 Section 4 of Prolegamina to Any Future Metaphysics. This is a LibreBox recording. All LibreBox recordings are in the public domain. For my information or to volunteer, please visit LibreBox.org. Recording by Yuting in Singapore. Prolegamina to Any Future Metaphysics by Manuel Kant. Translated by Paul Carras. Section 4. Second part of the transcendental problem. How is the science of nature possible? Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we can never cognize it, either a priori or a posteriori. Not a priori, but how can we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts in analytical judgments? We do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing, for the concept describes what belongs to its logical being. But what is in the actuality of the thing super-added to our concepts, and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concepts? Our understanding and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence do not prescribe any rules to things themselves. These do not conform to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them. They must therefore be first given as an order to gather these determinations from them. Therefore, they will not be cognized a priori. A cognition of the nature of things in themselves of posteriori will be equally impossible. For, if experience is a strategic law to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. Experience, therefore, can never teach us the nature of things in themselves. We, nevertheless, actually possess a pure science of nature in which our propounded, a priori, and with all the necessity requisite to apodictical proposition, laws to which nature is subject. And it only caught the witness that propagated with natural science which, under the title of the Universal Science of Nature, precedes all physics, which is founded upon empirical principles. In it, we have mathematics applied to appearance and also merely discursive principles for those derived from concepts, which constitute the philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature. But there are several things in it which are not quite pure and independent of empirical sources, such as the concept of motion, that of impenetrability upon which the empirical concept of matter rests, that of inertia and many others, which prevent its being called a perfectly pure science of nature. Besides, it only refers to objects of the external sense and therefore does not give an example of the universal science of nature in the strict sense for such a science must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense, the object of physics, as well as psychology, the universal laws. But among the principles of this universal physics, there are a few which actually have the required universality. For instance, the proposition that substance is permanent and that every event is determined by a cause, according to constant laws, etc. These are actually universal laws of nature which subsist completely a priori. There is then an impact of pure science of nature, and the question arises, how is it possible? The word nature assumes yet another meaning, which determines the object, whereas in the former sense, it only denotes the conformity to law of the determinations of the existence of things generally. If we consider it materially true, that is, in the matter that forms this object, nature is the complex of all the objects of experience. And with this, only are we are now concerned, for besides, things which can never be objects of experience, they must be cognized as to their nature, with obliges to have recourse to concepts whose meaning can never be given in concreto by any example of possible experience. Consequently, we must form for ourselves a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof, that is, whether they actually refer to objects or mere creations of thought, could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be an object of experience will be hyper-physical, and with things hyper-physical, they are here not concerned, but only with the cognition of nature, the actuality of which can be conformed by experience, though it, the cognition of nature, is possible a priori, and precedes all experience. The formal aspect of nature, in this narrower sense, is therefore the conformity to the law of all the objects of experience, and so far as it is cognized a priori, they are necessary conformity, but it has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be cognized a priori, and also as so far as they are considered, not in reference to possibly experience, but as things of themselves. And our inquiry here extends not to things themselves, the property of which we pass by, but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex of these is what we properly designate as nature. And now I ask, when the possibility of the cognition of nature a priori is in question, whether it is better to arrange the problem thus, how can we cognize a priori that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to law? Or thus, how is it possible to cognize a priori the necessary conformity to law of experience itself as regards all its objects generally? Mostly considered, the solution of the problem, represented in either way, amounts with regard to the pure cognition of nature, which is the point of the question at issue, entirely to the same thing. For the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition of things is possible, hold good of these things as objects of possible experience, not as things of themselves which are not considered here. Either of the following statements means quite the same. A judgment of observation can never rank as experience without the law that whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent which it follows according to a universal rule. And everything of which experience teaches that it happens must have a cause. It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula, where we can a priori and previous to all given objects have a cognition of those conditions on which alone experience is possible, but never of the laws to which things may in themselves be subject, without reference to possible experience. We cannot therefore study the nature of things a priori, otherwise then by investigating the conditions and the universal, those subjective, laws under which alone such a cognition makes experience as to mere form as possible. And we determine accordingly the possibility of things as objects of experience. For, if I should choose the second formula and seek the conditions a priori on which nature is an object of experience as possible, I might easily fall into error and fancy that I was speaking of nature as a thing in itself and then move around in endless circles in a vain search for laws concerning things of which nothing is given me. Accordingly, we shall here be concerned with experience only and the universal conditions of this possibility which are given a priori. Then, we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience. I think it will be understood that I here do not mean the rules of the observation of nature that is already given, for these already presuppose experience. I do not mean how, through experience, we can study the laws of nature. For these would not be laws a priori, and we yield as no pure science of nature. But, I mean to add, how the conditions a priori of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the universal laws of nature must be derived. In this case, we must state that, while all judgments of experience are empirical, that is, have their ground in immediate sense perception. By Seversa, all empirical judgments are not judgments of experience, but besides the empirical are in general besides what is given to the sensuous intuition, particular concepts must yet be super-added, concepts which have their origin quite a priori in the pure understanding and under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means changed into experience. Editors note, empirical judgments are either mere statements of fact, namely, records of a perception or statements of a natural law, implying a causal connection between two facts. The former can't cause judgment of perception, the latter judgments of experience. End of Editors note, empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience, but those which are only subjectively valid, I name mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, besides their representation of the sensuous intuition, particular concepts originally begotten in the understanding, which reduce the objective validity of the judgment to experience. All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception, they hold good only for us, that is, for a subject, and we do not till afterwards give them a new reference to an object and desire that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else. Or when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universality of application. And conversely, when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily universal, which never depends upon perception, but upon the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed, we must consider it objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of the object, for there will be no reason for the judgments of the other men necessarily agreeing with mine if they were not the unity of the object to which they all refer and with which they accord, hence they must all agree with one another. Therefore, objective validity and necessary universality for everybody are equivalent terms and though we do not know the object in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal and also necessary, we understand it to have objective validity. By this judgment, we can recognize the object that remains unknown as it is in itself by the universal and necessary connection of the given perception. