about some sort of transactional process where they would negotiate access. And let me just leave you with a final thought about the narratives of extremism in Libya. Obviously this is a fractured country. There are different fractional groups that have an interest in portraying their rivals as harboring extremists. So when you get certain information, when you get intelligence reports about a particular ISIS cell in this location, is it coming from the LNA? Is it coming from Heftar's Camp? Is it coming from the Miss Rottens? And these local communal groups down in the South are very well aware of the counter-terrorism narrative. The Tebu in particular have tried to portray themselves as natural counter-terrorism partners for the French, for the US, against their enemies, the Torek, who they suspect of being all extremists. So there are these fractional narratives that are being pushed that we need to be wary of. We have your two minutes, but thank you. Faraj, if the technology will hold, I think we'll go ahead and move on to you. Can you hear us? Go ahead, Faraj. I just forgot to unmute my microphone. Can you hear me okay? I can hear you, can you hear me? Hear me? Faraj? Can you hear me? Yes, we can hear you. Yes, I can hear you. Yes, go ahead. Can you hear me? Okay. Well, thank you very much. And good evening to you all from Brizzi Benghazi. We talk about the Islamist in Libya. Let me just provide you with some information historically, but also in relation to the neighboring countries to Libya. Libya, as you all know, is an enormous country. It's a continent and a country. It's almost bigger than 22 European countries, just to put it in perspective. Faraj? Yes, it's bigger than Britain 7. Yes. Faraj, can you speak up? We're having a hard time hearing you. Can you hear me like this? Better. Is this loud enough? Right, okay. It's to do with this small thing in here. Right, let me just repeat what I've just said. Libya is a continent and a country, even though it has a small population. It's almost bigger than 22 European countries, just to put it in perspective. It's bigger than Britain 7 times. We have a little over 6 million people live in this country. 95% of them, they live in the coast, whereas 95% of the country is a desert, but it's a good desert, it's full of oil. We have borders that are more than 4,000 kilometers of borders, which sadly are guarded right now, and we have a problem guarding them. The population in the desert, where the problems lie right now, it's around half a million. They are scattered in a number of towns, as there are some of them displayed in your board. The majority of those Libyans, they are either Arabs who constitute the majority, and followed by the Tuaregs and the Taboos, the old Muslims and the old Sunnis. They all live in tribal sort of like communities. They are split along the ethnical lines, even though they sometimes do mix in a big city like Sabha, which is the capital of the south. Most of those people, whether Arabs, Tuaregs, or Taboos, do have relations across the border. As you all know, the Tuaregs, they are divided into six countries, whereas the Taboos are divided into three countries, that's Libya, Chad, and Niger. The Arabs, obviously, they move around in those African and neighboring Arab countries. The Tuaregs, they live mostly in Ubari, Ghdamis, but also Ghat, Adri, and other small towns. But they do cohabit with others in Sabha, whereas the Taboos, mostly they populate towns like Murzig, Qatroun, Om Laranib, and the east, in the southeast, in Kufra, Arribiana, but also they do live in Sabha with others as well. As for the biggest Arab tribe in the south, which has dominated politics in the last, I would say a hundred years, is the tribe of Olaid Suleiman, led by the Safa Nasser family. They are mostly in Sabha, and they do have problems currently with the Taboos. The Taboos, obviously, they constitute a fighting force, especially after the revolution. They do control a big sway, but also big zones, and they pay their allegiance to the parliament and to its government in the east, whereas the Olaid Suleiman, mostly they have their allegiance to the west, and they allied themselves with the militias of Musrata. The Tuaregs, they do sort of like swing between these two political groups. The south, as we all know, they suffer from a great deal of marginalization, but also neglect, as we all know that those who control power and wealth are mostly in the north, whereas the south is left with nothing, even though most of the oil and water comes from the south. And as a result, a great deal of human trafficking, the business of human trafficking has grown, but also smuggling of fuel and consumer goods, which is subsidized by the state, as well as drugs and weapons has risen in the last six years, especially after the revolution. Some of the Arabs, but also the Tuaregs, do have relations with communities and those neighboring countries that have some terror groups. To name one, the Tuaregs do have some relation with Azawad in the south and some other groups. The political Islam has manipulated this to their benefit, and also since the area is far remote from the central government in the north, they managed to capitalize on this and use those bases in the south to penetrate either deep in the south or to use them as refuges whenever they