 Good morning, everybody. Welcome. We're delighted to have you here and I want to say a special thanks and welcome to Chairman McCall, where we've had the privilege of working with him for, well, probably 10 years, especially on cyber issues. We've always appreciated his strong leadership on those at a time when not a lot of people were paying attention and was really welcome to have that and we're very delighted to have him here. This is a time, I think, where we should be pausing a bit and thinking about how well-organized are we now for Homeland Security? I mean, we're having a change in secretaries and we really ought to pause and reflect, probably ask some big questions about what we're doing. You know, does it make sense to have the Secret Service inside the Department of Homeland Security? I mean, it has such a focused mission, it's hard to get a coherent department when you have things like that that are off on the side. You know, does it make sense for FEMA to be inside the Department of Homeland Security? It's not that you don't need FEMA, we need a FEMA. When we have a natural disaster, you know, FEMA is going to be working directly with the President, you know, and the Secretary is kind of in the way. You know, so what's that right organization? Cyber. I mean, German McCall has done more thinking about this than anyone. But, you know, what is cyber? Is it Homeland Security? Is it war? Is it espionage? What is it? And how do we organize ourselves for it? You know, these are big, important questions. And this is a time when we should pause, we should ask ourselves where these things are best structured and how best to organize ourselves. We shouldn't be locked in. We, you know, we do have a committee on Homeland Security, but I think that there are an awful lot of subcommittees that still claim jurisdiction and still make people come up and do lots of extra testimony. I mean, most Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries spend half of their days just going up meeting with all the committees that claim oversight. You know, this just, you know, we've got to get, we should be really looking at this. We finally have got the core of what I think is solid oversight, yet there's still a fractured landscape, German. And, you know, this is why it's so important to have, I think, your leadership at this time. We really should, we not should not be bound by just by how we got here, but we ought to be thinking freshly about where we want to go. And I think this is a unique opportunity. The start of what I hope is a series where we'll look freshly and honestly at this and we'll do this on a bipartisan basis because we're going to have to get this, try to get more uniform across the Congress. And this is going to be the launch. And so I'm delighted that Chairman McCall is here today and he's going to be leading off this conversation. And I hope we have many more with all of you. And I want to say thank you for coming. But with your applause, would you please welcome Chairman Michael McCall. We're delighted to have you. Well, thank you, Doctor. And it was nice to visit with Jim Lewis as well. And if he's here today, he's hiding in the back. He and I worked, it's kind of like coming home with CSIS. We worked for quite some time on the CSIS cyber recommendations to the 44th president. And of course the Congress is now dealing with this issue, as is my committee. And also the Iraq Steady Group. I remember flying out, I live in Austin, but I was flying out of Houston and a guy named James Baker was sitting next to me and said, what are you doing going back to Washington? And he said, you know, I'm starting this thing called the Iraq Steady Group. And I'd like for you to be a part of that. And CSIS was a real leader with that. And so I think we made some good recommendations to the President Bush that many of which were adopted. And I think we, you know, effectuate some good policy at the end of the day. What I wanted to focus on and, you know, the introduction talks a lot about dysfunctionality within the Department of Homeland Security. I could talk to you for two hours about that. But what I wanted to focus on is something that's really important to my mind as a former counterterrorism prosecutor. And that is, what are we doing? What is our policy when it comes to a counterterrorism strategy? You know, a little over a decade ago, Americans came to know their new reality. And no longer were only foreign dictators or rogue regimes threatening our security interests, but instead an anti-American fervor was spreading within a group of mobile, deadly extremists. Americans have adjusted to that reality. And they understand that the enemy camp is not headquartered in Berlin or Hanoi, but it's a transnational terrorist coalition that seeks to inspire others all over the world to commit horrific acts against civilians on our shores and abroad. This enemy has required the American government to change the way it looks at Homeland Security. Terrorism and war itself. It has required us all to adapt, to engage, and to persevere. Just a few months ago, President Obama challenged the notion of this conflict continuing by saying, this war, like all wars, must end. That's what history