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments of the experience take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object which is impossible but from the condition of universal validity and perical judgment which, as already said, never rests upon empirical or in short sensuous conditions but upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object always remains unknown in itself but when by the concept of the understanding the connection of the representations of the objects which are given to our sensibility is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation and it is the judgment that is objective. To illustrate the matter, when we say the room is warm, sugar sweet, and warm wood bitter, others note, I fully grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of experience even though a concept of the understanding were super added because they refer merely to feeling which everybody knows to be merely subjective and which, of course, can never be attributed to the object and consequently never become objective. I only wish to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid containing no ground for universal validity and thereby for relation to the object. An example of the judgments of perception which becomes judgments of experience by super added concepts of the understanding given in the next note. End of all those notes. We have only subjectively valid judgments. I do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it as I now do. Each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, to myself, and that only in my present state of perception. Consequently, they're not valid of the object. Such are judgments of perception. Judgments of experience are of quite a different nature. But experience teaches me under circumstances it must always teach me and everybody and its validity is not limited to the subject nor to its states at a particular time. Hence, I pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For instance, when I say the area is elastic this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only. I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But if I would have it called a judgment of experience I require this connection to stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perception under the same circumstances. We must consequently analyze the experience in order to see what is contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding and how the judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is the intuition of which I become conscious that is perception, perceptio which pertains merely to the senses. But in the next place, there are acts of judging which belong only to the understanding. But this judging may be twofold. First, I may merely compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my consciousness. Or secondly, I may connect them in consciousness generally. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception and of subjective validity only. It is merely a connection of perceptions in my mental state without reference to the objects. Hence, it is not, as is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in consciousness through judgment. There arises no universality and necessity for which alone judgments can become objectively valid and be called experience. Quite another judgment, therefore, is required before perception can become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept which determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in consciousness generally, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgment. A concept of this nature is a pure a priori concept of the understanding, which does nothing but determine for an intuition the general way in which it can be used for judgment. Like the concept the bed of cause, then it determines the intuition which is subsumed under it. For example, that of air relative to judgments in general. Namely, the concept of the air serves with regards to its expansion in the relation of antecedents. The consequence in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, which is totally desperate from all possible perception and only serves to determine the representation subsumed under it relatively to judgments in general and so to make it universally valid judgment possible. Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some such a concept of the understanding. For instance, air ranks under the concept of causes, which determines our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical. Others note, it's an easier example when we take the following. When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm. This judgment, however often I and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception and contains no necessity. Perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I say, the sun warms the stone, I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, namely that of cause, which connects with the concept of sunshine, that of heat as a necessary consequence. And the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity, usually valid, namely objective, and is converted from a perception into experience. And of others note, thereby the expansion of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of the air from a present state or in several states of mind, or in the state of perception of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, the air is elastic, becomes universally valid, and the judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect. And they thereby determine the perception, not merely as regards one another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, which is here hypothetical, and in this way, they render the empirical judgment universally valid. If all our synthetical judgments are analyzed so far as they are objectively valid, it will be found that it never consists of mere intuitions connected only, as is commonly believed, by comparison into the judgment. But that, that would be impossible, were not a pure concept of the understanding superrided to the concept abstracted from intuition, under which concepts these latter are subsumed. And in this manner, only combine into an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of pure mathematics and their simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The principle, a straight line is the shortest between two points, presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of quantity, which is certainly in no mere intuition, but has a seat in the understanding alone and serves to determine the intuition of the line with regard to the judgment, which may be made about it, relatively to their quantity, that is, to plurality, as Judicia Plurativa. Others note, this name seems preferable to the term particularia, which is used for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that they are not universal, but when I start from unity in single judgments and so proceed to universality, I must not, even indirectly and negatively, imply any reference to universality. I think plurality merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. This is necessary if logical considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding. However, there is no need of making changes in logic. End of others note. For under them, it is understood that in a given intuition that there is contained a plurality of homogeneous parts. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as it rests upon pure concepts of the understanding a priori, we must first represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various functions of the understanding in the complete table, where the pure concepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions, and such concepts are nothing more than concepts of intuitions in general. So far as these are determined by one or other of these functions of judging in themselves, that is, necessarily in universality. Hereby, also the a priori principles of the possibility of all experience as of an objectively valid empirical cognition will be precisely determined for they are nothing but propositions for which our perception is under certain universal conditions of intuition subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding. Logical table of judgments. One, as the quantity. Universal. Particular. Singular. Two, as to quality. Affirmative. Negative. Infinite. Three, as to relation. Categorical. Hypothetical. Disjunctive. Four, as to modality. Parbometical. Asertorial. Apodactical. Presidential table of the pure concepts of the understanding. One, as to quantity. Unity. The measure. Florality. The quantity. Totality. The whole. Two, as to quality. Reality. Negation. Limitation. Three, as to relation. Substance. Cause. Community. Four, as to modality. Possibility. Existence. Necessity. Pure physiological table of the universal principles of the science of nature. One, axioms of intuition. Two, anticipations of perception. Three, analogies of experience. Four, postulates of empirical thinking generally. In order to comprise the whole matter in one idea, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we're discussing not the origin of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former pertains to empirical psychology and would even then never be adequately explained without the letter which belongs to the critique of cognition and particularly of the understanding. Experience consists of intuitions which belong to the sensibility and of judgments which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding forms alone from sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. Four, in the one case, the judgment connects only the perceptions that they're given in a sensuous intuition while in the other, the judgments must express what experience in general and not what the mere perception which possesses only subjectively validity contains. The judgment of experience must therefore add to sensuous intuition and its logical connection in a judgment. After it has been rendered universal by comparison, something that determines the synthetical judgment as necessary and therefore is universally valid. This can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition determined in itself with regards to one form of judgment rather than the other, namely a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgment. The sum of the matter is this the business of the senses through intuitions that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness. This union originates either merely relative through the subject and is accidental and subjective or is absolute and is necessary or objective. The union of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinking therefore is the same as judging or referring representations to judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject only and united in it or objective when they are united in a consciousness generally, that is necessarily. The logical functions of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in consciousness. But if they serve for concepts, their concepts of their necessary union in a consciousness and so principles objectively valid judgment. This union in a consciousness is either analytical by identity or synthetical by the combination and addition of various representations one to another. Experience consists in the synthetical connections of phenomena perception in consciousness so far as this connection is necessary. Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be subsumed and they can serve for judgments of experience in which the synthetical unity, the perception is represented as necessary and universally valid. Others note but how does this proposition that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions agree with my statement so often before inculcated that experience as cognition up with theory can afford contingent judgments only. When I say that experience teaches me something I mean only the perception that lies in experience. For example, that he always allows the shining of the sun on the stone. Consequently the the proposition of experience is always so far accidental that this heat necessarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience by means of the concept of cause. Yet in the fact not learned by the experience or conversely experience is first of all generated by this addition of the concept of the understanding of cause to perception. How perception this addition may be seen by referring in the critique itself to the section on the transcendental faculty of judgment and others note judgments when considered merely as the condition of the union of given representations in a consciousness are rules these rules so far as they represent the union as necessary are rules a priori and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules or fundamental principles but in regard to the possibility of all experience merely in relation to the form of thinking in it no conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which bring the phenomena according to the variance form of their intuition under pure concepts of the understanding and the render the empirical judgment objectively valid these concepts are therefore the a priori principles of possible experience the principles of possible experience are then at the same time in universal lots of nature it can be cognized a priori and thus the problem in our second question how is the pure science of nature possible itself for the system which is required for the form of a science is to be met with imperfection here because beyond the above mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered in logic no others are possible and these constitute a logical system the concepts grounded thereupon which contain the a priori conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments accordingly constitute a transcendental system finally the principles by means of which all phenomenon are subsumed under these concepts constitute a physical system editors note Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as pertaining to the science of physics that is nature in general not as we use the term now as pertaining to the functions of the living body accordingly it has been translated physical end of editor's note that is a system of nature which receives all empirical cognition of nature makes it even possible and hence may in strictness be dominated the universal and pure science of nature the first one of the physiological principles others note the three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless reference be made to what the critique itself says on the subject of the principles they will however be of service in giving a general view of the principles and in fixing the attention on the main point end of author's note so seems all phenomena as intuitions in space and time under the concept of quantity and in so far a principle of the application of mathematics to experience the second one subsumes the empirical element namely sensations which denotes the real intuitions not indeed directly under the concept of quantity because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time though it places a respective object into both but still there is between reality sense representation and the general or total void of intuition and time a difference which has a quantity for between every given degree of light and of darkness between every degree of heat and of absolute cold between every degree of weight and of absolute lightness between every degree of occupied space and of totally void space diminishing degrees can be conceived in the same manner as between consciousness and total unconsciousness the darkness of a psychological blank ever diminishing degrees obtained hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence of it for instance no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of consciousness this occurs in all cases of sensation and so understanding can anticipate even sensations which constitute the peculiar quality of empirical representations appearances by means of the principle that they all have consequently that what is real in our phenomena has a degree here is the second application of mathematics to the science of nature and then to the relation of appearances merely with a view to their existence the determination is not mathematical but dynamical and can never be objectively valid consequently never fit for experience if it does not come under a priori principles at which the cognition of experience relative to the appearances becomes even possible hence appearances must be subsumed under the concept of substance which is the foundation of all determination of existence as a concept of the thing itself or secondly so far as a succession is found among phenomena that is an event under the concept of an effect with reference to cause or lastly so far as coexistence is to be known objectively that is by a judgment of experience under the concept of community action and reaction thus a priori principles from the basis of objectively valid though empirical judgment that is the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature these principles are the proper laws of nature which may be termed dynamical finally the cognition of the agreement and connection not only of the appearances among themselves in experience but of their relation to experience in general belonging to the judgment of experience this relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions which they understanding cognizes or their coherence with the materials of the senses of perception or combines both into one concept consequently it contains possibility, actuality a necessity according to universal laws of nature and this constitutes the physical doctrine of method or the distinction of truth and of hypothesis and the bounds of the certainty of the latter the third table of principles drawn from the nature of the understanding itself after the critical method shows an inherent perfection which raises it far above every other table which has either to involve in a vein being tried or may yet to be tried by analyzing the objects of themselves dramatically it exhibits all synthetical a priori principles completely and according to one principle namely the faculty of judging in general constituting the essence of experience as regards the understanding so that we can be certain that there are no more such principles a satisfaction such as to be attained by the dogmetical method yet this is not all there is still a greater merit in it we must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility of this cognition a priori and at the same time limits all such principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of if we desire it not to be misunderstood and extended and used beyond the original sense which the understanding attaches to it this limit is that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in general so far as it is subjected to a loss a priori consequently I did not say that things in themselves possess a quantity that their actuality possesses a degree their existence a connection of accidents in a substance etc this nobody can prove because such a synthetical connection from mere concepts without any reference to sensuous intuition on the one side or connection of it in a possible experience on the other is absolutely impossible the essential limitation of the concepts in these principle then is that all things stand necessarily a priori under the aforementioned conditions as objects of experience only hence there follows secondly specifically peculiar modes of proof of these principles they're not directly referred to appearances into their relations but to the possibility of experience of which appearances constitute the matter only not the form thus they're referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical propositions in which we distinguish judgments of experience from those of perception this takes place because appearances as mere intuitions occupying a part of space and time come under the concept of quantity which unites their multiplicity a priori according to rules again so far as the perception contains besides intuition sensibility and between the latter and nothing that is the total disappearance of sensibility there is an ever decreasing transition it is apparent that that which is in appearances must have a degree so far as it namely the perception does not itself occupy any part of space or of time others note heat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as in a large one in one manner the internal representation pain, consciousness in general whether they last a short or a long time need not vary as to the degree hence the quantity is here in a point and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great degrees are therefore capable of increase but not in intuition rather than in mere sensation or the quantity of the degree of intuition hence they can only be estimated relatively by the relation of one to zero namely by their capability of decreasing by infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance or of increasing from not through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation in a certain time the degrees of quality must be measured by equality and of others note still the transition to actuality from an empty time or empty space is only possible in time consequently those sensibility as the quality of empirical intuition can never be cognized a priori by specific difference from other sensibilities yet it can in a possible experience in general as the quantity of perception be intensely distinguished from every other similar perception hence the application of mathematics to nature as regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us becomes possible in its thus determined above all the reader must pay attention to the mold of proof of the principle which occur under the title of analogies of experience for these do not refer to the genesis of intuition as to the perceptions of applied mathematics but to the connection