needed, as we have seen recently with ISIS fleeing Sirt and taking refuge in the south. However, the Taboos, we have no evidence that they do harbor any extremists or outload groups as evident from their dealings with the government in the east. Some European countries had tried to strike some deals with some of these tribes, as we saw recently, an agreement which was signed between the Taboos and our late-slay man and robe under the auspices of the Italians, which does infringe on the sovereignty of the country, especially without the permission or the consent of the central authority. But again, there is a problem of central authority, which one we deal with, as we know the country is split between at least two, if not three governments there on the north. Right now, there are problems in the south, especially around the military base of Terminhent. This is not just a military base, but also a military complex. It's currently occupied by the Masrata militias, with some of their southern allies, the National Army under the auspices of General Haftar. They're trying to retake the base and extend their control over the south, and there is sadly a great deal of bloodshed going on right now as we speak. Some of these militias, especially the Masrata and others, they have sought the help and the aid of some of the Chadian opposition forces that have taken refuge in Libya. To summarize the problems in the south, as obviously part of the overall problems of Libya, but these have particular meanings. The settlers do suffer a great deal of poverty and neglect as compared to their northern brethren. They have a problem of unemployment, and as a result, we've seen the exploitation of young people and they're using them in smuggling and other illicit activities. There is a smaller political participation because of the geopolitics and the domination of the north of modern Libya, but also there is an element of tribalism in the south, and also racism. As we see, there are three races trying to live near next to each other. Two are disfranchised, whereas the Arabs are having the better deal. Also, as a result, there is a problem of inequality and everything, and the taboo followed by the Tuaregs, they are the ones who are suffering most. But again, the south, I think it's a victim of globalization and reasonalization. There is a problem of terror worldwide, and their homeland or their communities are used as transitional pipes, if you like, especially in the trafficking of humans from the south into Europe, but also exporting the problems of the north into the south and trying to subtle their differences at the expense of southerners. And I think I'll leave it to that. Farid, since you can't hear me, since you can't see me, you have a couple of minutes to wrap up. Two minutes. Oh, I think I have to help. Sorry, I didn't hear. Did you hear that? All right, you were perfect. Okay, we'll go ahead and move on to Manab. Thanks Farid. Yeah, hello, everybody. I want to talk about the spillout of Libya. At the beginning, like what exactly is this spillout of Libya? Let me start with what's ever coming out of Libya now is not something new. It was exist during Gaddafi. It's the difference that it was under one month control, but now it has the different players. So what is it, how it looks like? This is spillout of Libya. Let me see how exactly the thing that's going from Libya during Gaddafi out to the neighboring countries. Gaddafi used to train militant rebels, which is now we have a lot of militants and rebels and armed people, they go like in Mali or in many countries. So there is no big differences except Gaddafi were there. And then you have the trafficking. Gaddafi was there when he was happy with France or with Europe. He will just fill the boat of immigrants and send them to Europe and it happened before. So the change is now changing for who is the new player? Who is in control now? We have multiple players now in this new dynamics. If I look at the border, we tend to focus in southwest border because it's close to IPUM, it's close to Mali, it's close. But we really don't see a lot. We don't put emphasis on the border with Egypt and border with Sudan and border with Chad, which are very important now specifically. Like just two days before there was a fight on the south of Jakub and people were killed. Malaysia bordering these areas. If I look at the border between Egypt and specifically area of Jakub, south of Tugrub, like 90 or 100 kilometers south of Tugrub area. And then you have Khufra. This area are opening a strategic area for smuggling routes between Sudan and Egypt. And who is the main players over there? You find some tribal leaders. Mali, Wulad Ali, with Egypt. And then you have Zwaya and Khufra together with Tubu. And they are competing each other to control these routes. Then you have the border with Chad. You have Tubu, also they are competing with Quran and themselves, but also with Zwaya to control these routes, smuggling routes. And then you have Niger. In Niger they are competing with Tawaric and Tubu together. And in Algeria, Algeria are better in boarding their borders. But still there is a way you can go through the Sulfador triangle. But also you go to Tunisia. Tunisia, Zintan, they may play some role in smuggling in that small corridor, which is mountain, which is also reducing