 It's great to see so many people still here. One of our panelists was worried that as you were convening over coffee what you were really doing was heading for the exit. So it's a good thing that this individual won't be disappointed. I'm Cynthia Watson from the National War College and I'm delighted to be able to chair this panel this afternoon. You've heard about the history, you've heard about the raw facts, you've heard one extremely prominent and well respected analyst give you his views of where we're going and maybe a little hedging on where we might not be going. But on this panel we'll try to get a real range on what the individual speaker finds to be the most telling and pressing issue that he or she thinks we need to look into for the future. This is a concluding panel so I will ask everyone to try to leave some adequate time for questions and answers but I want to make sure that all of the perspectives represented on the panel have the opportunity to give us their views. I'm going to ask that we start with Dr. Chu who is, you have the biographies but coming to us from Tsinghua University. Then I will follow with Dr. Lai so that we move from the mainland over to Taiwan. Then Alexander Wong, Dr. Wong will be our third speaker and then concluding will be Bonnie Glazer. Dr. Chu. Thank you. I'm grateful for Bonnie Glazer and Richard Bruce giving me the opportunity to talk my will about the Taiwan election and the impact on the cross-strait relations for the next four years. First I see as we all know that the agreement of Douglas Paul's two terms to define mainland reaction to Taiwan election a few days ago that he was quite calm. And I read the so far two statements from Taiwan Affairs Office, a statement the Sunday about the election and the Tsinghua News Agency commentary about election and so far those are two only the official reaction I have seen from mainland China and basically two points first the welcome the election, second and believing and hope that the two cross-strait relations can continue to be stable peace and development. And yes, agree with the previous assessment that the mainland feel relaxed about election. The reason for the relaxed attitude is that the mainland also wants to see stability over the cross-strait relations. This is quite agreeable, same attitude with people inside Taiwan and here in this country that the stability, that is the central theme that President Hu Jintao produced before and at the 17 party congress in 2007 about the central theme of mainland on cross-strait relations and the peace and the development. Peace and stability are the same meaning, same words. And yes, mainland worry about the DPP position especially if PPP won because if DPP won that stability will become a question, peace and stability. And then mainland does not want to see that in stable position in next four years. And the reason for mainland to welcome and once the peace and stability cross-strait relations is because mainland in next four years has a full agenda in domestic issues. Like the Beijing leadership are fully occupied by the internal issues, economic continue growth, inflation, social inequality issues, corruption and public anger on something and social political stability. So it would like to see like the cross-strait relations will be no trouble now and in future. So I work on international affairs. My understanding of Beijing's attitude that is leadership fully occupying domestic issues does not care about others including United States. If you do not bring us trouble including from Taiwan. So I see that it's a general trend and this reason why the mainland like to see stability because the priority is internal. And so I see that this is basically reaction attitude that the mainland see from the towards the reelection. And the second talking about the impact, I see the election will outcome will bring about the not a positive impact on cross-strait relations in the future for years. That will continue to have the stability and the more progress in social economic issues. Like they call the social issues. Economic issues is basically a social economic issues. There have been 16 agreements in the past most of the four years. And then in future there will be some falling off and implement issues like investment protection agreement, law enforcement and education exchange in the future. So there are still some work to be done like the purist speakers are talking about. So I see that the result of the election Taiwan will give the opportunity for science to continue their efforts from the past four years to improve their social economic context times like this general trend. So that seems to be clear the impact. Another impact that we have talked a lot is not clear. That is the impact on political security relations between two sides across Taiwan Street in the future. And we have a lot of debate that's monitored, I've known about the political security talks. Here I should say that most mainland Chinese would want to see it like in future four years that two sides can start political talks and make agreements on the political issues can be peaceful or others. This is very much a general public opinion on the mainland side of China. We should pause yesterday's report like the Taiwan public opinion poll like 6% of the total needs are purified status quo, where small number like the purified reunification or something. Yes, this has been a long time that the poll, I think the mainland people understand, but is the public opinion there? But on the mainland China, we also have a public opinion and the public opinion is quite inconsensuous. 5% is 90% of people and it's quite strong for national reunification, for some movement towards national reunification. So I would like to be clear with myself that this is a strong opinion that the leadership in Beijing understand and I would like to stress it. That does not mean that it's the government position. She let the politicians government understand both public opinion demands and the difficulty in reality, politicians government. So in my study, I see government politicians everywhere in the world, their job is to work between something they want, something they are pure want and something they can do in the real world. I think it's the same truth to mind you, same truth to Hu Jintang and Xi Jinping and the same truth to President Obama here. So what does that mean in the future years? Depending on their judgment, their position, like the understand the public opinion and the reality. The general trend I see in the last four or couple of years, I see the leadership of the government