 I'm Alex Stark. I'm a senior researcher at New America and I'm thrilled to be hosting this panel of experts on Yemen on behalf of the political reform and international security programs at New America. There have been a number of political and humanitarian developments around Yemen's war in the past month or so including a UN negotiated truce and kind of a reshuffle of the internationally recognized government of Yemen at a meeting in Riyadh and I'm thrilled to be speaking with some of the absolute top experts working on Yemen today to really learn from them about what all of this means where they see the direction of the conflict going. Each of these panelists has extensive experience and I'd really encourage you to read their full bios online. I'm just going to for now give you the kind of the brief highlights to introduce them. Nadwal Dawstri is a conflict and policy analyst and a specialist in Yemeni tribes with over 18 years of field experience in conflict management and civil society development in Yemen, including at several international organizations like the National Democratic Institute and Center for Civilians in Conflict. Mysa Shuja Adin is a senior researcher at Sena Center for Strategic Studies. She holds a master's degree in Islamic studies from the American University in Cairo where the focus of her thesis was the radicalization of Zaidism. Abdel Wasya Mohamed is Oxfam's advocacy media and campaigns manager in Yemen and he has worked with several INGOs in humanitarian and development settings across Yemen and Adam Baron is a writer and political analyst who was based in Sena from 2011 to 2014 and he's also a former New America ISPs fellow. So I want to start with kind of a basic question for all the panelists maybe we can start with Mysa and then we'll go through but what are kind of the most interesting or surprising effects of the recent events that have happened around Yemen including the truce and the replacement of President Hadi with the presidential council? How do you kind of see those events shaping the conflict and are there any particularly overlooked or maybe under analyzed aspects of that? Is it for me? I will start with me okay. I think nothing is surprising until now the Saudis they are trying for one year since they announced their initiative with to the Houthis last year in March last year that to stop the war I think this is part of their attempts to end their military intervention in Yemen. First they replaced Hadi, President Hadi by presidential council which was one of the Houthi demands and also because Hadi has become a burden for the Saudis have become a burden for the Saudis so they have to get rid of him and also they try to negotiate it with the Iranian and it seems this negotiation goes far somehow but I have to clarify that the Iranian they can influence the Houthis especially in the decisions that are regarding the peace and war with the Saudis but since some internal issues they can't influence the Iranian and the Houthis on it. For example I think for the Houthis it could be an internal demand it's not something also it's not only a regional demand it is for them because they want to establish their own state they already they already start to establish their own state they change they change the education curriculum or what all their behaviors inside Sana'a seems that they are going to take this state and they are not going to to concede this this power in this areas for sharing power with anyone else so I think the Houthis they are establishing their own state according to their vision which is a religious division it is a bureaucratic state and they want a financial resources for this state which is Marib can provide this financial resources and also I think they want also to unify what was known as the Northern Yemen before the unity in 1990 so I think Marib is for them it is an internal demand it's not an Iranian one so the Iranian can influence the Houthis this is true but to what extent in some internal issues I don't think they can influence them and they can't limit their impressions especially in the internal uh in the internal level uh this is my first intervention thank you thank you Nadva would you like to go next um yeah so the the I agree with that may say nothing is surprising uh the one very important thing that happened is Hadi's removal um and I think that's a good thing um and a little overdue Hadi was not a good leader um and his lack of leadership created divisions within the anti-Houthi forces which you know fed into um which kind of played into the hands of the Houthis um militarily um and um and so this could potentially open up the opportunity to kind of unite anti-Houthi forces politically as well as militarily and that could be you know one step towards peace um if things work well between the eight members um I mean these are eight members every one of them have a different agenda and their backers also have different agendas the Emirates and the Saudis have different agendas so if the agendas did not align this could be this could make Yemen's conflict 10 times or eight times more complicated Adam what do you think were kind of the most important uh or interesting takeaways from the last month or so in Yemen? I mean I think all of the points that have already made are quite are quite um are quite valid one thing I mean just based on my own personal experience I happened to be in Aden basically up until maybe a week before uh actually yeah up until three or four days before the the GCC consultation started and what was interesting that is there's been a real shift in terms of the tone and momentum of how um how different political factions have been speaking to each other so on the ground in Aden for most of March despite everything it was quite a competitive tone you know different factions were looking at you know if you look at areas particularly Shaba was emerging as a major flashpoint uh with different political groupings really non-violently but the political competition was was quite strong the tensions were were quite palpable both in Shaba and on the west coast what you've seen that's dramatically changed now is a shift towards at least for the moment a more collaborative um and cooperative um politics between different groups in the anti-Houthi front um you know to some extent I've joked calling the the Riyadh consultations a handshaking festival but at the same time there's nothing wrong with the handshaking festival in terms of it does suit a particular set of means and if it does shift sort of the team the tone of everything and it does shift the momentum perhaps that can have significant follow-on effects with the rest of the conflict of course what the Houthis are thinking is the elephant in the room um for the Houthis and many other