the amount of smuggling. Look at this whole picture of smuggling routes around Libya. The new players are too many militants group that they're controlling these areas. Who stand among them strongly, specifically in Chad or in Sudan, border in Sudan or in Niger, Tubu. Tubu tribes are, you find them are very important in terms of controlling these smuggling routes. Why that happened? Because during Gaddafi collapse, during the revolution, Tubu, they found the opportunity to go and guard these gates. From Madama, Althom, Alwig, and Al-Sara, and area around Kufra with Dribiana, which historically is their area. But still in the past, they used to be worked to control by Gaddafi border. But actually they say it was in Gaddafi leaders. And that's where you find now Gaddafi and Tubu are close. They don't fight each other. Ironically, because Tubu, they fought against Gaddafi, but after a minute after the revolution, they alliance Gaddafi. Because that is one of the interests. So you have this alliances also is built up, tribal alliances over the smuggling. What I want to say here, if we want to see what's happening coming out of Libya, we look at this whole border as well complex. And then we look at every and each and every tribe and who is a player and what's their interest in this area. When Tubu, back when people, when they fighting against Gaddafi, Tubu, they take a chance and guard this. And till now they don't want to move and they will not move. And they just border strategic areas. Together with the oil fields, in the Sharar and the field. Since then, they don't want to move unless now recently, in 2014, Misrata helped to move them in the advantage for the Tawaric and Sharar oil fields close to Obari. So this dynamics of Tubu being in all these areas is telling us exactly it's competing for the oil, access to oil fields and smuggling grounds. That is the two main economic revenue for these two groups. And that make it very difficult, actually, trying to move them away from it. But I was looking for what's opportunity actually now. We have it that we can really give it to Tubu, at least to be integrated. First, we need to address the cultural grievances for Tubu. Tubu has been neglected for a long time. The language was neglected. And then, not only in Libya, even in Chad. They are better situation in Chad, but in a year. So you have this group that they are in these three countries, they want some recognition. And now they found the money, so they will not give it easy. And they are involved in many fights, they are involved even with Haftar in the North. So they know how exactly to ground themselves in military. I think we have the opportunity of now constitution, Libyan constitution in development. Give them some recognition, or give them the rights recognition in this constitution is an opportunity for international community to emphasize on it, specifically with Arabs Libyans that they don't want to give a chance to include these minorities rights in the constitution. This can also help actually address some of the identity grievances within the Tubu group. So this is mainly about the what is spill out of Libya. It's all the phenomena, new players. That's a main thing of it. But let me see what the international community is doing. I had the chance, I'm lucky, because I went to Niger and Chad and Libya. So I asked people in the ground, specifically in the area of security, appearance of Americans and French. When I was in Niger, I know my colleague, Eric, spoke about the security forces on the ground. The international community will be on American sites on this military training and military support for the army in Chad or in Niger. Which is good. It helps to lift up the capacity for the local forces actually to compete counter-terrorism. But at the same time, how local people perceive, how actually see them see it. And specifically when I was at Agadis, I asked some Tubu that they actually doing this kind of trafficking. And they told me, frankly, they were not there to touch us. And I was like, why? They said because they know that if they touch us, we're going to turn against them. Then I said, how do you prevent actually like confront them? The French base, North and close to Madama, they told me that they have the day and have the night. So it's very clear that it's division of time, actually, not work. So this is a way of actually they can do, conduct their business. But also, what is about the security forces of these countries on the ground? Every Thursday, there is a convoy protected by the local forces in Niger to guard the travelers or passengers, which are the immigrants that they go to Madama and then cross the town where they pay money for the army there, the Niger army. And they go to Libya. So this is also part of how we can handle the issue of smuggling and trafficking on the area, working with the local forces, capacity and dealing with the corruption, how actually they protecting them, and they take money out of these passengers or West Africans, and we're going to come to Libya. So this is also part of the dilemma. And then you have, which is of time, I can talk to three days. And then I think also, let me just go to what we can do to prevent extremism, because I know people here are very, very concerned about extremism. Because Libya is an area for operation and