has become very much realistic and practical in cross-Taiwan Street relations and peace and development is a reflection on that. So I see that we will continue to be the general trend in the future. By seeing that, I think that if we cannot have political talks in the future, and that means there will be a greater limitation for how to size can improve their relations. Because as we already said, like the social economic measures are mostly adjusted. So how many of those issues, how much work to size can do in the next four years on social economic issues? Yes, they can implement them, they can follow up on something. But basically they have reached the agreement that are possible or should to be reached on social economic issues. And then what we should do in the next four years. And if we don't have political talks and the price on it, I think there will be very much limitation for other specific issues like international space, CBMs, CBMs, security issues. Because then we do not have a framework or general principle. And the last point, if there is a political talks on myself, do not know what are those political talks will be. What is political talks, talk of what? I will not hear that my government, from my limited elimination, let my government give a clear talk. Because political talk, peace call, used to be first initiated, reached by Taiwan side in 1990s. It's not a millennial side in nature. And then later, millennial side talk about it. But now I don't know what does that mean, political talks? What is the contents of political talks, if to start it? Okay, I think my time is up. Thank you. Okay. Dr. Lai, I neglected to say is from Taiwan think tank. Thank you, Richard and Bonnie for inviting me here and among these very prominent speakers. My name is Sichuan, I have not been to the DC for about five years. So I'm very glad to be back here again. Although this is in a circumstances, I wish it could be in a better position. But well, the reality is like this. And so I thank you for this invitation. And of course, we all know from this morning about the election result. And the reality is that, yes, Mao win the election, but in comparison with what he got in year 2008, the difference between him and the opposition down from 2.2 million to 800,000. So it's about 1.4 million votes loss. And also his legislative majority, also down from 81 seats to 64 seats. So it's the decrease of 17 seats in legislative year. On the other hand, DPP, although did not win as it anticipated or it expected still was in a better position now than it was in four years ago. It has increased its vote share and also increased its legislative seats about 13 seats. So looking at this, if you believe or anybody, including President Ma and Joe, believe this. This is the mandate that the people, particularly on the 92 consensus, the Taiwanese people already given to him. I have to say that probably this will be a much reduced mandate if it is a mandate. Then otherwise, how could you explain about the losing support, rather than the increase of support or about the maintenance of support about his 92 consensus and other policies? And also in terms of the political operation upon view. Right now, we are looking at the mind Joe still commands the majority in the legislative year. However, not only the DPP has a 40 seats, but also a party that openly declared want to roll back the ECFA. And also the party at the same time, wanting to have a very open platform for Taiwanese independence, that the Taiwan Solidarity Union has three seats in the legislative year. And the three seats is sort of a magic number that they are able to form a party caucus and enter, just like Zhu Yihang said this morning, about the legislative piece of the policy legislation party-to-party inter-party negotiation. And if they wanted it, they can put on hold about a certain policy or certain piece of legislation for about a month or even three months. So that actually I think the president of mind Joe and his party is facing a stronger opposition and more constrained if he wanted to push forward a certain other thing that he wanted to do from now on. And also then that basically in terms of the cross-trade policy and many of the so-called cross-trade mechanism, that have the following impact. First of all, when we talk about 92 consensus, associated with it is the 92 mechanism. 92 mechanism, which means that the Taiwan established a straight exchange foundation in negotiation with another is counterpart from China, the rats. But the straight exchange foundation during that time was only authorized to talk about the functional issue, no political issues. But then if you look at the past 16 agreements, some of them actually has crossover to the political issues or the political content about an issue has a political implications. And they are able to go over and sort of pass through. It is precisely because the KMT at that time, with the overwhelming majority in legislative union, what they are able to do is to put those agreements, the agreements that the ARAT and SCF they have signed, then put into the legislative process, but then use the majority to prevent it from any discussion. And then it is because of the Italian legislative union, they have this bylaw that any piece of legislation put into the process. And if after like 45 days or three months without any discussion, that means that there is no disagreement and it will automatically pass. Or 16 of them, or 16 agreements of them have been passed in this way. So that basically was the exception of ECFA. What we have is a past 16 agreements between ARAT and SCF, what they have been signed, are not under or proper, in my view, the legislative union debates or discussions. And I think that situation will be changed from now on, with the DPP having 40 seats and particularly with the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and that three seats. I'm not saying that they are spoiler, but this is a stronger legislative opposition. And if they, if the mind your president wanted to push forward like it did in the past, then it will be facing a much, much stronger opposition. And I doubt if they're able to do that in this way. Another thing about the future development, probably something that is related with the US, Taiwan, China relation, is that the US and China, and also of course with Korea and Russia to a certain extent, you see that all are in the process of whether they have an election or leadership transition. And the transition process requires or demanded every government to want to have just a stable, a stability, not to have any other