advises. That's what our democracy demands. And to be honest, I watched the president deliver this speech in his emphatic words unilaterally declaring that the war on terrorism is winding down, that al-Qaeda is defeated, and now we can return to a pre-911 mindset with a law enforcement approach to defeating terrorism. Again, as a former federal prosecutor and a person who receives intelligence threat briefings on a very frequent basis on the terrorism threat for years, his rhetoric was both unreflective of the current threat and I believe out of touch with his administration's current actions. Indeed, I heard retreat after retreat and a nebulous explanation for the way forward. I wanted to hear the administration's policy, but that policy never came. Proclaiming the war is over is a popular thing to do politically. I think that's very obvious. However, misleading the American people with a false narrative does them a great disservice. And the reality is that the threats we faced on September the 10th exist today, and they have changed and grown more threatening in many respects. Al-Qaeda is certainly more decentralized, geographically dispersed, and has utilized technology to recruit and expand its influence. In short, the battlefield is now everywhere. The President likes to deliver speeches. What he may not realize is that his words have a practical application and the administration's narrative that the threat is diminishing in my judgment is a dangerous one. Publicly downgrading the real threat, which is growing, only boldens our enemies and sends a signal that we lack resolve. Perhaps even more importantly, this rhetoric has a tangible effect not only on our troops, but on the intelligence officials in the field. It affects their morale and their belief in government's backing. Rhetoric has a ripple effect, and it impacts the efficacy of our counter-terrorism efforts. Words do matter, and I believe the President should be more careful with them. My goal today is to examine where rhetoric and reality meet. What counter-terrorism steps is the President actually taking? What does he mean when he says he looks forward to engaging Congress to refine and ultimately repeal the authorization for use of military force mandate? What does he mean when he speaks of the need to close Guantanamo Bay, but does not give a roadmap for doing so? After the President outlined how we cannot prosecute many DNATs because we cannot use the evidence against them, he simply says that once we commit to the process of closing Guantanamo Bay, I am confident this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law. But what does the President's confidence mean? What does the President, you know, what the President does not seem to realize is that his rhetorical statements do not constitute a counter-terrorism policy. The day after this speech was given, drone strikes continued, the legal framework for transferring prisoners was not developed, and terrorists abroad did not give up their fight. And as much as we despise terrorism, we want to see it go away, words cannot simply wish it away. We need a multi-layered long-term counter-terrorism strategy. Today we are no more clear on the President's policy, and that lack of clarity isn't just confusing, it's dangerous. I want to talk a little bit about what I call the narrative. The administration's narrative has several premises. The first is that returning to a pre-911 law enforcement-centric counter-terrorism posture is an option in 2013. President Obama frequently compared the threat to us today to those before 9-11, saying in his speech at the National Defense University that as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9-11. Pre-911 mentality, this position directly contradicts reality and the threat briefings that I receive. The landscape is very different now, and Al Qaeda franchises growing in safe havens like Libya and Mali, Syria, Northern Africa posing even more dynamic threat to our security. Al Qaeda is a global threat, continues to be with a global ambition. And the idea of going back in time when we discounted the precursors to a large-scale attack such as the 93 World Trade Center bombing, the USS Cole and other attacks on our embassies in Northern Africa will leave us more vulnerable today than we were a decade ago. This administration has labeled the Fort Hood Massacre in my home state as a workplace violence. Explain Benghazi away with a protest to a video as opposed to a coordinated Al Qaeda-driven attack. And remove words like violent extremists, violent Islamists from their vernacular. It has downplayed the role of Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, even after the deadly bombing attack in Argentina at the Jewish Community Center and even after the most recent assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador. With each attack, the administration appears to distance itself from who's behind it. And one must ask themselves why they would go to such lengths to avoid calling the threat what it is. I see several explanations. The administration may think that by taking the war on terror and radical Islam out of the conversation, it will help end the conflict. But in reality, you cannot defeat