logistic aspects. But it's not actually an area now, you have like extremists coming in Zappa or coming to Dubai. They may exist during the election. There are some groups coming to Zappa and they said elections are forbidden. We don't want that, we don't understand the state. So there exists, but they don't come out and fight. Why? Because there's other competing forces there, which is Malik, which is a tribe, religious, strong. They will not let them come. Okay, so what exactly we can do to prevent those people not to come to South Libya? We tend here in America or in Europe or Western, in respect for conflict, we have two players. AFI, which is not the case in Libya. It's Libya, it's a bubble of conflicts, too many conflicts. Each one has to be dealt separately with the different root causes of this conflict. And ISIS itself, they're very smart, they figured that out. So where the ISIS came in search is completely different than it's in Derna. In Derna they make use of the power struggle between families and they align with one family and they bomb up and they call their foreign fighters. In third, they actually came from area originated, the Noflia, who are they used to fight in Afghanistan and they are Libyans, Libyans. And they just go there, enable the situation. The area, the central areas, a vacuum from power or animal issues is only very peaceful tribes. They made use of that vacuum of security forces. So they know how to use it, how to use actually the local substances and the local existing of power. So whenever we want to deal with preventive or working with counterism, we have to look at the cases by cases, not just like one approach or one enemy where ISIS in search is not in one sebrata. It's different from the one that's going to come in sepah or now is maybe it's going to come to Dufra. So that's all you have to consider. So. Thanks, Manal. I think we'll have to leave it there and we can open the floor for questions. I will take questions three at a time. Please be sure to identify yourself and again be sure to ask a question. Brian Stout, Foreign Policy Magazine. At the beginning of the month, the black market rate of the DNR exceeded seven US dollars per DNR. This week it has exceeded eight and it's due to exceed 10 by the end of the month. How do you see that affecting the smuggling business both with regard to humans and of oil? Thank you. I'm Rasmus Bose from the Danish Institute for International Studies. I have a question on an issue that sort of came through here and there, but which I personally am pretty concerned about. I want to sort of ask the the presenters. The question of to what extent regional revelry may be one of the sort of upcoming or even already very present drivers in these conflicts. And well, we may not necessarily be talking about jihadists or such, but the broader political conflict Fred spoke about it as sort of the fractionalism in the north. But this issue of Egypt having obviously there, let's say proxy friends there and Algeria opting for a different solution in Libya as far as I've understood much more inclusive. And we may have sort of French and European French Italian diverging ideas of how is this actually going to be. So the question is with these regional powers, we've seen sort of the escalation of a Syrian conflict exactly along these lines with regional powers pushing their proxies, etc. Is this something that you can recognize as a potential sort of prolongation and protection of these conflicts that are obviously in the roots local, but do you have any sort of attention to? Thanks, Sam David off Gore from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. My question is about the recent announcement of the revelation by the Italians that there had been an agreement between the table and the Torregg and a bunch of tribal leaders, which was pretty swiftly rejected by the table national assembly on the basis of not wanting the international interference and also saying that the table representatives at the negotiations weren't actually representative of the tables. So my question is, is there actually buy-in from the tribes, especially the locals, to have some sort of negotiating control over the border? And I guess is international negotiation going to be particularly useful in this situation? Is there any desire by those groups to have any sort of settlement? Sure. So on the economic question, I mean my broad answer is look, this is going to widen the circle of complicity and smuggling. So when you go to Tripoli, you sense a real desperation there. I mean the long lines outside of banks, I mean people who were trained as doctors or lawyers are now becoming involved in the smuggling business and the migrant trafficking business, running safe houses. Former taxi drivers are now shuttling the migrants along. So the circle of complicity will widen and the black market economy will expand, I think. So that's the pessimistic short answer. And again, it goes back to the fact that these are entrenched traditions. You go to Zalvia, Sabrata, I mean the networks there of smuggling are historic, whether it was goods, whether it was people, and then it's jihadists. So again, the jihadist networks that were flowing in through Sabrata were being run by traffickers who had previously done migrant smuggling just switched over to funneling