complexities in the future development. And for China, I think that will basically put into the issue whether they are in a choice that for Hu Jintao this. I look at this election as the relief. So I can safely step down since now will not be deteriorated when I step out of the office. Or this will increase the hawks within China. Demanded that the mind should pay back because all the good that we have been given to him in the previous four years. So it will be the debate between those two thinkings. And if that's something that's going to happen, I believe that window for this will be sometime before August. But after August, any major breakthrough in terms of political negotiation, dialogue and other things probably won't be able to happen due to the requirement for the sailing through safely in the future environment. And another thing is that that also has been related with what the Dr. Chu Sulong said in terms of the future negotiation. Because as Wang Yi, the Taiwan Affairs Director, once said that in the future negotiation will be Yizhong Younan and the Jingzhong Youzhen. That is there will be difficult issue within the easy issues. And there will be a political dimension within the economic negotiation. One other clear example is about the investment agreement treaty. That the environmental government that's been wanting to sign with China before this presidential election. But he did not. All right. And so I think that if issue like those will come in, it is not about the direct political negotiation. But the political contents have it issues within the economical, whatever other cultural and the social agreement they wanted to sign. That will study to occupy the agenda. And I think that will be a real test about how much of the so-called 92 consensus can carry through. So it is not about the 92 consensus with that we're able to negotiate without it. We won't be able to go forward. It is under this mind your government and with Hu Jintao facing those difficult issue. The already existing the 92 consensus would that be able to carry the very heavy burden for things meaningfully going forward. If it is not, for example, if there's a delayed or another very less than wanted the result in terms of investment protection agreement between Taiwan and China. How will that reflect to the people in Taiwan? How will that make the people in Taiwan feel about the cross-strait relationship will be going? So we actually we are going to enter the very uncharted water in the future. Now the finally about the global economic recession probably some people would like to say coming from the European debt crisis. Mass government during the election process during the campaign process once portrayed that it is because of European problem that we need China as a cushion for Taiwan's economic development. But we all know that the Chinese is relying on exploitation on the particular to the United States and Europe. So the Europe problem will become China's problem and when China faces problem, how will how it will react to Taiwan? Particularly the goodies that the mind your promise to Taiwan that in terms of equity in the future negotiations and that we're able to extract more goodies from China. Would China be able to deliver that? And if China won't be able to deliver that due to its domestic consideration. How would mind your be be able to say to the local Taiwanese community that the cross-strait negotiation or at least something that will be able to come forward? Because probably we are going to see is a complicated issues have political heavy contents and the progress. Whether that's with mind your or without mind your will be stalled or it be slow significantly due to a lot of other factors. And I think also with the already existing the so-called 92 mechanism where the SCF was not authorized to talk about political issues. And when we enter this political heavy negotiation, the already existing 92 mechanism that we have for the SCF would that be able to carry through? And that Taiwan at that time will be facing a very serious challenge that we probably need to reform the whole Liang An-Ren-Ming Guanxi Tiao-Li. That is the treaty article for the cross-strait people interchange. That is the article within Taiwan and how would that go with the today's reality? If that is the case, then with the stronger opposition in the later Yuan and with a discussion like those open. Probably we're going to face a very new and you can say prosperous but also fireworks about this because actually in the reality, 20 years past 1992. And we're still talking about 92 consensus to a certain extent this is we are in year 2012. So I think some improvement or at least some reform to reflect what is today that is needed. But with the mind shows, electoral victory and what he faced right now and also international situation, this moment, probably that will be complicated. If it is can be modeled through, that will be a very pleasant outcome. Thank you. Dr. Wang of Tom Kong University. Well, thank you. Thank you for the invitation, Richard and Bonnie. This is a little bit before Lunar New Year and I'm very happy to be back in Washington, DC. You know why? This is Richard you remember four years ago, three days after the election. I presented this slide four years ago and I say it won't be mama who who. Yeah, maintain a high altitude not to be disrupted by small events, pursue a peaceful environment. And I checked the list and I think pretty much, you know, excluding the economic, excluding the political and other sensitive security issues pretty much in the past four years. Those things have been carried out, not by Taiwan itself, but together between mainland China and Taiwan. And now let's go back to check, Ray, I promise that your picture is on. Let's look at the first term of Ma Yingzhou. Actually there was some misunderstanding of Taiwan's relations or Taiwan's rapprochement with China. Actually, Ma Yingzhou's guideline was Qingmei, He Zhongyuan Youru. And Qing does not equal to He. And I specifically put on the picture not only showing you how happy Ray was, but also to remind you that Ma Yingzhou when meeting with Ray had put a pin on the jacket. That's the flag of the my country and the United States. And that shows that sincerely that Taiwan when engaging dialogues, negotiations with Beijing did not put aside of the United States interest. And so was Ma too close to China? Who knows? You know, only Hu Jintao can answer that. And I'm sure his answer would be different from a lot of people. And Ma's second term China policy, we spent a lot of time debating and talk about 92 consensus. But