and their allies in Sana'a um a lot of what's happened in Riyadh they've been remained quite at least publicly and to some extent privately dismissive of what's happening in Riyadh so in a way the ball really is in there is is to some extent in their court and I think you've seen as this truce has extended tensions starting to emerge different factions within the Houthis or Ansar Allah figures sort of raising issues with what they view as unfulfilled elements of of the ceasefire um we can all debate whether or not that's valid or not um and and the fine points of that but the larger point is the fact that it shows that there is um a new stage potentially is about is about to emerge um and and we'll see how that goes of course the speed of shuttle diplomacy from key international factions I think has never been has never been as high um but I mean it comes down to the fact of of what people ultimately see as their red lines or their must-haves on the ground Abdul-Lasya you're working in Sana'a with Oxfam can you update us on the the humanitarian situation on the ground do you see anything that's changed as a result of of the truce um and and could you also comment on maybe the likely effects of of rising global food prices that we've seen recently due to the war in Ukraine uh yeah thanks I'll be happy to do that Alex and yeah before I do that maybe just one one short comment on on the first question um I think the the truth is is very interesting because this is the first time in six years you know both parties have a sort of committed to to a truce that long and we know of the history uh in the previous years uh uh parties have failed to commit to uh uh did the uh numerous uh uh attempts from the international community to bring them into the table um and also the the replacement of Hadi is is an interesting um it uh um it represents a change especially in the the south but it's yet you know for civilians to see the real change in on the ground especially that the same cabinet the same structure is is running the show for the past seven years um but in general the truce represents an ample opportunity for for all parties to uh make or or bring about a tangible change for for civilians uh which we are yet to see um on the humanitarian situation it is uh or it remains a dire with the families still struggling to survive um uh amid shrinking economic opportunities uh the people are still suffering or experiencing the lack of salaries uh price inflations and deteriorating services and conditions uh food is available in the markets in large quantities however uh not everyone can afford them actually the majority of the population can afford that uh the the foods on top of that also the humanitarian response is uh underfunded and if it remains so uh it will risk the suspension or reduction of uh life saving aid um the uh what we have been witnessing in the past one month and and almost nine 10 days now since the start of the truce um is that there was a remarkable reduction in violence and in in in security uh these are the the key outcomes of this truce also access has improved you know both for civilian movements as well as for humanitarian access um uh humanitarian actors were able to reach hard to reach or or no go areas uh roads in some key areas including Odeida um have been open for the first time in in in four years and the overall security situation has improved with much enhanced access uh for movement across government rates also public utility services especially in the southern part of the country has enhanced and this has to do with the presence of the government in in Adan also the the uh uh the the starts of the parliament sessions in in in Adan as well um and uh this will have you know further effect if it continues because people will have a sort of you know rebuild the trust with the system and also they will institutions will will also be effective uh fearing accountability at least from the presence of the government and and uh that sort of consensus among the different factions in the government is quite promising because it it uh uh it brings back stability especially in the especially with the reduced political tension in the in the south um coming to the ukraine crisis it had a major impact on the prices of key commodities in in Yemen as as most of you all know that Yemen uh imports over 90 percent of its foods medicine and ukraine is an important source for the imports especially of key commodities like wheat and uh oil now million uh haven't seen their salaries you know for four years and and some see it delayed for up to six months and even when salaries are available they are not even enough because the average value of the salary is still the same compared to the pre-conflict level and this you know leaves the people struggling especially with the deterioration of the currency and also you know this leaves families hostage to to debts forcing them to sell their personal assets belongings and also you know they further lose hope uh for uh progression over thank you um for folks in the audience please feel free to drop your questions uh and we'll we'll try to integrate as many of those as possible into the conversation so we have a question um from Muhammad El-Shanawi of Voice of America what could make or break a peaceful settlement in the war in Yemen and and I'll add to that maybe what um what are after the title of this event what do you see as maybe the prospects for peace and how that has changed over the past um month and in few days um Maesa would you like to start oh you're on mute uh definitely for the Saudis they have many more motivation to stop the war because this war um it is a disaster for them for the repetition for the economy for many things um for the Saudis I think they they are under international pressure these days and there is a kind of popular recentment in Sanaa and other areas because of the oil crisis because of uh the crisis of the oil and the gas and um there are many accusations that the main reason it is their corruption and the black market it's not about the blue gate and the war as they said so there is an increase in recentment that you can see it in the social media you can you hear it always from your family from our families from our friends in Sanaa so they are under pressure and they need uh they need to um and they need to apply their vision I mean they have a vision uh in ruling Yemen I I don't agree with it but they have this vision and this they want to apply it in a peace way not in a peace way to apply it I mean in state in and state that it is internationally recognized it's not necessary to be independent the state it could be a very loose federal state um a very decentralized state and they have a kind of of their autonomy in their areas but um I mean they they