 Hello, everyone, and welcome. Well, warm welcome to this event co-hosted by International Idea and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar. I am Annika Silva-Leander, head of North America for International Idea and Deputy Permanent Observer of International Idea to the United Nations. And I have the honor to moderate today's session. Before we start, I would like to remind those that are in the room that the event is being live-streamed and recorded. This event is part of a series on Myanmar organized by the Office of Permanent Representation of International Idea to the United Nations here in New York, together with our members. During this session, we have the honor to have Tom Andrew, here to my left, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, who will present the latest conference room paper, which examines the Myanmar military's illegal and illegitimate claim to be the government of Myanmar and the international response to this. The paper is published on the eve of the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar and contributes to set light on the appalling human rights situation in the country two years after the illegal takeover of the military. As you all know, Myanmar has been experiencing unprecedented upheaval since the coup amid spiraling violence, mass displacement, and widespread arrests and killings of civilians. The military's attack on the people of Myanmar has also led to an economic and humanitarian disaster displacing over 1 million people since the coup. And Myanmar has experienced one of the worst economic contractions in the world. I'm doing nearly a decade of progress on poverty reduction. Nearly half of the population in Myanmar now live below the poverty line. The Myanmar military junta continues to try to seek legitimacy internationally by trying to persuade member states of the United Nations to endorse and accept its illegitimate elections that are planned for August this year. So to Andrew, the UN Special Rapporteur will discuss the junta's attempts to gain legitimacy, member states' responses to the junta and the UN Special Rapporteur's recommendations for finding solutions to this crisis. As you may know, the National Unity Consultative Council, the NUCC, a body created to bring together pro-democracy forces in the country, is also at the same time seeking to rebuild the constitutional framework for a future democratic and federal Myanmar and adopted a federal democracy charter in January 22 that lays out a roadmap towards a new federal constitution to replace the 2008 one. So to contribute to the international community's understanding of the centrality of elections in both the military strategy and a future federal path chosen by democratic forces, the International Idea's head of the Myanmar program, Marcus Brand, will also present a new policy paper by International Idea, which outlines key areas to consider for genuine democratic elections in the emerging new constitutional context. Once the presentations have been made, we will open the floor to Q&A. So let me start by giving the floor to the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Bob Ray, here to my right, who also chairs the UN Group of Friends on Myanmar for some introductory remarks. The floor is yours, Ambassador. Thank you very much for the chance to be with you today. It's, I want to thank Idea and to you and to Sova and to my friend Marcus Brand, to special rapporteur Tom Andrews, who I've had the pleasure of working with for some time now. I'd like to thank all of you for coming and for bringing us together to share these very important pieces of not just research, but also analysis of what is taking place in the country and the implications for a democratic and federal future for Myanmar. Naturally, as we would expect from Idea, the timing is impeccable. Here we are, two years away, one day away from commemorating the second year anniversary of the coup. And it's important for us to recognize that the coup has plunged the country into a level of violence and humanitarian need, as has been documented by Annika Silva in her statement this morning, that the country has not seen for many, many years. As the papers note, it also marks an important date in the tools the junta has used to seize control. And they will also need to finally show their hand about whether they plan to call an election in the middle of a situation that can only be described as a civil war or if they're going to extend the state of emergency and their dictatorship. The papers to be discussed here are very important guiding documents for all of us in the international community that will allow us to chart our way through really challenging times for the people of Myanmar and challenging times for all of us who believe in democracy. And if I may say so as a Canadian who really appreciate the benefits of federal structures, which are key to, have been key to our existence as a country. And I think are key to the future of Myanmar. We've been very impressed at the extensive level of detail in the report, the sanctions that you have outlined among some like-minded countries are indeed one of the most important levers. As you note in paragraph 200, Tom, Canada was in fact the first country to sanction key arms brokers and jet fuel suppliers to the military. So for that and many other reasons, I can also share that earlier today, my government announced, together with like-minded partners, a new round of sanctions that are targeting key arms suppliers to the junta. We have to recognize that we can't, we are not able to effectively deal with those who are currently supplying arms, but we do feel it's important for us to make every possible connection to those countries and companies that are engaging directly in the military support of the junta. We're also gonna be watching very closely what the military regime says and does in the next few days as we are troubled as many of you are with the language that has been used around elections to date. We stand by the people of Myanmar and their aspirations for a democratic, federal, peaceful Myanmar, but we are also concerned that to hold an election in this context when the country is at war with itself, when people are being repressed, are being tortured, are being sent to jail, and are being killed, this is not the climate and the framework in which anyone can talk about and a reasonable election being held, and I think we have to understand that. So we look forward to hearing views that are gonna be expressed by all of you, and we think it's extremely important that we continue this very active discussion and dialogue on this question. I also note the clear call in the document for a deeper engagement with the NUG. From our end, Canada recently adopted an enhanced engagement approach in Myanmar that will enable government engagement with a wider range of stakeholders that of course includes the NUG. Part of that engagement from our perspective will be insisting on the engagement of Myanmar's many ethnic communities and to ensure that the Rohingya are meaningfully included in the plans for the NUG, including preparing the ground for their dignified return to Rakhine State. While some may argue that the world has forgotten the range of people or the broader conflict in Myanmar, I can assure you that this is not the case. In addition to the sanctions regime I've just mentioned, Canada working with the Netherlands is pursuing accountability efforts at the ICJ. We have greatly constrained our engagement with the junta and have passed a second phase of strategy to respond to the Rohingya and the Myanmar crisis. Here in New York, new ground was broken just over a month ago thanks to the persistence of the UK on the Security Council. There is now a Security Council resolution on Myanmar for the first time ever. Lastly, 2023 will have its challenges as we all know. The humanitarian crisis is extremely serious and shows no signs of improving or getting any better. We see the risks of an election that can only be called illegitimate given the circumstances under which it is being proposed. But at the same time, we also have to understand there are opportunities and we have to take advantage of them. As the Security Council resolution stated once again, ASEAN leadership will be key to restoring calm in Myanmar and we are hopeful