we all agree that Taiwan voters in this election decided to maintain the stability to keep policy consistency in their mind. And if we look at the future agenda in the next four years, I would say that Xianjin, Hou Zhen or economy first and politics or political issues later will remain the dominating guideline in the next four years. Not only because that we have more than two dozens of potential agreements or proposed negotiations is already at the plate between Straits Exchange Foundation and the A-Rats on the other side. Connecting to the ECFA framework agreement. Our negotiation agenda is full and probably cannot be completed in the four years. But also as Professor Lai mentioned that Ma Yingzhou is now facing a stronger opposition in the parliament. So he needs to be more careful, more sensitive to the Taiwan public opinion. How about the political or military negotiations? It's unlikely because the political agenda is full. Not only Beijing as Professor Chu remind us that Beijing will be distracted by domestic issues. But also Taiwan is a small state. We need to manage our relationship with two nuclear powers. So before the agenda in Beijing and in the United States are settled that we need to be more cautious at least this year. So if I may use this timeline to make my point. Starting from yesterday that we will have a four month of transitional cabinet. We may have two full cabinet resignation between February and May. So in Taiwan itself as we all know we are all in capital city. When government in transition there are a lot of restrictions in terms of policy decisions. And then we have to wait until the agenda in Beijing and the US election to be settled. And looking into the future. The 2014 as many of my friends from DPP suggested that the rotation of government will be a normal practice in Taiwan. Because we are a democracy. And the major challenge to KMT rule is 2014 the mayoral elections. If DPP is not in the central government they will have full time. And they will have two full years to get themselves ready to challenge right now three to two very thin margin majority of KMT in the mayoral seats. And also after 2014 Ma Yingzhou has to be very sensitive to his possible successors and their possible campaign platform. And their probability of victory. So when engaging in China Ma cannot put full strength or his personal agenda or willingness ahead. But keep the KMT or the party interests or national interests in his mind. Beyond that also Ma needs to keep in mind is the strategic re-engagement of the United States. I characterize as a trident. It's a multiple multilateral diplomacy plus trade and a new concept of air sea battle. So it's political, diplomatic, economic and military. And so Ma Yingzhou's second term in terms of U.S. policy I would say it will focus more on bilateral relations. We talk about the beef vis-à-vis a program Tifa arm sales. They are all very very difficult issues. I think Ma Yingzhou and his cabinet will spend more energy and time in dealing with this bilateral relations with the United States. Not only that Ma Yingzhou has to position his U.S. policy with American Asian strategy in mind. So how to expand the functions and utilities of AQFA and working for bilateral or mutual commercial and economic interests between Taiwan and the United States is at stake. Earlier we also mentioned a little bit about Taiwan's defense transformation. Ma Yingzhou with his campaign pledge we will soon in state a all volunteer force program with almost no hope for increase of defense budget. With the United States re-engaging and redeployment of U.S. forces in the region. And keeping the problems in Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea in mind. So these are all very daunting challenges to the United States. Lastly I want to throw an idea. It's what I call mini-SNED. Don't be distracted by the term. I'm in no way to suggest that Taiwan will copy its strategic and economic dialogue with the United States. But I think the experience that we got, we accumulate in the past four years between Washington and Taipei was that we allowed us to be distracted or confused or conflicted. In different agencies on different issues. So it would be nice or wise that if we can have an interagency, you know, cabinet to cabinet at an appropriate level, a full cabinet dialogue in a quiet, sensible, substantial way. To increase and promote the bilateral relations between Washington and Taipei. So conclude my remarks I would say that in the next four years Taiwan's relations with China will go slow. And Taiwan's relations with the United States will get better. Thank you. Our concluding speaker is Ms. Glazer. Thank you, Cynthia, and thanks to all of you for coming to Richard for collaboration in this conference today. And especially to the staffs at both the CNAPS and the Freeman chair without whom this event would not be possible today. So first, what are the implications of this election for the United States? This was Taiwan's fifth direct presidential election. The campaigns and Election Day itself were well normal. Some observers said that there was less excitement than in prior elections and that the process was fairly ordinary in mundane. After all, there were no bullets and there was no firing of PRC missiles. The normalcy of this election marks a maturing of Taiwan's democracy and that is most important, not who was the winner. It was an orderly process in which the presidential candidates presented their views to Taiwan voters who made up their minds about whom to support. Taiwan has demonstrated the strength and vitality of its democracy. A healthy democracy requires a strong opposition and keen electoral competition. And Dr. Tsai Ing-wen brought her party from its nadir after Chen Shui-bian's presidency, won 46% of the vote and 40 seats in the legislative UN. She raised important issues such as the widening gap between rich and poor, and she conceded defeat gracefully. Opposition parties play a critically important role in democratic societies. They keep the ruling party honest and help to bring better governance. The DPP will continue to play that critically important role in Ma's second term. When Ma won in 2008, President Bush called Taiwan a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world. Although that language was not repeated by the Obama administration in its congratulatory message, it nevertheless remains true today. Taiwan especially represents a model for the people of mainland China to aspire to. Mainland Chinese tourists and students in Taiwan witnessed the campaign firsthand. Even larger numbers