Tunisian jihadists across the border. So these are entrenched problems and the currency crisis will only widen the scope of them. The regional dimension is absolutely a factor to understanding Libya's problems today and especially down in the south. So Emirati weapons funneled to the LNA have been showing up in the Taboo fighter. So when you talk to these community leaders down in the south, the Tuareg, Taboo, they say, look, we're perhaps with some exaggeration, but not much that, you know, we're the pawns. We're the pawns in this larger northern conflict, but we're the pawns in this broader regional Cold War. And of course that Cold War goes back to 2011 revolution. You have the Qataris backing some factions, the Emiratis backing the other. And of course it really gained steam in 2014 with the launch of Operation Dignity. And you know, these regional powers, the key culprits have signed up in theory to the government of National Court, but they've been hedging all along. So that arm's flow, that support has never stopped and it was absolutely crucial to getting us to where we are today. And the south I think has fallen victim to that. On the question of this peace deal in Rome, look, I mean, when you go on the ground, there's a real center periphery disconnect. So you talk to leaders on the ground, whether militia, local communities, and there's a sense of when the Toreg representative goes to Tripoli, let alone when he goes to Tunis or when he goes to Rome, he loses touch with his people. So any deal, you know, it uses a sense we never actually see the results of these deals, never see the aid. So my sense is any sort of grand bargain, aid isn't going to stick because power is so fragmented and diffuse in the south as we've heard. I mean, we're talking about multiple players. So what you have is a number of sort of individual ceasefires being negotiated in this town that are sealed with tribal mediators. In this town, again, a tribal ceasefire, but is that really a foundation to build a broader institutional peace? No. The other flawed logic with this notion of, as I understand it, the Rome agreement, that if you've got these groups to agree on sharing the border, would that curtail the migrants? No, it wouldn't. They were just divided up among themselves the way they had it before. That was the media agreement. They had this, you get this territory. So the Tebu had the route west or east of the Salvador Pass. And then the Toreg had the Algerian route for flowing through Ghat. The big problem now is that route has been closed. So now the Tebu are dominating. Want to add anything? I just want to add of the how actually you can, how best way to actually get Tebu buying into the national dialogue and the national constitutional process. It's not an easy answer, giving the fact that Tebu now they are very poor. Tebu, they have the say in, they know that they back up themselves with their arm and they align with Hafter, with militias, with money, borders, border control and with the political alliances or at least buying in the chat. So they are not actually against the Italian government. They are involved in the Chinese government. Some of the, like the minister of the security or security or international security in India, it's Tebu. So they are, they are there, they have that backup. So what is the good, what is the opportunity for them to push for the rights? It's really because it's fragile, it's fragmented. It's, it's, there's opportunities. They know that it's a language being addressed in the constitution. That's opportunity for them. So they will push, they will push till they will find, they will find what they want. Or there's other power that can tell them that no, you can't have everything. So that's, that's, that is the balance in new super reality. Faraj, would you like to add anything? Yes, well, I think the problem is being agitated mainly by local players. Let's say the Islamists in particular who lost the election, they are causing some unease. And this is made way for others to come in. Obviously, as we all know that the Islamists are supported and financed by the Qatari government, but also the government of Erdogan of Turkey. And therefore their opponents had to go and seek support from others, mainly from Egypt, which is anti-Muslim Brotherhood, the United Arab Emirates. And recently when we saw the British and the Italians supporting the Misrata militias, the Easterners had to go to the Russians. So the problem in Libya is being agitated not just by local players, but also by their protégé outside the country, which is adding fuel to the fire. Thanks Faraj. Any more questions? I had a quick question. I'm going to identify yourself. Oh, sorry. Lucy Amadou with Counterpart International. And I'm a little bit curious about the problem that with immigration in Libya, I'm more familiar with the Sahel than immigration. And I know a couple of months ago, I believe the Libyan government repatriated a lot of West Africans who had immigrated. So I'm interested to see what it was under Qadhafi's regime and how it changed from the Qadhafi's regime to the situation now in terms of the immigration from West Africa and what the causes are. Maryam, Michelle? Michelle Dunn from Carnegie. A couple of people have alluded to Russia's role in Libya. I'm wondering if the speakers can say