 Yeah, thank you very much. The title changed it a little bit, but the paper is exactly the same. Yeah, you know, Tav and I recently met and decided that the title wasn't that clear, and it had this iteration of the word physical, so we went for empiricism, modality, and physical loss. The outline is just follow, I'll present the problem, then a brief outline of our proposal. I'll just mention the literature. I won't go through the details of the literature motivating the argument, but I'll mention the main, you know, authors with whom we engage. Then here's a first claim. We, as empiricists, we will introduce an ontological claim, then a second claim that would be what we call the egalitarian thesis. But then there'll be a question. Why if we are egalitarian and empiricist? Why would we bother to continue to talk about loss of nature? After responding to that, then we will introduce our third main thesis, which is actually a counter-argument to what we call a dogma, what we believe is a dogma on the loss of nature debate. And then there will be a response from mainly philosopher of physics who defend the primitive mathematical constraints theory. I'll end with a definition of physical loss, tentative definition of physical loss, and I'll just mention not address a few objections. So that's the plan for the talk. The problem is quite evident, so it doesn't need much motivation. Empiricism has historically faced several issues when dealing with nomic modality. In one reading, Hume Strip's way, the world from such features as causal powers or necessary connections and then most neo-Humans sub-OK one version or another of the best system account, which takes nomic modality to be just a property of theories, axioms in a theoretical system. So in every case, empiricism in the Humean tradition turns its back against the ray of modality, reducing it to a detailed property of beliefs, models, and theories. So what we try to do is well, fortunately, we recognize that Humean interpretations do not cover the whole spectrum for empiricists to work. So Humeanism and neo-Humans is one thing, but there are more other parts of the field where empiricists can work. So we try to, that's important, we try to elaborate a form of empiricism that accommodates modality as a future of physical domains. So the ray of modality in physical domains from an empiricist perspective. And we call it physical to distinguish it from mathematical, logical, or metaphysical modalities. In bio-physical laws, we argue, we provide a conceptual framework for arguing that laws inform us about physical possibilities and necessities in their respective domains. So that will be our working hypothesis. That's the definition that we want to defend here. Physical laws inform us about possibilities and necessities belonging to physical domains. And that's what I'll elaborate in the rest of this talk. But here, usually a problem arises, especially from people coming from severe training in the traditional standard base on laws of nature between Humeans and anti-Humans. They'll say, well, but you're not following the rules of the game. So you are not playing the same game because you are either Humean or you are anti-Humean, but you cannot have your cake and eat it too, and we think we can. So I'll try to move forward with that. Because if you're an empiricist, then you have to be a Humean and consider modalities just a property of beliefs, models, and theories. And if you want to have physical modality, then, okay, provide an interpretation and metaphysical interpretation of the grounding for that modality. And we don't want to do that. So we don't want to be Humeans nor anti-Humans. So what are we doing? So we're not playing the game. That's basically the response that we receive. We are really tired about that criticism in case you want to go for that. Now you can go for that, you don't worry. So this is the literature that we are engaging with. There is this beautiful chapter by Nancy Conprite, some lectures, chapter on modality in physics, Net Hall in the same book on a chapter on metaphysical modality. Hall basically argues that metaphysical modality ought to be reduced to physical modality. Then Tina and Ismael have these two very interesting contributions for a defense of modality from an empiricist perspective. John Norton recently published this chapter on how to make, say, possibility safe for empiricists. He doesn't always, he doesn't only speak about possibility, but also about, about necessities. So we follow Norton in some respects. But also we have in my contents a book on model empiricism, which I'll say is the most thorough elaboration of model empiricism in the literature. Anna Tavi and I seriously engage with your contributions. So we'll highlight points in which, apart from this literature, and of course I'll mention a few other references, but we do not directly address the other contributions. And I remember that I gave a talk thanks to your invitation online, and Alexander was saying, you must read Kenton's book, and we'll read it, we'll read the book. So thank you for your advice. So two key tenets that we take from these literature are these. This is almost literally to be found in Sam's chapter in physics. Theories of models are expressed in terms of mathematical structures, informing us about model features of physical systems. So Sam is breaking out. He says, model features of physical systems. And we take that literally. So we'll leave that model some theories to inform us about model features of the world. So that's a model reading of scientific theorizing and scientific modeling. And then we detect what we call