an enemy you're unwilling to define. Dictators and terrorists will never be appeased by mere rhetoric. In fact, they will be emboldened by our softening. The softening of our language because they see it as a sign of weakness. Ultimately, the dramatic departure in lexicon, I believe, serves to bolster the present's desire, legacy as a peacemaker ending Bush's wars. The narrative of going back to a pre-911 mindset is ultimately dangerous for one reason. It didn't work. Viewing terrorism as an investigation by law enforcement after the fact instead of a preemptive, coordinated effort by the intelligence community and our military didn't work to prevent 9-11. We need a multifaceted approach to be successful in preventing large-scale attacks on the homeland from overseas. In addition to a coordinated counter-terrorism approach to combat terrorist attacks on our soil that stem from conflicts overseas, such as Fort Hood and in Boston. Changing the definition to Sculpt One's legacy does not protect America. It doesn't secure our interest and in fact opens up for additional terrorist attacks. Our enemies have a say in when this war is over and they have not given up the request for a global caliphate. Great leaders do not tell their constituency what they want to hear. They tell them what they need to know. And the American people deserve to make informed decisions and they do not deserve to have the real threats against them obscured or our real efforts to combat them diminished. The president has not given the American people enough credit. They are strong and they deserve to know the truth. Now, more than ever, we need that kind of leadership. So what is the policy? Well, just weeks after President Obama attempted to define his counter-terrorism policies, he conducted deadly drone strikes in Pakistan. And the timing of this is telling. It is clear that the administration is not drawing down its campaign, but is instead transitioning to a covert war. What the president is doing is trying to have it both ways. The administration is telling the American people that the war, the struggle is over. And he is the one who brought it to an end, while at the same time fighting this enemy through different means. For example, the president has discussed more robust vetting for drone use, but all the while has increased their use without changing the status quo. Make no mistake, I believe the president must have the authority to conduct targeted drone strikes, as well as other tactics abroad against al-Qaeda and associated forces. And these strikes have decimated high-valued targets. However, the president's use of this campaign undercuts his argument that core al-Qaeda has been decimated. The concept of core al-Qaeda is, in my opinion, a false construct. Al-Qaeda is an ideology. It's an ideology that cannot be taken out by drone strikes alone. The inconsistencies found in these pronouncements versus the actions that followed have left Americans with a nebulous understanding of both the threat and what is being done to counter it. Failed diplomacy in Egypt, an inconsistent red-line policy in Syria, threatening to leave Afghanistan prematurely, and an absence of direction in Iraq has left us where we are today. In an increasingly unstable environment with an administration intent on leading from behind on all fronts. Diplomacy. I'd like to talk more about diplomacy. It's something that the president likes to talk about. The president speaks frequently about the importance of diplomacy. But when opportunities for diplomatic leadership present themselves, the president is visibly absent. This administration has followed the wait-and-see diplomacy mantra recently demonstrated in Egypt and in Syria that translates to watching governments to do as they please until there are few diplomatic options left that can help. Past opportunities for American leadership and influence have been wasted, including the failure to bolster the cries for democracy from Iranian citizens during the 2009 elections with public, vocal support. Concerted efforts to negotiate directly have also proven unsuccessful. Recently, the White House had a tense diplomatic exchange with Afghan president Karzai when Karzai called the president to the task on the administration's attempt to meet with the Taliban without including the Afghan government. This diplomatic failure was a huge setback in our efforts to work with Karzai and the Afghan people who was a difficult but necessary partner in our effort to secure Afghanistan. Moreover, the administration's response of floating the idea of a zero option is even more troubling because it points to a frustrated, unplanned exit instead of a responsible, continued strategy. Egypt. When President Obama took office in 2009, he made one of his first trips to Egypt to talk about a new beginning. And in this speech, he spoke about democracy among other topics and how the U.S. and the Muslim world were going to start over again. Upon returning from his trip, the president started work on his 2010 budget and gave the Egyptian people a new beginning by dramatically reducing support for democracy promotion programs that could have helped stabilize the region. The same audience he promised a new