want to establish their own state I think they have their network that they want to benefit from uh ending this war but definitely they have a big military wing and it's a very radical one and also it is very connected to Iran so also the Iranian intervention here it is very critical to uh to to lay some pressure on the Houthis uh to stop the war thank you um Nadwa what do you think about uh prospects for peace um I mean the Houthis like Maissa said the Houthis have a very radical uh political ideology and their vision is to control all of Yemen and liberate Meccan Jerusalem and that's no joke that is that's at the core of their vision um and if they have sitbacks they might kind of you know slow down just to recharge and and then resume um they're not going to stop military operations because it goes against their vision it goes against their goal um and so I don't see uh any they're they're also part of you know Iran's expansionist agenda in the region I can't talk about Iran uh but I I know that the Houthis um are not going to stop voluntarily they're not going to compromise they're not going to accept the power share unless they are the they are in control um so in my opinion the only way to bring peace is to weaken the Houthis militarily uh no we've seen the Houthis soften a little bit after the operations in uh in Shabua pushed them up to the you know the giant forces pushed them out of Shabua and parts of Marib um and and it's it's the Houthis way whenever they feel threatened militarily they soften so that the other side slows down and then they they they take that opportunity to reposition their forces and they've been repositioning their forces into Marib um they've they haven't respected this truce um and so if you know they need to be weakened militarily in order to open up you know an opportunity for peace um the problem was that I don't know if that is what the Saudis and the other Yemeni forces want um in yeah I know that the other Yemeni forces want to weaken the Houthis militarily but they're entirely or almost entirely um subject to the positions and the decision of the Saudis and the Emiratis and I don't know where the Saudis and the Emiratis stand it seems to me that the Saudis I agree with myself they do want to end this conflict they do want to end their military intervention but I think they're confused how to do that without you know um military pressure and I don't think that they're interested in a serious military pressure that will weaken the Houthis and you know bring them to a point where they feel that a peace settlement is their best alternative. Adam you mentioned that the Houthis are kind of and where they're they're looking is this kind of the elephant in the room here and Nadwa mentioned that there have been some violations of of the ceasefire could you talk a bit about kind of how you see um the Houthis fitting into all of this and what are the the prospects for them to to potentially come to a peace agreement? I mean there's a few wider elements and I guess it's almost like how they fit in with with everything it's not necessarily even about their own internal thinking. One I mean this is a war that has its manifestations all over Yemen but I think the more it looks at it if you look at the bulk of the fighting it's been concentrated in a few areas and unfortunately for the people that live there it has been so much of the fighting has become concentrated just in a single small strip of matter when you look at it and it's like sometimes I increasingly wonder whether the bulk of the fighting could be concentrated in just a handful of districts in there I've been definitely in the sense that this has become when you look at the Houthi forces and powers and Sana'a's assessment of what they want what they need out of the war etc both need in terms of how they view the economic situation need in terms of how they view resources and need as in terms of having something to give to their constituents. I I do wonder to what extent the battle for MADUP could go on quite indefinitely and if you look I mean Sotawa has been an active frontline since since before Decisive Storm even started it's it's astounding how long this could go on. Two I think you have had at least prior to the Riyadh consultations you had a situation where despite the fact that all of the all of the parties that are against the Houthis are saying we are going to fight the Houthis they were focusing more on competition between themselves in areas where the Houthis are no longer are no longer present so for example it's very easy if you were say one of the anti-Houthi factions to say you know we want to go we're going to take land but it's much it's much harder to take land from the Houthis than it is to go against one of the other anti-Houthi factions in their area that sort of battle for influence and you've seen that manifest itself in places like Taiz in Shabwa in even in Aden to some extent in Hadremot so the real question is has the foundation of this presidential council and the theoretical inflection point of the Riyadh consultations has that changed that are the anti-Houthi factions now whether due to certain agreements that have been made the encouragement of their of their funders are they now more willing to work together to fight the Houthis because that could be that could be a game changer if you have had theoretically coordination between all of the key different fronts you know Tardex guys in the national resistance pushing on the west coast the STC guys pushing on their respective fronts the people in Mata pushing their tribal resistance you know etc etc that could be a game changer but I think it remains to be seen whether that's going to happen and I think essentially the ultimate fate of this presidential council also remains remains open this can be a council of peace you know this could be the group that goes and negotiates directly with the Houthis leads negotiations for some sort of peace settlement it could also be you know a council of war in terms of something that provides some sort of manifestation you know the unification of the fronts that could help to greater mobilize the efforts against the Houthis or the third option is you continue sort of the the broader pattern of the past few years just in a new face you know this kind of slow motion muddling on fits and starts a war of attrition etc etc and of course the unfortunate part of a war of attrition is it'll continue to be hurt I mean it will hurt the entire country but it will hurt people in a small handful of places the most let's face it it will hurt people in Mata, Thais etc but Sada always gets hit hard so we'll see we'll see what happens moving forward Abdul-Lasya as part of the the truce agreement there were also pieces about allowing some