the Ismael Regent Taitlima, or tension, the Ismael Regent tension. There is a tension there, but you have to sort out for the character of laws, because of course any attempt at adopting on the logical commitment regarding laws, good seem to lead us to endorse either humane or anti-humane views, and extremely highly qualified people fear that. Catherine Braving, for example, she fears that. Jean and Ismael, she's always careful about not being humane or anti-humane. And for example, Kenton, he says, here it is. So Kenton, we fully agree when you say that there are situated modalities, situated possibilities and necessities, and we think that's perfect. But in your book, you still say, well, and normal physical modality, that's metaphysical. So that's something different. I hope I'm getting that right. And we can discuss that. And then what we say is, no, all that there is, is Kenton's situated possibilities and necessities. A loss of nature are just that situated possibilities and necessities that we access to through empirical research. So by means of protection, experimentation, and so forth. And there is nothing like a super special, non-logical, metaphysical conception of modality. And then Jean and Ismael, in view of this tension, she goes so deep, the tension goes so deep that non-humane empiricists will be happy with endorsing shadows of laws. So that's meant for, of course, we don't want anti-humane approaches. We don't want humane approaches. So what we have is something shadowy, shadows of law. And that's what we try to verify a little bit here with our notion of physical modality. So that's our first claim. And it's usually where discussions stop, because that's kind of a foreword for an empiricist approach. As empiricists, we introduce this claim, which is heavily metaphysical. And Jean would say, we say, we live in a physically modelled world, being empiricist. We live in a physically modelled world, where possibilities and necessities are determined by the constitution, properties, or relations of physical domains. So as empiricists, we acknowledge that we live in a physically modelled world. And that modality is determined by the properties and relations of physical domains. Here's a simple example. Take the case of sodium chloride. South is soluble, we say, and that's a model claim. It's a model claim that depends upon not a linguistic convention. It doesn't depend on a metaphysical postage, on a metaphysical close. It just depends on the molecular structure of sodium chloride. So some may say, well, sodium chloride dissolves in solutes, assuming that the latter are not already saturated with salt. Well, that's a more refined model claim. And some other people would say, well, sodium chloride necessarily dissolves in solutes, granted that a certain set of ketary sparbous condition. And we're all happy with that. These aren't model claims about sodium chloride. And that's the kind of physical modality we have in mind. And here I may run into troubles, because we say the same goes for the invariance of the speed of light. The same goes. It's exactly the same physical modality, which is confirmed by various experiments, and which is independent from the weight source, and from the inertial frame of reference of the observer. So what we have here is two degrees, not two degrees, two scopes of generalizations informing gas-power physical modalities. And there is no difference in kind, in nature. It's just degrees. I tend to say degrees, but I'll try to avoid that word. They just express modality, physical modalities of different scopes. And as empiricists, we want to be egalitarian. So our claim that the world is physical model is egalitarian in this period, since we say that there is just physical modality. Logical and mathematical modality, they are all fine, but they are about language. And so-called metaphysical modalities can be either dispensed with, or they can be reinterpreted as physical modalities when suitable. So that's what we will try to do. And granted, the egalitarian thesis, there comes another piece of argument. Nomic modality is just physical modality. So it's nothing special. There is nothing making it different from the modality of this cup of water on this table. Nomic modality is just physical modality. And here, we're aware that we clash with a longstanding tradition that assigns laws a special place in ontology. For us, laws are not a special kind of fantasy. We need not understand them as, for example, God's commands or second-order relational universals, essential dispositions, nomic facts or counterfactuals, the fundamental structure of the world, or primitive mathematical constraints, which are all different metaphysical clauses for redressing physical modality and trying to keep safe the place of laws of nature in our scientific imaginary. So we don't want to go that way for empiricism. The soul goes unnecessarily too far. Some introduced strange posits, alien posits to scientific practice, and some rely on heavy reconstructions of the details that we get from fiscal laws, from the laws that we have. So here's the question that we usually receive back is, well, why would empiricism bother to talk about laws? In a separate world, that's just in brackets. In a separate work, from the perspective of history of science and science studies, we argue that we should actually do away with laws, because they are extremely conservative in ontological, epistemological, and political terms. The best would be to do away with the law's jargon and the law's posits. And we just can keep with different degrees of different fiscal modalities of various scopes and models