 Well, what we do is to try to understand to what extent does corporate governance affect on the performance of banks during the financial crisis. So we look at the sample of American banks and we came up with a measure of corporate governance that is based on company loss and the variation in state loss across different states in the United States and we came up with the somewhat surprising finding that exactly those banks in which shareholders were more empowered in the sense that the company laws allow them more, you know, the right to interfere with managers more often were exactly those banks that did not perform as well during the crisis, which in the end led to a larger number of these banks being bailed out by the US government. And what can we learn from that? What can we do about it? Should we change governance policy? Well, I think one of the key policy implications of our paper is that if we want to start regulating the governance of banks we have to adopt a more sophisticated perspective rather than a naive view in which empowering shareholders is the right thing to do, right? So there has been some proposals, some policy proposals claiming that one of the reasons why banks were in trouble during the financial crisis was because shareholders didn't really take their responsibility seriously. Now, our paper challenges that view. Our paper suggests that especially in the case of banks, because they're implicit and explicit state guarantees, you don't really want shareholders to have full control over managers and over the board because that may lead to excessive risk taking, right? So I guess the policy implications are really if we want to regulate corporate governance we have to understand the special situation in which banks and other financial firms are in exactly because of the rule of the government in regulating these companies. I'm not completely aware of the situation in the United States, but there has been a kind of liberalization for banks during the 90s in Europe, probably also in the US. Has that gone too far? Well, that's difficult to say. What we do know is that in the years leading to the financial crisis, the amount of direct regulation on banks has been very soft. And although there were some major governance reforms that happened around 2002 and 2003 in the United States associated with Sarbanes-Oxley Act. And there were many follow-ups in different countries as well. Although there were those new regulations which apply to all companies, not only to financial service companies, in practice most of the activities of banks were kept pretty much at arm's length, both in the United States and also in the United Kingdom. And there was perhaps some competition between different regions trying to attract more companies and etc. Of course nowadays the trend is in the other direction. So there could be, perhaps deregulation was excessive, but it's probably easier for us to say this with the benefit of hindsight.