commercial flights into Sanaa and and fuel shipments into Hodea port and a conversation around opening the roads to Thais can you talk about how how implementation of those pieces of the truce has has happened is it happening and also kind of how will that potentially affect the humanitarian situation? Yeah well you know this what makes the truce itself you know over the past couple of weeks now we have seen parties not agreeing on certain aspects or bits and details including on the reopening of the Sanaa airport a better data have been some differences on some details related to passports and all that and I think these are gaps that the international community should invest on you know when when considering pushing for an extension of this truce now when it comes to the Hodea port we have seen a good flow of fuel to the northern part of Yemen through the Hodea port fuel has been one major issue you know for the northern areas because the Hodea is happening importing fuel through the Hodea port and with all those inspection processes constraining the smooth flow of fuel imports this has resulted in you know shocks to prices it contributed to increasing prices it affected even life-saving sectors like health now for example in some and other governors we have been witnessing before the truce we have been witnessing a severe fuel shortage that led to severe impacts on prices where people they already struggled you know to find or to afford prices and I think you know when we're talking about prospects for peace I think this is an ample opportunity you know since we have seen this unprecedented agreement between all parties that the international community should maybe invest in in bridging those gaps and solidifying you know an agreement maybe by pushing first for an extension of the truce and maybe engage different regional actors those who maybe the Routes perceive as neutral including the Omanis the Kuwaitis we have seen how the Omanis have done or were effective over the past month with their missions you know to Sana'a and and actually managing to get a lot of things done and and I think we should we should build on on on these developments because I think all these factors play major role in shaping the prospects for a lasting peace in Yemen. Mesa you have written about the the how the presidential council reflects the political and military situation on the ground but also that it could end up kind of reinforcing the divisions that have become deeper throughout the war we've talked about a little bit about how the presidential council could become a council of war or a council of peace what do you foresee for the presidential council and and its potential contributions towards a longer-term peace or not? Yes in the statement and the first speech of the president of the presidential council they talk about the Houthis as Ansar Allah and they are willing to negotiate with them so they say we are going to fight in defense so there is no longer talking about any kind of retrieving Sana'a or returning to returning the legitimate government to Sana'a or all these things or even forcing the what is called the three references the three references which is which is the UN resolution and the first of the war it is 2026 and the national dialogue conference outcomes and third the one it is the GCC initiative so it is no longer no one talk about this references and definitely the Houthis especially the UN resolution they refuse this political references and they want to establish a new situation according to what the war results resulted so what happened it is that this presidential council it is a result of this war so the Houthis can join this presidential council because this criteria it is not something belonged to Yemen before the war it doesn't belong to the Yemeni constitution it is something that represents what happened during this war what had what had happened during this war what militia that have been emerged during this war and this militias now they are representing in this presidential council and the Houthis they can represent themselves as well as any other forces or militia or whatever we can call them now so I think this presidential council is a turning point about the truth it's about the political will of both parties I have to say that the coalition their appetite their military appetite stopped or it's becoming very low after ending after the international intervention to end the the coalition advance in the western coast in Tehama after the agreement of Stockholm in December 19th in December 2017 after that that coalition appetite to expand in Yemen military militarily wise there is no appetite so I think all what they want is to protect their areas to make to keep the division in Yemen and to keep controlling the areas that none Houthi controlled area which is which they have now and they keep it this is all their ambitious now so it's about the Houthis if they are if they are going to join in this to be serious now and to stop dreaming in Marib because as I said Marib is important for them for their own state for their what they what they dream in this state and they need financial resources so and also if happened if it happened that the truth collapsed and now the Marib it is most probably Marib will be the next bottle after this truth if it collapsed so it depends to the results of the problem in Marib if it's in favor of the Houthis which will weaken a lot the position of the the coalition and the allies the Yemeni allies with the coalition or it will be in the favor of that coalition and they protect Marib and Marib didn't fall in the hands of the Houthis so this will keep the situation as it is now. Nadwa you have written about the role of local mediators and tribal leaders in preventing violence and negotiating the release of prisoners for example what roles do you see local leaders playing in mediation efforts and how might those sort of local effort efforts be linked up to the national level and the UN process. Yeah I mean the tribes have have actually been instrumental in maintaining order and stability and security in Yemen since the beginning of the war and well before the war they they provide justice they resolve conflicts they've been instrumental in exchange of thousands of prisoners and they have also helped protect civilians evacuating civilians from you know conflict areas negotiating passage for civilians and the interesting part about tribes is that during conflicts tribes actually tribes have revenge killings and conflicts amongst them which they managed to contain but when there is a conflict they also freeze their internal conflicts freeze their revenge killing and tribal conflicts and one of the really interesting things that I've seen over the past few years is that a lot of the tribal