and hypotheses and axioms, mathematical equations, structures, and so forth, whatever you will. But we say, well, the law's jargon and the ontological posit of laws of nature is, well, a Judeo-Christian. Let's put it this way. It involves the governing thing, and no, no, no. So it could be better to do away with that. So for the sake of the present argument, non-humane and empiricism can claim that laws are our best attempt at codifying physical possibilities and necessities and running from local and global modalities and from stochastic to deterministic system. So they basically express the generalizations about physical possibilities and necessities. And you can think of any laws. And what they do is to deliver generalizations of various scopes in their domain, as far as we understand them in scientific practice. And the difference in scope among these laws need not be grounded in metaphysically motivated ontological distinctions between different kinds of laws, fundamental and monological, for example, or no, no, no, no, between laws and accidents assaults shall argue, shall argue, but follows. So the law's pragmatic relevance is unquestionable for the empiricist. We can't keep laws if we want to deliver guides for building explanations and predictions and for deciding how to interact with both natural, natural laboratory settings. So we can use them as guides for deriving physically informative, sometimes physical informative inference. So here we come again to a clash with a dogma that I'm pretty sure you're all familiar with. Even if you don't work on the laws of nature debate, that's something that people believe as an article of faith. This is the dogma. Any theory of laws of nature ought to distinguish between laws and accidents. And if it doesn't do that, Mark Lane, for example, it's not a suitable theory of laws. It has to distinguish between laws and accidents or between nomic generalizations and accidental generalizations. And then, of course, the game begins. Recall the familiar example. This example, I think it's from Reichenbach or perhaps before him. All gold spheres have a time each of less than a mile. And the other statement, all uranium spheres have a time each of less than a mile. And then we begin, well, what can explain that? God's commands, they'll say, second order relational universals, essential dispositions, and so forth. And why? Because we want to find a ground for actually explaining why uranium spheres have a time each of less than a mile. Well, because if it was larger than that, it will run into immediate, I forgot the word, immediate, over here, fission. Yes, sorry, sorry about that. So what we say is that this distinction between these two clings is rhetorically powerful, but it's ontologically misleading. Think if you have, you know, two bottles, one with water, and one with pure alcohol, and you put them in the fridge. And you say, oh, one is frozen, and the other one is not. And that's what's going to happen. And then you will try to find, is it God's commands? Is it, you know, universals and so forth? Of course, the example of the gold sphere and the uranium sphere looks more scientific. So it seems more compelling, especially for those with, for people inclined to the metaphysical stance, seems more compelling to actually go on to the work and try to find the groundwork for the distinction. But we reject that. We follow two parts. So the first is the physical laws that we find out about through empirical research do not warrant an a priori nor an a posteriori categorical distinction between loss and accidents. There is no way to find an a priori categorical distinction between loss and accidents. There may be different generalizations of various scopes, but an a priori conceptual truth of loss of nature, you don't find something like that in any, you know, warranted way. And if you go for empirical evidence in the sciences, then, well, again, you won't find something that categorically allows you to distinguish between loss and accidents. As empiricists, here we go with the empirical stance, of course. So we declined the temptation to distinguish between loss and accidents by positing metaphysical or mathematical presuppositions, additional metaphysical clauses. So we declined going that way. And again, when it comes to physical laws, we only have a random supposedly design necessities here and there in various domains. And hence, we invite the audience to embrace the laws that we have and not the laws that we wish we have. So that's what way to go about it. And then second, empiricism embraces the ultimate, and we try at least to do so, to embrace the ultimate contingency of the physical world. Contingency appears in our most robust model claims about physical domains. Think, for example, again of the principle of the speed of light, which holds that nothing can travel faster than 299,792,458 meters per second. But for empiricism, this is not something one can discover or establish by conceptual analysis, but only through empirical investigation. As any other finding in empirical investigation, we may find out in the future that, well, the speed of light was different or that we didn't get it, you know, it's approximately, acceptably right. So although morally robust, it remains thoroughly contingent. No background logic, Otavio and Tchaikovsky say, no background logic or mathematics make this numerical value the unavoidable value of light's speed. No amount of a priori reflection alone will render it inevitable. And then, especially from the philosophy of physics, people would say, well, but we have primitive mathematical constraints. So here I'm