that under Indonesia's leadership in this year, we can make further progress. The resolution also expressed its full support for UN Special Envoy, Noeline Heiser, whose statement last night is reflective of the passion that we all bring to this issue. I'm very much looking forward to not only this discussion, but as has been pointed out, future discussions. I congratulate IDEA for playing such a strong role in bringing us together. On behalf of the friends of Myanmar, I wanna make it clear that together with my colleague, the Ambassador who's with us today, we are gonna continue to work hard to bring people together and to continue to focus on this critical issue here at the United Nations and elsewhere. But the value guidance that you could all give us, the ideas and the commitment that you share with us, will really help us to keep this issue in the forefront, but also to persuade others to become more active in joining us, which I think is a critical part of our efforts here. I have to say on a personal note, it's seven years since my first visit to Myanmar. It's been five years since I was appointed as Special Envoy on the Rohingya crisis. I've had the benefit to be able to visit the country on many different occasions and to see people in the most difficult of circumstances, and both in Myanmar and in Bangladesh, in Bukhaksa Bazaar. It has been an extraordinary voyage for me because it has allowed me to really see firsthand, not only the nature of oppression and cruelty, but also the nature of resilience. And I think we all have to reflect on the fact that we have both in full measure when we look at the nature of the crisis in Myanmar. And so to all of the courageous people in Myanmar who are putting their lives on the line, to those who have already made the ultimate sacrifice into their families, I think we owe it to them to continue on this journey towards democracy and peace and justice in Myanmar and in the region. Thank you for that opportunity. Thank you so much, Ambassador Ray, for your thoughts, for words, and for telling us about the renewed sanctions. They are welcome. Also for reminding us about the plight of the Rohingya, which should not be forgotten in this context, and for your continued and now wavering commitment to democracy in Myanmar. So let us now turn to Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar for the presentation of the key findings of the conference paper. Over to you, Tom. Thank you. I want to thank Bob Ray for his presence, his eloquence. Bob is a true champion of human rights and of the people of Myanmar, and it's a great honor to have him with us today. I also want to thank International Idea, Annika for moderating, and Marcus for sharing the stage. This is a wonderful and very important way to mark this second anniversary, and also honored to have Ambassador Chamotun with us sharing the stage as well. And certainly to all of you for being here to examine this most recent paper that we have put forward to the United Nations on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. This is, of course, a somber occasion. We are on the eve of the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar. And indeed, I believe it is also the second anniversary of the failure of we, as an international community, to respond effectively and responsibly to this crisis. So I think it's critically important for us to stop and examine what we have done and have not done over the course of the last two years to determine what it is that we can and should be doing with the people of Myanmar in the days and weeks and months to come. It is a pivotal year in my view for Myanmar, and it's critically important that we learn the lessons of the past two years and apply those lessons moving forward as an international community. As I've said in the past, there are at least three core things that the Huntun needs to sustain itself. It needs money, it needs weapons, and it needs legitimacy. Last year I submitted a conference room paper to the UN that focused on weapons. It was called Enabling Atrocities, UN member states arms transfers to the Myanmar military. It examined the way in which UN member states either directly or indirectly arm the Huntun with weapons that they are using to kill innocent men, women and children. Today, we are releasing the next in our conference room conference room paper series on the question of legitimacy. Illegal and illegitimate, examining the Myanmar military's claim as the government of Myanmar and the international response. So I want to examine and go over with you if you will the highlights or lowlights of this question of legitimacy, not only from the perspective of the legitimacy itself, both in terms of the standards that were set by the Huntun itself, its own standards of legitimacy, but then also the standards of the international community, the standards in which we as a international community recognize or not the legitimacy of member states. And then I want to examine the role that member states are playing with respect to legitimacy and how we either intentionally or inadvertently extend the veneer of legitimacy on the Huntun who in turn uses that as a propaganda weapon at home to make it appear to the people of Myanmar that their rule is inevitable and that opposition to that rule is futile. So it's extremely important that we as an international community understand the extraordinarily important role that we play in either recognizing the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of the military Huntun and that's what this paper is all about. I want to look now at the standards of legitimacy, the standards that are used to determine whether or not the claim that the Huntun is making, that the coup that it engaged in was in fact legitimate, that it was constitutional by virtue of its own standards. I examined three primary factors or tests in addition to the domestic constitutional question to international legitimacy and there's three questions that are asked in the international community. Do they have effective control? Number one, number two, do they have democratic and constitutional legitimacy? And number three, are they the legitimate representative of the people? Let's start with constitutional legitimacy because it is the very foundation on which Minha lying bases their case for legitimacy. Constitutional legitimacy suggests that recognition should only be granted when a government comes to power in accordance with the established rules set out in its state constitution. Indeed, the SAC has consistently or the state administrative council has consistently repeated some version of the following. And I quote, the legitimacy of the state administrative council is unquestionable as it was formed in accordance with the state constitution. The fact is, the military failed to follow the 2008 constitution by unconstitutionally removing President Winmint and appointing the unelected military appointed vice president as the acting president of the country. Under article 417 of a constitution that the military itself drafted, only the president of Myanmar can declare a state of emergency and he may do so only after coordinating with the national defense and security council and only after informing the union parliament. None of these three requirements were met. On February 1st of 2021, the day of the coup, two military officers entered the president's residence and told him to resign the presidency. Why? Because he was informed of your quote, ill health, unquote. Despite the officers' threats to him, to resign because of his ill health, he said in fact he was in excellent health and that he would rather die than comply with the officers' orders. So the military detained him and appointed their own acting president. Under the constitution, only the union parliament can initiate impeachment procedures for the removal of the president and can ultimately decide whether impeachment charges are substantiated. Impeachment proceedings were of course, never convened by the parliament because the parliament was never allowed to sit. I go into additional details of this point in my report but suffice it to say that the military did not follow procedures, its own procedures in the removal of the president of Myanmar. The SAC further claimed that the actions of the legally appointed election officials and