in tribal areas some conflicts that have been around for decades have been resolved like really complicated land disputes and revenge killings so and that's tribes way of neutralizing their internal conflicts in order to avoid the potential for the war or external conflicts to come and and disabilize them. The the tribes cannot the tribes the influence of the tribes is really at the local level in their areas within the tribal areas between tribes so they function at that level the tribes cannot influence when it comes to political conflicts and national level conflicts the tribes don't have the leverage or influence to change those dynamics or to pressure the conflict parties to even de-escalate again you know the the maximum thing they can do at that front is really prisoner exchange and allowing passage for civilians and things like that but if the conflict parties and that's a big if if they did decide to in the conflict if they decided to commit seriously commit to the ceasefire including the Houthis if they decide to commit the ceasefire and de-escalation the tribes can be very the tribes will be instrumental in kind of implementing the ceasefire mechanisms and at the local level so what they can do they can open roads they can negotiate open roads and there's a lot of negotiations about open roads it's not just going to be okay we're going to open the road there's a lot of logistics that go into that and the tribes can help with that they can negotiate the release of prisoners they can negotiate for example clearing land mines protecting certain public facilities and making them again accessible to civilians and you know others as well um they can also help implement the ceasefire if there are you know uh uh you know uh the parties agree on certain you know process to implement the ceasefire and you know the one thing is the international community does not need to engage the tribes because the conflict parties actually will use the tribes it's it's the to-go mechanism for every Yemeni politician every Yemeni you know um power uh you know um player you know since the beginning of time they will use the tribes automatically because again a lot of these people in power also come from tribes you know half of the presidential council come from tribal background most of the people in the military commanders and others come from tribes so it is embedded in Yemen's rich peace building and de-escalation mechanisms and so right now they can help mitigate the conflict at the local level make it a little you know easier on civilians but if there is a genuine ceasefire genuine commitment to ceasefire um in de-escalation and end the conflict uh the tribes will will be the main uh element of it in terms of implementation thanks i'm going to um pull out a few questions from the audience and and kind of throw them out and um maybe you all can decide which ones you'd like to answer and just a reminder for folks in the audience please um leave us your questions so uh we have a question from Hannah Porter how do southern secessionists feel about Zubaiti's membership in the presidential council do they see it as a win for the southern cause or a betrayal of it um another audience member asks whether you could elaborate about future scenarios in in marib especially if the truce collapses um i'll take the southern one i guess um i think with regards to by and large i think it's when you one of the things that people don't appreciate enough about the stc is the extent that they have been playing a long game um i think a lot of times because i mean going back particularly pre pre-war um and then going back even further pre-2011 the south has been marginalized in many sana not just the south all of all of the areas outside of the sana ali but particularly the south has been largely marginalized in sana centric um narratives regarding regarding Yemen so it is i would say when you look at how the stc is playing is playing things strategically in terms of incorporating and the networks that ended up for that matter the networks also that ended up making up the stc have played in terms of incorporating themselves within power structures in order to create their own networks um i would say that in a lot of ways having ideas in this position is is a significant victory for them this is a legitimization of the stc by in some cases literally people who are now members of the of the council who are extremely critical of the stc and said you know you know rather you know you can say things that now look quite radical by comparison considering they're all shaking hands and hanging out in riyadh together um i would say that the for the vast majority there is has always been this tension before the stc even existed between sort of the formal southern movement leaders and leadership and and the frustration on the streets and there's always going to be that tension between um you know the aspirations of immediate succession and the immediate restoration of the states and all of these things and and what is is politically possible perhaps um but moving forward i think this does represent um a potential opportunity for a shift in how in how all of this is done you know for the vast majority yes i was governor of adhan yes lemnos was governor of shabwa yes uh you know after the riyadh agreement lemnos was named was named um the governor of governor of adhan that being said i think by and large the way it's kind of been in terms of incorporation has not worked as of yet so now we get to see whether it was a matter of of the structure or not and i think there is a there is a sense of this from people i speak to uh that this shift in the structure um does present a potential new opportunity um that being said i don't think anyone is is overly optimistic um and i think there does you know let's let's face it in in many regards the past five six seven years have have only served to increase um separate to a secessionist uh pro restoration of the state to whatever you want to call it uh sentiments about southerners among southerners over uh abdel wasya do you um on the question of marib uh has i know there have been some violations of of the truce there but has has the truce allowed for uh an alleviation of of the humanitarian situation in there and how are you um and and humanitarian sort of thinking about uh the future of marib um yeah well obviously the truce was um a good outcome in terms of the reduced violence um usually when fighting and and as adam mentioned the serwa and other fronts in marib have seen massive fighting and um you know the displacement was on daily basis and and that has meant increase the needs and and more people you know push to areas where where they cannot easily access services and and some families as well you know had to walk for days