watched the presidential debates and the election results live via satellite TV. The election was the subject of postings in internet forums and on Chinese blogs. In years past, many mainlanders described Taiwan's election as chaotic and violent and viewed Taiwan's democracy as false or a negative model for China. This election has altered those views fundamentally. Many PRC citizens observe this election with respect and envy. One blogger wrote, and I quote, this is a first step in civil rights. This is a way we can learn how national leadership should be elected. Only when state leaders are elected via a democratic process can China become a democracy. Leaders produced via other methods are only dictators under a fake skin of democracy, end quote. Ma's reelection for a second term will ensure continued stability and predictability in cross-strait relations, which is critical for American interests. Ma has pledged to continue his three-nose policy, no unification, no independence, no use of force, and therefore the United States will not have to worry about the reemergence of cross-strait tensions or the implications of reunification. The U.S. will continue to support Ma's pragmatic approach to dealing with Beijing. There will not likely be pressure on Ma to move more slowly or more quickly into promoting better cross-strait relations. The U.S. will leave it up to Taiwan to decide. Washington will expect to be consulted as a friend and quasi ally with important interests at stake. U.S. policy toward Taiwan will likely continue to be guided by the view that only a secure and confident Taiwan will negotiate with Beijing. U.S. ties with Taiwan must therefore remain strong. In Ma's second term, whether President Obama remains in office or is replaced by a Republican, it is likely that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue. The question is, what will be sold? The Obama administration has approved $13 billion in weapons sales so far, but has yet to sell new weapons systems that were not previously approved by the Bush administration. President Ma's request to purchase F-16 CDs remains a front burner issue. Hopefully, Tifa talks will resume and the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship will be strengthened. The U.S. will be disadvantaged if it does not negotiate an FTA with Taiwan. Taipei is now in trade talks with Singapore, and New Zealand, India, Japan, Australia, and the European Union have all signaled a willingness to open bilateral trade negotiations. Let me turn to the implications of the election for U.S.-China relations and cross-strait relations. In the past few months, Beijing has not loudly opposed the many measures that the Obama administration took to bolster ties with Taiwan, including visits to the island by several senior U.S. officials. Undoubtedly, China's reserved response was due to its belief that such steps would help Ma to get re-elected, which was Beijing's preferred outcome. Now that the elections are over and Ma has won, China is likely to resume pressure on the U.S. to curtail weapon sales to Taiwan. China's hopes of achieving this goal have been buoyed by discussions in the U.S. to rethink U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Taiwan will therefore remain an area of friction in U.S.-China relations, how much friction will depend on U.S. policy decisions, and China's reaction to them. Ma's re-election presents opportunities for further progress in cross-strait relations, but problems are inevitable and should be anticipated. The mainland may be satisfied with the current agenda until after the 18th Party Congress, but subsequently greater impatience can be expected. Some on the mainland say that Ma's first term was waited in favor of concessions by Beijing to Taipei and called for the second term to be payback time, in which more benefits are accrued by the mainland. Whether this sentiment is translated into the mainland's policy approach to Taiwan remains to be seen, but it is worth watching. Beijing will conclude from Ma's victory that its policy of peaceful development has been a success. Discussion of the potential negative impact on whose legacy of the DPP win and resulting pressure on Chinese leaders to adopt a tougher policy toward Taiwan will now cease. With Ma winning by a bigger margin than expected, Beijing will become more confident in its efforts to win hearts and minds in Taiwan by means of economic favors. At the same time, however, the strong comeback by the DPP will ensure that mainland China will not be overconfident. Beijing will wisely not rule out a DPP victory in 2016, and hopefully over the course of the next four years, dialogue between the DPP and the mainland will expand. In the economic sphere, the easy things have been done between Taiwan and the mainland, and the more difficult things are yet to be addressed. Further trade liberalization under ECFA will be hard. Negotiation of a bilateral investment protection treaty will also be challenging. In the political realm, there is a possibility that Beijing will pressure Ma to adopt a definition of one China that is closer to the one China principle that is espoused by the mainland. China may also seek to persuade Ma to open talks on a peace accord, and this could become a major source of disagreement. The negative response of Taiwan's citizens to Ma's raising this issue during the campaign has likely made the president more cautious. Ma will undoubtedly continue to press Beijing to enable Taiwan to expand its international space and sign FTA-type agreements with other countries. He will also continue to call for a reduction in the military threat to Taiwan. In recent years, there has been little, if any, discussion on the mainland about adjusting its military deployments. I'm personally doubtful that mainland China will make any moves to do so, in part because the Chinese remain wary of the return to power by the DPP, now possibly in 2016. Military CBMs could be negotiated between the two sides of the strait. CBMs that reduced the possibility of a surprise attack, increased predictability, and reduced the chance of accidents would serve Taiwan's interests. A potential meeting between Ma and China's next top leader, Xi Jinping, could take place if Beijing supports Ma's attendance at APEC. It is not likely, in my view, that Ma will visit the mainland because Beijing would not agree to host him as the ROC's president. In some, the US-China-Taiwan triangular relationship can be expected to remain basically stable. Problems will invariably arise in all three sets of relationships, but are likely to be manageable. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank each of the panelists for remaining true to the time, and I'd like to open up. We have 25 minutes, roughly, for questions. Please give your identification and be as succinct as possible. Wait for the microphone, Chris. Oh, there we go. Thanks. Chris Nelson, Nelson Report. Thank you so much, all of you, for talking about the economic opponent so much. It's the other thing I try to write about, especially on TPP. I'd like to ask all of the participants, and perhaps even Ray Berghardt, who's trying very carefully not to look at me. Is it realistic to talk about Taiwan and TPP from a number of vantage points? China, at the moment, at least, seems to see TPP as yet another element of what it sees as a US containment policy. Does that in itself make TPP sort of a hot thing to even talk about that they're going to see that as a problem? Or would it be unrealistic to say no? Actually, to get the US and Taiwan talking about how Taiwan might get into TPP could help show the Chinese, given ECFA, that TPP is not aimed at China or against China, but it's something that China could also look at. And then from either or possibility, again, and maybe this is where Ray can help us out, what does need to be done so that it would be realistic to talk about Taiwan joining into TPP? Or is that just one of those things that we'd all like to talk about, but no way? Thank you. I'll just comment very briefly. Chris, I think that perhaps we need to make a distinction in this case between how scholars on mainland China view TPP and how the Chinese government view this, particularly regarding the intentions of US policy. I think that US officials at the White House have made perfectly clear that TPP is not intended to exclude anybody, that it is open to all countries and I believe to all economies. I think that is a signal to Taiwan as well. I believe it was Michael Froman at the White House who made the statement that TPP is not something that you get invited to. It is something you aspire to join. And I believe that in private discussions, this is likely to be reinforced in messages to China. It would undoubtedly be beneficial to the United States, to Taiwan, to the rest of the region if China actually were to join TPP and conform to all of the high standards that are involved in this, that will be included in the FTA agreement eventually. Having China not be part of the TPP in the long run, I really don't think would be beneficial. So I agree with you that there might be some scholars who see it that way. But I don't think that that's the way the Chinese government sees it. Thank you. Quick response, Chris. I think from the standpoint of Taiwan. You know, Taiwan has long feared that it will be marginalized economically. And ACFA was one approach or one solution. But joining the TPP is a long-term goal, as President Ma enjoying his press statement said that in the next 10 years we will try to work hard to meet the high criteria that TPP requires. But all these efforts, point number one is to put Taiwan or help Taiwan to escape from this possible economic marginalization. Number two, I think the biggest obstacle, if we sit in Taipei, the biggest obstacle is not Beijing. It's our domestic support. You know, the leadership, or President Ma and Joe in the next several years, will have to engage in conversation and discussions, not only with the oppositions, but also with different sectors, the agricultural, the service industry, the manufacturer. It's a daunting obstacle for Taiwan to meet the criteria before we think of whether we wanted to join something that opposed China or antagonized China. I agree with Bonnie that there are different views in China about the TPP. Yes, if you read the global time of some scholars, they tend to interpret everything the U.S. does in Asia to contain China, including TPP. The official and the mainstream scholarship will, including my will, basically see TPP as a competition that the U.S. has with China, not a containment, a competition for interest, for influence, for ties in Asia-Pacific. I see that so far most Chinese do not worry too much about TPP. First, it's going to be a long-term process for Ngozi Asia. Second, as Dr. Huang said, the criteria is too high even for Japan to meet. Third, I think most Chinese tend to have confidence that nothing is going to likely to replace that we are the largest trade partner on the market for most Asian economics, whether there is a TPP or not in the future. Yes, it seems everybody is responding, so I have to do the work. Basically, from adding to what Alexander's point, I think Taiwan signed the ECFA with China. If China rejected Taiwan to participate in TPP negotiation, showing anything like this, that will be demonstrating to Taiwan that China only allowed Taiwan to be an economic part of China, but not to let Taiwan engage with the rest of the real economy. That would be not good, not only to the people in Taiwan, but also it would reduce the support for Ma Ying-jeou in terms of his popularity in Taiwan. Another point about the complexity or the difficulty in the TPP negotiation, you look at the Taiwan economic negotiation with New Zealand, with the Singapore oil, that probably will be a little bit easier, but with India, that's going to be a difficult one. Because India specifically raised that it is not just about the goods, but also the movement of people and other, it had to be comprehensive. So the TPP negotiation in Taiwan encounter difficulty will also be the one that Taiwan encounter difficulty in negotiation with India and other countries. And I think that is not whether Taiwan is ready or not, but it's a political will. And if Taiwan, we really like to push over. In particularly that the TPP already bringing its support for the TPP. So I do not think that in this issue, the difficulty is really that big, because that is the one that really has endured the so called Taiwan consensus. Thank you. Ray Burkart, would you like to comment? I don't want Chris to think I'm ducking him. People have said it all. TPP is a serious, broad, deep trade agreement, very unlike the kind of trade agreements that have been signed recently within Asia, particularly very unlike the China-Ocean agreement, also very unlike ECFA. It's not one of these sort of, in other words, it's not one of these half baked, early harvest kind of trade agreements. It's a serious agreement that gets into service areas, the whole board range. The Taiwan economy, Taiwan has been fairly protectionist. It remains very protectionist. It's not Taiwan officials that made public, made clear