the duly elected parliament, I mean the actual duly elected parliament would, and I quote, may cause the loss of sovereignty to Myanmar, may cause the loss of sovereignty. Why? By refusing to further investigate the military's unfounded claims of voter fraud. This is both groundless and absurd. Now election observers from the Carter Center in examining this question of irregularities, along with others, the union election commission who examined the claims of problems with the election. They concluded that throughout the country, people were by and large, the election did indeed reflect the will of the people of Myanmar. So the military toppled a democratically elected government in an unconstitutional coup and therefore lacks democratic and constitutional legitimacy. Let there be no mistake. In the two years since the coup, the SAC despite its unrelenting violence has failed to gain effective control of the country and struggles to carry out even the most basic functions of what we'd expect a government to fulfill. The SAC should not under any circumstances be engaged as the rightful government of Myanmar. Now let's look at the legitimacy, the democratic legitimacy standard. The SAC can make no claim to democratic legitimacy or in other words, representing the will of the people as expressed through elections. The Huntess leader, me and online, has never run for public office and the military's proxy party, the USDP won only 33 out of 476 contested seats. The SAC has been given no authority in other words by the people of Myanmar as expressed through elections to govern the country. In at least 12 or so years, in the last 12 or so years, states have begun a practice of recognizing opposition groups as legitimate representatives of the people examining the climate within a country, examining the factors and actually recognizing opposition groups as legitimate representatives. We saw this in a variety of instances, but what we see that was used as the criteria for such recognition are four things. One, the incumbent government must have lost legitimacy and I think that is very clear. Number two, the opposition group must be representative. Number three, it must be broad and number four, it must enjoy a reasonable prospect of permanent. The SAC has none of these. The incumbent NLD led government that it overthrew did not lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Indeed, the NLD government had a stronger mandate to lead following the 2020 election than it did after the 2015 election. The SAC is not broad, it's not inclusive, nor is it representative of the people of Myanmar. Its primary goal is to perpetuate the military's place as the single most dominant institution in the country and to entrench an ethnic Berman supremacy entwined with conservative Buddhism. So let's look at the question of effective control, the effective control standard. This standard stipulates that recognition should be provided when a hopeful government can demonstrate control of all or nearly all the state's territory, the habitual obedience of the mass of the population and a reasonable prospect of permanence, those three factors. Well, let's examine each in turn. Territorial control, the SAC lacks control over most of the territory of Myanmar or the monopoly over the use of force and the ability to administer. Indeed, PDFs, many acting under NUG control and EROs, ethnic resistance organizations are effectively challenging the Myanmar military and expanding their base of control. Today, the SAC has substantially less control than previous Yangon-Nepodaw-based governments. Myanmar territory is currently controlled by a mix of EROs fighting against the SAC and aligned with the pro-democracy movement. SAC forces, of course, EROs and local militia aligned with or that have ceasefires with the SAC by PDFs, People's Defense Forces, or areas that are contested in the site of substantial fighting. Analysis of conflict data showing ERO locations strongly indicate that since the coup, many EROs have expanded their area of operations. A recently leaked document that provides the note of a SAC internal security meeting was very, very enlightening. In that meeting, SAC officials, and these were officials leading various operations in various states and regions throughout the country, expressed great anxiety and fear about the loss of their control and the success of the opposition, and they predicted. Now, these are the SAC's own leadership. They predicted that this trend will continue a pace in 2023 with PDF growing capabilities and operational control. The SAC also fails the standard of habitual obedience of the masses as evidenced by widespread armed resistance to its attempted rule, protests, strikes, and boycotts. Protests and armed conflict have remained high. There have been nearly 10,000 clashes against the SAC forces since the coup, while protests have declined relative to their peak as a direct result of the SAC's deadly crackdowns. They continue. There have been at least 1,400 anti-SAC demonstrations in the last six months alone, despite the danger. The SAC's sustainability and its permanence are gravely in doubt, and it has proven itself incapable of effectively managing the country. Now, just look at these startling, startling facts. First of all, half of Myanmar's school-age children have been denied the opportunity for a formal education for the last two years, half. 1.2 million people, 1.2 million have been displaced since the coup, driving the number of displaced people in Myanmar to 1.5 million. Nearly half of Myanmar's population is now living below the poverty line. 17.6 million people are expected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023. 17.6 million people. This is a dramatic increase from the 1 million people that were in need of humanitarian aid before the coup, from 1 million to 17.6 million since the coup. Finally, the SAC has manifestly failed to abide by Myanmar's international obligation under any and every standard that we might want to look at. It also can't be trusted to abide by the commitments that it has made since the coup. And I think the best example of that is what occurred two months after the coup when leaders of ASEAN nations brought together the leaders of that group in order to hammer out a way to address the crisis and end the crisis. And they established what is known as the five point consensus. The first point being the most important which was the cessation of violence. Mean Online was in that meeting. Mean Online committed to those five points including the cessation of all violence. He had no sooner returned to Myanmar from that meeting when he declared that those, the five point consensus, those points were not really commitments, they were mere suggestions, he said. And that he may abide by those suggestions once he's been able to with his forces stabilize, stabilize the country. Applying the same international standards of legitimacy used to look at the claims of legitimacy by the SAC, I found that the NUG has a far stronger claim to legitimacy, democratic legitimacy and being the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar. That NUG provides the international community with a credible alternative to the SAC. And of course the NUG has a strong claim to representing the will of the people of Myanmar as expressed in the November 2020 elections. As highlighted in the report, the NLD won 396 of the 498 contested seats in parliament. The Hunters political party, they won 33. That's 396 to 33, not exactly a cliffhanger when it comes to an election. We are talking about an entity, the NUG, that is broadly representative and reflecting the will as evidenced by this credible election in Myanmar. The National Unity Committee in Myanmar, the National Unity Government has a strong claim to the international standard of being the legitimate representative of the people. And the four considerations for this standard are this. One, seeking to replace a government that has lost legitimacy, being representative. Three, being broad. And fourth, being sustainable. The NUG is seeking to rest control of the state apparatus from an entity that has no legitimacy. The ministers of the NUG represent a diversity never seen in Myanmar's history. Half of the 26 cabinet members belong to ethnic minority groups. Eight are women, one identifies as