respectful relationship with, the same group he promised American leadership for democracy to, saw the president's policy of contradictions play out in front of them. Ironically, these cuts made Egypt the least funded country in the Middle East in terms of democratic programs. And the Arab Spring came and Egypt fell into political and economic chaos. The country didn't have the tools needed for the leadership transition. And it became clear that the democracy and friendship the president touted in 2009 was nothing more than hollow rhetoric. Ultimately, the damaging of this relationship is significant because we cannot put at risk the stability that Egypt provides in the region, which include the enforcement of long-standing peace agreements, most importantly those brokered by the Camp David Accords. The second time since the Arab Spring that Egypt faced political uncertainty just recently, the administration again was visibly absent. Choosing to analyze the situation instead of taking a position in order to promote stability. The White House's refusal to act will not help deter the chaos in Cairo. Its wait-and-see policy of diplomacy has been backfired and made us both an unreliable partner and diminished our ability to shape the future of one of our most important allies in the region. And then we turn to Syria. Syria has cascaded into a sectarian proxy war, but this did not happen overnight. And it is a case study in the ramifications of inaction. In two short years Syria has become the centerpiece of Al Qaeda's training strategy and one of the greatest threats to our homeland. The administration saw the bloodshed and waited. They read the reports of chemical weapons being used and yet the president stalled again. They talked about red lines and when those lines were crossed they waited. The bottom line is they waited too long. Ally after ally including France, the UK, and countries throughout the Middle East asked for America to lead, to lead a willing coalition to stop the bloodshed and chemical weapons in Syria. And yet the president waited. And as accounts are coming in today from both US forces monitoring the Civil War to our close allies in the region that have been feeling the negative effects of weight and sea policy, the Civil War is moving toward a more unsalvageable outcome, an outcome which will negatively affect US national security and the security of our closest Middle Eastern ally Israel. President Obama has waited so long to get involved that any help given to the Syrian rebels is now fraught with peril. The once identifiable forces of moderation are now camouflaged and have been infiltrated with jihadists from all over the world. And now we are faced with a hotbed of instability in which anti-American radicalism is festering with no simple solutions. As I mentioned chemical weapons have been used. These weapons are unsecure and now pose increased risk to the United States and our allies. The greatest risk however comes from the reality that Syria has now become the Mecca for jihadists around the world. Those secular forces that once could have been bolstered by this administration have been left to fend for themselves and today their influence is undermined by various terrorist groups currently fighting in Syria. Where there was once a choice to positively influence the outcome of the Syrian Civil War today there are really no good options, no good options for resolving this conflict. And when it comes to Afghanistan and Iraq I want to talk about the place where we've been involved directly for quite some time. I want to commend our soldiers who have made a great gains in Afghanistan and let them know that we're proud of them. We're thinking about them supporting and praying for their success. And I want them to know that we are behind them now more than ever. Starting the job is often more simple than finishing it. I also want to tell them that we're not going to withdraw prematurely and undermine their efforts. I want to tell the Afghan people that we have fought for and beside and that we will not abandon them. And I want to tell this administration that their failed diplomacy will not and cannot be allowed to endanger our future Afghanistan and that this zero option floated out there is not only counterproductive, it is dangerous. While men and women should come home as soon as possible and I believe the American people want that the president has given our enemies in Afghanistan a timetable for withdrawal and doing so he's told the Taliban when to seek retribution. Just yesterday the Pentagon reported to Congress that Afghanistan will need substantial long-term military support for the Afghans to hold off the Taliban insurgency. We know the danger in leaving Afghanistan unattended. We have seen it before when the Soviets pulled out and our covert operations ended. The unforgiving landscape of Afghanistan became a safe haven for Taliban-supported al-Qaeda terrorists. And if we fail to leave a force capable of conducting counterterrorism operations in cooperation with our Afghan partners, al-Qaeda will return and we will be back where we were before 9-11. The residual effects of withdrawal without a counterterrorism footprint moving forward can be seen