uh to get to safer places and um yes there have been some minor clashes here and there but uh the the reducing violence and and um across the different front lines in marib um has been significant and um by the end of this truce you know where we're i mean from my own point of view is that you know where we may be faced with two possible scenarios maybe an extension of the truce and um another scenario would be a total breakout of fighting uh and and marib would see the the you know the the the most share of it of the fighting especially across the the different front lines in the south with you know already reports uh indicating that there has been reinforcements to the um uh cost or or to the lines of uh the front lines in in marib um and and that's why you know we i mean the the narrative of the good narrative is always to support peaceful processes and and to uh because we have seen how seven years of conflict of military operations have resulted in in a um a good outcome it it's always um adding up to the burdens and to the multi-layered crisis people have facing and the suffering of of civilians and and and this is all happening while we are facing a an unprecedented shortfall of funding and that means uh we're not able to help everyone and and the uh the the scale of the crisis in marib is uh way bigger than the humanitarian community can can do anything you know to uh to uh alleviate the suffering of the people there oh i think this is a good question for for nadva but maybe others will like to chime in as well um this is from jasmine faruki from mercy corps how strong would you characterize um the presidential leadership councils current command and control over their respective factions on the ground um and do you expect that the this could help up overcome opposition at lower levels um wow okay that's a really good question so um there are three uh members four members of the presidential council who command different forces you have tariff salih and command at the forces in the west coast um which includes mainly the national resistance but also some of the tihama brigades um you have um uh elma harami abu zera elma harami who's uh who commands the giant forces which is probably one of the strongest military forces on the ground uh backed by the maraudis um you have uh bahsani uh farajah bahsani who commands the uh second military region the elite forces hadram elite forces about 20 000 soldiers um the s t is idris is also sdc commands um most of the forces in adan and and surrounding areas um and so these are four differences of forces that are under four different you know command centers the president of the the council does not really control any forces um and so that's the other part and adan talked about that a little bit you know i mean the entire houthi forces had a history of you know fighting among themselves um and it wouldn't be a surprise if that manifests in the coming years um i mean if they unite they will make a formidable force and they can weaken the houthis militarily but then how are we going to move from that to bringing all these forces under you know unified command of control it will be a challenge and i think you know in my opinion this will be the reality of human's future it will be multiple forces and there are multiple command structures and i don't think it will be possible to unite them any any time in the near future i mean that's giving the you know very optimistic scenario of you know weakening the houthis and then kind of you know prevailing for these forces um but if the houthis are not weakened then you know i think we will see um you know we will see this this situation where you know you have all these forces and then they clash with the houthis kind of low low intensity conflict um and you know i i think that that's likely to continue to happen um provided that the houthis don't take matter if the houthis take matter then that's a whole different scenario but you know to respond to the question i don't think we will see uh military or security forces in them and under a united command and control structure or even two united command and control structures um anytime soon may said um do you have thoughts about the connections between those members of the presidential leadership council and and the forces on the ground yeah um first of all all of the all of the presidential council it is in the host of al-darrus's ability because al-darrus's ability forces controlling adan and controlling tamash iqbalas where they live all of them so this is a big achievement it is a big credit for him and make him the strongest man inside the presidential council because he's the one who can decide if they can gather in adan or not if they can stay in adan or not he's the one who said that so i don't know if they can balance this situation after white because the the head of this presidential council he doesn't have forces he's the only one who doesn't have any forces actually she's a very unique situation it's a it's a very weird one actually and this uh and actually i will say they will not fight each other since there is coordination between the Saudis and the ua because it is a result of the coordination between the ua and the the Saudi Arabia uh if there is a kind and definitely there is a history of competition between them inside yemen so i can say this can last for long um this kind of collective ruling i have to say it can work for temporary period but for long one it's very difficult uh that executed yeah i mean the top authority in the country to be to be ruled by different people by different forces but this is this the situation of yemen now the state they doesn't have uh the biggest military power as it is in everywhere in the world it should be and it should be before it was the state the situation of yemen before the war that the state okay there is an armed society but the state has the biggest military power in the state uh now the situation is different um we have tariff salah it is in the western coast we have atman nijalli um he doesn't have that big power he's his importance coming from being an enemy for the houthis and he's a tribal chief from saada um definitely bohsini he represents hadramot this is very important for him and it's very interesting that two of the military two members in the military council they are also governors for example susana arada is he is a the governor of marib and the bohsini he is the governor of hadramot and they still until now they are keeping the two positions which is i mean it raised many questions about what is the future of this governance and it should be a new governor in this place especially bohsini i mean okay susana arada i would say it is an exceptional situation because he's facing the houthis okay i will say that but what