of their existence and experience and this can mean nothing but the determination of their existence in time according to necessary laws under which alone the connection is objectively valid and thus becomes experience the proof therefore does not turn on the synthetic unity in the connection of things in themselves but merely of perceptions and of fees not in regard to their matter the connection of time and of the relation of their existence in it according to universal laws if the empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively valid that is experience these universal laws contain the necessary determination of existence in time generally namely according to a rule of the understanding a priori in these for like amena not further discount on the subject but my reader who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a mere empirical synthesis of perception and hence not considered that it goes much beyond them as it imparts to empirical judgment universal validity and for that purpose requires a pure and a priori unity of the understanding is recommended to pay special attention to this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view end of section 4 recording by yutin in Singapore section 5 of prologa mina to any future metaphysics this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org prologa mina to any future metaphysics by Immanuel Kant translated by Paul Keros second part of the transcendental problem paragraphs 27 to 39 27 now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt he justly maintains that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of causality that is of the reference of the existence of one thing to the existence of another which is necessitated by the former I add that we comprehend just as little the concept of subsistence that is the necessity that adds the foundation of the existence of things there lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing nay we cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing though we can point out examples of its use in experience the very same incomprehensibility affects the community of things as we cannot comprehend how from the state of one thing an inference to the state of quite another thing beyond it and vice versa can be drawn and how substances which have each their own separate existence should depend upon one another necessarily but I am very far from holding these concepts to be derived merely from experience and the necessity represented in them to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit on the contrary I have amply shown that they and the theorems derived from them are firmly established a priori or before all experience and have their endowed objective value though only with regard to experience 28 though I have no notion of such a connection of things in themselves that they can either exist as substances or act as causes or stand in community with others as part of a real whole and I can just as little conceive such properties in appearances as such because those concepts contain nothing that lies in their appearances but only what the understanding alone must think we have yet a notion of such a connection of representations in our understanding and in judgments generally consisting in this that representations appear in one sort of judgments as subject in relation to predicates in another as reason in relation to consequences and in a third as parts which constitute together a total possible cognition besides we cognize a priori that without considering the representation of an object as determined in some of these respects we can have no valid cognition of the object and if we should occupy ourselves about the object in itself there is no possible attribute by which I could know that it is determined under any of these aspects that is under the concept either of substance or of cause or in relation to other substances of community for I have no notion of the possibility of such a connection of existence but the question is not how things in themselves but how the empirical cognition of things is determined as regards the above aspects of judgments in general that is how things as objects of experience can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding and then it is clear that I completely comprehend not only the possibility but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under these concepts that is of using them for principles of the possibility of experience 29 when making an experiment with Hume's problematical concept his crux metaphysicorum the concept of cause we have in the first place given a priori by means of logic the form of a conditional judgment in general i.e. we have one given cognition as antecedent and another as consequence but it is possible that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation which runs thus that a certain phenomenon is constantly followed by another though not conversely and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment and for instance to say it's the sun shines long enough upon a body it grows warm here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connection or concept of cause but I proceed and say that if this proposition which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions is to be a judgment of experience it must be considered as necessary and universally valid such a proposition would be the sun is by its light the cause of heat the empirical rule is now considered as a law and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the purposes of a possible experience which requires universal and therefore thoroughly valid rules I therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience and its possibility as a synthetical union of perceptions in consciousness generally but I do not at all comprehend the possibility of a thing generally as a cause because the concept of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things but to experience it is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition of appearances and of their succession so far as the antecedent can be conjoined with the consequent according to the rule of hypothetical judgments 30 hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not refer to objects of experience but to things in themselves, nominal they have no signification whatever they serve as it were only to decipher appearances that we may be able to read them as experience the principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world only serve our understanding for empirical use beyond this they are arbitrary combinations without objective reality and we can neither cognize their possibility a priori nor verify their reference to objects let alone make it intelligible by any example because examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in a possible experience this is complete though to its originator the evolution of Hume's problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin and for the universal laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding yet in such a way as to limit their use to experience because their possibility depends solely on the reference of the understanding to experience but with a completely reversed mode of evolution which never occurred to Hume not by deriving them from experience but by deriving experience from them this is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries all syntetical principles a priori are nothing more than principles of possible experience and can never be referred to things in themselves but to appearances and hence pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature can never be referred to anything more than mere appearances and can only represent either that which makes experience generally possible or else that which as it is derived from these principles must always be capable of being represented in some possible experience 31 and thus we have at last something definite upon which to depend in all metaphysical enterprises which have hitherto, boldly enough but always at random attempted everything without discrimination that the aim of their exertion should be so near struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who, confident in their supposed sound common sense started with concepts of pure reason which were legitimate and natural but destined for mere empirical use in quest of fields of knowledge to which they neither knew nor could know any determinant bounds because they had never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or even on the possibility of such a pure understanding many a naturalist of pure reason by which I mean the man who can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science may pretend that he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense not only suspected but new and comprehended what is here propounded with so much ado or if he likes with Prolex and pedantic pomp that was all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of experience but when he is questioned with his rational principles individually he must grant that there are many of them which he has not taken from experience and which are therefore independent of it and valid a priori how then and on what grounds will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist who makes use of these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience because they are recognized to be independent of it and even he this adept and sound sense in spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom is not exempt from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras he is often deeply enough involved in them though in announcing everything as mere probability rational conjecture or analogy he gives by his popular language a color to his groundless pretensions 32 since the oldest days of philosophy inquires into pure reason have conceived besides the things of sense or appearances phenomena which make up the sensible world certain creations of the understanding first on this basin called Nomina which should constitute an intelligible world and as appearance and illusion whereby those men identified a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought and we indeed rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself though we know not this thing in its internal constitution but only know its appearances with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something the understanding therefore by assuming appearances grants the existence of things in themselves also and so far we may say that the representation of such things has formed the basis of phenomena consequently of mere creations of the understanding