 Hello, I'm Thomas Hicks, Vice Chairman of the United States Election Assistance Commission. The EAC is an independent bipartisan federal agency created by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to help election officials improve the administration of elections and help Americans participate in the voting process. We work closely with state and local election officials to make sure everything is in order to vote as to cast a meaningful, secure and independent ballot. By statute, our agency is responsible for distributing federal funds to the states, including $400 million in emergency funding last year to address election issues caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The agency also establishes standards for voting technology used in our elections. In February, we issued a new set of standards for voting systems that will pave the way for the next generation of voting systems across the country. I have more on that later. Our agency also maintains the National Voter Registration Forum. And finally, we serve as the clearinghouse for best practices for state and local authorities to consult about election operations. Other federal agencies also play a role in the US election system. The Federal Elections Commission has oversight of the nation's campaign finance laws, the money and politics, and how those laws apply to candidates and committees. Many other agencies are also involved, even if their statutory mandate is not solely focused on elections. You may be familiar with the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, which plays a key role in securing our elections infrastructure in both foreign and domestic intrusions. And the US Postal Service has recently been the focus of absentee and profile mail efforts during the pandemic. At a great level of complexity, it's easy to see how the electorate can fall victim to simple misinformation and how bad actors can introduce more malicious information through any one of those points of entry. Among our most important lessons from the 2020 election was a tragic reality that those threats can stem not only from foreign enemies, but also from within. And at the same time, by its very nature. The decentralized system limits intrusions because any large scale efforts would require targeting the separate states and local jurisdictions at the county and local level. We're partnering across federal state and local governments, and with robust support from industry, civic organizations, nonprofits, and academia. We carried out one of the most secure elections in American history, and continue to improve operations to secure continued success. And the road to repairing this damage remains long and daunting. And I hope the ideas you share, and the connections you make the deaf on is everyone here, the opportunity to think strategically about protecting our elections. To be sure, missing disinformation succeeding and casting doubt about this fact. But what do we learn, and how do we respond. At the broadest level, we learn that online missing disinformation pose a threat to the election process. And it's incumbent upon government institutions at every level to make sure voters and potential voters have accurate information. It also requires vigilance by the platforms where miss and disinformation appear to be honest gatekeepers. Individuals have to be responsible for the information they consume. That means on the web, voters in the public should look for verified and trusted source labels, voters can and should refer to resources directly from local and state election boards. This is especially important for voters checking their registration status and confirming their information is correct. And in response to the recent executive order issued by President Biden in March, we are digitally working alongside the general service administration. To modernize and improve the user experience. Our voters can find information they need to participate in the democratic process. And on this, our agency, as well as the rest of the election infrastructure established numerous safeguards to monitor and engage for future threats to our systems. In January of 2017, DHS gave the critical infrastructure designation to our election systems. This designation is given to systems and assets whose incapacity or destruction with threatened countries physical or economic security. The designation allows the EC to participate in the government coordinating council, which provides for interagency and intergovernment coordination. This includes representatives across federal state local tribal and territorial governments, a sector coordinating council also serves as the counterpart to the GCC partners in industry and manufacturing. This also has proved highly important as covert restrictions started last one, with about half of the state still meaning to conduct that primary elections, the resources the GCC compiled, highly useful for election officials. The EC also launched several initiatives to support cyber security efforts at state and local level. The EC security program provides resources like security training has practices, expertise, and other assistance for election officials tasked with protecting critical elections infrastructure. Last year we helped provide election officials with online cyber security training, we're a partnership with the Center for tech and civic life. To date, over 1000 people have taken the training in 46 states DC and blue territories. And this training remains available for free through September for anyone interested in attending. The EC also launched the risk management and crisis management online workshop, the state and territorial election officials. The EC hosted a joint SISA online risk management tool on our website, allowing officials at the local level to easily measure and mitigate risk to the specific environments. And leading up to the election in June 2020, the AC also announced its partnership with the Center for internet security, the pilot and technological verification program, focused on non voting election technology, including electronic poll books, election night reporting websites and electronic ballot delivery systems. The AC, every discussion about election technology begins with our core statutory obligation, the voluntary voting system guidelines. The VBS gene are set a specific requirements against which voting systems can be tested to determine if the system needs requirements standards. The EC first developed the VBS gene in December 2005. This past February, the unanimously voted to approve the BS gene 2.0. The BS gene 2.0 is a major step forward to ensure the next generation of building equipment is more secure, accessible, and it ensures a better voting experience for all Americans. The election security has been a major topic and focus during these efforts, and I'm proud that the BS gene 2.0 includes provisions to ensure we have more paper ballots and built in support for election officials to conduct more effective post election audits. Even more than ever. Without sacrificing the mandate that those with disabilities can still vote independently and privately. These gains along with many others benefits to accessibility, security and usability that come with a 15 year technological week forward. All are part of what makes the update so critical. This version reflects the push and pull of various policy