today in Iraq where increased sectarian violence spilling over from Syria and the growth of al-Qaeda affiliates has led to instability and increased militancy and while the Bush administration negotiated a status of forces agreement when it expired the Obama administration failed to do so abandoning them with no stabilization assistance or advisors for securing their democracy moving forward. The recent Abu Ghraib prison jailbreak last week is the latest example of instability that directly affects the homeland and illustrates the growing level of operational sophistication of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Among the hundreds who escaped last week were top al-Qaeda leaders, a catastrophe reminiscent of the Yemeni prison break which led to the formation of AQAP, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. That franchise sent the underwear bomber to Detroit. All this comes as the president fights to close Guantanamo and send these inmates back to prisons overseas. These prisons, particularly ones that were raided this week in Pakistan and Libya demonstrate that our counterterrorism partners are still grossly ill-equipped to deal with holding militant prisoners. These criminals not only emerged from prison with a vast network of jihadists surrounding safe havens throughout the region but also with a vengeance to continue plotting attacks. The president either through his hubris or inability to make decisions has put America and Afghanistan's future in jeopardy. Threatening to pull out of Afghanistan early will not support the objective of a safe America. It will take us back to 1989 when the complete retreat of forces resulted in a safe haven exploited by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Merely floating the idea of a zero option is destructive to our security mission there and poison us to our diplomatic mission not only in Afghanistan but all around the world. And how we exit these theaters of war will create a ripple effect that will wash up on our shores. This is about more than protecting the president's legacy as someone who ended the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is about making sure that what our soldiers fought for and died for persists and that the gains they brokered are not lost. I understand Americans are tired. Our fight against terrorism has taken a toll on all of us. Individuals as families as a nation. I read the reports and I've traveled to the battlefield sites. I want to talk about someone I met who knows the price of this fight more personally. When I was in Afghanistan in an army hospital I stood by the bed of a young man who was bandaged and bruised. But he was not broken. Just days before he lost his leg to a roadside bomb attack. We talked about a lot of things. And I left. He left me with a request. He asked me if he could go back. He knew the job wasn't done and he wasn't going to go home until it was. That soldier in that sentiment is why I know we will persevere. And I heard that countless times from many of the soldiers I met over there. We cannot let fatigue undermine our mission. The fight against terrorism will change. It already has. Many of our men and women have come home. And many more will soon. But terrorism is an enemy unlike any traditional military opponent. Our leadership in the international fight against terror and our multi-pronged approach to it must be maintained. And anyone who thinks that Al Qaeda and its worldwide affiliates will back down is wrong. So in conclusion. Great leaders are the ones who step up and convince nations of why and how they must tackle hard and even devastating realities. One cannot lead if they refuse to accept reality. Months ago we were hit by another terrorist attack in Boston. Men who followed the words of radical imams and Al Qaeda terrorists overseas built a bomb that mirrored those used by the Taliban in Pakistan to murder and maim innocent Americans. The administration would like for you to believe this was coincidence or perhaps an isolated event. But it was not. What happened in Boston and Fort Hood are not isolated events but are tied to a greater movement that we must face today. Terrorism and our fight against it is our reality. That being said we have the technology and intellectual and tactical tools to confront it. Fighting terrorism today at the most simplistic level needs a cohesive international and national strategy. We cannot afford to go back to a pre-911 strategy of seeing terrorism as a domestic law enforcement only issue. But we can't proceed with just a military strategy either. Nor can we refrain from using words to describe the issue at hand such as terrorism and Islamic extremism and radical Islam. We must call it for what it is and use every tool at our disposal to fight it. Finally we must proceed boldly not apologetically. We must make decisions based on the realities of a lengthy struggle not the desire for it to end. We must lead this nation honestly knowing full well the challenges ahead. That is what our democracy demands and that is what the American people deserve. Thank you so much for having me. Thank you very much sir. By way of introduction my name is Stephanie Costa. I'm the acting director