is not only admissible but unavoidable our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort, Nomina but rather limits the principles of the aesthetic the science of the sensibility to this that they shall not extend to all things as everything would then be turned into mere appearance but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience hereby then objects of the understanding are granted but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding because our pure concept of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience consequently to mere things of sense and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever 33 there is indeed something seductive in our pure concept of the understanding which tempts us to a transcendent use a use which transcends all possible experience not only are our concepts of substance of action of reality and others quite independent of experience containing nothing of sense appearance and so apparently applicable to things in themselves but what strengthens this conjecture they contain a necessity of determination in themselves which experience never attains the concept of cause implies a rule according to which one state follows another necessarily but experience can only show us that one state of things often or at most commonly follows another and therefore affords neither strict universality nor necessity hence the categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than can be exhausted by their empirical use and so the understanding inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more extensive wing which it fills with nothing but creatures of thought without ever observing that it has transgressed with its otherwise lawful concepts the bounds of their use 34 too important and even indispensable though very dry investigations can therefore become indispensable in the critique of pure reason this the two chapters from Schematismus der reine Verstandsbegriffe and from Grund der Unterscheidung aller Verstandsbegriffe überhaupt in Phenomena and Nomena in the former it is shown that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of the understanding in concreto but only is a schedule for their use and that the object conformable to it is not only inexperience as the product of the understanding from materials of the sensibility in the latter it is shown that although our pure concepts of the understanding and our principles are independent of experience and despite of the apparently greater sphere of their use still nothing whatever can be thought by them beyond the field of experience because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of the judgment relatively to given intuitions but as there is no intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility these pure concepts as they cannot possibly be exhibited in concreto are void of all meaning consequently all these Nomena together with their complex the intelligible world are nothing but representation of a problem of which the object in itself is possible but the solution from the nature of our understanding totally impossible for our understanding is not a faculty of intuition but of the connection of given intuitions in experience experience must therefore contain all the objects for our concepts but beyond it no concepts have any significance as there is no intuition that might offer them a foundation 35 the imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional vagaries and for not keeping carefully within the limits of experience since it gains life and vigor by such flights and since it is always easier to moderate its boldness than to stimulate its linger but the understanding what to think can never be forgiven for indulging in vagaries for we depend upon it alone for assistance to set bounds when necessary to the vagaries of the imagination but the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and modestly it first elucidates the elementary cognitions which in here in it prior to all experience but yet must always have education in experience it gradually drops these limits and what is there to prevent it as it has quite freely derived its principles from itself and then it proceeds first to newly imagine powers in nature then to beings outside nature in short to a world for whose construction the materials cannot be wanting because fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly although not confirmed is never refuted by experience this is the reason that young thinkers are so partial to metaphysics of the truly dogmatical kind and often sacrifice to eat their time and their talents which might be otherwise better employed but there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors of pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of solving questions so occult by complaints of the limits of our reason and by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures for if their impossibility is not distinctly shown and reasons cognition of its own essence does not become a true science in which the field of its right use is distinguished so to say with mathematical certainty from that of its worthless and idle use these fruitless efforts will never be abandoned for good 36 how is nature itself possible this question the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever reach and to which as its boundary and completion it must proceed properly contains two questions first how is nature at all possible in the material sense by intuition as the totality of appearances how our space time and that which fills both the object of sensation in general possible the answer is by means of the constitution of our sensibility according to which it is specifically affected by objects which are in themselves unknown to it and totally distinct from those phenomena this answer is given in the critique itself in the transcendental aesthetic and in this prolegomena was a solution of the first general problem secondly how is nature possible in the formal sense as the totality of the rules under which all phenomena must come in order to be thought as connected in experience the answer must be this it is only possible by means of the constitution of our understanding according to which all the above representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to as consciousness and by which the peculiar way in which we think was by rules and hence experience also are possible but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects in themselves this answer is given in the critique itself in the transcendental logic and in this prolegomena in the course of the solution of the second main problem but how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible or that of our understanding and of the aperception which is necessarily its basis and that of all thinking cannot be further analyzed or answered because it is of them that we are in need for all our answers for all our thinking about objects there are many laws of nature which we can only know by means of experience but conformity to law in the connection of appearances i.e. in nature in general we cannot discover by any experience because experience itself requires laws which are a priori at the basis of its possibility the possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature and the principles of the experience are the very laws of nature for we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances i.e. of representations in us and hence we can only derive the laws of its connection from the principles of their connection in us that is from the condition of their necessary union in consciousness which constitutes the possibility of experience even the main proposition expounded throughout this section that universal laws of nature can be distinctly cognized a priori leads naturally to the proposition that the highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves i.e. in our understanding and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience but conversely must seek nature as to its universal conformity to law in the conditions of the possibility of experience which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding for how were it otherwise possible to know a priori these laws as they are not rules of analytical cognition but truly are the conditions of it such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience with the laws of the possibility of nature can only proceed from one of two reasons either these laws are drawn from nature by means of experience or conversely nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general and is quite the same as the mere universal conformity of the latter the former is self-contradictory for the universal laws of nature can and must be cognized a priori i.e. independent of all experience and be the foundation of all empirical use of the understanding the latter alternative therefore alone remains but we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature which always presuppose particular perceptions from the pure or universal laws of nature which without being based on particular perceptions contain merely the conditions of their necessary union experience in relation to the latter nature and possible experience are quite the same and as the conformity to law here depends upon the necessary connection of appearances in experience without which we cannot cognize any object whatever in the sensible world consequently upon the original laws of the understanding it seems at first strange but is not the less certain to say the understanding does not derive its laws a priori from but prescribes them to nature 37 we shall illustrate the seemingly bold proposition by an example which will show the laws which we discover in objects of sensuous intuition especially when these laws are cognized as necessary are commonly held by us to be such as have been placed there by the understanding in spite of their being similar in all points to the laws of nature which we ascribe to experience 38 if we consider the properties of the circle by which this figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself at once in a universal rule we cannot avoid attributing a constitution to this geometrical thing two right lines for example which intersect one another in the circle how so ever they may be drawn are always divided so that the rectangle constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed with the segments of the other the question now is does this law lie in the circle or in the understanding that is does this figure independently of the understanding contain in itself the ground of the law or does the understanding having constructed