approaching the end of the presentation. We have primitive mathematical constraints. The PMC theory would say certain mathematical truths, certain mathematical facts constrain physical possibilities and necessities. So in the 17th century, we have got, 21st century, we have mathematics. Mathematics will act as a constraint on physical possibilities and physical necessities. Or so the rhetoric goes. The rhetoric is super heavy in this literature. Here's an example by Tim Motley. So he says, in each case of a law expressed in a differential equation, in each case, there are models or solutions of the equations from these mathematical results, model conclusions flow like what's from an open spigot. All one does is to treat a set, the set of mathematical models of the basic dynamical equations as the possible worlds in a standard model semantics. A set of events is physically possible only if there is a mathematical model or the fundamental dynamical laws that corresponds to those events taking place. We can talk about that for a couple of hours, at least. There are, yeah, there is a set of assumptions in this passage about what I want to call your attention to is to the force of the rhetoric that says that you have a set of mathematical equations and then you work out solutions of those mathematical equations and you'll get information about events, physical events that are physically possible or physically necessary. And that modality, physical modality will flow from there like water from spigot, from a spigot. Yeah, because of course in the philosophy of physics this is usually said in another sense, in a sense that well you can design a possible board with set of equations and then you interpret that world and you'll see what's possible there or what's necessary there and you may end up in contradictions and so forth. So you will explore the space of possibly design necessities. But what I'm trying to highlight here is the way in which you know you replace the standard talk of laws of nature, 17th century style talk of laws of nature and now these primitive mathematical constraints that are particularly popular in the flow of physics. There is plenty of people, brilliant people working on that now, but we can go on in more detail later on. So our response would be that empiricism fully recognizes mathematics contributions to the formulation of physical laws, but excessive focus on fundamental physics laws will motivate the BMC theory, making us prone to forget about you know the humble inductive empirical origins of our most robust, even of our most robust physical generalizations, think of the speed of light, postulate, and then essentially mathematical formalisms provide a tool for codifying model information, but that's all they do, codifying model information and to not provide a source for atomic modality. Then what we need of course is what we'll tell you and other people, Mark, Colin, and Stephen French have done. We need to provide a framework for accounting for the application of mathematical structures to physical domains, but I think I'm just going to go super fast here. You use lots of different pieces of mathematics, variables, functions, vectors, spaces and so forth for modeling physical domains, but it's not that the physical modality comes from there, but only that from there you get your best language for codifying possibilities and necessities and the ultimate crown is always empirical and you get there intuitively. In all of that I think we may agree. So to definition that's absolutely not needed, but this has been a friendly workshop, so I'm going to be break here, I know you won't be too aggressive. This is a definition. So routinely expressing mathematical terms, physical laws are empirical hypotheses expressing generalizations about possibilities and necessities in various physical domains. Oh no, we'll say the manifestation, those are propositions, those are not the laws we want, and I'll say yes, these are propositions, empirical hypotheses, but modality is not the victim. Modality is physical and it comes from physical systems, physical possibilities and physical necessities. So we'll try to keep in the middle, in a middle way between humians and anti-humians. This goes beyond the conceptual frontiers of the humian versus anti-humian framework. Maybe that explains why nobody wants to publish this paper because they always send it to humians or anti-humians and they'll say, oh no, this is not the rule that we follow in the game. So they do not require the theology minded distinction between no economic and accidental generalizations and that model force need not be grounded in, for instance, a DMC. Objections. The first two we have actually recede them, but I don't take them too seriously. Ultimately, lost masquerade. People have said there must be a law giver, or we wouldn't exist if there were no laws, or people have said, well if there were no laws, Fisi would not be possible. But I don't think that's something to really worry about. But yes, epistemic fears. What you have said, all the audiences have replied, it's just a matter of multiple beliefs. So who cares? It's multiple beliefs, empirical hypothesis, theories and models, multiple beliefs. You're not saying anything robust about physical modality. In the paper, we try to do a bit more. I haven't said anything here about that. And then another one, we are not respecting the rules of the game. So everybody will be waiting for our view to collapse into humianism or anti-humianism. We don't think so, but we may be wrong, of course. We may be wrong. And then this is an objection that I received from, you don't