of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism program. And it is my honor and privilege to moderate today's discussion. Now the chairman has to leave a little bit earlier than expected due to the vagaries of the hill and the vote schedule. But we'll try to get in as many questions as possible. Rob did people get cards to write questions on? What we'll do is we'll collect the cards as I ask the first question and give chairman McCall an opportunity to respond. And then because we find this way with cards is actually the easiest way to get as many questions asked as possible in a short amount of time. So sir I noted with appreciation that you talked about having a multifaceted approach and you talked about the importance of consistency between both rhetoric and policy. Looking back over the last 12 years since September 11th 2001 could you highlight what you would consider successful counterterrorism initiatives? What made them successful? Well I think what we've done both from a military standpoint taking the fight to the terrorists I think from a covert standpoint our intelligence community focused on the issue knowing they had full support of the president. Knowing our enemies knowing what our policy was it was coherent. Had a tremendous impact in terms of stopping and certainly when you talk about the Pakistan-Afghanistan area the successes we've had in dealing with the Taliban, the Pakistan, the Haqqani network and Pakistan for instance. But I think on the homeland front I think the Joint Terrorism Task Forces have worked really well. That's why you have not seen a large scale attack like 9-11. Now we did have Boston and we had Fort Hood and I would argue that was a breakdown within the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The idea that 12 years later we still can't share, connect the dots and share information. Fort Hood they had the dots they just didn't share it. The FBI had it in San Diego on a FISA, didn't share it when he was talking to Milwaukee. They don't share that with Fort Hood that could have prevented the killing of 13 soldiers. And I think with respect to Boston, the Boston police who know the streets better than anybody were totally cut out of the process within the task force. And they have four police officers on that task force. The customs knew a flag that he was going to travel back to Dagestan as the Russians warned about. And yet the FBI claims they didn't know anything about that. And now today the FBI will not cooperate with this committee's investigation on the Hill as well. So while we have made great progress I think there's a lot more to be done. And one final thing I think where we have failed I think is the fact that, I've always said the moderate Muslim is the most effective weapon we have against the radical Jihadist. And while I know there have been attempts to engage with the moderate Muslims, particularly countries like Jordan, I think the Saudis can be helpful even though they got the Wahhabi problem there. But I think the more we can engage the moderate Muslim to speak out against the very radicals perverting their religion, long term that's what's going to win this. As I said, this is a war of ideology. It's a struggle, a conflict of ideology. At the end of the day the drone strikes I'm going to take that out. And I'm just hopeful that while I think it will still be throughout my lifetime, that possibly in our kids and grandchildren's day the struggle will end. I appreciate that answer. We have a question from the audience which I am very interested in hearing your response. And it really is about how Pakistan will be impacted and Pakistani-Afghan relations will be impacted post-2014. If you wouldn't mind providing your assessment of what the withdrawal or the redeployment out of Afghanistan would mean for the wider region from your perspective. We've traditionally been focused on two main safe havens of being Pakistan and Afghanistan. And why I say the threat is getting worse is I've seen that threat like a spider web now go across northern Africa. So you had Egypt, Libya, you know, Mali, now Syria. It's expanding, not contracting. Pakistan and how we leave Afghanistan is going to be vitally important to have a counterterrorism footprint because the Pakistanis, they have good terrorists they deal with and bad terrorists. The ISI literally will depend on the Haqqani network, for instance, to protect them against India and the Kashmir, but also against the United States and Afghanistan. It's one of the most complex relationships I've ever seen. It's like being in a bad marriage but you can't afford a divorce. It's kind of what it's like. It's quirky. I mean, they summit low levels protected bin Laden, for instance. I predict, though, that I think they will see a vacuum. We've said the timetables 2014 and I do think you'll see Taliban seeking retribution, but forces like the Haqqani network and other al-Qaida influence organizations moving into Afghanistan. And it's going to create a real mess if we don't handle this, right? And what I'm most concerned about from the Homeland Security perspective is my job is to protect what comes into this country and the homeland itself. And when you have safe havens out there