a little bit more. I mean, we've seen reports about Russian special forces, perhaps based in Western Egypt operating in Libya. But a few media reports about the Russian's growing relationship with Haftar, Haftar possibly playing the questions in Egyptians off against each other a little bit. But I guess the question is what, you know, how serious of a factor is Russia becoming as yet another outside player in Libya? Or is this still at this point a reminder factor? Sure. That's good. Okay. Any more questions? Anybody else? Jeff Howard from the UK Foreign Office. A quick question about the increasing role of practically Salafist in Libya. And in particular, if you see their role increasing in the South, particularly we've heard reports about their increasing difference amongst the Alawi Suleyman. And would you see this to be a particular point of concern specifically in the South? Yes. I want to talk about the immigration. How was it during Qadhafi? Libya was rich. So most of the immigrants, their final distinction was Libya, mainly, or majority, okay, except the people that they have like, like they really look for a different, they go to Europe, which was not really something that they think about. So the guy was in control of the border. The guy was in control of the coast border also. So he knows how to control this. So people they come and sometimes he bring them at the workers in his country. So that's the pattern of during the Qadhafi. But sometimes whoever, whoever worked in Libya at that time, and he's not happy with Europe, he will just freak and give a free shipping to Europe. And there's people, they went there through that opportunities. But I had the chance, I was in Malta last year, and I asked some people that they came through the desert from Sudan, and they originated from Eritrea, Somalia, and Somalia, and Sudan, and Ethiopia, and Bangladesh. They come with the boat. They come to Libya with this very organized smuggled traffic network, which also depend on the tribal connections. In a specific route, it has a specific tribe that they take those people from Dongola and Northern Sudan. They bring them to Ajdabia, area close to Ajdabia, which is a specific tribe. Then from Ajdabia, there is another tribe, we take them, they move to other to the north, until they are in Tripoli, or in Azawia, or Zawara, to go to Europe. You have the same routes, completely controlled, and organized by tribal connections. You have every tribe, they have a point to reach, then you give, okay, and then you go with other tribe. So that is the pattern of how the people transformed and immigrating in Libya. I want to talk about Russia. Russians, they didn't hide their work with Haftar. It's very clear they just sent him one of these flights, or helicopters, and they took him for meetings. Something that is not, is not hiding, okay, and they are very vocal about it. But the only thing that I want to just think, that's what I want to emphasize with, and I think it's going to be a real test for the new administration, relationships with Europe, because if Russia in the backyard of Europe, in Libya, and that means it's going to, European Union and EU will not be, and NATO will not be happy with that. So that's how actually US is going to handle these relationships with the European Union and NATO, having Russia on the backyard of Europe. So that's, I want to know also, that's a question. Faraj, would you like to answer these questions? Yeah, if I can just touch on the Russian relation, especially I'm based here in the east, and I'm, you know, I'm close to this. The, sadly, what the West, especially America and Britain, did, they left a vacuum here, especially with the, with the legitimate elected democratic parliament. And they tried to force down those Islamists who were rejected by the ballot box, and be part of the political game. And since they couldn't be in Libya, you know, people like Jonathan Minor, who's the American envoy, did ignore the east, and just concentrated in the west, and especially they banked on the militias of Musrata. And therefore the people in the east, especially the army, found itself left alone, especially in this awful fight against terrorism. And they did not appreciate the effort by General Haftar. And therefore they were, they were calls to, to look for, for other supporters. And, and, and certainly they, they went east, they went to Russia, they went to China. But they were contended with the, with the fact that they had the Egyptians on board, they had the Saudis, the Jordanians, the Emirates, and the Russians. And they said, hey, who needs America or Britain, since they could not really help us. And therefore, you know, mind you, the Russians, they have not physically offered much. You know, mainly it's a moral, as well as political support. But from evidence in the ground, I cannot really see much given to the Libyans, not as much as the French did, even though it's a little. But the biggest involvement was from the Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, particularly Egypt and the UAE. But the Russians, no, but the political support, it was very much needed. As for the Salafis, the Salafis, they played a very pivotal role in the fight against terrorism. They did provide the theological argument against them. They pulled the car from underneath them. They