remember, a conference online. And I couldn't respond it. And Otavia is now taking care of that objection. What happened with physically relevant modalities? Because of course, models in physics, they have all these weird things that there is no physical interpretation for that. But we think we can have, yeah, thank you. There were short questions. I don't have a question about that thing. I wanted to ask you about something on the modeling slide. I'm curious about why you chose that particular quote that you did, because the particular quote from modeling... Yes, your quote. Modeling. Modeling. Yeah, yeah, yeah, okay. It's the slide labeled as numbers. Sure, sure, sure, sure. Because this particular quote doesn't seem like it's... I wouldn't have thought that this is the illustration of the thing that you want to argue against. In fact, it seems like what modeling is saying, at least interpreted on its basis, is actually just an expression of your view in the deacinocratic language. Because all that he's saying is, here's one way of interpreting what he's saying. He's not saying what his actual views are. But from the quotation, you would think, well, we learn about, we've got our physical theories. They're empirically confirmed in the usual way. We get evidence for them in the usual way. After we have those theories, which are ultimately empirically grounded, those theories tell us things about physical possibility. All the flowing is coming from after we have the theories, and then we're making deductions or inferences from the theories that we have. What you're worried about is driving claims about physical modality before we got to the point where we have our well-confirmed physical theories. But it seems to me that what modeling is saying is like, he's describing the procedure that you apply after you have the physical theories. And that's totally compatible with what you're saying, isn't it? That's a great point. No, that's an amazing point. I already wrote a ton. I'm going to think about it. I'm going to go back to modeling's work. But even there, if he's, perhaps he's focusing, like Tina and Ismael says in his 2018 contribution, the mistake philosophers of physics make is that they focus too much on the end result, on the end result. So you wait to have your physical theories write or approximately write, and then you say, well, where does dynamic modality come from? Well, it flows from, yeah, I know, but perhaps we are focusing on the early stage of where, you know, from where we work to get decent physical generalizations about components and necessities. Yeah, Tina and Ismael says exactly that in the 2018 book chapter. And in the 2017, she says something similar that in philosophy of physics, one of the mistakes is that you focus too much on the end product. And if that's the case, well, that will explain, yeah, definitely. Perhaps modeling wants to say something similar, but we don't want to be any kind of primitists about nomic modality. We don't think that laws are something, but we have nomic generalizations about physical possibility and necessities. So there perhaps we will disagree. Interesting. Maybe you can find a quote that illustrates that. That's the main thing. Oh, perfect. Yes, yes, I'll take care. Thank you. Okay, thank you, Christian. Great talk. I will try to not to put forward the same whole objection about you having your cake and anything to do, but I will ask have a related question. And lyricism can be said to be many things, but well, it's a philosophical tradition that gives experience a key central role in warranting ontological novelties, and especially perception. So I was wondering what's the relationship between your ontological commitments with physically necessary and possible facts to the domain of perception? Perception. Hundreds of pages in this book. In the context book, there's hundreds of pages. Okay. Yeah, Kenton's book is really good. Yeah, no, it's really good. Yeah, I'm not talking. It's really good. And yeah, and a few people like Kenton, John Norton, and well, there are people I mentioned here, they don't work on, yeah, how you get to, you know, modally infused theories and models. And Norton, for example, will say, well, he will relate modality with evidence and he will say what's possible. It's what evidence that positively allows. And what's necessary for the empiricist is what evidence compels, compels. But of course, he falls into the problem of offering thresholds for the amount of evidence you need for judging possibilities and necessities. But yeah, I couldn't go for perception. I'll go for observation, detection, experimentation, replication, and so forth. And yeah, different procedures for gathering evidence. So Christian, I want to try to say something constructive about where you can keep encountering this humanism. I think the issue here may be that people just follow on Norton's point want to understand in what sense this is an empiricist view. And so the issue is that you say that physical modality in the world is something that's determined by properties and relations, what depends on properties and relations. And what people want to know is, so what is the determination relation? What is the dependence relation? And historically, some people have said, well, I'll tell you what it is. And then they spell out a metaphysical proposal. That's non-human view. Or they'll say, I'll tell you what it is. And they'll spell it out in a deflationary way, right, in a big victim way. And that's a non-human view. Now to the extent that you don't spell out this relation, that must be frustrating for people, right? Because they want to know