gay. The NUG has committed to becoming even more diverse and I strongly encourage it to do so, including appointing a Ryinga as in a leadership role within the government. Clearly, the pro-democracy movement that the NUG leads is broad based. It has the support of millions of people within Myanmar and it reflects the values, the interests and the aims upon which all can agree. The NUG has publicly committed to the position of establishing a true federal democracy following the defeat of the SAC, something major ethnic minority groups have been demanding since independence in 1948. I encourage the NUG to continue earnest engagement with the EROs and the UCC in the creation of such a constitution and such a future of Myanmar. I urge member states to provide recognition to the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar and begin providing appropriate support to ensure their sustainability. So that leaves us with a military junta that manifestly lacks a claim to being legitimate and a resistance movement led by the NUG that has a very strong claim indeed. That leads us to a SAC that is of course fearful of its losses inside the country in terms of control of the territory and the illegitimacy that it has and its failure to generate legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, what's it going to do? Well, it's decided what it's going to do is hold what it claims is an election this year and thereby turn the page so that the international community can recognize a legitimate democratically elected government. Ladies and gentlemen, you cannot have a free and fair election when you arrest, detain, torture and execute leaders of the opposition. You cannot have an election when it is against the law for journalists to do their job. You cannot have a legitimate free and fair election when it is a criminal act to criticize the junta. Member states, international organization and election monitoring groups should not aid and abet this travesty by providing technical support to the SAC's Union Election Commission or to send election observers to Myanmar. Instead, they should explicitly denounce what will be a farcical exercise designed to perpetuate military control of Myanmar's political system. Against this, excuse me, against this backdrop, I spent considerable time and effort examining member state engagement or lack thereof with the stack. And in this case, there is good news and bad news to report. The good news is that the international community has by and large refused to accept the SAC's claim to be the legitimate government of Myanmar. The UN Credentials Committee has prevented the junta from occupying Myanmar's seat in the General Assembly. The UN General Assembly in Resolution 75287 called upon the Myanmar Armed Forces to respect the will of the people as freely expressed by the results of the general election of November 8th, 2020. And the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has barred junta representatives from key ASEAN meetings. Most democratic states, especially those that make the promotion of democracy and human rights part of their foreign policy agenda, do not explicitly recognize nor engage with the SAC as the government of Myanmar. I highlight in particular actions and statements of member states, I'm sorry, that have acted to deprive the junta of legitimacy, including Australia, Canada, the 27 member states of the European Union, Japan, Littgenstein, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. These actions include denouncement of the coup, the downgrading of diplomatic relations, the imposition of sanctions and engagement with the national unity government. I identify in the report a small minority of states including Belarus, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka that have implicitly supported the junta's claim as the government of Myanmar by taking actions that are tantamount to recognition. These action include presenting diplomatic credentials to the SAC, the SAC leadership, strengthening economic and military relations with the SAC and in the case of at least Belarus and India publicly engaging with the SAC on its plans to hold sham elections. None of these states have publicly indicated having engaged with the national unity government. The limited engagement of some other states have been used by the SAC to advance their claims of legitimacy, manipulated by the SAC to advance their claims of legitimacy. These include Australia, Bangladesh, Japan, the Republic of Korea and South Africa which based these engagements on specific foreign policy or national security concerns or the interests of their citizens within Myanmar. ASEAN states now appear divided over ASEAN policy vis-a-vis the SAC. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have reduced diplomatic engagement with the SAC and have rejected its claims of legitimacy. Some of these member states have also engaged with the national unity government. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam have chosen to engage with the SAC. I did extensive research during the drafting of this paper and I sought the input and the feedback from every member state who I mentioned. I thought it noteworthy that many states that engage with the SAC stressed to me that they do not view their engagement as tantamount to recognition. Vietnam for example told me and I'm quote, contact exchange and cooperation activities with Myanmar within bilateral settings of ASEAN frameworks should not be interpreted as or equated with the recognition of a military government or the state administrative council. Cambodia meanwhile told me and I quote, it is seriously misleading to equate such engagement with legitimizing them. So it's encouraging to me that even those countries that have moved to engage in one form or another with the SAC recognize the plain truth. The SAC lacks legitimacy. Finally, I make a series of recommendations in my report. I urge all member states, particularly those who have imposed some costs on the Hunter to initiate a strategic approach to strengthen, coordinate and enforce economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the SAC. This includes sanctioning Myanmar oil and gas enterprise, aviation fuel, the key SAC controlled financial channels including the Myanmar foreign trade bank. And I urge Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, all of which have imposed sanctions in the Russia Ukraine context to act immediately to impose sanctions on the SAC and its interests. ASEAN states should publicly distance themselves from the SAC and condemn its actions. I urge them to support the enforcement of international sanctions in their jurisdictions and increase their engagement with the national unity government. I urge Belarus, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka to reconsider and reverse their policies with respect to actions that are tantamount to recognizing or otherwise legitimizing the SAC. Now I recognize that some states particularly those sharing a border with Myanmar may have security reasons to maintain communication channels with the junta. Indeed, many asserted that their engagement should not be an indication of a recognition of legitimacy on this front, including Bangladesh. I urge whatever communication may need to be pursued that member states not engage with the SAC as the rightful government of Myanmar. Any engagement related to resolving the Myanmar crisis should include the national unity government and other pro-democracy bodies. I finally urge UN agencies to conduct due diligence before inviting any member states to conferences to ensure that SAC representatives are excluded. And I urge the UN Office of Legal Affairs to instruct all UN funds, agencies, programs and affiliates that the SAC should not be invited to any conference or meetings. And finally, I urge regional and global election monitoring organizations such as International Idea to expressly disavow and reject the SAC's planned elections for 2023. And I'm sure that Marcus is gonna have a few words about that. Let me just say in closing, this is a critical year for the people of Myanmar. The second anniversary of the coup is the second anniversary of a disaster for the people of Myanmar. And the second anniversary of a failure for the international community with respect to Myanmar. In the year ahead, in the year that is forthcoming, let us learn the lessons of the past two years and let us resolve to provide the people of Myanmar with the support that they so much deserve and need so that next year, next year, we are celebrating the turning of the tide to a justice and towards human rights for the people of Myanmar. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, Tom, for this incredibly rich analysis, full of important data to show the scale of the humanitarian, political and economic disaster of Myanmar. Also for highlighting some hopeful messages, interesting to hear about the recognition of the success of the opposition in these leaked documents. Also these important messages for the international community to recognize the energy and engage with the energy not under any circumstances to engage with these sham elections that are planned for August and to increase sanctions in a consistent and coordinated way. Also some key messages for the UN there. So thank you very much, Tom, for this. And now we will turn over to Marcus Brandt, head of International Ideas Myanmar program, who's gonna give us an overview of the most recent International Idea policy paper on elections at a crossing point, considerations for electoral design in post-court Myanmar. Over to you, Marcus. Thank you, Annika. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I would like to thank Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews for co-hosting today's event with us and for his excellent briefing on his latest conference paper and for his tireless support for the people of Myanmar, which is a commitment we wholeheartedly share. I would also like to thank a permanent representative of Canada, Bob Ray, for his excellent remarks and his leadership among member states here in New York. And I would also like to thank and acknowledge the presence of Ambassador Chomotun, the permanent representative of Myanmar, who is here with us, and whose principled stance has become a shining example of integrity and upholding the rule of law at the United Nations. Let me also acknowledge the fact that as an intergovernmental organization, comprising 34 member states from around the globe, that we are grateful for enjoying the status of a permanent observer here at the UN General Assembly. On the ground in Myanmar, international idea has been active on supporting democracy since more than 20 years, including with a sizable field presence for the past decade, where we have built a close partnership with the Union Election Commission and the Parliament of Myanmar, which with the latter we still maintain. Since after the coup, we have been only operating from outside the country following threats and security concerns. So at the moment, we do not have any staff or contractors inside the country, which gives us a free hand to speak as we do. We understand that some of our peer organizations are not in the same situation. Today, we would like to present to you our idea report on elections in Myanmar at a crossroads, which was prepared by Michael Lee Dower and Jill Safi, who are two of the leading experts globally on elections in Myanmar. And this report was already presented at the European Parliament in Brussels in December last year. So I will only summarize its findings now and mention some of its recommendations. It is also available on our website in English and Burmese, and you can also find the summaries in Burmese and also in Thai. I will then also read a joint statement on the sham elections with reference to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observers. Ladies and gentlemen, following a decade of democratic opening and two general elections organized under the 2008 Constitution in 2015 and 2020, Myanmar's military abruptly ended this period with a coup d'etat on the 1st of February, 2021. The military leadership has established a governing body called the State Administration, which we already heard about earlier today, and sought to justify its coup with a narrative of electoral fraud regarding the November 2020 elections. This narrative has since been extended as the election results were canceled, political leaders and election administrators arrested and convicted, and evidence was fabricated to legitimize these actions. The SAC quickly announced that it would hold fresh elections, possibly in 2023, and to this end, it is planning changes to the election and political party registration laws, some of which were just recently announced in the past few days. It seeks to change the electoral system with the apparent aim of manufacturing electoral outcomes in the interests of the military and its proxies. It attempts to co-opt or co-arce mostly small political parties to join it in these undertakings, and it is preparing a new voters list. The military is likely to perpetuate its narrative of electoral fraud and make preparations for an electoral sham exercise aimed at legitimizing its hold on power. It is therefore critical that the international community does not provide any recognition to the Qantas undertakings. At the same time, the country is experiencing unprecedented resistance to the military's attempts to establish control by force. Pro-democracy actors, some of whom remain in the country while others are in exile, are not only supporting civil disobedience and opposition to military rule, but also seek to reconfigure the constitutional framework for a future democratic and federal Myanmar. Democratically elected representatives and interim institutions created since the coup have begun to prepare a new institutional framework, in particular with the adoption of a revised federal democracy charter in January 22, exactly a year ago, in preparation for a new permanent federal constitution to be adopted by a future constituent assembly. International IDEA focuses on three main themes in its work, electoral processes, constitution-building processes, and political participation and representation. And this report has been produced to support Myanmar stakeholders in all of these areas. International IDEA has recommended and explained in this report that it is advisable to factor in questions of electoral design from an early stage. This can also help to counter the military's problematic narratives. In this endeavor, guidance can be found in international human rights law, which provides principles for and guidelines on holding democratic elections. This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also the ICCPR, which the Myanmar national unity government has now pledged to sign up to and ratify. Guidance can also be found in Myanmar's past electoral experiences, as the next generation of lawmakers and election administrators inherit a host of lessons learned from dealing with longstanding systemic and structural problems with the electoral process, in particular also with regard to the inclusion of the Rohingya community. By building on an overview of Myanmar's recent electoral history and deconstructing the military's election related claims, this report proposes key areas for consideration in the process of federal constitutional design with regard to elections. The overall legal framework for elections, the choice of electoral system, election management, voter registration, including a clear framework for suffrage rights and dispute resolution. The shape of the federal system eventually chosen will have strong impact on the conduct of elections, and the federal constitution will determine at which level and how the electoral legal framework is legislated for. Federal systems provide for a division of powers between the center and federal units, allowing the two levels of government to function partly autonomously. The forward-looking parts of this report are intended as a contribution to ongoing discussions among democratic decision-makers on options for electoral design within a federal framework. It should also contribute to the international community's understanding of the centrality of elections in the strategy of the military, junta, and in any future federal path chosen by democratic forces. Ladies and gentlemen, let me now turn to the joint statement by international election experts and organizations on Myanmar, which we released together with UNFREL and NDI, and several other organizations are still considering ways to join this statement publicly. They have