according to its concepts of the equality of the radii the figure itself introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another in geometrical proportion when we follow the proofs of this law we soon perceive that it can only be derived from the condition on which the understanding founds construction of this figure and which is set of the equality of the radii but if we enlarge this concept to pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common laws and considers the circle as a conic section which of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of construction as other conic sections we shall find that all the chords which intersect was in the ellipse, parabola and hyperbola always intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not indeed equal but always bear a constant ratio to one another if we proceed still further to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused over all material nature the rule of which is that it decreases inversely as the square of the distance from each attracting point i.e. as the spherical surfaces increase over which this force spreads which law seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things and hence is usually propounded as cognizable a priori simple as the sources of this law are merely resting upon the relation of spherical surfaces of different radii its consequences are so valuable with regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity that not only are all possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections but such a relation of these orbits to each other results that no other law of attraction than that of the inverse square of the distance can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the understanding cognizes a priori and chiefly from the universal principles of the determination of space now I ask do the laws of nature lie in space and does the understanding learn them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning that lies in space or do they in here in the understanding and in the way in which it determines space according to the conditions of the syntetical unity in which its concepts are all centered space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so indeterminate that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it whereas that which determines space to assume the form of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere is the understanding so far as it contains the ground of the unity of their constructions the mere universal form of intuition called space must therefore be the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects and in it of course the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies but the unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding and on conditions which lie in its own nature and thus the understanding is the origin of the universal order of nature in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws and thereby first constructs a priori experience as to its form by means of which whatever is to be cognized only by experience is necessarily subjected to its laws for we are not now concerned with the nature of things in themselves which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility of our understanding but with nature as an object of possible experience and in this case the understanding whilst it makes experience possible thereby insist that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all or must be nature with an existence of things determined according to universal laws appendix to the pure signs of nature of the system of the categories there can be nothing more desirable to the philosopher than to be able to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the principles which had accured to him in concrete use from a principle a priori and to unite everything in this way in one cognition he formerly only believed that those things after a certain abstraction and seemed by comparison among one another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions were completely collected but this was only an aggregate now he knows that just so many neither more nor less can constitute the mode of cognition and perceives the necessity of this division which constitutes comprehension and now only he has attained a system to search in our daily cognition for the concepts which do not rest upon particular experience and yet occur in all cognition of experience where they as it were constitute the mere form of connection presupposes neither greater reflection nor deeper insight than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words generally and thus to collect for a grammar in fact both researches are very nearly related even though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution and still this why an exact number of such formal determinations in general are found in it Aristotle collected 10 pure elementary concepts under the name of categories to these which are also called predicaments he found himself obliged afterwards to add 5 post predicaments some of which however Pryos, Simul and Motus are contained in the former but this random collection must be considered and commended as a mere hint for future inquires not as an regularly developed idea and hence it has in the present more advanced state of philosophy being rejected as quite useless after long reflection on the pure elements of human knowledge those which contain nothing empirical I at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary notions of the sensibility space and time from those of the understanding thus the 7th, 8th and 9th categories had to be excluded from the old list and the others were of no service to me because there was no principle in them on which the understanding could be investigated measured in its completion and all the functions once its pure concepts arise determined exhaustively and with precision but in order to discover such a principle I looked about for an act of the understanding which comprises all the rest and is distinguished only by various modifications or phases in reducing the multiplicity of representation to the unity of thinking in general I found this act of the understanding to consist in judging here then the labors of the logicians were ready at hand though not yet quite free from defects and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a complete table of the pure functions of the understanding which are however undetermined in regard to any object I finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general or rather to the condition of determining judgments as objectively valid and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding concerning which I could make certain that these and this exact number only constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding I was justified in calling them by their old name categories while I reserve for myself the liberty of adding under the title of predicables a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them by combinations whether amongst themselves or with the pure form of the appearance i.e. space or time or with its matter so far as it is not yet empirically determined this the object of sensation in general as soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be completed with the construction of which I am engaged in the critique of pure reason itself now the essential point in this system of categories which distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any principle and for which alone it deserves to be considered as philosophy consists in this that by means of it the true significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition of their use could be precisely determined for here it became obvious that they are themselves nothing but logical functions and as such do not produce the least concept of an object but require some just intuition as a basis they therefore only serve to determine empirical judgments which are otherwise undetermined and indifferent as regards all functions of judging relatively to these functions thereby procuring them universal validity and by means of them making judgments of experience in general possible such an insight into the nature of the categories which limits them at the same time to the mere use of experience never occurred either to their first author or to any of his successors but without this insight which immediately depends upon their derivation or deduction they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names without explanation or rule for their use had the ancients ever conceived such a notion doubtless the whole study of the pure rational knowledge which under the name of metaphysics has for centuries spoiled many a sound mind would have reached us in quite another shape and would have enlightened the human understanding instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations thereby rendering it unfit for true science this system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself systematic and affords a direction or clue how and through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must proceed in order to be complete for it exhausts all the possible movements of the understanding among which every concept must be classed in like manner the table of principles has been formulated the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the system of the categories even in the division of the concepts which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding it is always the very same clue which as it must always be determined a priori by the same fixed points of the human understanding always forms a closed circle there is no doubt that the object of a pure conception either of the understanding or reason so far as it is to be estimated philosophically and on a priori principles can in this way be completely cognized I could not therefore omit to make use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions with the various distinctions of the notions of something of nothing and to construct accordingly critique page 207 a regular unnecessary table of their divisions and this system like every other true one founded on a universal principle shows its inestimable value and this that it excludes all foreign concepts which might otherwise intrude among the pure concepts of the understanding and determines the place of every cognition those concepts which under the name of concepts of reflection have been likewise arranged in a table according to the clue of the categories intrude without having any privilege or title to be among the pure concepts of the understanding in ontology they are concepts of