what you need. What is the determination relation? What is the dependence relation? Now, you can say, well, I'm not going to say. I think that's not what you want to say. Then you've got to say something. And so we're waiting for that. Yeah, I love how Andin asks the question. It's amazing. Yes. No, I do have to wait a little bit more. No, wait until I send to the manuscript. We're trying to say something there. You just reminded me of James Goodward's complaints. I'm not sure if you have read this chapter where Goodward speaks. He has a dialogue. He makes up a dialogue between a Platonist metaphysician and he himself and James. And he basically complains that all these words, determination, determinable laws, these positions are co-opted by the mainstream metaphysics. And that he feels fully free to use the same words in a different sense. But of course, he spells out what he says by that. I'll send to the manuscript. But we will certainly try to avoid engaging, especially in a paper-sized, in a paper-length manuscript, we'll certainly try to avoid engage with all these metaphysical today, too. We'll try this way. So you don't think it's empiricist? Well, I'd like to know the sense of which it is. Yeah, right now I don't know, because I don't know what determination, Yes. Okay, for now. Thank you. I'm going to write that down. Yeah, thank you. Christian? Okay, okay. Okay, I had some questions before and also similar to Engels, so I should ask something different. I could ask something different. But just to start with that point, I mean, the monthly is, quote, for me it's absolutely neutral with respect to this discussion. I mean, this is the usual way in which philosopher of physics usually just lay out what dynamical laws, how could you get something like models from dynamical laws? Your paper, 2020. Yeah, yeah, but this is different. Yeah, yeah, I wouldn't want to do that. But I agree with Sam that doesn't reflect what the model in his view is. I mean, it's not how primitiveismo is not him. Tell me more serious. Yeah, I mean, it's like, I mean, I could imagine that someone like, John Erwin could perfectly agree with that, and it's not the model in his philosophy, I could agree with that. And it's a very neutral description of what is going on. And you have to add something else to say, okay, this is modern talking. This is not modern talking, it's just any random philosopher of physics. This is, I think this is what Sam wanted to say, and also I agree with that. But there's something there that goes against what you said before. And you said in some point that, I'm just an interfere. This is this definition of modality relates modality with laws, right? We can obtain something about modality in any sense, only through the laws. But you at some point say, okay, I don't believe that nomological modality collapses with physical modality. So if I understood you right, you are thinking of, okay, we can imagine some physical modality that is not related to the laws. It's related to something else. Otherwise, they usually collapse, although they usually think that physical modality subtains through the laws. So I want to hear what who else could be, I mean, usually we think of modality in terms of law, physical modality in terms of law, last definition, but you said that they don't collapse. So probably you are thinking that there is another source for physical modality that is not in the laws somewhere else, but I would like to hear where. Yes, yes. So we definitely do not think that laws impose modality on the world. No. Okay. Yeah, so we don't think that. We think there is just physical modality. Okay. And that what physical laws do is to codify and express our best generalizations about possibilities and necessities. And that those possibilities and necessities depends upon the constitution of physical domains, properties and relations. Yeah. And then they're going to engage with that metaphysical language. Yeah. But the fear, the collapse fear had to do with that collapsing with either humianism or anti-humianism. Okay. Yeah. So you don't think that physical laws give you physical modality? You don't think that. To inform you about physical modality. Yes. Okay. But so physical modality should be grounded in something else or they are just primitive. Yeah, physical domains. Yeah, but it is too bad. I mean, this is, I mean, again, I mean, you could say, okay, they are just primitive, right? They are just out there. Okay, fine. But this is just one position that could be also, I would like to hear, okay, what is grounded in this physical modality or what is, I mean, is giving me to this, to this. Depends on the context. Okay. For the Hooke's Law, for the Hooke's Law, different kinds of sprints for Coulomb's Law, electrostatic propulsion. Okay, okay, okay. For example, some things that are, yeah, physical domains. Okay, okay, okay, okay. But, for example, that humian will reconstruct metaphysically in such a way the world that they will say, well, these are all A-modal properties, especially generally distributed and we say no, that's too much. And, and take me and still say, oh, it's God commands, so are universal, so are dispositions, metaphysically understood and so forth. I will say no, that's too much. So, what is it? Well, okay, okay. Southern chloride, you know, what are electrons and light speeds and how do you access physical modality through experimental research? Detections, measurements and so forth. And then you get evidence for your model claims. Yeah. We will, we got to talk about that. Yeah, yeah, thank you, thank you. Sorry for the people that. Thank you for, yeah, thank you.