like that, like what's happening in Syria, and then with Abu Ghraib, the extremists getting out there, when you have hundreds of jihadists pouring in almost on a daily basis to Syria, it's becoming quite a training ground and with the chemical weapons there and with the alliance al-Nusra in Syria aligned, that's the al-Qaida faction, aligned with AQAP, which is working on non-metallic IEDs. It's a real, it's a real threat. It's a real threat. Given that you've just turned to the Middle East, we've got a couple of questions about the Middle East and there are two very different questions and I'm going to put them both to you at once and then if you could figure out how to reply to both of them. The first one is the role of Israel. Obviously, Israel is in a rough neighborhood and as you said is one of our closest allies. What impact are our decisions in the Middle East having on our relations with Israel, particularly from a counter-terrorism perspective, and what role does Israel play in U.S. national security? And the other one is actually pretty operational which is, if you wouldn't mind commenting on the recent large prison breakouts, again, a little bit more about throughout Africa and the Middle East we've seen them and you mentioned several prison breakouts, but what would you recommend is the most effective approach to prevent those kinds of things? Partner. And really that wouldn't turn on. I mean Israel's been an ally and a partner and we need to seek by them and the neighborhood is getting worse, not better for them. And Netanyahu is very worried about this. I tell you, I met with the ambassador from Jordan and they're very worried about what's going to happen in Jordan with the influence in Syria. And that's next to Israel. The Saudis are very concerned about the Saudi ambassador with the assassination plot against him and Saudis are very concerned about what the domino effect in the Arab Spring. And so I know that Secretary Kerry is over there trying to broker a peace negotiation and I wish him all the best success. We've seen this play out before unsuccessfully, but I do think he's talented and I think he can bring hopefully some skills to the table to bring this together. But I do see the growing threat of the more radical influence in the Middle East and that's what is putting Israel in jeopardy. As is Iran and I think Israel feels like we haven't been a strong ally to them when it comes to Iran. I don't think we've been tough enough with Iran. I think that the idea that we can negotiate with the supreme leader of the Ayatollah is a bit naive from a foreign policy standpoint and yet that's been sort of the position, as I mentioned in my speech, not even supporting the freedom fighters. The young people who wanted a different election outcome, this president said nothing. He was absolutely silent on the issue. And we had a great opportunity to support freedom forces like Reagan did. And yet I think that may have been done because he doesn't want to upset the apple cart when it comes to negotiating with then-president Aikman Diddajad and the supreme leader. And they view that as a weakness. And they are moving forward with their nuclear program at a very fast clip. They are getting closer and closer to that. And when that happens, you can't turn the clock back. When the Pakistanis got it, you couldn't stop it. It's all AQCon network influencing Pakistan, Iran, North Korea. Once that happens, you could see a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which would be a very troubling outcome. And I'm sorry, the next part of the question. It was about the prison breaks. This is, as of recent as of last week, we've seen Abu Ghraib. We saw another prison in Iraq. We've seen in Northern Africa. I think there have been a total of four prison breaks. And these are some of the really worst of the worst. And I can't prove it right now, but I have to think, given the timing, there is a concerted effort to release them. When you look at what happened in Benghazi, and they were the brigades of the blind shake trying to knock out the consulate even months before 9-11, the warnings are out there to the secretary, the ambassador asked for more security. They're chanting President Morsi's name in the streets in Benghazi. There's a connection. And Morsi calls for the release of the blind shake. Again, the guy who's behind the 93 World Trade Center bombing. So I think these are not isolated getting to your overall point. These are really not isolated events. I believe they are connected together. And the prison breaks are the latest in what I believe a very huge concern. I think they're all making their way to Syria. And again, I don't see any good outcome in Syria right now. We have two other, it seems, categories of questions. The first, if I could bring you back home to the United States and get your comments on how foreign policy affects our border security. And if you could talk a little bit, in recent statements you've talked about border security and counterterrorism. Can you talk a little bit about, so foreign policy impact on border security and that nexus of border security and counterterrorism that you've alluded to in the past? I try to be very careful when I