were hardened fighters. And they did a hell of a job, especially with the LA. As for the south, I think it's, this is repeated again, the formula they did in the east. They are repeating it in the south as well. Thank you. Yes, so just to add to that, I mean, I think the Russian role was actually, I think a little more crucial than we've heard. I think they helped print the currency in the east, which was a huge boon to the east. They've offered medical support to wounded fighters. You know, they're providing spare parts. But again, is this really sort of a game changing, wholesale support to one side, to General Heftar? I think what they're trying to do is exert some leverage in that whatever new government emerges, if there's some new formulation, they will have a friendly ally. We have to remember the number of arms contracts that they lost after the revolution, the sense of real bitterness after the regime change, after they abstained on the UN vote. And so there's this narrative, I think, that they're pushing that we're sort of cleaning up the mess. And so I think we're sort of at the level of narrative here. There's a huge economic dimension. Are they really trying to pull a Syria? I don't think they have the sort of institutional levers to do that in Libya. I think the Libyan landscape is completely different than what they had in Syria, in terms of proxies, in terms of networks that they can use. So again, I think they're pushing this envelope. They're trying to exert leverage. I think General Heftar, for his support, is playing that very well to try to get U.S. attention. So again, when I met with him in 2014, and this was a tactic that he said. He said, look, the Russians are knocking at my door, the Chinese, but I really want U.S. support. It's classic proxy bargaining. So I think that's kind of the way I would frame Russian support right now. The Marhali Salafis, again, huge presence in the policing sector in the east, and also in Tripoli, in terms of militias playing the role of police, running prisons. In Sebha, their presence, I visited a prison in Sebha that was run by Marhali Salafis. They were sort of doing their sort of re-endocrination with a heavy dose of sort of Islamist discourse. I don't know if it's still there. I know the SDF, the Special Deterrence Force in Tripoli was heavily involved in that, and the Masrottans were facilitating that. But beyond that, I just don't have any window into the south. I know there's a presence also in Kufra. There's reports of Salafi militias among the Zway there. So again, I think there are a force across the country. CERT, they're certainly present. Kufra, Mars, Beta, and they're taking over sort of these policing functions. The migrants, the question was, what's changed between Qadhafi and now? Is that the... Yeah, I mean, the basic answer is, and I visited a number of migrant detention centers, just become a huge, horrifically abusive business. And so it's these reports of slave markets, the forced labor, the complicity of so-called coast guards on the coast in Zawiya. So the uniform personnel that are supposed to be actually policing this in places like Zawiya are actually complicit. So-called NGO-run migrant detention centers are actually complicit. So again, the web of complicity is just expanded. And the other thing, when you talk to these migrants about repatriation, these countries, they don't have a diplomatic presence in Libya anymore, this is another problem. So they've kind of been forgotten. So, I mean, this is a huge change as well. Take one more round of questions. Is there any question? Laidali Amori, Independent Consultant. My question is about an incident that took place in December. I don't know, just wondering what you heard about it. It's about General Haftar Bahman, an armed group opposed to Debbie, President Debbie Chad. And the incident took place weeks after Haftar visited the capital of Chad in Jamina. So I'm just wondering, maybe because you were on the ground, if you heard what are the reactions to this incident, was it legitimate or coincidental? What did you hear on the ground? Thank you. Didn't hear about that. Or you just one more question. There is some rumor saying that there is a Chadian rebel in South Libya around Kufra. And but the rebellion again is the Chadian government. They said that, but I didn't hear that. I know Haftar hit Rubiana at some point, which is the border south of Kufra. But it was not because of the Chadian rebel. It's because they said there's some intelligence came to him, as it be reported that there's some group of ISIS group that they were doing some logistic things in that area. If I may add before I get cut off. Hold on just a minute. Go ahead Faraj. Yes, it's my battery is going to go in a minute. I just wanted to add that the Chadian opposition forces have been attacked in the last two days in the Yufra basin. They are in the south as well in Taminhent. And the Libyan television has shown some images of soldiers, Chadian opposition soldiers who were captured, but also others who have been terminated by the Libyan Air Force. Thanks Faraj. I think there's one more question. Go ahead. If there's time. A couple questions, yes. Rest of the day. I wanted to ask a question, but broadly to the panel again on sort of the future of the GNA it's been there for a year and all