considerations, but ultimately represents reasonable compromise that puts the agency in a good position. Allows manufacturers to build to the requirements and gives labs clear guidance to test and certify those machines and positions the EAC for considering enhancements in the future. That goes to the issue of elections post COVID and the new systems and technologies that have been adopted across the United States. According to the Britain Center, 25 states have passed 54 laws that lower barriers to voting by adopting election practices that were employed in 2020 in response to the pandemic. Those permanent fixes include more early voting options, like longer periods or additional days for in person voting, more valid drop off locations. Adoption of no excuse absentee ballot requests. In addition to states from our in Nevada, elections will be conducted entirely by mail. Joining the five states that adopted all mail valid prior to 2020. States have also adopted new procedures to minimize the rejection of mail ballots online voters the opportunity to fear any defects or to verify their signatures. To ballot tracking technology, some states and localities are even allowing voters to follow the progress of their ballots to ensure that it counts. And on the front end states have simplified and expanded voter registration. For example, some states modify or struck laws for giving voting for preventing felons from voting. Others expanded registration to 17 year olds who are eligible vote upon turning 18. Finally, a number of states adopted new technology to allow for accessibility providing remote options for voters with disabilities. Today, more than 20 states in the District of Columbia offer electronic ballot delivery. Changing long standing election practices, procedures and systems is no small order. In many cases. This may require legislative action. And in 2020 governance and state legislatures across the country, active quickly to adapt election administration procedures to meet a health and safety guidelines. These formalities are more practical considerations that the timing of the introduction of those changes that implementation is ongoing monitoring and the new voter education. For changes to an implementation of new technology. There is further consideration about balancing efficiency, accessibility and security. In many cases capacity and securing house with best practices, election officials returned to our agency for guidance about how and when implementing selection systems practices in their jurisdiction. As one example, let's talk about electronic poll books or a poll books. These are voter registration lists that have been digitized to check voter eligibility at the polls. In 2017, more than one quarter of jurisdictions use the poll books. This was an increase of more than 50% in 2014. 36 states use the poll books, and at least one jurisdiction, seven states use the poll books and all local jurisdictions. The poll books have some inherent security concerns. The poll books can be deployed in a jurisdiction during the election. They may be network to other people books, or an equal book central server, or a voter registration database. People books to take personal identification information, including name address and age. And some circumstances other data includes driver license numbers and voter signatures. And potentially the target of attacks by the various actors that could cause potential polling place delays, turn away voters or modify or delete voter registration data. Often personnel with minimum security training are also trusted with operating easy folks as part of our effort to guard against potential seek these potential security scenarios. And EAC will create a program manual that will describe key elements such as requirements and responsibilities for participating in the program. Requirements will be developed and published similar to the dbsg, but with a narrow list of it will focus on unique aspects of the poll books related to security, usability and accessibility. The poll will be conducted by EAC accredited voting system test labs, this holds test plan reports and relevant attachments will be posted on the EAC website. And it will include typical system configuration information like software versions, hardware reviews and hatches. It will be voluntary and manufacturers participation is necessary for it to be successful. And they can help if they stop requiring the EAC evaluation. In some instances, they may still need to provide testing to ensure enough ability with their specific systems. It must be agile. We don't want to cause too much. We don't want to cause too much additional overhead in terms of time costs. The labs take approximately one or two months to evaluate. We believe that this turnaround can be shortened to standardization. We also want to support the ability for manufacturers to rapidly generate to have their systems evaluated. We need to be kept up to date depending on how the specifics requirements are the standards need to be updated frequently. This could be yearly or less. For election officials, the convenience and efficiency of using a poll books must be weighted against potential security threats. That's because this data must be stored somewhere. For example, some of the officials increasingly rely on crowd services from Amazon or Microsoft, for example, to manage these systems. Unfortunately, those systems are vulnerable to cyber security threats as a 2016 election demonstrated. Some of the methods attempted to penetrate the voter registration databases are several states. By some meeting accounts, they were successful with at least one of those states being penetrating. Similarly, security measures are implemented. Officials may inadvertently raise barriers for voters with disabilities. So there is a need to protect against trading accessibility for security. Our goal is to be both. We are a public education piece that voters with the information to help them navigate new systems and technology. Maybe even more importantly, this education component about making sure that the public understands any new system or technology is not only convenient, but also reliable and secure. For example, the books have people books have made it easier for jurisdictions to adopt the use of both centers. These are often larger, more centralized polling locations that combine several precincts were voted contested ballot. People books allow both centers to more easily access information about voters across multiple jurisdictions with more ease than consulting traditional registration lists on paper. During the pandemic, both centers played an important role in protecting both election workers and voters, because in some instances, they were in larger settings, like sports stadiums that allowed for proper social distancing. When used for early voting, both centers allow voters to cast a ballot ahead of the election day and avoid traditional longer lines at a time of uncertainty about the pandemic and the protective measures needed to prevent infection. The election workers worked with their municipalities, professional sports leads and the media to inform voters about using both centers to stay safe and to provide reassurance with their votes would count. I'll end here, but I look forward to the conversation and the collaborations that stem from deaf comments here. Thank you.