about al bohsini in hadramot so there are many questions i have to say also there was a legal committee should be formed to set the regulation of the residential council and it's it never gathered and because even the head of this committee he apologized and said he will not take this position um definitely i have to clarify that the economic situation threatened everyone inside yemen treating the houthis treating even the stc i mean the priority of the stc decreased a lot because of this economic situation so now which is the biggest test that is facing the the residential council it is the economic situation now the summer is coming the electricity in adan what about the situation of electricity in adan this is this is the real test this is the real challenge otherwise the other things is not important for the people what concerns the people it is the living conditions it is the economic situation if their problems will not be addressed so there will be their anger will be against everyone even the stc so it is the biggest challenge for everyone in yemen in the economic situation thank you so for those of us who are um kind of following this from from the perspective of us policy i wanted to ask each of you if you were able to brief the biden administration right now and what the united states should be doing um what would you tell them and what what should the role of the us of the us special envoy um the international community even what should their role be in uh hopefully increasing the likelihood of a sustainable peace and helping to alleviate or stabilize the humanitarian situation um adam do you want to start i don't particularly want to start but i guess i have a choice um she called me out um if i was advising i would say i mean i would say one of the biggest things is to know is to know the limits and i think the limits of and i say this with with all due respect to all of the actors involved the limits of of different countries were dramatically uh underlined by the conference that was held by the gc's or the consultations were held by the gcc in in riyadh this showed that certain countries certain actors namely the saudi arabia particularly the gcc is an institution and the ua e have a far greater capacity than than other actors in that are that are putting it in yemen right um if you compare what was happening the buzz etc would say the gcc consultations versus the consultations that happened just before uh they were held by oseski it was it was quite notable right um but that's because certain countries have the leverage they have the power they they have yemen in their backyard so to speak um not of course not to say that the us uk and other key powers don't have um and key global powers don't have significant leverage in yemen but the flavor of it is different i think when it comes to different powers so it's in that kind of i would say embracing complementarity um and keeping lines of communication open um i mean i remember a few years ago there were questions of people you know the idea of speaking with the stc was was kind of something that was people raised questions about now the stc is there the legitimizes the mainstream political political movement um so i think and finally i would say there needs to be a focus on what is actually happening in the ground rather than what is happening in various exile locus of of exile political activity um in some regards you know it feels like it's a completely different world in terms of what's happening on the ground in yemen and this is not just in whether it's areas that are under control of the de facto authorities based in sanah uh whether we're speaking of a then whether we're speaking to whatever there's a whole new political roadmap that's emerged to some extent yes this political council the the presidential council rather does reflect that to a greater extent than what was there before but that doesn't change the fact that there is a remarkable disconnect between policy on yemen you know whatever and what's actually happening on yemen and the only really way to combat that is spending more time on the ground which i understand is difficult through the security situation but but not impossible because you have seen progressive improvements in that particularly with visits earlier this year from the europeans and the americans or at least the europeans to uh to sanah and a then other parts of the country and the americans to uh to visit basini and sheik awad um in shabwan haldramot um and i think i mean but then it all comes into the biggest the biggest larger conceit of regardless of what we think about it um the yemen that existed before this conflict no longer exists and we need to sort of move on and deal with that i more than as much as anyone else in the world would love to go into time machine if there was a magic fix that brought yemen back the way it used to be it would be pretty great i had a great time in sanah before all of this happens you know loves it fantastic but it's it's never gonna happen um so we need to disabuse ourselves with the notion that you can put things back in pandora's box pandora's box has been open the spirits have been floating around uh freely for now six seven eight possibly more years now so the only thing moving forward is something that will be a solution that is input that is reflecting um the inside and it as interpreted and put into framework by outside parties to lack of a better way to put it rather than something that is imposed from the outside and i think if there's one thing of the past if we want to say 10 possibly more years of yemen history show and regional history it's not a yemen thing you know solutions imposed from the outside um tend to have a pretty limited shelf life um look at the Stockholm agreement uh and that's my two to seven cents um mesa what what should the biden administration be doing yeah the problem in the us um there is no actually there is no consistency in yemen i mean in tram he will leave the file of yemen to the sodies and by the no the sodies they are the wrong people they are the bad guys and we have to be against them it's not about that it's not about it's about it's always a reaction to what the relationship between the us and the so maybe it's not about yemen they are always handling the yemeny fight from this perspective i can understand they have many interests with the sodies and nothing about yemen but even if you are dealing with yemen if you don't have interests with yemen and you have interests with the sodies i think you should if you're if the Saudi Arabia is your ally or you are nothing good terms with them you should have um a kind of consensus consistency with yemen um for example to secure at least the cost to secure at least the region because it's a long borders