already endorsed it informally to us, and the statement is, of course, open for additional endorsements, and we invite all related organizations to join us in this. But UNFREL and NDI have already agreed to publicly join this statement. So I'm reading this statement now on our behalf. We are organizations specializing in election observation, electoral, and democracy assistance, committed to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, a document that was adopted here in this building under the auspices of the UN Secretary General in 2005, which has become basically the rulebook for integrity for international election observation. We denounce and distance ourselves from the sham election that the illegal and illegitimate military junta of Myanmar, the State Administrative Council, and the illegitimate Union Election Commission it has established are currently planning for later this year. We also express an urgent request to the international community to deny the SAC any technical, material, or symbolic support for such a sham election. We encourage UN member states to join us and make their opposition to the junta's electoral exercise widely known, including through individual and joint statements and resolutions at the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the UN Human Rights Council. The Myanmar junta has been systematically and massively violating the human rights of the people to such a degree that the free expression of their will cannot at this time be ensured. It is impossible to hold a genuine election on the current conditions in Myanmar, which include the arrest, detention, torture, and the execution of leaders of the most widely supported political party and other politicians and civic activists, as well as the harassment, jailing, and torture of journalists. Those who criticize the coup and the military junta and protect the internationally recognized valid elections of 2020 are considered criminals and are persecuted. It should also be noted that 21 officials from the legitimate Union Election Commission are still being held in detention following the coup as a result of their involvement in the 2020 elections. Genuine elections cannot be achieved unless human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, as was largely the case in 2020. The evidence is overwhelming that the SAC denies the exercise of any of these freedoms. Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty which belongs to the people of a country. The free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. The SAC can make no claim to democratic legitimacy that is representing the will of the people as expressed through elections. Where possible, our organizations offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral processes. But no recommendations that we could offer on this sham election could cure the falsity of this process other than the SAC to follow the call of the United Nations General Assembly. Let me recall that in its resolution of June 21, the General Assembly urged the military, I quote, to respect the will of the people as freely expressed by the results of the general election of 8 November 2020, to end the state of emergency, to respect all the human rights of all the people of Myanmar, and to allow the sustained democratic transition of Myanmar, end of quote. The implementation of a sham election will not bring stability to Myanmar. It will only contribute to increasing violence and polarization, worsening the crisis caused by the military coup, and further threats to regional and international stability and security. Thank you. Thank you so much, Marcus, for sharing the findings of the paper, both making us understand better how the SAC is changing the electoral system in their favor in an already challenging situation where the opposition is imprisoned, tortured, killed, or in exile, and where there is no free press. But also for providing recommendations for how the electoral system could be strengthened going forward in a federal structure. So thank you for that, and also for reading out this statement, encouraging as many of you as possible to join in this statement. We will now open the floor for discussion, but before we open to all of you, I would like to... I have the honor to introduce you and to hear a few words from Ambassador Joe Motun of Myanmar, representing the Democratic government of Myanmar here at the United Nations. We would like to hear a few words from you. Thank you. Over to you, Ambassador. Thank you, Annika. Madam moderator, I would like to begin by expressing our sincere appreciation to special reporter Mr. Thomas Andrew and the international idea for organizing this timely event on the eve of the second anniversary of the illegal military coup in Myanmar, as well as for your continued supporting the democratic aspiration of the Myanmar people. I also wish to thank Ambassador Buckray for his insightful remarks. I thank special reporter Mr. Andrew and Mr. Market, brand of international idea for their comprehensive presentations of the conference room paper and the policy paper respectively. I support the recommendations made by the special reporter. Madam moderator, the title of the conference room paper pretty much summarizes the status of the military hunter. It is illegal. It is illegitimate. And having seen all kinds of atrocities, they committed against the people of Myanmar. During these two years, we have to call it what it is. It is an illegal illegitimate and criminal hunter. No constitutional or statutory laws provided any legality to the forcefully detention of the nation's democratically elected sitting president by the an elected military leaders. If it was by every interpretation and illegal coup and treason against the government and the country. This special reporter rightly pointed out that the SAC has no constitutional legitimacy, no democratic legitimacy. SAC is not representing the people of Myanmar. SAC does not meet internationally accepted criteria of effective control. It is crystal clear that military survival is based only on mutual force. They shot peaceful protesters to silence their voices. They annihilated the rule of law and replace it with corruption to make people living with fear. They torture detainees and executed democratic activists to strike fear. And able to contain the growing resistance, they punished the civilian populations by repeated mass kills in discriminate area bombings and wholesale banning of residential towns and villages. The atrocities committed by the military hunter amount to crimes against humanity and world crimes. The consequences of the military's atrocities and institutional destruction are extremely huge, not only for Myanmar, but also countries in the region and beyond. The people of Myanmar are resolute to end the military's lawlessness and avoid any future repeat of this situation. Madam moderator, I joined the special reporter in Arjin or U.M. member states not to support the illegal hunter's attempt to gain legitimacy through the sham election. The reason is so obvious. No election organized and controlled by the illegal hunter will have any chance to genuine, free, fair and independent, especially why they are holding politicians in hostages and the rule of law has been dismantled. Shand elections of the military will never, will never be a solution nor a realistic path to stability. Of course, we need elections, but for any future elections to be genuine, free, fair and democratic, we must have conditions conducive to a transition to the federal democratic union. In doing so, the people of Myanmar need help from the international community. Specifically, we need timely, coordinated, concrete actions both from the UN Security Council and individual countries to help us release the country from the military dictatorship, hold the perpetrators of the serious international crimes to account and begin a genuine transition towards a democracy with effective, inclusive and accountable institutions. It will be the real exit to sustainable peace in Myanmar. People of Myanmar deserve nothing less than a free, open, just and peaceful democratic country. I wish to reiterate that the National Unity Government of Myanmar appreciates your efforts, Mr. Thomas Andrew, and always stand ready to close working with you and everyone who went peace and