talk about this issue. I don't want to engage in hyperbole and be a fear monger. But if you don't know who's coming into your country, if you can't control who's coming into your country, then you are vulnerable. And there are groups out there who would like to get in to do this harm. So the more insecure we are at the border, I think the more vulnerable we are. We saw, again, with the Hezbollah-Kutz Force operative in Mexico working with what he thought was a Lozeta's drug cartel member to assassinate the Saudi ambassadors, one of the latest ones. We know that there's a lot of narco-terrorism activity going on in Latin America from a finance standpoint. We know that Hezbollah through Iran has had a great influence on Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, they're trying to influence Mexico. And we've also read reports that whether it's Al Qaeda or Hezbollah they want to exploit the Southwest border. There are specific cases I'm not really at liberty to talk about about groups, dangerous ones, trying to get into this country. And when you look at the numbers of special interest alien crossings, those are from countries of interest, or you look at the other, the Mexican rate increasing, more numbers trying to get into the country, those are the things that really concern me. We've passed, I passed out of my committee a unanimous bill, which in Washington is almost unheard of to have, you know, every, you know, we did this in a bipartisan way. Every Republican, every Democrat voted for the Border Security Results Act. It was in the Washington Post yesterday. And I believe that finally I know you worked for Mr. Hunter. And I'm hopeful that we will be able to finally close this chapter to get operational control and not by building a 2,000 mile wall. We need, we need technologies down there. We need assets that DOD has used in Afghanistan, aviation assets, the Vader technology. We need to be able to see from the sky what's coming in and what's not so that we can measure what we're apprehending and what we're not. And then operational control is a 90% apprehension rate. And once we achieve that, we can say we have it. But it can be done. It's going to take an investment of resources and political will and capital. But I think it's important not just from the immigration reform debate, but as I think you point out from a national security debate. Thank you. I've perhaps saved the most challenging questions for last. So we've gone from, you know, easy things like South Asia and the Middle East to border security. And now we've got a few questions about the responsibility and operations of Congress. One of the audience members asked how anyone can achieve anything with a divided and what they called a derisive Congress and talking about so what can Congress do to address gaps in DHS leadership and also the steps Congress might take to help implement the 9-11 Commission recommendations from several years ago. Yes, that's a great question. Well, it's an issue that's bad for the country on a lot of levels, the state of political state of this Congress not being able to work effectively together and govern. I can just say from my example, I conduct this committee. Benny Thompson is my ranking member, very open-door policy. Everything we've done so far has been unanimous with bipartisan support. And I think that's the way a chairman should strive to be. And there are a lot of issues. I think there are 11 top positions within the Department of Homeland Security unfilled right now. And now the Secretary is going to be leaving. That doesn't leave the department in a very good state. From a management standpoint and accountability, one thing that Benny and I both, we had a TSA reform bill we just passed at a committee. But reforming the way they are managed and the way they operate is something that we're very interested in trying to change that process. It's difficult. It's 22 agencies in one. Not an easy task. Morale is not very good. But my philosophy has not been to blow it up but to fix it. I think I have a responsibility to fix the system because ultimately it impacts American lives. And so that's been my goal. And I think a lot of these things are achievable. The accountability piece is going to be very, which is what we do with the border bill. We try to hold them accountable, come up with a strategy and a plan which they've never had, metrics developed by the national labs. And then government accountability office verification along the way so it's an independent rather than political decision. Well, sir, thank you so much for being here. You entitled your remarks an assessment of counterterrorism policy. And I think we can all agree you gave a very strong critique of both the rhetoric and the policies that have been touted or put in place over the last several years. As Dr. Hamre talked about, and as you just mentioned, the importance of bipartisan dialogue in moving anything forward in this area is absolutely critical. So thank you again for your remarks. Thank you for being here. And I would also like to thank the audience for participating. I hope I got to as many questions that satisfy you as I could. But please join me in thanking Chairman McCall for being here.