connection and thereby of the objects themselves whereas the former are only concepts of a mere comparison of concepts already given hence of quite another nature and use by my systematic division they are saved from this confusion but the value of my special table of the categories will be still more obvious when we separate the table of the transcendental concepts of reason from the concepts of the understanding the latter being of quite another nature and origin they must have quite another form than the former this so necessary separation has never yet been made in any system of metaphysics for as a rule these rational concepts all mixed up with the categories like children of one family which confusion was unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories end of section 5 section 6 of prologamana to any future metaphysics this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Farno Jahangiri prologamana to any future metaphysics by Emanuel Kant translated Paul Karros section 6 third part of the transcendental problem number 40 to 49 how is metaphysics in general possible 40 pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a deduction as we have made of both for their own safety and certainty for the former rests upon its own evidence and the latter thou sprung from pure sources of the understanding upon experience and its thorough confirmation physics cannot altogether refuse and dispense with the testimony of the latter because with all its certainty it can never as philosophy rival mathematics both sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry not for themselves but for the sake of another science metaphysics metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature which always find their application in experience but also with pure rational concepts which never can be given in any possible experience consequently the objective reality of these concepts that they are not mere cameras and the truth or falsity of metaphysical assertions cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience this part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its essential end to which the rest is only a means and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake the third question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and essential differences of metaphysics i.e. the occupation of reason with itself and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately from this incubation of its own concepts without requiring or indeed being able to reach that knowledge through experience without solving this problem reason never is justified the empirical use to which reason limits the pure understanding to satisfy the proper destination of the latter every single experience is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain but the absolute totality of all possible experience is itself not experience yet it is a necessary concrete problem for reason the mere representation of which requires concepts quite different from the categories whose use is only imminent or refers to experience so far as it can be given whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness i.e. the collective unity of all possible experience and thereby transcend every given experience thus they become transcendent as the understanding stands in need of categories for experience reason contains in itself the source of ideas by which I mean necessary concepts whose object cannot be given in any experience the latter are inherent in the nature of reason as the former are in that of the understanding while the former carry with them an illusion likely to mislead the illusion of the latter is inevitable though it certainly can be kept from misleading us since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our judgments to be objective a self-knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent exaggerated use is the conservative from the aberrations into which reason falls when it mistakes its destination and refers that to the object transcendentally which only regards its own subject and its guidance in all imminent use 41 the distinction of ideas that is of pure concepts of reason from categories or pure concepts of the understanding as cognitions of the quite distinct species origin and use is so important a point in founding a science which is to contain the system of all these a priori cognitions that without this distinction metaphysics is absolutely impossible or is at best a random bungling attempt to build a castle in the air without the knowledge of the materials or of their fitness for any purpose had the critic of pure reason done nothing but first point out this distinction it had thereby contributed more to clear up our conception of and to guide our inquiry in the field of metaphysics than all the vain effects which have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent problems of pure reason without ever surmising that we were in quite another field than that of the understanding and hence classing concepts of the understanding and those reasons together as if they were of the same kind all pure cognitions of the understanding have this feature that their concepts present themselves in experience and their principles can be confirmed by it whereas the transcendent cognitions of reason cannot either as ideas appear in experience or as propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it hence whatever errors may sleeping on a verse can only be discovered by pure reason itself a discovery of much difficulty because this very reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of its ideas and this unavoidable illusion cannot be limited by any objective and dogmatical researchers into things but by a subjective investigation of reason itself as a source of ideas in the critic of pure reason it was always my greatest care that were not only carefully to distinguish the several species of cognition but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from their common source I did this in order that by knowing when they originated I might determine their use with safety and also have the unanticipated but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness of my enumeration classification and a specification of concepts a priori and therefore according to principles without this metaphysics is mere rhapsody in which no one knows whether he has enough or whether and where something is still wanting we can indeed have this advantage only in pure philosophy but of this philosophy it constitutes the very essence as I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all the judgments of the understanding it was quite natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason for as soon as these pure concepts of reason the transcendental ideas are given they could hardly except they be held innate be found anywhere else than in the same activity of reason which so far as it regards mere form constitutes the logical element of the syllogism of reason but so far as it represents judgments of the understanding with respect to the one or the other form a priori constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason the formal distinction of syllogism renders their division into categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive necessary the concepts of reason founded on them contained therefore first the idea of the complete subject the substantial secondly the idea of the complete series of conditions thirdly the determination of all concepts in the idea of a complete complex of that which is possible the first idea is psychological the second cosmological the third theological and as all three are given occasion to dialectics yet each in its own way the whole dialects of pure reason into its prologism its antinomy and its ideal was arranged accordingly through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure reason are completely represented and that none can be wanting because the faculty of reason itself when they all take their origin is thereby completely surveyed in these general considerations it is also remarkable that the ideas of reason are unlike the categories of no service to the use of understanding in experience but quite dispensable and become even an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition of nature yet in another respect still to be determined they are necessary whether the soul is or is not a simple substance is of no consequence to us to the explanation of its phenomena for we cannot render the notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that is sensuous or concrete the notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped for insights into the cause of phenomena and cannot at all serve as a principle of the explanation of that which internal or external experience supplies so the cosmological ideas of the beginning of the world or of its eternity apart until cannot be of any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the world itself and finally we must according to a right maxim of the philosophy of nature refrain from all explanations of the design of nature drawn from the will of a supreme being because this would not be natural philosophy but an acknowledgement that we have come to the end of it the use of these ideas therefore is quite different from that of those categories by which and by the principle built upon which experience itself first becomes possible but our laborious analytics of the understanding would be superfluous if we had nothing else in view and the mere cognition of nature as it can be given in experience for reason does its work both in mathematics and in the science of nature quite safely and well without any of this subtle deduction therefore our critic of the understanding combines with the ideas of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the empirical use of the understanding but this we have above declared to be in disrespect totally possible and without any object or meaning yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and that of the understanding and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter and cannot possibly upset it the solution of this question is as follows pure reason does not in its ideas point to particular objects which lie beyond the field of experience but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience but this completeness can be a completeness of principles only not of intuitions i.e. concrete outsize or are shown gum and of objects in order however to represent the ideas definitely reason conceives them after the fashion of the cognition of the object the cognition is as far as these rules are concerned