democracy in Myanmar. And thank you. Thank you so much, Ambassador, for your important words. And you are an important proof that the SAC does not represent the legitimate government of Myanmar in any way, since you are sitting here representing Myanmar at the UN as a representative of the democratic government of Myanmar. And, but still important, your message of urging all member states, including the UN Security Council as well, to support a democratic Myanmar and your report on outlines how this could be done. So now we will open the floor for questions. And we have a few 20 minutes about four questions and answers. So the floor is open. Any questions? Over to you, Ambassador of Liechtenstein. Thank you so much. And I really wanna thank our friends from international view for putting this together. And a big thanks to Thomas Andrews for all the work that he has done and for giving us a very, I mean, I think legally and politically very compelling case. You have talked in the past very vocally about the issues of supply of weapons to the country that was addressed in the GA resolution but has not been implemented consistently by the international community. And we echo that call. We were in the lead of that resolution and we continue to believe that that provision is the key provision of the General Assembly resolution that should be followed up on in the Security Council and elsewhere. You have now turned your attention to the topic we have discussed today and we do believe that this is really essential topic. I think you have made it very clear that engagement doesn't mean recognition and that is an approach that we completely agree with with respect to Myanmar and also in connection with other situations and it's important to make that differentiation. But we are certainly called upon here on a daily basis to work very consistently for the issue of representation at UN. And the first thing we can do is of course to support our friend and colleague, Chomoton, in his role. He is a fully accredited PR of his country to the UN as I am and as Bob is and as Axel are. And he can play all the roles and the functions as such. But he does need our support in this respect. We do agree that it's good that the Credentials Committee has made it possible for him to continue playing this role. We're not that happy that the decision of the Credentials Committee is not applied consistently across the UN system, I have to say. So we're looking as Tom certainly knows the very different situation in Geneva and at a different situation again at the International Court of Justice and we do believe that it is actually very clear that what the Credentials Committee says should be applied across the UN system as a whole. And that's something that I think all of us need to continue calling for whenever we can. I also want to flag as Chomoton the importance of accountability for what we are discussing here. There is of course a case before the International Court of Justice that is well known. There is also the investigation of the International Criminal Court into a very small but extremely important facet of its docket of crimes. There is also the expressed intention of the NUG to join the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which is really of essential importance. But I do believe and I that's also how I understood that the panelists that we are all called upon to take a very, very clear stance on the so-called elections that are being planned and that we have to do so very early on so not after the elections not to comment on the result of the elections but on the fact that it is impossible to hold anything coming close to free and fair elections that meet with any sort of international standards that we're all in agreement with. So thank you so much and thank you for doing this today. This is a very important discussion that would I think deserve a larger audience but I'm grateful to see everybody here and I hope that people will also be very vocal tomorrow on the first of February which is the actual anniversary. Thank you. Thank you so much Ambassador for your important messages on consistency across the UN system with regards to recognition of the democratic government of Myanmar. So that's important to keep in mind. And I think also the timing on the stance on the elections that have been announced I think that's very important that they are denounced now early on and not after the facts. Are there any other questions in the room? If you do, raise your hand over to you. Thank you. Thank you. Let me begin by thanking Idea for organizing this very important event. And also I would like to specially appreciate the statement of special reporter Tom Andrews and I hope I will get a copy of this statement if it is. Regarding this, I mean, you know, I'm the deputy permanent representative of Bangladesh. So Bangladesh is actually, I would like to, if you'll give me three, four minutes of time. I'd like to see these issues from three planes. One is the humanitarian. So for this Bangladesh is taking care of 1.2 million Rohingya refugees and we'll do the best possible efforts to continue the support, of course, with the help of the international community. And since it is humanitarian, I also want to thank the ambassador of Liechtenstein. I mean, for his comments and we share his views fully. Second, on the bilateral plane, I think special reporter has already mentioned since Bangladesh is a neighboring country. So we have to remain engaged with the current, I mean, the current, I don't know whether I should legally call it government or not, but it is up to you to say and decide. But we have to have some kind of engagement due to not only security, but also for the people to people relations that we have from decades. And on the international level, as a responsible country internationally and as a democracy, Bangladesh believes that the denial of citizenship status and related rights to any ethnic communities and minorities anywhere in the world is a concern, serious human rights concern. So wherever it happens, if it is in Myanmar, also we think the same way. And also we want to see that the equal opportunity for representation and equal inclusive participation of any person in a country, in a defined country can be given, be it Myanmar, Rohingyas or others. And thirdly, and the UN General Assembly third committee resolution, it is said to ensure Rohingyas and other minorities and internally displaced persons. I'm reading from the para 14M of the operative para that they have an equal opportunity for representation and the full equal and meaningful participation as candidates and votes in all general elections. Now this is my, I mean, statement or comments as Bangladesh representative here, but I have some questions which is not necessarily as a Bangladesh representative as a person and also for all of our understanding because these are legal issues. So I don't know whether these are, this is appropriate to ask the questions on behalf of Bangladesh government. But I am sure, I mean, on the basis of your answer, Bangladesh government will be able to think about the policy changes or whatever to maintain the policy. First question is whether each and every time, I formulated this now, but there could be some linguistic problems. Whether each and every time a government takes over, either legally or illegally, do they need to have a fresh recognition of other governments around the world? That is number one. And number two, in the concept note possibly, I saw that there is a sentence, what is that? I'm sorry for that thought. There is a sentence that even member states to deny any support to SSE. So what does that any support means other than particularly, it is mentioned that holding the supporting the elections. What does any support mean? And thirdly, what are the tools in hands of international community to denounce or reject elections? Of course, other than just giving statements or some sort of mini sanctions. And the last one would be like, we know that UN Security Council's resolutions are legally binding. So in 2669, what are the legally binding part? And which part is legally binding for international community or for Myanmar for other member states? And particularly in relation to the ASEAN. So what are the binding portion of the Security Council resolution is binding to