publicly and privately that Taiwan is not ready for a TPP kind of agreement. But for Taiwan to aspire to it, and to move in that direction, would be certainly very welcome by the United States. And the same thing can be said about China. One of the clear things about TPP was very much emphasized during the APEC meetings in November, is that one of the aims of TPP, at least from the United States point of view, is to have a trade agreement which does not give state-owned enterprises special rights, and which basically forces state-owned enterprises to compete on equal terms with private companies. That's going to be very tough for Vietnam in terms of TPP negotiations. It would be really tough for China. Almost unimaginable, frankly, at this point. Eric. I'm David in the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Alex, I liked your strategic trident for all sorts of reasons. But you mentioned TPP. When you said the multilateral diplomacy, what countries were you primarily talking about in the multilateral there? And I missed the third prong of the trident, so remind me of that. Dr. Lai, the residual tension over the Chen Shui-Bian era for the DPP and the U.S. considered a significant factor in this election, and is the DPP going to continue to do things to try to build a better relationship with the U.S. government while it's not in power? Very shortly. When I make the case of strategic trident, basically I look at the three elements that in the past two or three years that the United States has been done. The multilateral diplomacy means the more proactive participation of the United States in Asia-Pacific regional fora, you know, from Secretary Clinton's efforts, from APEC, from ARF, and East Asia Summit, all the way to even initiative to the Pacific Islands. I mean, I categorize those as the multilateral diplomacy. And the third element was air-sea battle concept. So it's a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military re-engagement of the United States in the region. Actually, I don't quite understand this question. I think it is the tension between DPP and the U.S. government during the Central Vietnam era. How will DPP be able to re-address that in particular right now? And I think if you look at the time when her leadership during those four years, that she particularly does not want to put the so-called the identity issue and unification versus the independence issue upfront. And I think it is important to note that from the campaign, I mean, this is way before when she entered the primary within DPP all the way until today, I believe, that in the campaign process she refused to call China by name. She never made any best statements referring to China. It's always something that we can discuss, and she even offered that we are willing to talk about any things with no precondition, which means that Taiwan will not attach any condition China has to abide by. And if I'm going to be more specific, China does not even have to withdraw these missiles. China does not have to renounce its so-called one China principle. And China does not have to do anything. We are willing to talk anytime, anyplace, anywhere. So that is what your time when actually pledged. And if you look at the 10-year platform that is still in the DPP's part of Tsai Ing-wen's process, one of the 10-year platform in the so-called core idea in which that is the article about how to reach the social consensus within a democracy. And if you look at that, there are distinct, in terms of language differences, with what the Taiwan future resolution is. There's a resolution about Taiwan's future in 1999 which talks about Taiwan's current name. So the current name is Republic of China. But in Tsai Ing-wen's, that is Taiwan is Republic of China. So that's one of the first differences. And second difference is that the name changes in the Taiwan resolution or any other change of this status quo has to be confronted with referendum process. But in this 10-year platform, particularly in that part, that particularly set user language that democratic process. So it dropped the word about referendum and using democratic process instead. So all those are just signified, the kind of the changes and also sensitivity that she had in terms of lowering down the possible tension across the street. But unfortunately, that when Tsai mentioned those things and when Tsai made those gestures, she was met by the, particularly later on, the Chinese official calling her by name and taking her position that Taiwan's ROCS, that's a disguised Taiwan independence strategy. Or calling Tsai Ing-wen by name that she is actually trying to prevent the three links by adopting the so-called ministry links, which I think that's unfortunate. Because the transformation process within DP also that has been symbolized by Tsai during this time is that if you have positive gestures, whether by the United States or by China, then the kind of transformation within DP will be much easier. So that's, and then we are left with this, that when the Tsai is about to resign from leadership, how the tenure platform, will that just cease to exist because she resigned from the leadership or they will continue to stay there. So that's going to be another question. Thank you. The gentleman at the third table back on the left, from on my left. Hi, my name is Raymond and I'm from the Carnegie Endowment. It seems to me that the midterm prognosis seems to be cautiously optimistic, but a lot of that is obviously contingent on Ma having won the election. I was just wondering if we could explore a little more the possibility of not so much a DPP victory, but necessarily a DPP communication with the Communist Party or the Chinese government. Specifically, it seems that from the perspective of a lot of DPP folks, including the perspective we just heard, that DPP has gone through a very intense process of transformation and it's moderated itself, but still China is deeply suspicious from its perspective of what the DPP's actual goals are and what its agenda is. So in that light, do you see it necessary for the DPP to go through an even more significant and painful process of renewal to moderate its demands, to come closer to a different understanding of sovereignty? What is the likelihood of that actually happening? And if that process were to fail, what would the implications for Taiwan's democracy, for cross-strait rapprochement be? Thanks. The DPP-CCP dialogue, I think that has happened particularly last year, later have last year, that has gone to several degrees of intensity. That is, we know that the DPP New Frontier Foundation, one