the three presentations and each their way pointed out to the what we could call sort of the general failure of re-establishing central authority ushered in through a year long process of UN dialogue with the several regional etc etc. We all know this story. The question is what are the options for moving that process onwards? Are there any chances that the decentralized whatever policy could help that failed centralization there for it? Or do you see any any way that this could come up flying again? And it's is there another better alternative that is out there that I just haven't seen lately? Thank you. I think Claire do you want to ask? Well, I suppose mine's Claire Spencer Chatham House. I suppose a related question is what does the panel for C is going to break the stalemate in Libya and how things are going to develop and that is with or without the GNA because that may in my estimation be endless wishful thinking on the part of the sponsors of that particular initiative for the reasons that Rasmus has outlined. Who to Farage first before his connection runs out. Farage would you like to address these questions quickly? Yeah, for Claire's question I didn't think I agree with you the GNA this so called this agreement it's going to bring any piece to Libya. It's been rejected in the ground here. There is a problem with the outcome of it and the so called GNA government in Tripoli it cannot even look after itself let alone look after the people of Libya. So there is a serious problem as for the way out God knows we don't know. Certainly Haftar is and there's a great deal of of of public support here for him and they are pushing for a military solution. You know one has to wait and see if this is going to bring the peace and the settlement that we all you know aspire for but I doubt very much it has to be a negotiated settlement but again I think we there are some elements especially those Islamists who have have taken up arms need to be demilitarized before any peaceful settlement can be reached. Well again the GNA is is facing huge problems I mean just in terms of its own security in terms of a real critique is how it disperses funds to municipalities I mean there's just a whole list I think we can agree that it's it's failing that there needs to be some new you know reformulation there needs to be some new revision. So again what I'm against is sort of throwing it out before there's something else to replace it and of course you know military conquest is is not an option. The prime minister in the east Finney just came out and said this is the only solution which of course I think is just infeasible and would of course lead to tremendous bloodshed. I think what needs to happen is there needs to be some new negotiation forum. There's been a number of you know tracks proposed by the Algerians the Tunisians I think there's a huge role for US diplomatic muscle in this but again we're talking about addressing two key areas that were never part of the original LPA and that's the security sector I mean getting the armed groups on board in terms of what is the new military going to look like in terms of command structures in terms of the different groups in terms of merging the the older military with the you know the so called militias and then some mechanism for the dispersal of oil resources I mean transparency this this economic question this management of economic oil of economic resources is so crucial and that was never part of the first agreement too but of course getting the regionals on board I mean this strategy of hedging that you know yes we sign up to this agreement but meanwhile under the table we're backing a faction to obstruct the agreement is a non-starter so I might just say a small thing okay for the the just I want to go back for the history because it is we have to deal with Libyan history we supported Tobruk okay Tobruk came out before before Tobruk leave then we have the GNA then Tobruk refused to go so we have two governments now and now actually three so I'm a little bit skeptical about putting one on face while moving this gradually so I think the approach to Libya dealing with this local conflict as they uh rabbit response emergencies but at the same time action but the same time work at the level national level I think we need to be creative like think out of the box like international community were smart when they did the Kosovo model so why not something like that if that work could work you know that should be buying from Libyans collaborate for Libyans but at the same time Libyans it's very difficult now for Libyans themselves to manage all this dilemma and mess uh inside their country so they need outside support but how this support uh could be come to them that is the way we should like really think about model that can really help to do this one model just go for like just stop thinking about oh let's empower this group maybe you will come and do something Libyan are not patient with their government they will give them one year two years that they will be against them because this is this is the way it's like when you are proceeded after the post and there's no all there are no institutions to give you any security so very much Manal um thank you very much Fred and thank you for us I think Michelle would like to come up and say a few closing words first