ASEAN? Thank you very much. Thank you so much to the representative of Bangladesh. Four questions to the panel. Do you want to start? Can I ask you, please? Could you repeat the first question? Whether each and every time a government takes over either legally or illegally or any changeover of government either by election electoral means or illegally by coup or other means. Do they need fresh recognition of the international community or countries around the world? We see that it is a convention to congratulate and things but whether they need a legal, whether there is a legal need to take fresh recognitions. That happens when there are competing claims, when a government particularly is, when there's a violent overthrow of a government. In the normal course of things, when there's a change of government, then it is a, as you say, congratulations, now we move forward. But it's in the particular case of Myanmar and in some other cases in which a democratically elected body is overthrown by a violent, by use of force, by a violent entity, in this case, the SAC, it becomes a question and an issue. The UN member states can deny support in many significant ways. The first, as you mentioned, the election. Not recognizing this election and not allowing the junta to use it as a propaganda tool for its people. In other words, what they're using is every opportunity to create this veneer of legitimacy that they will then try to convince the people of Myanmar that they're being recognized by the international community. So even any way in which that can be avoided is a service to the people of Myanmar by member states. But there are other ways. Certainly helping to stop the flow of weapons into the hands of the junta. Helping to stop the flow of money, of resources, of flows of cash, which are then being used to either produce weapons or the materials to make weapons in their domestic production facilities. So those are always that governments can play a particularly important role, but legitimacy I think is very important, particularly on the eve of 2023 and the so-called elections that are going to be orchestrated mid-year. And then in terms of the Security Council, the resolution that was passed in December was an important one. I know that those that were supporting it and involved with it worked very, very hard in its development. But it's not binding. That is to say this is in order to achieve a binding resolution, you would need to have the support of all the permanent members of the Security Council. And obviously that was not going to happen. But there's a pattern here. In the Ukraine context, there was not a binding resolution from the Security Council. But nonetheless, governments worked together to form a very effective strategic coalition that could then identify where they collectively could do the most good in terms of actions such as sanctions and target those sanctions so that they all add up to a coherent whole. That is what is missing when it comes to Myanmar. That kind of strategic coordinated approach by a coalition of countries, much like we saw with respect to the Ukraine crisis, we've yet to see with respect to the Myanmar crisis. So those are always that the international community can provide significant support. In the ASEAN's role, I mean, whether they are bound to do something as per the Security Council resolution? Well, the resolution, as I was saying, is it's not a binding resolution. That is to say it is not an action. It's not... No, my understanding is Security Council resolutions are binding, legally binding. It depends on the nature of the resolution. The resolution that was passed in December was not. There is nothing that could be, I mean, legally binding. Like for example, they request the ASEAN as an organization to engage with the special envoy and to see how UN can help and things like that. So are they legally bound to work with the special envoy or they can say that it is not our matter, we can just... No, no, the key here is enforcement, right? So the Security Council had a resolution calling upon member states, including ASEAN, to do very, very important things. That's very significant, very important, but it's not enforceable in the sense of... Okay, I mean, of course. I have one small question. I mean, since Myanmar is a federal government, right? The federal structure. There are national government and the sub-national governments at the... I don't know the full structure, but... So when we say that the elections are illegal or illegitimate, I mean, it is just, again, for my understanding, it is not Bangladesh's position. So what happens to the state or something? I mean, if they say that they want to do the election, then what the international community will do? I mean, what is the nature of the illegality of the elections in Myanmar? It is only for the federal parliament. I don't know the structure, I admit. But what happens to the local? Like, for example, if we think about the US or India, like when there is a presidential election and the congressional and Senate elections, so which one, normally the governments around the world, they congratulate the president. They don't congratulate the governor or the, I mean, the senator or congressman, right? I mean, at the official level. So what will happen if any state or any province of Myanmar say that the people are agreeable to the elections, then how would the international community handle that? I mean, in terms of recognition. Thank you. If I may answer that briefly with reference to the 2008 constitution that we now consider defunct, but which the military is still considering to be the legal framework for what it does, according to this quite peculiar constitution, elections in Myanmar were held at the same time at the union level for a bicameral parliament, or let's rather say for 75% of the seats in those because a quarter was always held by the military, as well as for the 14 assemblies of the states and regions. So in November, 2020, all of these elections were held at the same time for the elected seats of the two chambers of the union parliament, as well as for the 14 state and region unicameral assemblies. And the military prevented on the 1st of February, 21, the convening of the union parliament, but also of the 14 state and region parliaments and took over control or attempted to take over control in those 14 states and regions as well. So we often speak about the union parliament, but basically we have hundreds of additional elected representatives in state and regional assemblies who have suffered a similar fate to the union MPs, meaning they have been persecuted, they have been killed, they have been arrested, many of them have left the country, and many of them are still active in, as the union parliament is, in trying to put together these interim legislatures and reaching out to other stakeholders in building these broader coalitions. So it's actually a very good point that you raise attention to the state and regional level, because as we are moving more into a federal system, this level of government will be increasingly important, and it is also in the plans, in the current plans of the military junta that we were talking about, not only to create a new union parliament in its own making, but also to create the 14 state and region parliaments with the same intention of controlling the outcome and of putting in proxy parties, because again in the 2020 November elections, it was the NLD that won, in some cases, the totality of the seats at the state and regional level, and is the dominant political power at the state and region level as well. So that is the brief answer to your question. Thank you, Marcus, for clarifying that, for the very pertinent questions posed by the representative of Bangladesh. We have five more minutes for questions. If anyone wants to ask another question, I also wanted to let you know, those that are sitting in the blue seats, if you do want to make a question, we have a microphone that we can provide to you, so anyone can make a question. I don't see any other questions in the room, so I would like to take this opportunity to thank the speakers for their excellent and insightful contributions to this discussion. Thanks for all the pertinent questions and all our support to Myanmar and particularly tomorrow. Thank you, everyone, goodbye.