between the sodies and the yemenis even between the yemenis and the omanis so it's important to protect this entity to make it at least a relatively stable and it's not freeing their neighbors so i think they have first of all to realize that yemen is yemen it's not only south south of Saudi Arabia so yemen has its own problems and it's not about Saudi Arabia and Iran only it's about many complicated issues and it can be solved totally it's not can't it can be completely solved but it can be at least reduced the bad consequences or the negative consequences of the many conflicts inside yemen and decrease the degree of this complex um this is the issue i mean they they can and they have to realize that they have limitation in in their intervention in Yemen especially with the Houthis and um and they can do some pressure on the Saudis maybe on that and i think the Houthis they couldn't do some pressure on the omanis if they can't do pressure on the Oranians the omanis they are allies they are not neutral and they provide for the Houthis many logistics many service the Houthis cannot live without them so the omanis you can reach to the Houthis through the omanis if you can't reach to them through the Iranians because it's very difficult for you so at least the omanis they are a good a good area that you can do your pressure with them because you have good relationship with the omanis and they can't and and they need they need the US and they need the western to have good relationship with the west so i think you have to balance your situation if you want a relatively stable place in Yemen so you have to do pressure and with the Saudis and Houthis and recognize there is no good guy in Yemen it's everything is bad and all what you can do is to use the negative consequences thank you thank you Abdul-Lasya what should the international community and the United States be doing from your perspective yeah i think the US should invest maybe more in the great work that is being carried out by its invoiling the king and i think one key step is to secure an extension to the truth and maybe continue support for the UN working with with the its allies in the region especially those regional actors including Oman as Mesa mentioned and i get that we always you know mention Iran if if the US also can do is to eliminate you know that line of supports if if if it's evident and it can be effective in ending the conflict i think also the US could and also the international community could push on back on the hard potential decisions that would have huge humanitarian and economic impacts on the Yemeni people including the blanket designations and that would have you know huge humanitarian and economic impacts in Yemen and also where it has leverage the US could support to to ensure there is an accountability mechanism in Yemen which we don't have since the the GE was voted to expire back in October 2021 and also what is also important is that the US could use its leverage with the IRG to ensure women are engaged and civil society are engaged also in peace processes now we see that the the presidential council has no women zero representation of women the committee for the reconciliation reconciliation and consultations has only two women out of 15 members which is quite shameful and it's a failure you know to uphold the commitments to empower women and it is important also that the US ensures funds are being provided for the humanitarian response it could use its leverage on the US and on the UAE and Saudi Arabia to provide funds to the humanitarian response as well and and maybe more investment on peace than on arms deeds that's all I have to say thanks Ned well I'll give you the last word what what should the US and the Biden administration be doing yeah thank you um I so I would say um watch how you use your leverage the US has leverage on the Saudis has leverage on the government Yemeni government it does not have leverage on the Houthis and when you apply pressure on one side um most likely automatically uh help the other side and we've seen what happened after the Stockholm agreement when the US pressured the Saudis and the Emirates and the government to stop the um you know operation uh to liberate Hodeida from the Houthis and how the Houthis then repositioned their forces and made massive military gains and how that further complicated the conflict in Yemen and played into the hands of the Houthis militarily so that's one thing um I agree with Adam and and with everything that my my uh the other kind of said um we have to be realistic uh stitching Yemen back together is not going to happen um and if a peace settlement looks great on paper you know a unity government or a political settlement where the Houthis and every other party will come together uh it does not mean that it can translate and we've seen that in 2011 and 12 how the GCC agreement seemed to be great on paper but then it actually it actually planted the seeds for the current war um so be realistic uh use your leverage to help Yemen um one piece at a time uh right now I think you know the Yemen conflict is is complex uh it's probably going to continue for a while so focus having said that there are areas in Yemen that are stable there are a lot of things that can be done to help mitigate the impact of the conflict and kind of build blocks for future peace so focus on things that you can do which is supporting local economy supporting local governance um you know uh training supporting local forces not in terms of fighting but also but supporting local forces um training them on laws international humanitarian law you know this way you can promote accountability um and and again don't pressure or don't sign don't use your political pressure to uh to force a premature political settlement um um also I think one important thing that the areas can do is help with the slaughter tanker this tanker if explodes or if spills uh into the the sea it would cause you know the worst the worst environmental disasters we've seen in the region um and right now the UN needs only 144 million dollars to fix it and if it spells the cost for cleaning up only would be 20 billion dollars so and the UN is struggling to secure the money so contribute to that but also talk to the Saudis and the Emiratis to contribute money to that kind of use their political pressure and your leverage on the Saudis and the Emiratis to force them to contribute to that fund um so final word Yemen is complex embrace the complexity thank you I want to thank all all four of these panels so much for taking time out of your mornings and evenings to um speak with us and and thanks to new america's events team for helping us uh to organize everything uh and and thanks for the audience for joining this conversation so until next time bye