completely determined but the object is only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the understanding as near as possible to the completeness represented by that idea prophetory remark to the dialectics of pure reason 45 we have above shown in number 33 and 34 that the purity of the categories from all a mixture of sensuous determinations may mislead reason into extending their use quite beyond all experience to things in themselves though as these categories themselves find no intuition which can give them meaning or sense in concreto they as mere logical functions can represent a thing in general but not give by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything such hyperbolical objects are distinguished by the appellation of no mina or pure beings of the understanding or better beings of thought such as for example substance but conceived without permanence in time or cause but not acting in time etc here predicates that only serve to make the conformity to experience possible are applied to these concepts and yet they are deprived of all the conditions of intuition on which a lone experience is possible and so these concepts lose all significance there is no danger however of the understanding as spontaneously making an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere creatures of thought without being impaled by foreign laws but when reason which cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical use of the rules of the understanding as being always conditioned requires a completion of this chain of conditions then the understanding is forced out of his sphere and then it partly represents objects of experience in a series so extended that no experience can grasp partly even with the view the series it seeks entirely beyond it nomina to which it can attach that chain and so having a blast escaped from the conditions of experience make its attitude as it were final these are then the transcendental ideas which though according to the true but hidden ends of the natural determination of a reason they may aim not at extravagant concepts but at an unbounded extension of their empirical use yet used the understanding by an unavoidable illusion through a transcendent use which though deceitful cannot be restrained within the bounds of experience by any resolution but only by scientific instruction and with much difficulty one the psychological idea people have long since observed that in all substances the proper subject that which remains after the accidents as predicates are abstracted consequently that which forms a substance of things remains unknown and various complaints have been made concerning these limits to our knowledge but it will be well to consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its inability to know the substance of things that is to determine it by itself but rather for requiring to cognize it which is a linear idea definitely as though it were a given object pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject and for this subject which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate its subject and so on indefinitely or as far as we can reach but hence it follows that we must not hold anything at which we can arrive to be an ultimate subject and that substance itself never can be thought by our understanding however deep we may penetrate even if all nature were unveiled to us for the specific nature of our understanding consist in thinking everything discursively that is representing it by concepts and so by mere predicates to which therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting hence all the real properties by which we cognize bodies are mere accidents not accepting impenetrability which we can only represent to ourselves as the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves in the thinking subject and indeed in an immediate intuition for all the predicates of an internal sense refer to the ego as a subject and I cannot conceive myself as the predicate of any other subject hence completeness in the reference of the given concepts as predicates to a subject not merely an idea but an object that is the absolute subject itself seems to be given in experience but this expectation is disappointed for the ego is not a concept but only the indication of the object of the internal sense so far as we cognize it no further predicates consequently it cannot be in itself a predicate of any other thing but just as little can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject but is as in all other cases only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown subject yet this idea which serves very well as a regulative principle totally to destroy all materialistic explanations of the internal phenomena of the soul occasions by a very natural misunderstanding a very specious argument which from this supposed cognition of the substance of our thinking being infers its nature so far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of experience but now we may call this thinking self the soul substance as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further represented as the predicate of another thing it remains quite empty and without significance if permanence the quality which renders the concept of substances in experience fruitful cannot be proved of it but permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance as a thing in itself but for the purposes of experience only this is sufficiently shown by the first analogy of experience and whoever will not yield to the proof may try for himself whether he can succeed in proving from the concept of a subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing that its existence is thoroughly permanent and that it cannot either in itself or by any natural cause originate or be annihilated the synthetical a priori propositions can never be proved in themselves but only in reference to things as objects of possible experience if therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance we would infer its permanence this can hold good as regards possible experience only not of the soul as a thing in itself and beyond all possible experience but life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience consequently we can only infer the permanence of the soul in life for the death of man is the end of all experience which concerns the soul as an object of experience except the contrary be proved which is the very question in hand the permanence of the soul can therefore only be proved and no one cares for that during the life of man but not as we desire to do after death and for this general reason that the concept of substance so far as it is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of permanence can be so combined only according to the principles of possible experience and therefore for the purposes of experience only that there is something real without us which not only corresponds but must correspond to our external perceptions can life as be proved to be not a connection of things in themselves but for the sake of experience this means that there is something empirical i.e. some phenomenon in a space that admits of a satisfactory proof for we have nothing to do with other objects than those which belong to possible experience because objects which cannot be given us in any experience do not exist for us. Empirically without me is that which appears in a space and a space together with all the phenomena which it contains belongs to the representations whose connection according to laws of experience proves their objective truth just as the connection of the phenomena of the internal sense proves the actuality of my soul as an object of the internal sense. By means of external experience I am conscious of the actuality of bodies as external phenomena in a space in the same manner as by means of the internal experience I am conscious of the existence of my soul in time but this soul is only cognized as an object of the internal sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state and of which the essence in itself which forms the basis of these phenomena is unknown Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish external experience from dreaming and the conformity to law as a criterion of its truth of the former from the irregularity and the false illusion of the latter in both it presupposes space and time as conditions of the existence of objects and it only requires whether the objects of the external senses which we when awake putting space are as actually to be found in it as the object of the internal sense the soul is in time that is whether experience carries with it criteria to distinguish it from imagination this doubt however may be easily disposed of and we always do so in common life by investigating the connection of phenomena in both space and time according to universal laws of experience and we cannot doubt when the representation of external things throughout agrees there with that they constitute truthful experience material idealism in which phenomena are considered as such only according to their connection in experience may accordingly be very easily refuted and it is just as sure and experience that bodies exist without us in space as that I myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense in time for the notion without us only signifies existence in space however as the ego in the proposition I am means not only the object of internal intuition in time but the subject of consciousness just as body means not only external intuition in space but the thing in itself which is the basis of this phenomena as this is the case the question whether bodies as phenomena of the external sense exist as bodies apart from my thoughts may without any hesitation be denied in nature but the question whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense the soul according to empirical psychology exist apart from my faculty of representation in time may be very similar inquiry and must likewise be answered in the negative and in this manner everything when it is reduced to its true meaning is decided and certain the formal which I have also called transcendental actually abolishes the material or Cartesian idealism for if space be nothing but a form of my sensibility it is as a representation in me just as actual as I myself am and nothing but the empirical truth of the representations in its remains for consideration but if this is not the case if a space and the phenomena in it are something existing without us then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception can never prove the actuality of these objects without us End of section 6