of the deputy director for the international affairs, he went over to Shanghai on November along with another person for some discussions. I'm not going to reveal why the content discussion, because I don't know. We have also engaged in several content with not just a scholar, but also with officials. But unfortunately, some of the report that we reported back and in the Chinese public statement are demonstrating two very different themes, that the possibility about the 92 consensus, in which when we look at it, the DPP's position has moderated to a certain degree that even the DPP position on 92 consensus that 92 really happened something. So we are willing to talk based on what the result of the 92 negotiation. But the second fact about the 92 consensus is that the Chinese position of one China principle is not probably endorsed by the KMT. But also KMT position about one China different interpretation is also not accepted by China. And the third point is that about the facts, the 92 consensus from 1993 all the way to 1998 that despite the Chinese repeated refusal and the denial about the one China different interpretation, in 1998 both sides are still able to get going for the second Gu Wang negotiation, the Gu Wang talk. And from year 2000 all the way to year 2008, with the pragmatism there, this under DPP's rule that both sides are still able to finalize the three links, first from the ministry links and then to the air transportation links on the festivity, charter flight and all those things. So the issue is that on DPP's position that is that the non-acceptance about the so-called 92 consensus is based on what is actually there. But the DPP was believing when DPP was looking at the Hu Jintao's three opinions regarding the 92 consensus, they found tremendous amount of similarity. They actually can engage upon. So those are the issue because I'm just taking this occasion to talk about the one part of the examples about how the difference between both sides in terms of 90 consensus. But I think DPP to a certain extent misjudged about how the 92 consensus and all those particularly signified to Hu Jintao himself because it seemed that Hu Jintao, he is the one that personally take these things and take the political risk within his body to really going forward in order to, in his management about the Taiwan issue. And rejecting this, sort of like put a public slap in his face that the Hu Jintao would never accept. And I think that kind of the underestimate about the how this personally mean to Hu Jintao is some of the lessons that DPP needs to learn. But how would that mean to Xi Jinping and others? I think that would be the open things. Thank you. Thank you. Dong Huiyu with the China Review News Agency. My question is for Mr. Chu Shulong. And I remember you wrote an article in Global Times a couple years ago arguing that China doesn't need to focus too much on U.S.-China relations or take the U.S.-China relations too seriously. And how would you view the U.S. federal in a further cross-trade negotiation regarding the political and security issue? And this question also for Mrs. Bonny. And you mentioned that the U.S. won't push the developments of cross relations faster or slower. Do you think the U.S. would be really happy to see a closer cross-trade tie? And also what the possibility of reaching the peace accords although the opportunity would be very small? What role the U.S. will play in this process? Thank you. My argument from then until today is basically you look at the national ground strategy upon real China or argue China become much more internal oriented. I think like the general trend in whole China and let China be continued. I think like China is good for Chinese from policy, from release. But that does not mean U.S. is no longer important to China including Taiwan's regional relations. I should say in the past 10, more than 10 years including Bush eight years, Obama near four years U.S. has played a very positive, stabilized role in cross-Taiwan regional relations. I think the relatively peace stability cross-Taiwan through recent years has a lot of contribution from the U.S. side. Will the United States be happy to see improved cross-trade relations? Absolutely. I think that has been quite clearly stated by this administration and also by George W. Bush administration. Many people in China seem to not want to believe this. I was listening to a CCTV interview with a Chinese scholar the other day after the elections and he predicted the United States is going to ensure that it slows down the progress in cross-trade relations. I really think this is nonsense. The United States has repeatedly said that what we care about is the process. We want differences solved peacefully and without any coercion or an undue pressure by the mainland on Taiwan. It is the people on Taiwan that should have a say in the outcome. I see absolutely no concerns that the U.S. has about improved cross-trade relations. I don't think privately or publicly that we have conveyed any concerns to Ma Ying-jeo about his policies. But if anybody here from the U.S. government, there are several of you, want to disagree with that, feel free. What is the U.S. role in a peace accord? I would say none. Unless Taiwan and mainland China want the United States to play some role. I don't believe that you will see any active effort by the administration to encourage or discourage such talks. If that's something that Taiwan and the mainland agree that they want to talk about, I think we will certainly be supportive. I think that Taiwan probably would like the United States to play some role, for example, in a I've talked with people in Taiwan about confidence-building measures in the military sphere. Many people have said they would like the U.S. to play a role of guarantor. Again, unless it's something that the mainland wants, I think that the United States would not do that, though it might be important for a third country or several countries to play that role. Thank you. We have reached the end of our appointed time. I'd like to ask you to join me in giving this panel a round of applause. And let us turn it over to our conveners for any final comments. Well, I just want to thank you all for coming. Very much appreciate the interest and your questions and your engagement on this issue. We will continue to hold events in the future and publish in the future. We will have this event on our respective websites, both Brookings and CSIS, and we will also be posting with the agreement of the speakers today either the text of their presentations or the PowerPoints. Thank you very much.