 I will try to answer the question you addressed and the question is how do you understand power relations in the world today, right? So in my view, there are two main trends in the international system. One is the rise of the Sino-American competition in the world, which is certainly going to be the dominant feature of the international system in this century. And there's no doubt about this. And in comparison to the Cold War, I mean, there is a difference. And the difference is that the competition between the United States and China is much more, is wider than the Cold War, because it includes an economic and technological component which didn't exist during the Cold War. So in a sense, the challenges of the Sino-American rivalry or competition are much wider. Now, it is not going to be like the Cold War. Why? Because at the same time in the international system, you have a second dynamic which is taking place. And the second dynamic is created by the rise of a multi-polar world. In other words, what characterizes the international system today make it quite complex and unstable is the articulation between this bipolar structure and a multi-polar structure. So we have a combination of both in the international system. So when we start thinking about the international system, we have to keep in mind both dynamics. And the important question is to understand how international actors are reacting to those main dynamics. And in my view, this new organization of the international system is creating three kind of actors. The first are what I call the followers, the second are what I call the bystanders, and the third are what I call the hedgers. And let me develop, if you allow me to do so, those three main actors. The followers are those who decided on purpose for national reasons to take side in the Sino-American competition. So they think that they will increase the national leverage in being part of that competition. And what we saw is Australia is a perfect illustration of this in a sense that three years ago, the Prime Minister of Australia said that Australia is not going to take side between the United States and China. And now they decided to align on the United States, which is a perfectly respectable choice made by the Australian. My point here is not to say if it's good or bad, I'm just trying to analyze the international systematic works. But the decision taken by the Australians has another implication. It means that China's influence is resented in the world, negatively, by an increasing number of countries. And not only in the West, that's what our Chinese friends think. But in many other parts of the world, the Chinese influence is resented. And I think that it's a mixed message, which is sent by AUKUS. And in my view, the Chinese should take this into account. But obviously, there is a source of polarization around this conflict. And on the other side, on the Chinese side, you can, for example, argue that Pakistan has decided to side with China, which and the Pakistanis used to say that China is an all weather ally. So you have countries who are going to take sides very clearly. You have a second category of countries who are bystanders. They are waiting. They are seeing. In many cases, they don't feel for the moment concerned by the competition between the United States and China. And many countries in Africa, even in the Middle East or in Latin America, I mean, are seeing the rise of this competition. But I mean, don't feel necessarily concerned. But so they're bystanding. They are not taking side. They have good relations with both sides. And they think that they can increase their leverage and defend their national interests without taking side. And for the moment, it's the majority of the countries. You have a third category, which is, in my view, extremely important, which is what I call the hedgers. So the hedgers, coming from the verb to hedge, concerns large countries, significant countries, who want to increase their leverage in the international system, who understood that this competition is going to be crucial, and want to play on this competition to increase their leverage. And I'll give you three examples who are totally different. You have the case of Russia, you have the case of Turkey, and you have the curse of India. If you take the case of Russia, Russia obviously understood that is not going to become, once again, the big power, but they want to increase considerably their leverage in the international system against the West, against Europe, against the United States. And in building an informal alliance with the Chinese, not a formal alliance, it's an informal alliance to increase their leverage. So they think that this competition between the United States and China is going to benefit Russia in a way or another, and there are plenty of examples in this regard. The Indians, particularly after what happened in Afghanistan, are of course keen to increase their independence, and they are not going to become the followers of the United States. That's not in the Indian parameters, but they are certainly going within the Quad, for example, increase the strategic cooperation with the United States, of course, to balance China, which is their main rival in the international system. And the third case, which is also very different from the two others, is the case of Turkey. Of course, Turkey is not concerned by the Sino-American rift as such, but Turkey understood that there is a slightly weakening of the position of the United States in the world, and they want to take advantage of this to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the United States, in, for example, having a purely, let's say, interested relationship with Russia. And Russia, of course, understood that they can or they have to accept many things from the Turks if they want to have the Turks more independent from the United States. Now, in all this, where Europe stands, Europe has two liabilities in this. First, because Europe is not a state, it's not a state. And second, Europe was not historically constructed to deal with power politics. So we have structurally to face those two main constraints, not being a state. So we have to define common interests. And second, I mean, the driving force behind the European Union was not power politics. I mean, I used to say that Europe was historically built against power politics. So it's a sea change. But we cannot afford staying like a soft power because all instruments of soft power are becoming now instrument of hard powers. So if we, and I will finish with this, we have those three main actors, the United States, Russia, and China, among others, of course, vis-à-vis the United States. I mean, nobody seriously in Europe discussed the fact that NATO is the backbone of our security. So there's no serious debate about this. The debate is whether NATO is the exclusive instrument for our security. That's the first question. And there is an additional question concerning the nature of the relationship within NATO. And obviously on those two questions, there are debates. But I think that there is an unsatisfaction on both, on those two points. There are areas in which obviously Europeans have an interest, but within which NATO is not going to be involved. And you mentioned Sahel, it's a good illustration of this. So we need to have a common position. We need to have a common European involvement in this part of the world, because NATO is not going to be the answer to all our security problems. And I think that the Americans are understanding this quite seriously. And that was mentioned in the communique between Biden and Macron. And second, there is a kind of unsatisfaction on the nature of the dialogue between the United States and Europe within NATO. So obviously, this view is not shared by all member states in Europe. But the point then, I think that the HRVP will develop it later on in his dialogue with Thierry. The point is that first of all, you have NATO members who are not part of the European Union. And this is a problem. And this is a problem. Because when we talk about constructing a European pillar in Europe, within NATO, I mean, we have non-EU countries who are part of the debate in NATO. So by construction, NATO cannot be the exclusive place where our strategic dialogue with the United States should take place. And actually, the United States have accepted that since they, in the recent, I mean, following the visit of President Biden in Brussels, the United States have accepted the idea of a strategic dialogue between the EU and the United States. But it's not in opposition to NATO. It's just if we want to have a European pillar within NATO, we need to construct this European pillar. And in order to construct this European pillar, we need to have a concentration at dialogue among Europeans. So there is no contradiction, accepted if we consider that the status quo is quite perfect.